Opinion
No. COA12–598.
2012-12-4
In the Matter of C.M.C.
No brief filed for petitioner-appellee Rockingham County Department of Social Services. Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, by Sarah F. Hutchins, for Guardian ad Litem.
Appeal by respondent from order entered 1 March 2012 by Judge James A. Grogan in Rockingham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 November 2012. No brief filed for petitioner-appellee Rockingham County Department of Social Services. Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, by Sarah F. Hutchins, for Guardian ad Litem.
Levine & Stewart, by James E. Tanner III, for respondent-appellant mother.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Trial court's conclusion of law that a dependent child was likely to suffer future neglect was supported by its findings of fact. We affirm the trial court's order terminating respondent's parental rights.
I. Factual and Procedural History
On 28 December 2010, the Rockingham County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) filed a juvenile petition alleging that C.M.C., a minor child, was neglected and dependent. DSS had been involved with C.M.C.'s family since September 2008, and C.M.C. was removed from mother's home in May 2009 due to allegations of domestic violence between mother and her live-in boyfriend, and mother's alcohol and substance abuse.
After C.M.C. was removed, mother made sufficient progress that a trial home placement was attempted. On 23 November 2010, the trial court terminated its jurisdiction over the matter. However, on 25 December 2010, DSS was notified of an incident of domestic violence between mother and her boyfriend, which resulted in each of them being arrested for assault. C.M.C. witnessed the incident and told the boyfriend not to hit her mother.
Due to C.M.C.'s dependency while mother was in jail, DSS obtained non-secure custody of C.M.C.
On 17 February 2011, the trial court adjudicated C.M.C. neglected and dependent after mother stipulated to the facts alleged in the petition. In the disposition order, the trial court ordered that mother enter into and comply with a services agreement with DSS. That agreement required mother to: (1) attend parenting classes; (2) demonstrate parenting skills; (3) seek substance abuse treatment; (4) attend individual counseling; (5) comply with a 50B order against her boyfriend; (6) obtain and maintain employment; and (7) pay child support while C.M.C. remained outside of the home.
On 13 May 2011, mother was arrested for attempting to run over her boyfriend with her car. She was charged with assault, fleeing to elude arrest, and driving while license revoked. The assault charge was later dismissed. On 30 June 2011, the trial court relieved DSS of further reunification efforts and changed the permanent plan to adoption.
On 23 August 2011, DSS filed a petition to terminate mother's parental rights based on allegations of: (1) neglect (N.C.Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(1)); and (2) willfully leaving C.M.C. in foster care for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the conditions which led to removal of C.M.C. from the home. (N.C.Gen.Stat. § 7B1111(a)(2).) A hearing was held on 15 and 16 December 2011. On 1 March 2012, the trial court filed an order terminating mother's parental rights to C.M.C. based on both grounds. The trial court further determined that termination of mother's parental rights was in the best interests of C.M.C., and entered an order terminating mother's rights.
Mother appeals.
II. Termination of Parental Rights
In her first argument, mother contends that the trial court's conclusion of law that there was a high likelihood of repetition of neglect by mother was not supported by its findings of fact. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
“The standard for review in termination of parental rights cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law.” In re Clark, 72 N.C.App. 118, 124, 323 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1984).
B. Analysis
A trial court may terminate parental rights based on a finding that the parent has neglected the juvenile. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111 (a)(1) (2011). A neglected juvenile is one who “does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline” from a parent or caretaker, or “who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare[.]” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–101(15) (2011). Generally, “[a] finding of neglect sufficient to terminate parental rights must be based on evidence showing neglect at the time of the termination proceeding. ” In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 248, 485 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1997) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). However, “a prior adjudication of neglect may be admitted and considered by the trial court in ruling upon a later petition to terminate parental rights on the ground of neglect.” In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 713–14, 319 S.E.2d 227, 231 (1984). Where a prior adjudication of neglect is considered by the trial court, “[t]he trial court must also consider any evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a repetition of neglect.” Id. at 715, 319 S.E.2d at 231 (citation omitted). Thus, where
there is no evidence of neglect at the time of the termination proceeding ... parental rights may nonetheless be terminated if there is a showing of a past adjudication of neglect and the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence a probability of repetition of neglect if the juvenile were returned to the [his or] her parents.
In re Reyes, 136 N.C.App. 812, 815, 526 S.E.2d 499, 501 (2000) (citation omitted).
Mother argues there was no evidence of any ongoing risk of domestic violence between her and her boyfriend since they had ended their relationship after the 13 May 2011 incident which led to her arrest. She argues that since there were no additional incidents of domestic violence during the seven months leading up to the termination hearing, the evidence did not show that there was a risk of repetition of domestic violence and thus neglect of C.M.C.
In its order terminating parental rights, the trial court found that: (1) C.M.C. was adjudicated neglected on 20 October 2009 and again on 17 February 2011, (2) mother, along with her boyfriend, “has a long history of domestic violence in the presence of the juvenile,” (3) mother has a history of alcohol and substance abuse “affecting the stability of her home,” (4) after C.M.C. was returned to mother's care, mother admitted to DSS that her boyfriend had been living in the home during the trial placement in 2010, (5) despite mother's participation in various services as part of her case plan, “she showed no improvement in the area of breaking the pattern of domestic violence,” (6) mother was arrested on 13 May 2011 after attempting to run over her boyfriend with her car, and she told police that earlier her boyfriend had assaulted her and she was angry and wanted to scare him; (7) the boyfriend told police that he was living with mother; and (8) several 911 calls regarding incidents at mother's address “reflected chaos or instability in the home.”
In addition, the trial court found:
23. Besides [mother]'s lack of positive change in the area of domestic violence, as noted above, she continues to shirk responsibility for [C.M.C.] being in foster care and she continues to fail to understand her role in this situation. She continues to say that on Christmas of 2010 she called 911 and removed [C.M.C.] from the fighting, without acknowledging her role in allowing [her boyfriend] back into their lives and without acknowledging that [C.M .C.] was present for the physical violence on that occasion (which this Court had already found as fact). She continues to deny, contrary to overwhelming evidence, that [her boyfriend] was involved with her and indeed living with her on May 13, 2011. In her conversations with [DSS social worker] Ms. Lambert, [mother] has continued to minimize the history of domestic violence with [her boyfriend] has continued to minimize the effect her alcohol abuse has had in that history, and has continued to say (as she testified to at this hearing) that she has done “everything DSS has asked” her to do.
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that “[t]here is a high likelihood of repeated neglect if the juvenile were returned to the care and custody of the respondent-mother.”
Mother does not challenge any of the findings of fact referred to above, and they are therefore deemed supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. See Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). Rather, she only challenges the trial court's conclusion that the findings of fact do not establish the likelihood of repetition of the neglect.
We hold that the trial court's findings of fact support its conclusion of law that mother neglected C.M.C. and that such neglect will likely be repeated should C.M.C. be returned to her care. A trial court's determination that neglect is likely in the future “must of necessity be predictive in nature.” In re McLean, 135 N.C.App. 387, 396, 521 S.E.2d 121, 127 (1999). Mother's past actions and multitude of poor decisions are important indicators of the likelihood of repetition of neglect. Mother's repeated failure to improve the living environment for C.M.C. in a timely manner, her failure to stop the cycle of violent incidents involving her boyfriend, which continued after C.M.C. was removed from the home, and her inability to acknowledge that her actions were preventing C.M.C. from being returned to her, were sufficient to show neglect would likely occur again if C.M.C. were returned to mother's care.
This argument is without merit.
III. Other Arguments
We note that although the trial court concluded that more than one ground existed to terminate mother's parental rights, we find it dispositive that the evidence supports termination of her parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(1), based on neglect. See In re Humphrey, 156 N.C.App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 426 (2003) (a finding of one statutory ground is sufficient to support the termination of parental rights). Because the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights was supported by the probability of recurrence of neglect, we need not consider mother's additional arguments.
Mother does not challenge the trial court's conclusion that termination of her parental rights is in the best interests of C.M.C. on appeal, and therefore such argument is deemed waived. N.C.R.App. P. 28(b)(6).
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the order of the trial court terminating mother's parental rights to C.M.C.
AFFIRMED. Judges ELMORE and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).