Opinion
No. 5-429 / 04-1656
Filed June 15, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dickinson County, David C. Larson, District Associate Judge.
A mother and father appeal the order terminating their parental rights to two children. AFFIRMED.
Michael Johnson of Stoller Johnson, Spirit Lake, for appellant-mother.
Brian Thul of the Thul Law Firm, Whittemore, for appellant-father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, and Rosalise Olson, County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Shannon Sandy of Sandy Law Firm, P.C., Spirit Lake, for children.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Christina and Ricky are the parents of ChyAnn, who was born in 2000, and Corbin, who was born in 2002. The Department of Human Services (DHS) has been involved with Christina since she was a pre-teen and became involved with ChyAnn shortly following her birth. The State filed a petition alleging ChyAnn to be a child in need of assistance (CINA) in March of 2002. That petition was dismissed, but the court granted a subsequent petition and found her to be a CINA pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(b) and (n) (2001) in June of 2002. Christina and Ricky separated in March of 2003. In June of 2003, Corbin was adjudicated to be a CINA under sections 232.2(6)(b), (c)(2), and (n) (2003). In August of 2003, the children were removed from Christina's custody and placed in foster care after the DHS discovered Christina was allowing a man with a lengthy criminal history to live in her home. On May 12, 2004, the State filed a petition seeking to terminate Christina's and Ricky's parental rights. Following a hearing, the court granted the petition and terminated their parental rights under sections 232.116(1)(d) and (h). Christina and Ricky appeal.
DNA testing revealed David to be the biological parent of Corbin; however, legal paternity has never been established. Nonetheless, David's parental rights to Corbin were terminated in this proceeding and he does not appeal.
We review termination orders de novo. In re R.F., 471 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1991). While the district court terminated the parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we will affirm if at least one ground has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). Our primary concern in termination proceedings is the best interests of the children. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).
On appeal both Ricky and Christina maintain the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination was appropriate. Upon our de novo review of the record, we disagree, and conclude the court properly terminated under section 232.116(1)(d), which requires proof that the court has previously adjudicated the children based upon a finding of physical abuse or neglect, and that the parents were offered services to correct the circumstances which led to adjudication but those circumstances continue to exist.
The record reflects a variety of continuing concerns about Christina's ability to parent, including her long history of mental illness, her drug abuse, lack of supervision of the children, and use of poor judgment in parenting the children. Christina contends the State failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify her with the children and termination was not in the best interests of the children. We reject both contentions. First, DHS offered a wide variety of targeted services intended to allow her to resume care of her children. Those services included, for example, family centered services, parenting classes, daycare, individual therapy, substance abuse treatment, and psychological testing. Despite the offer and receipt of these services, the consensus of service providers was that reunification was inappropriate. Christina attended only six out of sixteen parenting classes and did not accomplish the goals of the classes. She was also inconsistent in her individual therapy classes. She has also displayed a troubling pattern of failing to take her prescribed medications for her mental illness. Although indications were that she was taking her medication at the time of termination, service providers harbored concerns she would resume her pattern of going off the medications.
Ricky asserts that remedial services were only half-heartedly offered to him and that two witnesses equivocated in their testimony as to whether parental rights should be terminated. Contrary to these assertions, service providers Jessica Harman and Debra Nelson both opined that supervised visitation was not immediately advisable and that reunification clearly was not warranted. Nelson testified that over her four-year involvement in this case, she did not believe that any further services would "ensure competency for these parents." Moreover, it appears that Ricky has maintained at most a sporadic interest in the children, at one time going six months without seeing ChyAnn.
We further find termination of Christina's and Ricky's parental rights is in the best interests of ChyAnn and Corbin for their safety and stability. In addition to the factors listed above, both children are doing very well in foster care and are likely to be adopted by their foster parents. While there was evidence the parents loved these children, that love alone is not a sufficient reason to return two young children to the custody of two parents who have long been involved with juvenile court, and who, despite a great deal of services, are still not in a position to provide safe, nurturing, and effective care. These children deserve permanency. See In re D.J.R., 454 N.W.2d 838, 845 (Iowa 1990). "The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up to their own problems." In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987).