Opinion
No. 1 CA-JV 18-0425
04-30-2019
IN RE CLAY C.
COUNSEL Yavapai County Public Defender's Office, Camp Verde By Gary H. Horton Counsel for Appellant Yavapai County Attorney's Office, Camp Verde By Patti M. Wortman Counsel for Appellee
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. V1300JV201880071
The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Yavapai County Public Defender's Office, Camp Verde
By Gary H. Horton
Counsel for Appellant
Yavapai County Attorney's Office, Camp Verde
By Patti M. Wortman
Counsel for Appellee
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.
BROWN, Judge:
¶1 Clay C. appeals the juvenile court's order adjudicating him delinquent for one count of disorderly conduct, a domestic violence offense, arising from an incident with family members in their home. For the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 The State filed a delinquency petition against Clay, age 14, alleging he committed three counts of disorderly conduct, one each against his mother ("Mother"), stepfather ("Stepfather"), and sister ("Sister"), also age 14. The petition also alleged that each count was a domestic violence offense. After a contested adjudication hearing, the court found Clay not responsible for disorderly conduct against Mother and Stepfather but responsible for disorderly conduct against Sister. The following evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the adjudication, In re John M., 201 Ariz. 424, 426, ¶ 7 (App. 2001), was presented at the hearing.
¶3 Clay was at home with Mother, Stepfather, and Sister. Mother asked Clay to get ready for church but he said he "wasn't going to go." A few minutes later, Stepfather went into Clay's room and told him to "just make it easy," but Clay continued to refuse. Mother then threatened to take away Clay's cell phone if he did not get ready. After further refusals from Clay, she took his phone and went into the kitchen with Stepfather. Clay followed them into the kitchen, where Mother warned him, "[I]f you do not get into that van, I am going to take a hammer to your phone." Clay responded, "If you . . . break my phone, I'm going to break you, and I'm going to break [Sister]."
¶4 Sister heard Mother ask Clay, "are you really going to break me and [Sister]?" Mother then pulled out a hammer from a kitchen drawer and smashed his phone. Clay lunged toward her. Stepfather pushed him away from Mother, and testified that he did not know what Clay's intentions were when he lunged at Mother, but he knew Clay was angry
because he "narrow[ed] his eyes and puff[ed] up." Clay attempted to go around Stepfather and he lunged towards Mother a second time. Stepfather then put Clay in a headlock and pushed his upper body down onto the dining room table, knocking over a kitchen chair. Sister witnessed the altercation and went outside because she was scared. Stepfather held Clay down for about 20 seconds and released him after he felt him relax. Clay returned to his bedroom, and Mother called the police.
¶5 Mother testified Clay was not yelling when he threatened her and Sister, but she knew he was upset based on his demeanor. Sister testified she did not hear Clay make the threat; she heard him say something to Mother in a muffled voice, then heard Mother's question back to him about whether he would really "break" her and Mother. Sister stated she felt scared.
¶6 The juvenile court found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Clay's fighting and disruptive behavior disturbed Sister's peace and quiet. The court explained that the situation would have been merely a disobedient act of refusing to get ready for church if Clay had de-escalated the situation after Mother threatened to break his phone. At the disposition hearing, the court placed Clay on standard probation for 12 months and later granted Clay's motion to file a delayed appeal.
DISCUSSION
¶7 Clay challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his adjudication. To determine whether sufficient evidence exists to support a delinquency adjudication, we consider whether "a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JT9065297 , 181 Ariz. 69, 82 (App. 1994). We do not reweigh evidence; rather, we will affirm unless "there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the judgment or . . . the judgment is contrary to any substantial evidence." John M., 201 Ariz. at 426, ¶ 7.
¶8 The State charged Clay with violating Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 13-2904(A)(1), which states:
A. A person commits disorderly conduct if, with intent to disturb the peace or quiet of a neighborhood, family or person, or with knowledge of doing so, such person:
1. Engages in fighting, violent or seriously disruptive behavior. . . .
When a specific victim is named in a charge under this statute, the issue is not whether the peace of a reasonable person in the victim's position was disturbed; rather, the State must prove that the identified victim's peace actually was disturbed. See In re Julio L., 197 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 8 (2000); State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585, ¶ 8 (App. 2005).
¶9 Clay argues Sister's testimony that his threat was muffled shows that he did not intentionally or knowingly disturb her peace. The volume at which Clay spoke is not dispositive; instead, the pertinent question is whether the evidence presented showed he knew that the threat he uttered, along with his actions thereafter, would disturb Sister's peace. See A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(b) ("'Knowingly'" means, with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense, that a person is aware or believes that the person's conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance exists."). Clay expressed a threat of violence and lunged at Mother, which caused a physical reaction from Stepfather and ultimately caused Sister to be fearful. Cf. State ex rel. Williams v. Superior Court (Elliott), 20 Ariz. App. 282, 283 (1973) (explaining a disturbance of the peace "may be created by any act which . . . excites disquietude or fear"). Sister testified that because of Clay's conduct, she was scared, yelled for them to stop, and left the house. On this record, a rational trier of fact could find that Clay knew his actions would disturb Sister.
¶10 Clay also argues he did not engage in fighting or seriously disruptive behavior within the meaning of § 13-2904(A)(1). In Julio L., a student at an alternative school for children with behavior problems ignored an administrator's request to talk with her outside the classroom. 197 Ariz. at 2, ¶ 3. When the administrator asked the student a third time to talk outside the classroom, he cursed at her and kicked a plastic chair, which "tipped over but did not strike anyone." Id. The administrator stated she did not feel frightened by the student's actions and acknowledged he was merely being defiant. Id. at 3-4, ¶ 10. The juvenile court found that the student's behavior was seriously disruptive and thus constituted disorderly conduct. Id. at 2, ¶ 4. On review, our supreme court construed seriously disruptive behavior as "of the same general nature as fighting or violence or conduct liable to provoke that response in others and thus to threaten the continuation of some event, function, or activity." Id. at 4, ¶ 11. The court reversed the juvenile court's finding, explaining that the student's conduct was not seriously disruptive because the administrator "did not feel threatened," she "was not provoked to physically retaliate," and the conduct "did not impact the normal operation of the school." Id. at ¶ 13.
¶11 In this case, the State presented evidence demonstrating that Clay engaged in seriously disruptive behavior. His overly aggressive conduct, which occurred in the family home, caused Sister to be afraid. She witnessed Clay lunge toward Mother and saw Stepfather grab Clay and put him in a headlock to prevent Clay from reaching Mother, and testified that when the chair fell over, she yelled for them to stop. Clay's acts scared her, and she left the house to get away. This is unlike the situation in Julio L., where the juvenile's conduct did not result in the administrator being fearful, the incident occurred at an alternative school where such conduct "was not unusual," and the administrator's peace was not disturbed because "[h]andling such problems was part of her job." Id. at 3, 5, ¶¶ 10, 15. Moreover, the student in Julio L. made no threats toward the administrator or other students, whereas Clay vocalized a threat to "break" Mother and Sister. Accordingly, the record supports the juvenile court's ruling.
CONCLUSION
¶12 We affirm the juvenile court's order adjudicating Clay delinquent.