Opinion
Nos. N05-CP02-013015-A, N05-CP02-013016-A
June 20, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On January 10, 2005, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, ("DCF"), filed petitions pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112 et seq., to terminate the parental rights of Charity C., and Clayton M., Sr. to their children, Clayton and Jacob. Respondent father failed to appear for trial and a default was entered against him on September 16, 2005. The petitions as to mother were amended on October 28, 2005. Respondent mother contests termination of her parental rights. Trial of this matter took place before this court on February 16 and 17 and May 4, 2006 at the Regional Child Protection Session at the Middlesex J.D. For the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner.
Mother was known as Charity M. at the beginning of trial. During trial, her maiden name was restored and she is referred to herein as Charity C.
A TPR petition was also filed as to their half-sibling, Victoria W., but the petition was withdrawn on October 12, 2005.
The statutory ground alleged against respondents as to both children was that the children, Clayton and Jacob, were found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and the parents failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the ages and the needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the lives of the children (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)). The petitions also allege as to mother that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to the parents that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the children, and to allow further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the children (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)).
On October 15, 2002, DCF invoked a 96-hour administrative hold as to Clayton and Jacob and their older half-sister Victoria after investigating allegations that the children had been left in the care of maternal grandmother who was unable to care for them. On October 18, 2002, Orders of Temporary Custody were issued (Esposito, J.) and DCF filed neglect petitions on behalf of Clayton and Jacob alleging that the children were denied proper care and attention physically, educationally, emotionally, or morally and that they were permitted to live under conditions injurious to their well-being. On December 19, 2002, Clayton and Jacob were adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of DCF (Esposito, J.). On August 20, 2003, commitment was maintained until further order of the court (Turner, J.). On June 24, 2004, commitment was again maintained until further order of the court (Bear, J.). On January 10, 2005, the petitions for termination of parental rights were filed. On May 3, 2005, the court (Brenneman, J.) found that it was no longer appropriate to continue to make reasonable efforts to reunify children with mother or father. On October 28, 2005, the petitions were amended as to mother.
The court finds that notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with he provisions of the Practice Book. The court further finds that the Child Protection Session of the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters Division, has jurisdiction over the pending matter and that no action is pending in any other court affecting custody of the children.
"The termination of parental rights is defined as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his [or her] parent . . . [As such, it] is a most serious and sensitive judicial action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 231, 764 A.2d 739 (2001); In re Bruce R., 234 Conn. 194, 200, 662 A.2d 107 (1995).
The termination of parental rights is governed by statute. C.G.S. § 17a-112. In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must prove a ground alleged in the petition, as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment, by clear and convincing evidence. In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842 (1991), cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901, 599 A.2d 1028 (1992); In re Teresa S., 196 Conn. 18, 29, 491 A.2d 355 (1985); Practice Book § 32a-3(b), 35a-7. Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984); In re Karrlo K., 44 Conn.Sup. 101, 106, 669 A.2d 1249 (1994), aff'd, 40 Conn.App. 73, 668 A.2d 1353 (1996).
Termination of parental rights trials proceed in two stages: the adjudication and the disposition. The adjudicatory stage involves the issue of whether the evidence presented establishes by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more of the statutory grounds as of the date the petition was filed or last amended. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 264, 471 A.2d 1380 (1984). "Pursuant to Practice Book § 33-3(a), [now P.B. § 35a-7] in deciding the adjudicatory phase of the hearing for the termination of parental rights, the trial court's inquiry is limited to the events and facts preceding the filing of the petition for the termination of parental rights [or last amendment]." In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 357, 776 A.2d 487 (2001). However, "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000) (emphasis in original); see In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748, 789 A.2d 1024 (2002).
If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court proceeds to the disposition stage. The court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest. Procedurally, the evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases is heard at the same trial without first determining if the state has proven a statutory ground for adjudication before consideration of the dispositional question. In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688-89, 741 A.2d 873 (1999); In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. at 258; State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172-73, 425 A.2d 939 (1979); In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000); In re Emmanuel M., 43 Conn.Sup. 108, 113, 648 A.2d 904, (1993), aff'd, 35 Conn.App. 276, 278, 648 A.2d 881, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 915, 648 A.2d 151 (1994); In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App. 598, 602, 520 A.2d 639, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 804, 525 A.2d 519 (1987).
I. FACTS
At trial, the petitioner introduced the social studies and addenda, psychological evaluations, police reports, hospital records, and other documentary evidence, and the testimony of DCF social worker Karen Weiss; Carra Mauriello and Yvette Wooten, of Boys Girls Village, Inc.; foster mother; and Michael Haymes, Ph.D. Respondent mother, Charity C., introduced documentary evidence and testified on her own behalf. She called as witnesses Andrea Barletta, APRN; Rita Brzozowski, LCSW; DCF social worker Liz Colon; Victoria's father, Harold W.; and mother's boyfriend, Richard A. The children's attorney participated fully, but introduced no exhibits or testimony. The credible evidence admitted at trial supports the following facts by clear and convincing evidence.
Beginning in 2001, mother and father were the subject of referrals to DCF based upon domestic violence issues in their home. In May 2001, father was arrested due to a physical altercation with mother and maternal uncle. He had no stable living arrangements at that time. Several additional domestic disputes occurred throughout 2001. In April 2002, Victoria's school reported possible physical abuse of Victoria by mother and in the same month, father reported to DCF that mother abused substances such as OxyContin and that her associates used a variety of drugs while visiting at her apartment. In May 2002, mother began a relationship with an individual whom DCF believed posed a risk to the children and issues of physical neglect continued. In September 2002, mother was offered a safe place to live with the children and turned it down. Father told DCF he had no permanent address. Neither parent was involved in services.
In October 2002, mother left the children at maternal grandmother's house for three days while mother was whereabouts unknown. Grandmother had no medical insurance cards for the children and the boys were ill. Maternal grandmother had previously seen the children playing with a toaster while mother was sleeping and had found the children unattended outside while mother was supposed to have been watching them. Grandmother informed DCF that she could not care for the children. At the time, father, Clayton M., was reported to have psychiatric issues and his whereabouts were unknown. On October 15, 2002, a 96-hour hold was invoked and the children were placed in DCF care.
A. Respondent Mother — Charity C.
Respondent mother, Charity C., was born in Meriden, CT, on July 7, 1978. Mother and her siblings were severely emotionally and physically abused as children by their father who hit them with 2x4s, locked them in their rooms and tied them up. Mother stated that her father used to beat them in order to "beat the demons out of them." Her mother apparently had untreated psychiatric problems including bipolar disorder. Mother was raped at the age of thirteen by a sixteen-year-old, but did not disclose or report the incident. She began using alcohol and marijuana at the age of fourteen. Mother first used cocaine at fifteen. Mother's twin brother has Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD"), depression with frequent suicidal ideation, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD") and a severe polysubstance abuse disorder using crack cocaine, cocaine, alcohol and OxyContin. Mother's sister also has PTSD, and social anxiety.
At the age of fourteen, mother began a relationship with Harold W., then twenty, and, as a result, she was thrown out of the house by her father. She moved in with Harold W. and at the age of seventeen gave birth to her daughter, Victoria. After approximately four years together, mother and Harold W. separated when mother was eighteen and mother began a relationship with Clayton M. who was thirty-eight years old. They married and had two children Clayton, Jr., born March 3, 1999, and Jacob, born October 16, 2000. The parents' relationship was fraught with domestic violence and both parties were unfaithful. In May 2001, after they had separated, father was arrested and charged with risk of injury as a result of a physical altercation with mother in which he was accused of throwing Clayton into the car causing injury to Clayton's mouth. Victoria and Clayton were both present. In July 2001, mother was involved in another domestic violence incident to which the Meriden Police responded, in which her boyfriend Eric D., with whom she was living at the time, accused her of being unfaithful. The children were also present at the time of this incident which resulted in an injury to mother's foot.
During her continued separation from Clayton M., mother met Scott W. and she and the children moved into a building he owned. Significant domestic violence marred this relationship with police involvement and protective orders. On August 25, 2002, Scott W. was arrested for driving while under the influence. On September 14, 2002, Scott W. was charged with threatening and a violation of a protective order when he threatened to burn the house down with mother and children inside. After this incident DCF offered mother and the children a secure placement in a shelter which mother refused. This relationship ended after DCF told mother that a 96-hour hold would be invoked if she continued her relationship with Scott W. Shortly thereafter, mother left the children with her mother and became whereabouts unknown. Her mother reported to DCF that she could not care for the children and a 96-hour hold was invoked on October 15, 2002.
After her relationship with Scott W. ended and her children were placed in DCF care, mother continued in a series of short-term relationships. Mother's fourth child, Peter, was born February 26, 2003. In April 2003 mother claimed that Peter's father was Paul B., who was then incarcerated. Based on mother's representations, Paul B.'s family provided mother with financial assistance, including rent. A short time later, however, mother denied that Paul B. was the father and moved in with Michael B. for a short time. Mother moved in with her mother briefly and then moved into a shelter with Peter in July 2004. Ex. 5. When she was discharged by the shelter in September 2004 for failure to follow the shelter rules, mother, twenty-six, moved in with her current boyfriend, Rick A., who was then forty-six. Mother gave birth to her fifth child, Adam, on November 16, 2005. Mother, Rick A., Peter and Adam resided together at Rick's apartment at the time of trial. Mother has not worked in many years. She previously worked sporadically as a bartender and waitress. Mother remained legally married to Clayton M. until their divorce which occurred recently.
Mother has a criminal record including convictions in March 2004 for larceny in the sixth degree and in February 2005 for evading responsibility when she left the scene of an accident.
Mother has a significant mental health history including one suicide attempt and one incident of suicidal ideation. On December 7, 2004, mother was taken by emergency medical services to Bristol Hospital for a psychiatric assessment. She was despondent following a case status conference at which she learned that DCF would be pursuing a TPR and stated that she had "no reason to live." At the time she was admitted to the hospital, she tested positive for cocaine. Emergency personal indicated that the conditions of the home were filthy. Mother was observed at Bristol Hospital and left the hospital a few hours later. Shortly before this incident mother began treatment at the UCONN out-patient psychiatry department in Farmington. Upon her intake at UCONN, mother stated that several years earlier she had attempted suicide by taking thirty tranquilizers. She stated that she fell asleep and then woke up, but did not receive treatment in connection with this earlier suicide attempt. As discussed below, mother has been diagnosed with PTSD, Depressive Disorder NOS in partial remission with medication, and cannabis and cocaine abuse disorders in self-reported early remission. On Axis II, she was diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder and Histrionic Personality Disorder. Ex. 10.
Mother's history of substance abuse includes use of marijuana and cocaine, as well as alcohol. She overdosed on cocaine in 1998 after snorting twenty lines. She reported infrequent use after that time, but tested positive in June 2003 and December 2004. In May 2004, mother's ex-boyfriend Scott W., who had been watching his son Peter, reported to the police that mother left a crack pipe in Peter's clothing. In June 2004 mother underwent a hair test which was positive for cocaine.
B. Respondent father — Clayton M., Sr.
Respondent father, Clayton M., Sr., was born on August 16, 1958 in Massachusetts. He lived in Connecticut and later Ohio and Florida before returning to Connecticut when he was fifteen. He was raised in an affluent environment in a large home with a pool and horses. He attended private schools and graduated from Lyman Hall in 1977. After graduation; he enlisted in the U.S. Army and was honorably discharged in 1982. He married Charity in 1997. He stated to DCF that his marriage was strained due to his wife's drug use and promiscuity. He has been employed full-time for many years as an assistant operator of steel machines. He has convictions for criminal mischief and breach of peace. Father used marijuana from age fifteen through twenty-one and has used cocaine a few times since the age of nineteen. Although he had regular visitation with Clayton, Jr. and Jacob, visitation ceased pursuant to court order of February 10, 2006. (Bear, J.) He has not been a resource for his children and he failed to appear for trial.
C. Specific Steps
Specific steps were issued by the court on December 19, 2002. Respondent mother's specific steps required her to do the following: keep all appointments set by or with DCF; cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the children's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem; keep the children's whereabouts and her own whereabouts known to DCF, her attorney and the attorney for the children; participate in counseling, individual and parenting, and make progress toward identified treatment goals; accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF; submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations made regarding treatment, including inpatient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention; submit to random drug testing; obtain and/or cooperate with a restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan as approved by DCF to avoid further domestic violence incidents; sign releases; secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income; no substance abuse; no further involvement with the criminal justice system and cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and comply with conditions of probation or parole; and visit the children as often as DCF permits.
With regard to compliance with the specific steps, mother has complied with some, but not all of the specific steps. She has not always kept DCF advised, of her whereabouts and has not always allowed DCF access to her children. At times she refused to provide DCF with an address or access to Peter and DCF was required to attempt to contact mother though maternal grandmother. Mother has not fully complied with recommendations for counseling and treatment. To address dysfunctional and abusive relationships, mother was referred to Turning Point on August 6, 2001; she failed to attend. Mother did attend counseling at Meriden Catholic Family Services from October 2001 through April 2002 when she stopped attending. In August 2003 mother was discharged from the Bristol Hospital Counseling Center after two months due to noncompliance with attendance, testing positive for cocaine and marijuana and failing to see the psychiatrist for a medication assessment as recommended. The discharge summary reflects that mother made little progress and continued to involve herself in unhealthy relationships.
Mother was assessed again at Bristol Hospital in December 2004 at which time a higher level of care including a partial hospitalization program or intensive outpatient program was recommended. When the program called to tell mother the recommendation, she was angry and said she had no transportation. Over one month later, mother left a message with the program requesting a lower level of treatment. When the program attempted to call her back, the phone call was not answered and program staff was unable to leave a message. Mother completed a six-week parenting class at Catholic Family Services on April 13, 2004.
With regard to substance abuse evaluation and testing, mother submitted to a urine screen on June 17, 2003 which was positive for cocaine and one on June 18, 2003 which was positive for cocaine and Tetrahydrocannabinol. On September 18, 2003, mother admitted to DCF that she had smoked marijuana three weeks earlier. On May 10, 2004, father informed the police that he found a crack pipe belonging to mother in Peter's clothing after mother dropped him off. In May 2004, DCF referred mother to Rushford where she was diagnosed with codeine abuse and Depressive Disorder NOS. Mother was admitted to the Rushford Center on May 25, 2004. Upon admission, mother reported smoking marijuana two times a week up until one year prior to admission. Ex 7. Mother was discharged on June 17, 2004 after attending a total of three sessions in the explorer's group. Mother was discharged with a diagnosis of cannabis abuse. On June 18, 2004 mother had a hair test which was positive for cocaine. Mother tested positive for cocaine on December 7, 2004 when she was admitted to Bristol Hospital with suicidal ideation. On December 10, 2004, mother told DCF that the Bristol Counseling Center was recommending an intensive outpatient program for several hours a day, but that she was unable to attend.
Since the issuance of the specific steps, mother has been arrested on larceny charges. She has not maintained appropriate housing since the children were placed in DCF care. She has resided at approximately thirty-one different addresses beginning in August 1999. Her moves have occurred due to evictions, moving in with various partners and fleeing violent partners, staying with friends short-term and non-compliance with shelter rules. Recently, mother has had more stable housing with Rick A. with whom she and her two youngest children have lived since September 2004. Mother has been unemployed for most of the last five years, relying on her partners or their families for financial support.
Mother has not been fully compliant with visitation. Although she visited fairly regularly with the children, mother missed visits at times and has not maintained appropriate boundaries, speaking with the children about inappropriate matters such as paternity testing. Mother also frequently brought extraneous people to the visitations such that the visits had to be supervised by DCF and ultimately stopped when Clayton and Jacob began to decompensate and have significant distress associated with visitation.
With regard to father, specific steps were signed by father and approved by the court on October 25, 2002. Respondent father's specific steps required him to do the following: keep all appointments set by or with DCF; cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the children's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem; keep the children's whereabouts and his own whereabouts known to DCF, his attorney and the attorney for the children; participate in counseling, parenting and individual, if recommended, and make progress toward identified treatment goals, with Catholic Family Services recommended for parenting; obtain and/or cooperate with a restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan as approved by DCF to avoid further domestic violence incidents; sign releases; secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income; no substance abuse; no further involvement with the criminal justice system and cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and comply with conditions of probation or parole; immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household to ensure the health and safety of the children; visit the children as often as DCF permits; and follow psychiatric care as recommended including medication if necessary.
Father has complied with some steps, and failed to comply with others. Prior to January 2005, father had not informed DCF where he was residing and provided only a post office box number where DCF could contact him. He ultimately did give DCF a place of residence which was an efficiency room in a motel which was not adequate or permanent housing for his children. Father signed releases and has remained employed. Father completed an SOS parenting program at Catholic Family Services. He was referred for a psychiatric evaluation to address mental health concerns, but no evaluation was completed and father denied any mental health problems. He has maintained visitation with the boys and has often overwhelmed them with gifts and toys. As of January 2006, father had missed several visits. Father attended individual mental health treatment with Dr. Plummer attending sessions in December 2001 and January 2002, and a few times in December 2002. Dr. Plummer found that father was not very committed to his mental health treatment and could have benefitted from more counseling. Father was not on medication or receiving psychiatric care at the time the TPR petitions were filed.
D. The Children 1. Clayton M., Jr. CT Page 11483
Clayton M., Jr. was born March 3, 1999. He was placed in DCF care on October 15, 2002 at the age of three. After initially disrupting from several foster homes, Clayton was placed in his therapeutic foster home with his brother Jacob on November 20, 2003. He is adjusting well at his foster home and his foster parents are ably meeting all of his physical, medical, educational, and emotional needs. He is seen weekly by case manager Yvette Wooten of the Boys and Girls Village, Inc. to address behavioral issues as well as anger and depression. He is diagnosed with depression. He is up to date medically and is not on medication. As observed by Wooten, Clayton has a very positive bond with the foster parents, as well as with Jacob and his foster brother. He is safe, secure and happy living at his foster home and has expressed a desire to remain there and to be adopted by his foster family. He submitted a letter to the court requesting that he be permitted to stay with his foster family. He does not wish to see biological mother. Clayton is in first grade this year and is doing well behaviorally as well as academically. He began taking karate and is involved in other community activities such as swimming, summer camp and library functions.2. Jacob M.
Jacob M. was born October 16, 2000. He was placed into DCF care with Clayton at the age of two. Jacob is strongly bonded with Clayton and with foster parents. Jacob attends kindergarten at the same school as Clayton. He has done well in kindergarten despite initial reservations due to his maturity level. The foster home has provided both children with a sense of security and they would like to stay there and be adopted by foster parents. The foster parents are providing exemplary care and more than meeting all of the children's needs. Both children call foster parents Mom and Dad. Foster parents have expressed their desire to adopt Clayton and Jacob if they are available for adoption. With the help of his therapist, Jacob also submitted a letter to the court specifically requesting to be permitted to live with his foster family.
Carra Mauriello, a therapist at Boys and Girls Village, Inc., testified that she began therapy with Clayton in March 2004 and with Jacob in January 2006. She testified that she began working with Clayton on increasing his self-esteem and decreasing his anxiety. Initially, Clayton was fidgety, suffered from sleeplessness and was fixated on perfection. He frequently repeated tasks over and over and looked for reassurance. Using artistic and expressive therapy as well as talk therapy, however, Clayton has made significant progress in treatment. Mauriello testified that Clayton can now make a mistake and be creative with it. Although he continues to be reluctant to talk about his biological parents, he now can talk about them more openly than in the past. Clayton continues to have a generalized anxiety disorder, but is not on medication. According to Mauriello, Clayton calls his biological parents by their first names and does not wish to have visitation. Mauriello testified that Clayton wrote the letter to the court on his own. Jacob also asked to send a letter, but was unable to write it himself, so she wrote down the words for him. Clayton made a New Year's wish to be adopted and change his last name to the foster family's name. Clayton's memories of biological parents are mainly from the visitation he has had with them, although he stated that he has a memory from the time prior to being in DCF care of playing in the backyard with a toy airplane.
For much of the time Clayton was attending visitation with parents, he was exhibiting anxiety and sadness surrounding the visits. Although he was often withdrawn prior to the visits, he was usually fine once he arrived. Ultimately he began to question why he had to go. Both boys refer to mother as a stranger although they did enjoy the activities she brought for them. Jacob often yelled and screamed and ran away from the case manager who arrived to pick him up for a visit. Jacob has no memories of mother from the time period before the removal and all of his memories stem from the visitation.
Mauriello recommended that visitation with both parents cease in February 2006 because the boys were decompensating in their social environment. Clayton had a fear of not being able to return home after the visits and was experiencing increased anxiety and sadness. In an incident at school, Jacob became upset and ran away from his teacher and the principal after he had been informed of a scheduled visit. He immediately calmed down when the visit was cancelled. Both boys have been verbal about not wanting to see mother or father. Clayton has said it was the activities he enjoyed about the visits and stated that if foster mother would get face paints, they would not have to have visits. The relationship between the children and the parents during visitation continued to deteriorate and it no longer appeared healthy. The foster family is very committed to the toys. They have abided by all recommendations made and participated fully in the boys' therapy. Both boys look to foster parents to have their needs met and the boys have a sense of stability in the foster home. Mauriello testified that she had no concerns about the foster placement and would be in agreement with a good-bye visit if parental rights were terminated.
Yvette Wooten of Boys and Girls Village, Inc., the therapeutic case manager for both boys, testified that she trained therapeutic foster parents to prepare them for placement of children with special needs. She often supervised visits between the boys and biological parents. When the visits were becoming too chaotic, she directed mother to bring a structured activity for the boys. Beginning in May 2005, the boys began expressing their reluctance to attend visits and Wooten had difficulty getting them into the car. Even though the boys were encouraged to go, they physically ran away. Wooten observed that the boys did not generally respond to mother's physical affections and did not refer to biological mother as mom. Rather, they refer to her as "visitor mom" or Charity. Wooten testified that the boys were generally excited to leave the visits and return to foster mother and had no difficulty separating from mother. Wooten observed that the foster parents were loving toward the boys who are happy, well-adjusted and well-cared for in the foster home. Both boys were very bonded with foster parents and expressed that they wished to stay with them.
E. Psychological Evaluations
The two children and father were evaluated by Michael Haymes, Ph.D., in August 2004. Haymes found that father had an Axis II diagnosis of Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder and a Mixed Personality Disorder with Paranoid, Borderline and Narcissistic traits. At the time of the evaluation, father was living in a one-room efficiency apartment that was not appropriate for children. Father's psychological testing revealed a profile associated with substantial deficits in coping, being overwhelmed by ordinary stresses, a limited tolerance for frustration, emotional outbursts and impulsive actions. Haymes further found father's profile associated with a limited ability to form and maintain close relationships with others, anger, negativity and an increased risk of violence. Such individuals can be perceived as detached and aloof and the characteristics have "a good chance of interfering with the ability to function effectively as a parent." Ex. 9 at 6. During the evaluation, father told Dr. Haymes that he had never been a parent to his sons, but that he "wanted to be and tried to be." Id. at 15. When asked by Haymes how much time he had actually spent with his children, father stated: "A couple of weeks and I've always wanted to be there for them." He said he had seen them very little. Id. at 12. Following the interactional evaluation with father, Haymes concluded that the boys had some positive feelings toward father, but that "there was little or no emotional involvement shown. They related to him as one would to a parentally approved adult relative. That is, they related to him superficially and enjoyed the gifts." Id. at 22. He found the children were not likely to have a sense of his being a part of the family. Id. at 22-23. Haymes recommended that father's time with the children not be increased until after he established himself in an appropriate home for the children and in appropriate counseling. In August 2004, Haymes recommended allowing no more than a maximum of six months for this process in view of the development of the boys' identities and their relationships with their foster family.
In October 2004, Haymes conducted an evaluation of mother, mother's boyfriend, Richard A., the children, the boys' foster parents, another interactional evaluation between the boys and father and others associated with Victoria. Mother was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Depressive Disorder NOS in partial remission with medication, and cannabis and cocaine abuse disorders in self-reported early remission. On Axis II, she was diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder and Histrionic Personality Disorder. Mother also reported to Haymes that she has diabetes, migraines and degenerative arthritis in her back which she stated may be secondary to being beaten as a child. Mother's psychological testing revealed a profile associated with deficiency in self-knowledge, substance dependence disorder, high suicide potential, serious depression, hypervigilance, problems with authority figures, limited frustration tolerance, problems with impulse control, distortions in perception leading to poor judgment and inappropriate behavior, and an increased risk of behaving violently toward others. Haymes found that mother's ability to form and maintain close relationships was deficient and that negative emotionality and the level of problems with reality testing would be likely to interfere with appropriate parenting behavior. Haymes also found that mother's Child Abuse Potential Inventory (CAP) scale score reflected a person statistically more likely than most to become abusive in disciplining the children. Id. at 87. Her profile also revealed chronically low levels of coping skills and a tendency to resist influence toward change, providing a poor prognosis for psychotherapy. Id. at 9. At the time of the evaluation mother was taking medication for diabetes, Zoloft for depression, Seroquel for anxiety, Trazadone for sleep and for PTSD, and Imitrex for migraines. Haymes found that mother
has emotional characteristics that severely impair her ability to develop and maintain appropriate relationships with children and adults. She is not in adequate control of herself to discharge childcare responsibilities. Her partner, Mr. [A.] is impaired in his ability to discharge childcare responsibilities because of extreme emotional immaturity. Id. at 92.
With regard to Clayton, Haymes diagnosed him with Anxiety Disorder NOS with Obsessive Compulsive features in that he has to fold and refold clothing several times and starts over if he makes any mistakes. He frequently straightens out furniture and is uncomfortable if prevented from making his bed in the morning. Foster parents reported to Haymes that when distraught, Clayton will not accept soothing, but that recently he had begun to ask for and return affection.
With regard to Jacob, Haymes found that he referred to mother and father as "visit mommy" and "visit daddy." Foster parents reported him to be loving and affectionate, but also stubborn and physically aggressive at times. Haymes found that both Clayton and Jacob have few memories regarding mother, that most stem from visitation experiences, and that the relationships could not be considered healthy parent-child relationships. Id. at 97. Haymes testified that Clayton spontaneously reported that he has a memory which Haymes described as a camera image in the child's head of parents arguing and of father physically abusing mother.
During the interactional evaluation with father, the boys did not particularly like the roughhousing in which father engaged and both were moderately anxious in their demeanor. According to Haymes, there was "a modicum of affection between father and Jacob at the end when father asked Jacob for a kiss" and no affection between father and Clayton. Id. at 77. During a discussion with father after the interactional evaluation, father told Haymes that he had not obtained an appropriate apartment as recommended. He stated that a DCF supervisor told him he had no chance of getting the kids, so he was there to "to be sure the mother doesn't get them because I saw her beat them." Id. at 78. He stated that if mother's parental rights were terminated, he would consent to termination so that the children could be adopted. Id.
Haymes found that mother was "not at all likely to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation within a reasonable period of time such that she could resume or for the first time undertake a responsible position in the lives of [her children]." Id. at 96. He also opined that father was "not likely to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time he could undertake a responsible position in the [lives of Clayton or Jacob]." Id. at 97. Haymes concluded that there would be no negative or detrimental impact of severing the children's legal ties with mother or father. Id. at 98.
Haymes testified at trial that in the fifteen months since the evaluation, mother had not made progress toward rehabilitation. He stated that she needed to take the time to focus on the issues that led to the children's removal, to "unplug from other life roles," and to begin from the point prior to early abuse. He stated that in the fifteen months since the evaluation, mother could have made a good start on addressing the combination of disorders which negatively affect her psychological functioning. He testified that mother might have been able to address those issues if she had been able to make a break from her negative relationships and had entered a program, perhaps with her children. However, mother failed to take the necessary steps and Haymes stated that even in a residential program with superb services, fifteen months was not long enough to accomplish rehabilitation. In view of the addition of two more children in mother's life following the removal of the older three, Haymes testified that the demands on mother would make it a moot point, that she would not reach a point where she would be in a position to parent Clayton and Jacob. Haymes testified that it would be damaging to the children to move them now and that they need "a forever bond" and permanency as soon as possible.
With regard to Rick A., Haymes found him to be at fairly high risk for relapse to alcohol dependence. He noted that Rick A.'s history included experiencing blackouts as a result of drinking and that he had acknowledged the problem the prior year and attended some general AA meetings. He did not attend step meetings, however, and never had a sponsor. Haymes stated that Rick A. had a history of being let go from jobs probably due to poor attendance related to an alcoholic lifestyle. Id. at 25. Rick stated that he continues to "have a beer once in a while." Id. at 28.
Rick A. appeared for an in-take at Advanced Behavioral Health for substance abuse treatment at which he was identified as having a history of alcohol abuse and cocaine dependency in remission. The in-take summary noted that he lacked insight into the nature of his substance abuse and the effects on his life from being raised by an alcoholic father. Although he was scheduled to begin a group treatment program at the Rushford Center, he failed to do so.
F. Testimony of Respondent Mother
Respondent mother testified on her own behalf. Charity stated that she had been divorced recently from Clayton M. and that her maiden name had been restored. She stated that she has visitation with her daughter Victoria who has her primary residence with her father, Harold W. Mother testified that in December 2004 when she learned that DCF was pursuing termination of her parental rights to Clayton and Jacob, she was devastated and in a state of complete depression, shock and sadness. She stated that at that time, she had "no reason to live." Due to mother's despondency, Rick called emergency medical services and mother was transported to Bristol Hospital. A drug test was administered at the hospital which was positive for cocaine. Mother testified that she stayed at the hospital for several hours for observation. She admitted to hospital staff that she used cocaine and marijuana a couple of days earlier. She stated that this was her last drug use and that it was a bad decision. Mother stated that she had used a very tiny amount at a girlfriend's house and that she used because of her mental state at the time.
Mother further testified that she believed she made progress with her counselors Barletta and Brzozowski. She testified that she had many good visits with the boys where they were excited to see her; they were happy and smiling and enjoyed doing the crafts she brought. She stated that they did not like to leave her.
Mother stated that Peter and Adam are doing well living with her in Rick's three-bedroom apartment and are healthy and up to date medically. She described her life as clean and sober and stated that she goes to church every Sunday. She admitted that she had attempted suicide in the past by taking an overdose, but could not recall whether she took thirty tranquilizers or some other drug. She stated that in September 2004, she was asked to leave the women's shelter and moved in with her boyfriend Rick. She stated that her boyfriend is not an alcoholic, but has attended AA meetings. Although Rick drinks occasionally, mother stated that she has not had a drink in 2006.
With regard to the charge of evading responsibility, mother stated that she was in an auto accident, but left because the other driver started screaming at her. According to the police report, the other driver stated that mother begged him not to call the police because she was driving without insurance.
Mother called as witnesses Andrea Barletta, APRN, and Rita Brzozowski, LCSW, both of the University of Connecticut Health Center, School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry. Both witnesses testified that mother was a patient at the UCONN Health Center Outpatient Psychiatry Clinic and that mother was treated there for PTSD, anxiety and depression. They testified that mother attended her appointments and actively participated in treatment. Barletta signed a letter on mother's behalf on July 18, 2005 stating that "Charity's illness . . . never has and never will compromise her ability to be a parent to her children." Ex. D. Similarly, Brzozwski signed a letter of the same date stating "I have absolutely no reservations about her ability to parent her children." Ex. E. At the same time, however, both witnesses acknowledged that although mother brought Peter with her to some appointments, they had never seen mother with any of the three children who had been removed from her care, nor were they aware of her history beyond what she had reported to them. Barletta testified to mother's ability to parent despite mother's hospitalization shortly after in-take with UCONN for suicidal ideation at which time she also tested positive for cocaine and marijuana use. Further, Barletta testified that she had read only part of Dr. Haymes's report with which she disagreed.
At the time Brzozowski wrote her letter in support of mother, she had seen mother for approximately one month. She had not reviewed any hospital records or information from any prior therapists, nor had she received any information from collateral sources. Brzozowski also testified that she was not aware that mother had attempted suicide and stated that she "wouldn't believe it." When asked, Brzozwski testified that she was not sure it was important whether mother was telling her the truth in therapy sessions. She stated that she recommended the return of Clayton and Jacob even though she had never seen them and had never spoken with the children's therapists, Mauriello and Wooten, or Haymes. In August 2005, Brzozowski filed a 136-page report with DCF when mother, who was pregnant at the time, showed up for an appointment late and smelling of alcohol. Mother admitted drinking and told Brzozowski that her boyfriend was making sobriety difficult because of his drinking. Brzozowski testified that Rick A. called her up and screamed at her in a threatening manner, but that this was a normal response.
DCF worker Liz Colon testified that she had supervised visits approximately one and a half to two years ago and that at that time, the boys were excited to see their mother and she was excited to see them. Mother also offered photographs of the children with her and with each other and confirmation that she had participated in services with Catholic Family Services in April 2004 and completed a parenting class in December 2001 and a parent-child interaction program in April 2004.
Rick A. testified that he has known mother for three years and that she was taking good care of Peter and Adam. He stated that they had lived at their current address in Bristol for the past year and a half He had been employed for the past two years as a tow-truck driver and prior to that was a self-employed mechanic. He stated that he is forty-eight years old and that he used cocaine up until he was forty-five and that he had an alcohol problem in the past, which was not a problem at present, although he continued to drink occasionally. He has a twenty-seven year old son whom he has not seen in thirteen years. He admitted calling Brzozowski and yelling at her when she filed the 136-page report with DCF.
II. ADJUDICATION
The ground alleged in the petition as to both respondents was that the children, Clayton and Jacob, were found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and the parents failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the ages and the needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the lives of the children (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)). The petitions also allege as to mother that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to the parent that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the children, and to allow further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the children (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)).
A. Location and Reunification § 17a-112(j)(1)
In order to terminate parental rights, DCF must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the statutory element requiring "reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing . . . that such efforts are not appropriate." C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1). "Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000). On May 3, 2005, the court (Brenneman, J.) found by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts to reunify the children with their mother and father were no longer appropriate. Under the statute, a finding that reasonable efforts were made is not required if the court has determined, as in this case, that reasonable efforts are no longer appropriate. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1); In re Gary B., 66 Conn.App. 286, 290-91, 784 A.2d 412 (2001).
The court nevertheless also finds that DCF made substantial efforts to reunify with mother and father in this case. Throughout DCF's involvement, numerous referrals were made to service providers who could help both parents address substance abuse and mental health issues as well as parenting concerns. Although respondents participated in some services, they did not benefit from the services provided. Visitation was provided until the children's therapists recommended against it due to the negative effect it had on the children. Mother failed to participate in and benefit from substance abuse treatment and tested positive for cocaine in December 2004 shortly before the TPR petitions were initially filed. Father has not played an active role in the lives of the children during the time they have been in DCF care, has not presented himself as a resource for the children, and has not put himself in a position to have the children placed with him. Father did not appear for trial in this matter and indicated his intention to consent to termination of his parental rights. Under all the circumstances, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify both father and mother with the children and that as of the filing of the petitions, they were unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
B. Parental Failure to Rehabilitate § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)
The petitioner alleges that respondent mother's and father's parental rights should be terminated because they have failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). As Clayton and Jacob were found to be neglected on December 19, 2002, the critical issue for this court is whether the respondents have achieved rehabilitation sufficient to render them able to care for the children. The court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
Section § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as to "the parent of a child who (i) has been found by the Superior Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and such parent has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . ."
`Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation she has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that [within a reasonable time] she can assume a responsible position in her child's life.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Eden F., 250 Conn. at 706 . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Shyliesh H., [ 56 Conn.App. 167, 180, 743 A.2d 165 (1999)]. In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000). See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 269 A.2d 63 (2001); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384-85, 784 A.2d 457 (2000).
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that neither respondent mother nor father has achieved a sufficient degree of rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the ages and needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the lives of the children. See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. at 354; In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. at 665; In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. at 448. "The psychological testimony from professionals is rightly accorded great weight in termination proceedings." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) In re John G., 56 Conn.App. 12, 24, 740 A.2d 496 (1999). The psychological evidence in this case clearly establishes that neither parent has achieved § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) rehabilitation. As Haymes found, mother "has emotional characteristics that severely impair her ability to develop and maintain appropriate relationships with children and adults. She is not in adequate control of herself to discharge childcare responsibilities." Haymes found that father's psychological testing revealed a profile associated with substantial deficits in coping, being overwhelmed by ordinary stresses, a limited tolerance for frustration, emotional outbursts and impulsive actions. He found that father's limited ability to form and maintain close relationships with others, anger, negativity and an increased risk of violence were likely to interfere with his ability to parent. He recommended that father's contact with the children not be increased until he had appropriate counseling and adequate housing for the children.
Although specific steps were issued with regard to mother and father, the evidence clearly and convincingly indicates that they failed to fulfill them in a number of significant measures. As described above, respondent mother did not refrain from substance abuse as she tested positive for cocaine on June 17 and 18, 2003 at which time a higher level of care was recommended. She failed to follow through with that recommendation. She again tested positive for cocaine when she was seen at Bristol Hospital with suicidal ideation in December 2004. After approximately eight months of counseling, in August 2005, mother showed up to an appointment with her therapist; mother was pregnant and smelled of alcohol such that her therapist filed a 136-page report with DCF. At that time, she stated that Rick's drinking made it difficult for her to maintain sobriety. Thus, at the time of the filing of the amended TPR petitions, mother had engaged in insufficient individual counseling to address her history of substance abuse and unstable relationships fraught with domestic violence. Mother's history of violent and unstable relationships is particularly concerning. Her history of moving from one dependent, abusive relationship to another began when, at fourteen, she was thrown out of her home because she was having a relationship with a man who was twenty. She had a child with him when she was seventeen. That relationship ended when she was eighteen and she began a relationship with Clayton M., who was thirty-eight. Mother and Clayton M. married and had Clayton and Jacob, but the relationship was abusive and they soon separated. Mother then moved in with Eric D. with whom she had a domestic violence incident. She next entered into a violent, dependent relationship with Scott W., and moved herself and her children into a house owned by him. This relationship included numerous incidents of violence, culminating in his threatening to burn the house down with mother and children in it. When DCF told mother that if she did not leave the relationship, a 96-hour hold would be invoked on the children, she finally ended the relationship. At that point she essentially abandoned the children by leaving them with her mother who was unable to care for them when they became ill because mother had left no insurance information with the grandmother. When the grandmother told DCF that she was unable to care for the children, they entered DCF care at the ages of two and three and a half After the children's placement, mother continued in a series of short-term and often troubled relationships, including one with Paul B., whom she at one time claimed was the father of her son, Peter. Alter Paul B. was incarcerated, mother moved in with her next boyfriend, Michael B. She later began a relationship with Richard A., the father of her last born child, and moved in with him when she was asked to leave the Women's Shelter.
Finally, mother's lack of stability and failure to rehabilitate is apparent in her having thirty-one different residences since DCF first became involved with the family. In some instances, the housing included stays at shelters, in some cases apartments subsidized by boyfriends or their families, and on multiple occasions, residing with boyfriends or their families. Throughout DCF involvement, mother has failed to maintain housing that could in any way be viewed as stable. Although mother points to the testimony of Barletta and Brzozowski that she is able to parent all of her children, the court finds that their opinions were based on inadequate information and were contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
The evidence showed that respondent father failed to rehabilitate in that he did not obtain the recommended mental health treatment nor did he secure housing appropriate for the children. At one time he expressed his intention to consent to the termination of his parental rights and he has not expressed a desire to have the children placed with him. Father failed to appear in connection with these proceedings and a default was entered on September 16, 2005.
The court concludes by clear and convincing evidence, that as of the adjudicatory date of January 10, 2005 as to father and October, 28, 2005 as to mother, respondents had not brought themselves into a position in which they could provide adequate care for the children. Father was not a resource for the children and mother did not engage in necessary counseling and other services and did not have appropriate housing for two additional children. Thus respondents did not demonstrate an ability to provide day-to-day care for the children.
The court must also consider whether events after the adjudicatory date establish "a degree of rehabilitation that is sufficient to foresee that the parents may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. at 230; In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. at 749-50 (acknowledging that the court could take facts into account from beyond the adjudicatory period in making its decision in the adjudicatory phase with regard to whether the degree of rehabilitation was sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time). There was no change in fathers' circumstances after the adjudicatory date and he continued to be essentially uninvolved in the children's lives. Mother's conduct after the adjudicatory date does show improvement. To her credit, she has been apparently able to care for Peter and Adam. She has remained in a relationship with Rick A. who has been steadily employed. Rick A., however, is at a fairly high risk of relapse in connection with his alcohol abuse as noted by Haymes. He is not currently attending AA, he does not have a sponsor and did not complete the step program. Mother reports that she has been sober and substance free and has not had a drink in 2006 although Rick does drink on occasion. Mother reported to Brzozowski that Rick's drinking made it hard for her to remain sober. Mother has continued her counseling at UCONN with Barletta and Brzozowski.
Rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 479-80, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). "What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. at 231 (quoting In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000)). Haymes concluded that mother was "not at all likely to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation within a reasonable period of time such that she could resume or for the first time undertake a responsible position in the lives of [her children]." Id. at 96. He also concluded that father is "not likely to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time he could undertake a responsible position in the [lives of Clayton or Jacob]. Id. at 97. Haymes concluded that there would be no negative or detrimental impact of severing the children's legal ties with mother or father. Id. at 98.
As Haymes and Mauriello testified, the children are in great need of permanency. Given mother's current inability to have the children placed with her, additional time would be unreasonable and detrimental to the children. Clayton and Jacob have been in DCF care since October 2002. Here, for children who now have the stability of a wonderful foster home and foster parents who would like to adopt them and who are committed to them and their development, any additional time for rehabilitation of respondents even under the best of circumstances is not reasonable.
Mother has been able to manage her own life to the extent that she has remained in a stable relationship for approximately a year and a half and has maintained adequate housing for herself and two children with Rick A. However, she remains dependent on him for all of her and her children's needs and she does not have appropriate housing for two additional children. Thus mother remains completely dependent upon Rick whom Haymes described as having a fairly high likelihood of relapse into alcohol abuse and as one "impaired in his ability to discharge childcare responsibilities because of extreme emotional immaturity." Ex. 10 at 92.
The court finds that parents are not in a position to provide day-to-day care for the children or to assume a useful role in their lives and that they have not achieved rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that they will be in such a position within a reasonable time. Thus at the time of trial, respondents had not rehabilitated to the point where they were in a position to play a constructive role in the day-to-day care of the children.
In assessing rehabilitation, "[t]he critical issue is whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. at 261; accord, In re Gary B., 66 Conn.App. 286, 292, 784 A.2d 412 (2001); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. at 384-85. The issue is not whether respondent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the children. In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. at 180; In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. at 448. Clayton and Jacob both have specialized needs to the extent that they will require continued therapy. Although they have both made significant progress in treatment, Clayton suffers from depression and is diagnosed with Anxiety Disorder NOS, with obsessive compulsive features for which he will need to continue treatment. Jacob is doing well, but continues to have problems with aggression and can be oppositional and stubborn. Mother's history of unstable violent relationships raises significant concerns about her ability to provide a stable home for these special needs children, particularly since, as Haymes testified, she now has two other children in the home and has failed to address the issues she has struggled with for many years. As Haymes noted, mother has never maintained steady employment or supported herself. She has always been dependent on someone else, even when her three oldest children were out of her care. The dependent relationships she entered into were unstable, intense and abusive.
Clayton and Jacob desperately need and deserve a safe, stable and nurturing environment. Expressing love for a child and visiting with a child occasionally is vastly different from being able to care for the particular needs of a child on a day-to-day basis, even with supports in place. As Judge Brenneman stated in In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd, 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998), "[t]erminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate; it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying her a safe, permanent home with proven competent care-takers because her biological mother has tried hard but continues to be incapable of providing such a home for her." Here, respondent parents have not made sufficient efforts to rehabilitate and remain unable to provide the day-to-day care these children need within a reasonable time. The children now have a foster family with whom they have thoroughly bonded. The family is committed to the children and would like to adopt them.
Thus, in its totality, the clear and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that respondent mother and father remain unable to successfully parent the children and lack the ability to assume a responsible position in the children's lives within a reasonably foreseeable time. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has proven respondents' failure to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
C. No Ongoing Parent-Child Relationship § 17A-112(j)(3)(D)
This ground is established when there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with the parent, which is defined as the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and where allowing further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.
No ongoing parent-child relationship contemplates a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parent, or that no relationship has ever developed between them, or that the child has lost that relationship so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 645-46, 436 A.2d 290 (1980); In re John G., 56 Conn.App. 12, 22, 740 A.2d 496 (1999). In any case, "the ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent." In re Juvenile Appeal, (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 670, 420 A.2d 875 (1979). The mere recognition of an individual as a parent will not defeat this ground. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-6), 2 Conn.App. 705, 708-09, 438 A.2d 1101 (1984), cert. denied, 195 Conn. 801, 487 A.2d 564 (1985). The presence or absence of positive feelings on the part of the child is determinative. In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 234, 240, 754 A.2d 169 (2000).
In the adjudicatory phase, the petitioner must establish as to respondents (1) that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists; and (2) that the allowance of further time for the establishment of such a relationship would harm the interests of the child. In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001).
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between the children Clayton and Jacob and respondent mother. Both children consider their foster parents to be their psychological parents. Mother has not provided day-to-day care for the children since they were two and three years old. As Haymes testified, mother does not have a parent-child relationship with the children who referred to her as "visitor mommy" or "visit mommy." Although mother has attended visitation with them, neither child asks for mother or wishes to be placed with her. Both children submitted letters asking the court to allow them to stay with foster parents. With regard to whether the children have present positive memories of mother, Haymes testified that Clayton had a camera image in his head of parents arguing and of father abusing mother. While Clayton had one memory of playing with a toy airplane prior to the time he was in DCF care, the memories both children have of mother stem from visitation. Both boys have been verbal about not wanting visitation. Thus the evidence establishes to a clear and convincing standard that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between mother and Clayton and Jacob.
Respondent mother may be well-intentioned to the extent that she has expressed her love for the children and a desire to maintain a connection to them. However, when she had the responsibility of caring for them on a daily basis, she was unable to do so. As a result of her own conduct, including failure to obtain treatment, she has not served as a parent for Clayton and Jacob. See In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. at 241. Respondent mother has not met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the children in over three years. In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. at 525.
The court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that to allow respondent mother further time for the reestablishment of a parent-child relationship with children who are in a stable, nurturing foster home would be detrimental to the best interest of the children. Clayton and Jacob are now seven and five years old. They have been in a pre-adoptive foster home together since November 2003. According to the testimony of Dr. Haymes, in view of the children's need for permanency, it would be detrimental to them to allow additional time in which mother could attempt to establish a parent-child relationship, with a mother whom they view as a "visiting" mother. Thus, the court finds that the petitioner has proven this statutory ground for termination as to respondent Charity C. by clear and convincing evidence.
III. DISPOSITION
As to the dispositional phase of this hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights, the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including May 4, 2006, the date upon which the evidence in this matter was completed. "`If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.' [ In re Eden F., 250 Conn. at 689]." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. at 103. "In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in General Statutes [17a-112(k)]." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. at 528 (quoting In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 833, 733 A.2d 298 (1999)). The seven factors "serve simply as guidelines to the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. at 104. The court considers each of them in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section. The court makes the following seven written findings:
(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the children by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the children with respondents, the court finds that DCF offered services including parenting education, substance abuse testing and counseling. Respondent mother and father engaged in some services, including parenting classes, but failed to engage in others.
(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds that DCF made such efforts.
(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds specific steps were ordered as to respondent mother and father. As set forth above in detail, there was compliance by respondent mother and father as to some steps, but failure to comply with others. DCF has fulfilled its obligations to facilitate reunification of the family.
(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect to the children's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties, the court finds that the children do have some emotional bond with their biological mother with whom they have had a visiting relationship for three and a half years. They also have a visiting relationship with father, but they do not have a strong emotional bond with him. The children have a strong emotional bond with each other and with the foster parents with whom they have lived since November 2003. The children have adjusted very well in their foster family and the foster parents are providing the day-to-day physical, emotional, moral and educational support the children need. The foster parents are committed to the children and would like to adopt them.
(5) As to the ages of the children, the court finds that Clayton, born March 3, 1999, is seven years old and Jacob, born October 16, 2000, is now five. The court further finds that these children require stability of placement and continuity of care and that the children's attorney and the guardian ad litem both recommend termination.
Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). The Appellate Court has also noted, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence . . ." In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994).
(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to return such children home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child; the court finds that respondent mother and father have maintained only a visiting relationship with the children. The court further finds that respondents are unable to assume a responsible parental role in the children's lives. Giving them additional time would not likely enable them to adjust their circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to be reunited. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, CT Page 11503 554 A.2d 722 (1989); In re Juvenile Appeal, 183 Conn. 11, 15, 438 A.2d 801 (1981).
(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties. Further, while the mother's financial means were limited, economic factors did not prevent regular, continuing contact with the children.
With respect to the best interests of the children contemplated by C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Charity C. and Clayton M., Sr. to Clayton and Jacob M. is in the best interest of the children. Permanency, consistency and stability are crucial for Clayton and Jacob. The children have already endured many difficulties in their lives, including the trauma of witnessing various domestic violence incidents with mother's many partners. The children are now in a foster home where they are very well cared for by foster parents who are fully committed to them. They are making great progress in therapy. Mother and father are unable to assume a responsible parental role for the children. Following a series of short-term relationships, mother and two additional children are now living with and dependent upon a man who has a fairly high likelihood of relapse into alcohol abuse. Although mother loves the children and would like to care for them, she has not put herself in a position to be able to care for them.
In view of the fact that respondent father failed to appear for trial, has not been involved in the children's lives and is not a resource for the children, termination of his parental rights is in the children's best interest.
In finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the children's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the children's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of their environment; their length of stay in foster care; the nature of their relationship with foster parents and biological parents; the degree of contact maintained with their biological parents; and their genetic bond to respondents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). The court has also balanced the children's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with their biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity). Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that termination of respondents' parental rights is in the children's best interest.
With regard to permanency, the court considers the testimony that the foster parents are committed to adopting the children. These children are entitled to a resolution, without delay, of the period of uncertainty as to the availability of respondents to serve as their parents by terminating respondents' parental rights. The court also notes that counsel for the children supports termination.
After considering the children's sense of time, their need for a secure and permanent environment, the need to avoid future placements, and the totality of circumstances, the court concludes that termination of parental rights of respondent mother and father is in the children's best interest. It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Charity C. and Clayton M. to the children Clayton and Jacob are hereby terminated. The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for the children.
With regard to the permanency plans for the children, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption as to each child and finds that such plans are in the best interest of the children. The court also finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plans. Permanency plans shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.
Judgment may enter accordingly.
It is so ordered. CT Page 11505