We agree with the minor that the plain language of section 5-710(7) prohibits the commitment of a juvenile offender to the DOC for a period greater than the maximum adult sentence for the same offense. See In re C.L.P, 332 Ill. App. 3d 640, 644, 773 N.E.2d 188, 190 (2002). In this case, the minor admitted committing misdemeanor theft, a Class A misdemeanor ( 720 ILCS 5/16-1(b)(1) (West 2002)).
Cases addressing this issue have uniformly held that dispositional orders must include a limitation on the period of commitment so that it does not exceed the maximum period of incarceration for an adult committing the same offense. See In re K.S., 354 Ill. App. 3d 862, 864 (2004); In re S.M., 347 Ill. App. 3d 620, 627 (2004); In re C.L.P., 332 Ill. App. 3d 640, 645 (2002); In re Jesus R., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 1072 (2002). Consequently, we decline to employ the public interest exception to reach this issue.
Our appellate court districts are divided on the issue of whether a delinquent minor should receive sentence credit for time spent in predisposition detention. Compare In re E.C., 297 Ill. App. 3d 177 (4th Dist. 1998), and In re Jesus R., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1070 (4th Dist. 2002) (holding that juveniles sentenced to indeterminate terms are entitled to predisposition credit), with In re J.J.M., 299 Ill. App. 3d 327 (2d Dist. 1998), and In re C.L.P., 332 Ill. App. 3d 640 (2d Dist. 2002) (holding that juveniles sentenced to indeterminate terms are not entitled to predisposition credit). The appellate court in this case relied on E.C. to reach its conclusion that habitual juvenile offenders are entitled to predisposition credit.
Thus, contrary to Elijah's claim, it is clear that less restrictive placements were considered but found to be inappropriate. ¶ 23 Elijah next argues that the dispositional orders must be modified to include a limitation on the periods of commitment, so that they do not exceed the maximum period of time for which an adult could be incarcerated for the same offense. See 705 ILCS 405/5-710(7) (West 2010); In re C.L.P., 332 Ill. App. 3d 640, 645 (2002); see also In re K.S., 354 Ill. App. 3d 862, 863-64 (2004) (placing limitation on commitment to Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, for misdemeanor). The State agrees. Accordingly, we order the dispositional orders be modified as follows:
Often section 5–710 has arisen where the minor was committed to the Department until age 21, exceeding the determinate term for a particular offense. See In re Jesus R., 326 Ill.App.3d at 1072, 261 Ill.Dec. 148, 762 N.E.2d at 718 (Class 3 felony aggravated battery); In re C.L.P., 332 Ill.App.3d 640, 644, 265 Ill.Dec. 826, 773 N.E.2d 188, 190 (2002) (Class 3 felony aggravated battery). ¶ 51 We conclude the language of section 5–710 is clear and unambiguous with regard to the question at issue.