Opinion
SC: 164928 COA: 360356
02-03-2023
IN RE O. O. CLAUDIO-PEREZ, Minor.
Order
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 22, 2022 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals to review and address the trial court's decision finding statutory grounds to terminate parental rights under MCL 712.A19b(3)(c)(i ), (c)(ii ), and (j).
We do not retain jurisdiction.
Cavanagh, J. (concurring). I concur in the order remanding this case to the Court of Appeals, and write separately to highlight some points for that court's consideration. At the outset, I note that it's not clear from the Court of Appeals’ recitation of the facts why the goal of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) changed from guardianship to termination of respondent's parental rights. Prior to that decision, the focus of efforts seems to have been expanding respondent's parenting time, including unsupervised parenting time. This abrupt and unexplained change of the goal from guardianship to termination seems relevant to many other aspects of the case.
Regarding MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i ), the trial court relied on the fact that respondent-mother failed to attend some medical appointments of her minor child, OOCP. However, there is testimony from caseworkers that in the beginning of the case, respondent was not asked to attend these appointments because the goal was a guardianship, not full reunification. The DHHS was contemplating, at least for the first years of the case, that the foster parents would be the primary managers of the child's care. When asked to become a more active participant, respondent was present at appointments. The trial court highlighted a particular incident when respondent did not schedule a hearing test, but it neglected to consider that respondent had been given the wrong referral. The trial court said that respondent "has done nothing to educate herself enough to care for her child," but that assertion seems be contradicted by the record. The bulk of training and education offered to respondent, according to caseworker testimony, came from medical care providers at appointments, and as mentioned when asked to attend these she did so.
Regarding MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii ), the trial court faulted respondent for living with her boyfriend, opining that the situation would be "perilous" if the relationship did not work. But there was no record evidence of any problems caused by respondent's boyfriend or problems with the relationship. The trial court faulted respondent for not obtaining a driver's license, but again there was no record evidence that respondent's lack of a driver's license had caused any problems.
Finally, regarding MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), the trial court opined that respondent's previous physical discipline of OOCP amounted to abuse and that there was nothing other than respondent's word that she had learned to behave differently. However, it is not clear what record evidence there was to the contrary, or what respondent could have said to persuade the trial court. The trial court did not acknowledge that during many years of supervised visits there was never an observed incident of physical discipline.
Because evaluation of these issues is relevant to the determination of whether the trial court erred in finding statutory grounds to terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i ), (c)(ii ), and (j), I concur in the order remanding the case to the Court of Appeals to conduct that evaluation.