Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. HJ06003639
OPINION
Parrilli, Acting P. J.
M. M., minor mother of C. M., appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional order. The juvenile court concluded the welfare of the minor, C. M., required he be removed from the custody of appellant. We affirm.
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
C. M. was born in 2006. On April 5, 2006, respondent Alameda County Social Services/Children & Family Services Agency (“the Agency”) filed a juvenile dependency petition concerning C. M., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The Agency filed an amended petition on April 12, 2006. The amended petition named appellant as the mother, listed her date of birth as 1989, and listed her address as “AWOL.” Also, the amended petition named two alleged fathers, D. H., born in 1978, and K. H., born in 1988.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code.
The amended petition alleged C. M. was at risk of serious physical harm or illness as a result of the failure or inability of his parent or legal guardian to supervise or protect him adequately, pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b). The petition stated the following facts in support of this allegation: “B-1 On or about March 30, 2006, the minor, C. M. was taken into protective custody by Social Services Agency to wit: (a) the minor mother, M.M., left her baby in the grandmother’s care; the grandmother was overwhelmed with caring for another child with serious medical problems and could not care for the minor C. M. [¶] (b) C. M. was born prematurely and requires special care; he is a very fussy baby who needs attention which the mother has not provided. [¶] B-2 The mother is also a minor court dependent with Alameda County; she is currently AWOL from her mother’s home. The minor mother has demonstrated numerous behavioral and emotional problems and because of the parent’s limitations, they [sic] are unable to properly care for the minor C. M. [¶] B-3 The alleged father, D. H. is an 11590 drug registrant and is on drug probation. The father has not provided the minor with any financial support for clothing, food, shelter etc. [¶] B-4 The alleged father, K. H., is in jail; he has not provided the minor with any financial support for clothing, food, shelter etc.
The amended petition also alleged C. M. had been left without provision or support, pursuant to section 300, subdivision (g). The petition stated the following facts in support of this allegation: “G-1 The exact whereabouts, circumstances and ability of the mother, M. M. to care for the minor is unknown. [¶] G-2 The exact whereabouts, circumstances and ability of the father, D. H., to care for the minor is unknown. [¶] G-3 The alleged father, K. H., is in jail and is unable to care for the minor.”
A detention report filed April 6, 2006, by Bonnie Sorlie, a child welfare worker with the Agency, noted the following circumstances regarding protective custody: “This matter was brought to Social Services regarding the baby, C. M. and the minor mother, M. M. M. M. is sixteen years old and has a two-month-old baby, who was born prematurely [in] 2006. The maternal grandmother, Sonja, contacted Sandra Theis [Emergency Response Unit] on March 30, 2006, and said that the minor mother ran away from home two days ago and left the baby with the grandmother. She needed help; the grandmother said that her other three year old grandson, [T.], lives with her and almost died last Friday. He had an epileptic seizure and had to be rushed by ambulance to the hospital. The grandmother has CPS history regarding serious physical abuse and was convicted of felony child abuse. The minor mother has a history of AWOL behavior and not caring for the baby. The minor was taken into custody and placed into a foster home.”
In the detention report, Sorlie noted M. M. was herself the subject of a section 300 petition in November 2001, which alleged her mother Sonja and stepfather were responsible for hitting her with an extension cord, resulting in abrasions and scars on her hands and arms. Regarding the situation of C. M.’s parents or caretakers, Sorlie reported she had “not been able to reach the minor mother or the grandmother in this matter. There is no answering machine at their home. The grandmother has not been compliant with the case plan, nor has the mother. The grandmother is supposed to be drug testing but refuses. M. M. has not taken responsibility for having a child. It is unknown whether she is attending school.” Regarding caretaker characteristics, Sorlie reported “[t]he mother is a 16-year-old young woman who is currently a dependent of Juvenile Court for allegations of serious physical abuse. She was removed from the maternal grandmother in 2001 and the family received reunification services. The mother ran from various placements while in foster care. She was returned to the maternal grandmother on or about 8/8/2005. The mother has run away from the maternal grandmother’s home since that time. Most recently, the mother left the home on or about 3/28/06 without informing the maternal grandmother. The maternal grandmother could not locate the mother and called police to report her as a run away. The maternal grandmother also contacted [me] to state that the mother left the home and her whereabouts are still unknown.” The detention report recommended the court approve C. M.’s continued detention and the provision of reunification services to the family.
The detention hearing on April 6, 2006, was continued at the request of appellant’s counsel so that he could attempt to contact her and discuss the matter. The juvenile court granted the continuance and made temporary findings of detention. At the next day’s detention hearing, appellant’s counsel reported he had been unable to contact appellant, and appellant did not appear. The juvenile court found removal necessary and that C. M.’s welfare required custody be taken from appellant. The court vested temporary placement and care in the Agency and set a hearing for April 19, 2006.
At the April 19 hearing, counsel was appointed for each of the two alleged fathers, D. H. and K. H., both of whom were incarcerated. Also at the hearing were Sonja C., appellant’s mother, and Rosalyn O., K.H.’s mother. Appellant was not present. Appellant’s counsel requested genetic testing for both alleged fathers while they were incarcerated. Appellant’s counsel also informed the court Rosalyn “would like to have placement of C. M. whether or not K. H. is the father. She’s also been a friend to the mother M. M., was there at the time of C. M.’s birth and has helped her throughout, so we believe she fits the definition of a fictive kin, in addition to possible paternal grandmother.” C. M.’s counsel objected to such a placement because “it could lead to a confusing situation if K. H. turns out not to be the father.” The court ordered genetic testing for the alleged fathers. At appellant’s request, the court set the matter for a contested hearing on June 1, 2006.
Appellant appeared at the June 1 hearing. The Agency asked the court to receive into evidence the April 19 jurisdiction/disposition report as well as the addendum report of June 1, 2006. Appellant objected to hearsay contained in the reports. The court received the documents into evidence subject to the hearsay objections. The court adjourned the case to July 20, 2006, for further contest. Also, the court noted the sheriff had not followed the court’s order to arrange genetic testing for the alleged fathers, and renewed its order for testing. Additionally, the Agency asked with regard to appellant’s own dependency matter that her counsel “file a JV-140, [to] let us know where the minor is residing and I would actually ask the Court to order that the . . . minor mother remain at her current residence.” The court ordered appellant’s counsel to “[f]ile the appropriate paperwork [and] [d]isclose your client’s whereabouts in the interests of the minor in this case forthwith and without any excuses being made.”
Appellant did not appear at the July 20 hearing. The court stated “[t]he record should also reflect that [appellant] is a dependent and has been in Department 132 of this court in Oakland in dependency proceedings and that the Commissioner in Department 132 has transferred her case to this department so that this Court can manage both C. M. and M. M. as dependents. I am prepared, of course, to do that.” The court denied appellant’s request for a continuance and received the Agency’s report of July 20 into evidence without objection. The Agency argued “[w]ith regard to the b-2 allegation, the minor mother is a dependent and the Court actually indicated that her case should have been on calendar, but she is currently AWOL. There is a warrant out for her. She was ordered to be in court today and she is not present. [¶] I think all of those facts support her inability to properly care for C. M. So I would ask the Court to make the jurisdictional findings.” Appellant’s counsel renewed his hearsay objections to the Agency’s reports, pursuant to section 355. In response, the court ruled: “The mother’s counsel has timely filed a motion in writing making those [hearsay] objections. The motion is noted and the objections are sustained. The record should reflect that the Court is not making any findings or dispositional orders that I may make in this matter solely on the basis of hearsay statements contained in the documents that have been received into the record.”
Regarding jurisdiction, appellant’s counsel argued that without the hearsay statements in its reports, the Agency could not prove C. M. was removed at the grandmother’s request because she was unwilling to care for C. M. Rather, counsel argued the grandmother was upset about C. M.’s removal because all she wanted was temporary respite care. Counsel argued the evidence showed appellant left C. M. with her mother and “the child was receiving good care there,” therefore the removal was illegal and the court lacked jurisdiction.
Regarding C. M.’s placement (disposition), appellant’s counsel argued “the maternal grandmother should be looked at.” Also, counsel stated “there is a fictive kin placement available,” referring to Rosalyn O., mother of alleged father K. H. Counsel stated Rosalyn was “friends with M. M. She knew M. M. She was at the hospital when C. M. was born. She helped M. M. in those ensuing days. She’s come forward to take care of C. M. Even if C. M. is not her biological grandchild, she still would like to take care of the child because of her relationship with M. M. . . .” Counsel requested “that placement be with this non-relative extended family member and be made today.” The court stated it would take the matter under submission “to carefully go through the reports and see what is subject to [appellant’s counsel’s hearsay] motion. [¶] I am also on my own motion going to take judicial notice of the dependency proceedings in [appellant’s] matter and I will make an order that is consistent with what information I have that is appropriate to consider.”
Appellant did not appear at the proceeding on July 27, 2006. Because counsel for one of the alleged fathers (D. H.) was unable to attend this hearing, the court continued the matter to August 10, 2006. Appellant also failed to appear at the August 10 hearing. At the outset, the court stated: “[T]he case was taken under submission, and I indicated that I would be ruling on the issue of jurisdiction. After having reviewed the various reports that were presented . . . to excise any hearsay statements objected to by the mother, I have done that and conclude that even after the hearsay statements, of which there are some, have been removed and not relied upon by the Court, the basis for jurisdiction remains. [¶] I’m prepared after a contested hearing to assert jurisdiction to make placement orders. [¶] Before I do that, I would like to hear anything further from any party on the record.” Appellant’s counsel requested the court identify the evidence the court relied upon to assert jurisdiction. The court agreed to do so “by way of marked-up copies of the jurisdiction disposition report . . . filed on April 13 for the date of April 19, which will indicate clearly what statements therein were relied upon by the Court and which were not. That document will be part of the record. [¶] As well, I have marked-up the addendum report prepared for the date of July 20, 2006.”
After the court’s jurisdictional ruling, counsel for alleged father K. H. requested visitation be resumed, stating: “K. H. informs me all visitation has been stopped with him and his mother, and we would like continued visitation for the child and the father, and grandmother if the grandmother is to be thought of as placement once we get testing back.” Then appellant’s counsel renewed his request C. M. be placed with K. H.’s mother, Rosalyn O., as a nonrelated extended family member, even though no blood relationship had yet been established between the two by way of genetic testing.
Counsel for the Agency stated the Agency stopped visitation between K. H. and C. M. because “the visits had been inconsistent. The Agency requested until K. H. actually proved or did his paternity testing that we would stop all visits because they weren’t consistent. Since he recently had his test done two days ago, I believe the Agency could start visitation again. However, the Agency would need a current address for [Rosalyn]. It’s my understanding the address we have is not current or accurate. [¶] Regarding the placement, all of the concerns that were expressed regarding visitation also go to placement. [¶] More importantly, there was concern by the Agency regarding [Rosalyn’s] contact with the mother in the beginning of all this, what impact that could have on C. M. given the mother’s lack of willingness to participate with the Agency. So there is a risk concern to placing C. M. in this home.” Counsel for the agency added another “concern is that the maternal grandmother had strongly expressed some concerns about placing C. M. in this [Rosalyn’s] home, and I think it’s hard for the Agency to follow up on many of these concerns because both the mother and grandmother have disappeared.”
Next on the matter of placement, C. M.’s counsel stated: “[W]hen I visited C. M., he was in a home where there are two adoptees already there in the home. . . . [I]t’s a wonderful home with a wonderful attitude. She is looking forward, if the mother does not come forward or the fathers do not pan out, she is looking forward to adopting C. M. So he is in a very secure, loving home. [¶] I would be concerned about moving him after four months at the age of six months, it would be detrimental to him, until all of these potential issues are resolved in a solid fashion.”
Noting “[w]e have a six-month date coming upon us because of the way this case has been limping along,” the court decided to “make jurisdiction and disposition findings, [and] set it for . . . a six-month review.” The court added it would “order that [alleged father D. H.] be removed, that the paternity testing as to him take place, and hope that the paternity testing as to K. H. . . . has revealed some results by then.” The court added it would “address these difficult issues about placement further at the six-month date.” The court ordered it would conduct the six-month review on October 4, 2006. The court then adopted the recommendations set forth in the Agency’s “report dated April 19, 2006, numbered 1 through 23. . . . Each of them is adopted as the Court’s own findings and orders.”
The court’s oral pronouncement is reflected in the minute order entered on August 11, 2006. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on August 23, 2006.
DISCUSSION
A. The Juvenile Court’s Order Complies With The Rules of Court
Appellant contends the juvenile court’s August 10, 2006, jurisdictional finding and dispositional order must be reversed because it failed to specify what allegations it found to be true, in violation of California Rules of Court, rule 1450(f)(3) [now rule 5.684] and her constitutional right to due process. This contention is baseless.
Following the January 1, 2007, reorganization to the California Rules of Court, rule 1450 was renumbered as Rule 5.684, and will be referred to as such.
If the juvenile court finds allegations of a petition to be true, California Rules of Court, rule 5.684(f) requires it to make specific findings, noted in the minutes, on the following matters: “(1) Notice has been given as required by law; (2) The birthdate and county of residence of the child; (3) The allegations of the petition are true; and (4) The child is described under one or more specific subdivisions of section 300.” (California Rules of Court, rule 5.684(f)(3).) The minute order of August 10, 2006, states the juvenile court’s findings as follows: “Notice has been given as required by law, birth date and county of residence of minor has been determined. [¶] Minor’s legal residence is in the county of Alameda. [¶] The welfare of the minor requires custody be taken from . . . mother, M. M. [¶] Reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his or her home. [¶] Minor is a person described by Section(s) 300 b and g of the Welfare and Institutions code: Allegation 1 (WI 300(b)) Court finds true on 8/10/06[.] [¶] Allegation 2 (WI 300(g)) Court finds true on 8/10/2006.”
The juvenile court’s use of shorthand (Allegation 1 and Allegation 2) to refer to the separate allegations under section 300(b) and 300(g) listed in the amended petition in no way detracts from the juvenile court’s clear intent to find those allegations true as alleged. The juvenile court’s order of August 10 satisfies California Rules of Court, rule 5.684(f) and appellant suffered no violation of due process.
B. The Juvenile Court Properly Asserted Jurisdiction
1.
Appellant challenges on various fronts both the sufficiency and legality of the evidence the juvenile court relied on for jurisdiction. We need not tarry long on certain of them. First, appellant asserts we should not consider anything contained in her dependency file to support jurisdiction because the juvenile court erred on various grounds by taking judicial notice of the file. However, as appellant acknowledges, nothing of her dependency file was made part of the record on this appeal, so there is nothing of it for us to consider. Accordingly, this contention is moot.
In any case, the juvenile court was entitled to take partial judicial notice of appellant’s dependency file, and to take judicial notice of the entire file absent specific objections by appellant. (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 819 [no error for juvenile court to judicially notice the entire file of previous dependency matter involving the child where mother failed to identify allegedly inadmissible portions and state a cognizable objection]; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, but can only take judicial notice of the facts asserted in documents such as orders, findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgments].)
2.
Next, appellant contends the juvenile court was precluded from relying exclusively upon the hearsay statements in the social worker’s reports in support of jurisdiction. Appellant does not specifically identify any hearsay statements the juvenile court allegedly relied upon for its jurisdictional finding. Rather, appellant criticizes the court’s procedure in issuing its ruling on her hearsay objection, asserting the court erroneously modified its ruling sua sponte, and took on the role of advocate when it “modified” its order. Additionally, appellant asserts respondent is somehow “changing its position on appeal” with respect to the issue of hearsay.
This contention and its component parts are founded on appellant’s misreading of the record. The record shows that on May 26, 2006, appellant filed a motion pursuant to section 355 objecting to certain hearsay statements in the social study of April 19. At the hearing on July 20, 2006, the juvenile court stated the “motion is noted and the objections are sustained. The record should reflect that the Court is not making any findings or dispositional orders . . . solely on the basis of hearsay statements contained in the documents that have been received into the record.” Later in the proceeding, however, the trial court decided the matter should be taken under submission regarding both jurisdiction and placement, so that the court could go “carefully through the reports and see what is subject to [appellant’s counsel’s] motion.” The minute order of the July 20 hearing states: “The Court takes the matter under submission. . . . Court does not make any findings or orders and will issue a written ruling.” In short, the Court’s ruling on the hearsay was to take the matter under submission for more careful consideration, and the minute order reflects this. Thus, the juvenile court never issued an effective order granting in full appellant’s hearsay objections. (Cf. In re Anthony H. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 159, 165 [no effective order dismissing robbery count where juvenile court’s initial decision to dismiss robbery allegation “must be construed to be only a tentative and interim ruling” which was “effectively vacated in open court . . . by the court’s own action” after it realized its ruling may be incorrect].)
Earlier in the proceeding, it should be noted, the Court admitted the addendum report of 7/20/06 without objection, hearsay or otherwise. Later in the proceeding, appellant’s counsel objected to hearsay in the April 19 report and asserted a blanket hearsay objection to hearsay contained in all future social studies, thereby encompassing the addendum report of 7/20/06. However, a blanket hearsay objection does not satisfy section 355. (California Rules of Court, rule 5.684(d) [hearsay objection must be made with “reasonable specificity to particular hearsay in the report].) Nor did appellant subsequently amend his hearsay objection to include his objections to the addendum report of 7/20/06, as invited to do by the trial court. However, we need not base our decision today on appellant’s waiver of hearsay objection to the 7/20/06 addendum report.
In sum, the juvenile court never sustained appellant’s hearsay objections in full. The court later issued an Order on Evidentiary Objections on August 14, 2006, sustaining in part and denying in part. As the court stated at the hearing on August 10, 2006, and as reflected in its Order on Evidentiary Objections, the court identified what it considered to be hearsay in the social studies “by way of marked-up copies of the jurisdiction disposition report . . . filed on April 13 . . . [and a] marked-up [copy of] the addendum report prepared for the date of July 20, 2006.” Appellant raises no specific objection to court’s ruling as reflected in the marked-up copies of the reports provided by the court. Accordingly, it is these marked-up copies we shall review for substantial evidence supporting jurisdiction, excluding of course the statements identified by the trial court as hearsay.
These marked-up copies were not originally included in the Clerk’s Transcript but were the subject of the Clerk’s augmented transcript forwarded from superior court and filed in this court on December 5, 2006.
3.
Appellant contends the evidence remaining after hearsay is excised is insufficient to find true the section 300, subdivision (b) allegations. Similarly, appellant contends the evidence remaining after hearsay is excised is insufficient to find true the section 300, subdivision (g) allegations.
At the jurisdictional hearing, the court determines whether the minor falls within any of the categories specified in section 300. (In re Michael D. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1082.) The petitioner in a dependency proceeding must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child comes under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. (In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329.) On appeal from an order making jurisdictional findings, we must uphold the court’s findings unless, after reviewing the entire record and resolving all conflicts in favor of the respondent and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment, we determine there is no substantial evidence to support the findings. (In re Monique T. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1378.) Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924.)
We need not discuss appellant’s voluminous assertion there is insufficient evidence to support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), because we are satisfied there is sufficient evidence in the un-stricken portions of the Agency’s reports to support jurisdiction under section 300 subdivision (g) (hereafter “subdivision (g)”). (In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875-876 [an order asserting jurisdiction on multiple grounds will be upheld as long as a single, valid ground for jurisdiction exists].) The amended petition alleged jurisdiction under subdivision (g) because C. M. had been left without provision for support. In support of the subdivision (g) allegation, the amended petition stated “[t]he exact whereabouts, circumstances and ability of the mother, M. M. to care for the minor is unknown.” The record irrefutably supports such a finding.
The amended petition also stated in support of the subdivision (g) allegation the circumstances and abilities of the fathers (D. H. and K. H.) to care for the minor are unknown. However, at the jurisdictional hearing, D. H. and K. H. had not yet been genetically tested to see if either was the biological father.
M. M. made only one appearance in court on June 1, 2006, and at the time of all subsequent hearings her whereabouts were unknown. According to information in the jurisdiction report of April 19, M. M. may be in the Los Angeles area. And the case worker states in the report “the mother’s whereabouts were and continue to be unknown and her history of AWOL behavior raises concern about her stability as a parent.” Also, the case worker stated she called appellant after C. M. had been taken into custody, but appellant would not reveal her whereabouts and did not call the case worker back as promised. The April 19 report also describes appellant as a “16-year-old young woman who is currently a dependent of Juvenile Court for allegations of serious physical abuse. She was removed from the maternal grandmother in 2001 and the family received formal family reunification services. The mother ran from various placements while in foster care. She was returned to the maternal grandmother on or about 8/8/2005. The mother has run away from the maternal grandmother’s home since that time. Most recently, the mother left the home on or about 3/28/06 without informing the maternal grandmother. The maternal grandmother could not locate the mother and called the police to report her as a run away. The maternal grandmother also contacted this [case worker] to state the mother left the home and her whereabouts are still unknown.” The addendum report of July 20 adds: “A protective warrant was issued for [appellant] since she has once again left the mother’s home and has been on the streets for four months, both in LA and here in the Bay Area. [Appellant] was given a warning to stay with her mother . . . at the . . . hearing, on June 1, 2006, however [she] ran away again.”
All this amply supports a finding that “[t]he exact whereabouts, circumstances and ability of the mother, M. M. to care for the minor is unknown.” Nevertheless, appellant asserts even if this finding is true it is insufficient to support jurisdiction because she arranged for C. M.’s care by leaving him with her mother, Sonja C., who provided the baby with good care until the Agency’s intervention. For this assertion, appellant relies on the following statement plucked from In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814 (Rocco M.): “Moreover, the fact that a child has been left with other caretakers will not warrant a finding of dependency if the child receives good care.” (Id. at p. 824.) The Rocco M. court made this statement in the context of assessing whether there was sufficient evidence of “substantial physical danger” to support a dependency finding under section 300, subsection (b) against Rocco, an eleven-year old boy, whose mother left drugs where Rocco could find them. (Id. at pp. 824-825.) Here, we are assessing jurisdiction, not under subsection (b), which requires a showing “there is substantial risk that the child will suffer[] serious physical harm or illness” (§ 300, subd. (b)), but under subsection (g), which requires a different showing — that “the child has been left without any provision for support” (§ 300, subd. (g).) In any case, the above statement from Rocco M. does not control because the record evidence casts serious doubt on whether appellant’s mother could in fact provide the care necessary and suitable to a 3-months-old baby such as C. M. The Agency’s report for the April 20, 2006, hearing states the case worker decided not to leave C. M. with appellant’s mother [Sonja] pending dependency investigations because Sonja was already under the stress of caring for another young child and had requested respite help from the Agency. Moreover, the caseworker was concerned about Sonja’s case history involving allegations of serious physical abuse against appellant. Also, Sonja informed Family Maintenance staff she would not abide by the case plan or cooperate in completing case plan requirements. By the time of the July 20, 2006 addendum report, Sonja had moved to a new address without informing the Agency. A staff member from Family Maintenance contacted Sonja on her cell phone and asked for a current address, but the address Sonja provided turned out to be bogus. In sum, we conclude the juvenile court properly asserted jurisdiction under subsection (g). (Rosa S. v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1181 [rejecting mother’s claim jurisdictional findings under subsections (b) [failure to protect] and (g) [abandonment] were insufficient because mother left the child “under the watchful eyes of [the child’s] grandparents” (id. at p. 1185) where grandparents were unable to influence the mother’s behavior, thereby putting child at risk of abandonment or being subjected to mother’s dangerous lifestyle].)
Appellant also contends her trial counsel “effectively presented an oral demurrer” that the amended petition failed to state a cause of action. Even if she had, we would affirm the trial court’s effective over ruling of such demurrer. Appellant also contends the trial court failed to further amend the petition to conform to proof on the matter of jurisdiction. However, as discussed above, we are satisfied sufficient evidence supports the allegations in the amended petition filed on April 12, 2006, and no further amendment by either the Agency or the court was required in order to conform the petition to proof of jurisdiction.
C. Appellant Did Not Require A Guardian Ad Litem
Appellant contends the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional order is invalid because the court failed to appoint a guardian ad litem for her. Appellant asserts Code of Civil Procedure section 372, subdivision (a) mandates a guardian ad litem must be appointed for a minor in any proceeding to which the minor is a party. Further, appellant asserts the court’s failure to appoint a guardian ad litem “constitutes structural error” compelling reversal.
Appellant waived this contention by failing to raise it below. (In re Charles T. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 869, 873 [“failure to appoint a guardian ad litem is not jurisdictional and is subject to waiver if not raised in the trial court”].) Moreover, even if we were inclined to consider it, we would reject the contention as meritless. A guardian ad litem in dependency proceedings does not serve the same function as a guardian ad litem in adversarial procedures governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. (In re Charles T., supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 875.) In the adversarial context, the function of a guardian ad litem is to protect the rights of the minor, and the guardian is vested with powers to “control the litigation, compromise or settle the action, . . . and make stipulations or concessions in the [minor] person’s interest.” (Id. at pp. 875-876.) By contrast, in the dependency context, the function of the guardian ad litem is to assist the court in protecting the minor’s interests. (Id. at p. 876.) Indeed, “the function of a guardian ad litem in a dependency proceeding is . . . closer to the functions of minor’s counsel as described in section 317 (fn. omitted). Minor’s counsel advocates for the protection and safety of the child, investigates, participates in presenting evidence to the court, advises the court of the child’s wishes, and investigates interests of the child beyond the dependency. (§ 317, subds. (c), (e).)” (Id. at p. 878.) Accordingly, where counsel is appointed for the minor in a dependency proceeding, the juvenile court does not err in failing to appoint a separate guardian ad litem. (Id. at p. 879.) Here, appellant was represented by counsel at all times. Therefore, the juvenile court did not err in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem. Indeed, the juvenile court would have erred if it had appointed a guardian ad litem for appellant without her consent. (In re Joann E. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 347, 356-359 [reversing jurisdictional order for violation of due process grounds where guardian ad litem was appointed for grandmother without notice, consent or opportunity to be heard].)
D. The Juvenile Court’s Dispositional Order Was Proper
1.
Appellant contends the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing C. M. from the home of Sonja C. [appellant’s mother], pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c), is not supported by substantial evidence. This contention is wholly unpersuasive.
When a parent challenges a dispositional finding, the question is whether substantial evidence supports the finding. (Kimberly R. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1078; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581 [although trial court makes findings by the elevated standard of clear and convincing evidence, substantial evidence test remains the standard of review on appeal].) In resolving this question, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s determination, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the determination and affirm the order even if there is other evidence supporting a contrary conclusion. (In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 596, 610; In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the order. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
As relevant here, before the court may order a child physically removed from his or her parent, it must find by clear and convincing evidence that the child would be at substantial risk of harm if returned home and there are no reasonable means by which the child can be protected without removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) A removal order is proper if it is based on proof of parental inability to provide proper care for the child and proof of a potential detriment to the child if he or she remains with the parent. (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136, disapproved on another ground in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6.) The parent’s level of denial is an appropriate factor to consider when determining the risk to the child if placed with that parent. (In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044 [denial is a factor often relevant to determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future without court supervision].) The parent need not be dangerous and the child need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child. (In re Diamond H., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136; In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 536, citing In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 699.)
The July 20 addendum report states appellant had never contacted the Agency and had not visited C. M. since March 30, 2006. Appellant, herself a minor dependent of the court, had a history of running away from home, and at the time of the July 20 addendum report had been living on the streets for four months, both in LA and the Bay Area. Appellant cannot seriously suggest the juvenile court should have returned C. M. to her care under such circumstances. As for Sonja C., C. M. was taken from her care in the first instance after she contacted the Agency for help because her other three-year old grandson who was living with her almost died from an epileptic seizure and had to be rushed to the hospital. Moreover, by the time of the July 20 addendum report, Sonja C. told Agency staff she would not be complying with the case plan requirements because she was tired of the system, and also stated she would not submit to drug testing or comply with any court ordered services. Sonja C. also failed to provide the Agency with her current address: in fact, she provided a bogus address. In sum, applying the standards set forth above, we conclude the juvenile court’s dispositional order was supported by substantial evidence.
The juvenile court struck this information concerning Sonja C. from the April 19 report and July 20 addendum for purposes of its jurisdictional finding. However, the information may properly be considered for dispositional purposes. (In re Corey A. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 339, 347 [“The statutes clearly indicate legislative intent to treat the two phases of dependency proceedings differently. Under section 355, more stringent evidentiary requirements must be met at the jurisdictional hearing where the court initially intervenes and obtains jurisdiction over the child. At the subsequent dispositional phase, any relevant evidence including hearsay shall be admitted pursuant to section 358, subdivision (b) to help the court determine the child’s best interests”]; In re Tasman B. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 927, 932 [“Hearsay statements in a social study are admissible at a disposition hearing”].)
2.
Also, appellant attacks the dispositional order on the grounds the juvenile court violated section 362.7 by failing to ensure the Agency evaluated Rosalyn O. as a suitable placement for C. M. This argument is also unpersuasive.
After a child is removed from the home under section 361, the social worker is responsible for the care, custody, control, and conduct of the child, and to that end may place the child in any of the following: “(1) The home of a noncustodial parent . . . . [¶] (2) The approved home of a relative. [¶] (3) The approved home of a nonrelative extended family member as defined in Section 362.7. [¶] [or] (6) . . . in a suitable licensed foster family home.” (§ 361.2, subd. (e).) Here, no suitable placement was available with a noncustodial parent or a relative. At the time of the dispositional hearing in August 2006, C. M. was “safe and well cared for in the foster home . . . [and] very attached to the foster mother.” At the disposition hearing, the possibility of placement with Rosalyn O. was discussed. C. M.’s counsel objected because he thought the foster placement was “a very secure, loving home.” The Agency was concerned on account of Rosalyn’s “contact with the mother in the beginning of all this” and the concomitant flight risk. In the end, the juvenile court decided to await the results of paternity testing and “address these difficult issues about placement further at the six-month date” [on October 4]. Accordingly. we see no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court ordering C. M.’s placement be continued in the foster home.
E. The Juvenile Court Did Not Violate the ICWA
Last, appellant contends the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional order must be reversed for failure to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”). This contention is meritless.
Proper and effective ICWA notice is critically important in dependency cases. (In re Samuel P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1259, 1264.) Social service agencies and courts are responsible for ensuring that the law is rigorously followed. (Ibid.; see also California Rules of Court, rule 1439(d) (renumbered 5.664 and amended, eff. Jan. 1, 2007) Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).) “Under the ICWA, where a state court ‘knows or has reason to know’ that an Indian child is involved, statutorily prescribed notice must be given to any tribe with which the child has, or is eligible to have, an affiliation. (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) The court and the social services agency have ‘an affirmative duty to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under section 300 is to be, or has been, filed is or may be an Indian child.’ [Citation.]” (In re Samuel P., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1264.) Because the determination of a child’s Indian status is a matter for the tribe, “the juvenile court needs only a suggestion of Indian ancestry to trigger the notice requirement. [Citations.] Both the court and the county welfare department have an affirmative duty to inquire whether a dependent child is or may be an Indian child. [Citation.]” (In re Nikki R. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 844, 848.)
Here, the amended petition utilizing Judicial Council form petition, JV-100 (Jan. 1, 2006 rev.), provided two check boxes for indicating the child’s Indian status. One box meant: “Child may be a member of, or [] eligible for membership in, a federally recognized Indian tribe.” The other meant: “Child may be of Indian ancestry.” Neither was checked. The April 6, 2006, detention report stated, “The Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply.” (The April 19 jurisdictional/dispositional report stated the ICWA was inapplicable, as did the July 20 addendum report. Appellant was represented by counsel at all times, yet counsel never objected to these statements. From the affirmative representation that the ICWA did not apply, it is fairly inferable that the social worker did make the necessary inquiry. Moreover, appellant introduced no evidence whatsoever suggesting even the possibility C. M. has Indian ancestry, nor does she do so now on appeal. Accordingly, we conclude both the court and the Agency met the duty of inquiry necessary under the ICWA. (In re S.B. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1161-1162 [ICWA duty of enquiry satisfied where court forms stated ICWA did not apply and mother raised no objection]; In re Aaliyah G. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 939, 942-943 [rejecting father’s contention that “mere marking of a box and DCFS’s subsequent statements in its reports of ICWA’s inapplicability were insufficient to show that [] affirmative duty [of enquiry under ICWA] was discharged” where record contained no indication child had Indian heritage].)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings are affirmed.
We concur: Pollak, J., Siggins, J.