Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County Super. Ct. No. J185948. Raymond P. Van Stock um, Judge.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
King, J.
Nearly four years after the filing of the initial juvenile wardship petition, the filing of six supplemental petitions, two subsequent petitions, and minor’s placement in three separate foster care facilities, the trial court committed minor to the California Youth Authority when he admitted to the unlawful taking of a vehicle after leaving his then current placement without permission. On appeal, minor contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in placing him at CYA. For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment.
In an immense reorganization of California corrections in 2005, California Youth Authority became the Juvenile Justice Division within the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (Gov. Code, §§ 12838, 12838.3.) For the sake of clarity, we will refer to the Juvenile Justice Division as CYA.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 23, 2001, the juvenile court sustained allegations that minor committed felony residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and misdemeanor petty theft (§ 488). The court dismissed an additional allegation of vandalism. (§ 594.) The court placed minor on “Success” probation. After violating probation on three occasions, minor was finally released from probation on March 25, 2002.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
On December 30, 2002, the People filed the present Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 juvenile wardship petition, alleging that minor committed the crime of felony possession of a weapon on school grounds. (Pen. Code, § 626.10, sud. (a).) Minor admitted the allegation after the People moved to have it reduced to a misdemeanor. The court declared him a ward of the court, placed him in his parents’ custody, and imposed probation on various terms and conditions.
On March 13, 2003, minor’s probation officer filed a request for a special hearing alleging minor had violated the terms of his probation by incurring seven unexcused school absences and receiving several behavioral referrals for violating school rules. Minor admitted the allegations, albeit, conceding only six unexcused absences. The probation officer and the People recommended minor serve 30 days in custody. The court committed minor to 10 days in juvenile hall.
On June 13, 2003, the probation officer filed another request for a special hearing in which he requested modification of minor’s probation conditions to include drug testing. Mother had contacted minor’s probation officer on two occasions to request the additional condition because she had noted a couple of circumstances which led her to believe minor was using marijuana. Although minor denied any drug use, he stipulated to the additional condition and the court imposed it thereafter.
The People filed a supplemental wardship petition on August 13, 2003, alleging minor violated the conditions of his probation by testing positive for marijuana on two occasions, failing to participate in his court-ordered community service, and disobeying his parents’ directive to remain at home. The probation officer recommended minor serve 20 days in juvenile hall and, when released, be placed on Success probation. Minor admitted one instance of testing positive for marijuana. The court dismissed the other allegations, committed minor to 20 days in custody, and imposed Success probation conditions.
The People filed another supplemental juvenile wardship petition on November 4, 2003, alleging minor had violated the terms of his probation by testing positive for marijuana, incurring an unexcused absence from school, and violating curfew. The probation officer recommended minor serve 15 days in custody and be returned to the custody of his parents on Success probation. Minor admitted the allegation of testing positive for marijuana use. The court dismissed the remaining allegations, sentenced him to 15 days in custody, and released him to his parents’ custody on Success probation.
Prior to the appearance review hearing held on February 3, 2004, the probation officer filed a memorandum recommending the court continue minor on Success probation. Although minor had complied with the terms of his probation requiring that he complete an anger management class, drug and alcohol program, test negative for drugs, and obey his curfew, he had a number of problems at school, including truancies, tardies, and a suspension. At the hearing, the parties stipulated to the probation officer’s recommendation and minor was continued on Success probation.
On February 26, 2004, the People filed a supplemental juvenile wardship petition alleging minor had violated the terms of his probation in that he failed to report to a scheduled appointment with his probation officer, incurred more than seven unexcused absences from school, and left home without permission on February 10, 2004, and had yet to return. The court issued a warrant for minor’s arrest on March 2, 2004. Minor was arrested on the warrant on April 22, 2004. Minor admitted to his probation officer that he failed to report to his appointment because he knew he was going to test positive for marijuana. He also admitted he had not attended school in the nearly two months he had been away from home and that he smoked marijuana daily while he was gone. Minor admitted the allegation that he left home without permission and the court dismissed the remaining allegations. The court continued the matter for disposition to allow the preparation of a probation officer’s memorandum, but detained minor in juvenile hall in the interim. The probation officer recommended minor go to placement in a foster care facility, noting the numerous efforts which had been made up until that time to prevent the need to remove minor from his parents’ custody. A detention behavior summary compiled during minor’s stay in juvenile hall reported that minor had numerous behavioral problems. After a contested dispositional hearing, the court ordered minor placed with Lodge makers, a foster care facility.
In the probation officer’s statement prepared October 8, 2004, minor reportedly continued to have behavioral and academic problems while in placement. The probation officer recommended continuance of minor’s placement for an additional six months. Nonetheless, on December 17, 2004, the juvenile court freed minor from his placement, releasing him to the custody of his parents under his previous probation conditions.
A March 16, 2005, probation officer’s report noted minor had incurred 32 unexcused absences since re enrolling in school on January 18, 2005. Minor also admitted to the officer that he smoked marijuana on February 6, 2005. On February 15, 2005, minor was suspended from school for three days after campus security found him in possession of a marijuana pipe and lighter. Minor also failed to show up to a scheduled drug counseling session. On March 16, 2005, the People filed a supplemental juvenile wardship petition alleging minor violated the terms of his probation by failing to attend school regularly, failing to return home since March 5, 2005, and using marijuana. The court issued a bench warrant for minor’s arrest on March 21, 2005.
On March 30, 2005, a highway patrol officer arrested minor after his involvement in a hit and run accident in a stolen vehicle. Minor broke into a home, stealing a number of items therein, including the keys to the truck he was driving when he was involved in the accident. On April 4, 2005, the People filed a subsequent juvenile wardship petition alleging new charges of burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, sud. (a)), hit and run driving (Veh. Code § 20002, sud. (a)), and driving at an unsafe speed (Veh. Code, § 22350). Minor admitted the burglary allegation. The court dismissed all enhancements on that count and all other counts and enhancements in both the supplemental and subsequent juvenile wardship petitions. The probation officer recommended placement in a foster care facility. The court ordered foster care placement and minor was eventually placed with Philos on June 23, 2005.
On October 5, 2005, the People filed a supplemental juvenile wardship petition alleging minor violated the terms of his probation by leaving school without permission on September 28, 2005, and failing to return to his placement. The court issued a warrant for minor’s arrest on October 6, 2005. Fontana Police arrested minor on October 29, 2005. Minor admitted leaving because he had been caught drinking alcohol on school premises and was afraid he would be terminated from his placement; he admitted stealing the alcohol from his place of employment. Minor admitted the allegation and the parties stipulated to minor’s placement in a suitable foster care facility. The probation officer recommended placement in a foster care facility “yet again, as a means of exhausting all efforts at services before a [CYA] recommendation comes into fruition.” Minor was eventually placed with Boys Republic on January 26, 2006. While at Boys Republic, minor brought marijuana onto the premises and distributed it to other residents at the facility.
On March 10, 2006, the People filed a supplemental juvenile wardship petition alleging minor had violated the terms of his probation by leaving his placement on February 26, 2006, having yet to return. On March 13, 2006, the court issued a warrant for minor’s arrest. On August 14, 2006, police conducted a traffic stop of a stolen vehicle in which all three occupants leapt out and ran. Officers arrested two of the three individuals and later investigation revealed that minor was the third participant. One of the arresting officers positively identified minor as the driver of the stolen vehicle. Officers approached minor’s parents’ home and were told by minor’s mother that he was not in the home. Officers conducted a consensual search of the home and found minor hiding underneath a bed.
On August 15, 2006, the People filed a supplemental juvenile wardship petition alleging minor had committed felony grand theft auto (Veh. Code, § 487, sud. (d)(1)), felony unlawful taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, sud. (a)), felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594 sud. (b)(1)), and misdemeanor resisting a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, sud. (a)(1)). Minor admitted the allegation of felony unlawful taking of a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 10851, sud. (a)) and the court dismissed the remaining allegations. The probation officer recommended “minor be sentenced to the [CYA] as probation rehabilitation services have been exhausted.” The court declined minor’s request for another foster care placement and ordered him committed to CYA.
II. DISCUSSION
The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Committing Minor to CYA
Minor contends the juvenile court erred when it committed him to CYA because there was little evidence to show he would benefit from CYA placement and there was an appropriate, less restrictive placement available. We disagree.
Our review of a juvenile court’s decision to commit a minor to CYA is deferential. “The appellate court reviews a commitment decision for abuse of discretion, indulging all reasonable inferences to support the juvenile court’s decision.” (In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.) “There is no abuse of discretion where the commitment is supported by substantial evidence on the record.” (In re Kevin F. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 178, 186; In re Tyrone O. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 145, 151.)
In determining the appropriate disposition for a ward of the juvenile court, the focus must be on both the need for public protection and the best interests of the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, sud. (d); In re Jimmy P. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1679, 1684.) The court may make a commitment to CYA without first trying less restrictive placements. (In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473.) “[T]he 1984 amendments to the juvenile court law reflected an increased emphasis on punishment as a tool of rehabilitation, and a concern for the safety of the public.” (Ibid.) “Nonetheless, there must be evidence in the record demonstrating both a probable benefit to the minor by a CYA commitment and the inappropriateness or ineffectiveness of less restrictive alternatives. [Citations.]” (In re Angela M., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396.)
Under the abuse of discretion standard of review and in light of these principles, we cannot find an abuse of discretion in the decision of the juvenile court to commit minor to CYA. The record contains substantial evidence demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the less restrictive alternatives which had been tried. Likewise, substantial evidence supports the determination that minor’s commitment to CYA would be of probable benefit to him and the potential safety of the public.
Here, the juvenile court gave minor every opportunity to rebuff the criminal lifestyle he was involved in; however, minor rejected every chance he was given, continually running from his placements and escalating the seriousness of his crimes. The juvenile court upwardly graduated the severity of its dispositions as minor committed new crimes and violations of his probationary terms in an effort to compel minor’s understanding of the seriousness of his behavior and the repercussions. Minor first received probation, then 10 days in juvenile hall, then 20 days and Success probation, then 15 days, then placement in Lodge makers, then placement in Philos, and, finally, placement in Boys Republic. However, minor never seemed to take the situation seriously or avail himself of any of the opportunities for self-improvement. As the juvenile court judge himself noted: “I have looked at [minor’s file] before and it is quite extensive at this point. I rarely see cases with this much in it where we’ve tried as many things as we have tried for this minor. We’ve tried every possible avenue that we have in our genre we can do with a minor or we tried to do.” Given these facts, the juvenile court was well within its discretion in committing minor to CYA.
Moreover, the record shows that the court considered the “dual concerns” of minor’s best interests and public protection. (In re Jimmy P., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1684; § 202, sud. (d).) As to minor’s best interests, the court stated: “I think [CYA] can provide him with some of the counselling [sic] and diagnostic training that will help him in the future. . . . maybe he can learn a profession. They can teach him work ethic rather than stealing.” The court went on to state that “I believe he will be benefited by the professional help and the intensive counselling [sic] and schooling provided by the [CYA]. If he applies himself he might even get his GED. . . . The rehabilitation and punishment and restitution commitment would be of benefit to minor and I’ve indicated unsuccessful attempts at rehabilitation that we’ve gone through.” Finally, the court found it is “probable that the minor will be benefited from the reformatory educational discipline and other treatment provided by the [CYA].” Thus, the court’s finding that CYA placement would benefit minor was supported by substantial evidence. In rejecting an alternative placement, the court concluded: “I reviewed this file in preparation for this afternoon and I think it’s a CYA case. I don’t see any alternative. I don’t think he’s a candidate for Out Springs at all, and that wouldn’t be in the mix for me any way.” In making this statement, the juvenile court also demonstrated it had considered and rejected another placement alternative. (In re Angela M., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396.)
Likewise, the record demonstrates the court was also concerned with protection of the public when it committed minor to CYA. Minor’s criminal record included multiple thefts, multiple burglaries, substance abuse, and possession of a weapon. In determining minor’s disposition, the court reviewed this record and noted “[h]is previous delinquency history I have gone through indicating that we tried everything for the last five years to do something with the minor Nina [sic] reform fashion that we have. Minor must be incarcerated for safety and protection of the public.” Thus, substantial evidence supports the court’s imposition of a CYA commitment on the basis of public protection as well.
Minor’s reliance on In re Aline D. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 557 (Aline D.) is misplaced. In Aline D., the Supreme Court reversed a commitment to CYA on the grounds that the only basis upon which the commitment was made was that there was no other alternative placement for the minor. The court stated: “The record before us reflects that the referee ordered the CYA commitment solely because there appeared to be no other available placement facility.” (Id. at p. 559, italics added.) In addition, all parties interested in the disposition determined that a CYA commitment was inappropriate in that case. (Id. at p. 561.) The court concluded that lack of an alternative placement cannot be the sole determining factor in a CYA commitment. (Id. at p. 567.)
Here, the juvenile court did not commit minor to CYA solely for one reason; such as there were no alternative placements from which he could not run. The court noted an alternative option, but found such placement inappropriate under the circumstances of this case. The juvenile court in the instant case considered additional factors when committing minor to CYA. For instance, the court expressed the potential benefits to the minor from a CYA commitment, such as minor’s educational needs. The court also noted the need for protection of the public. It is clear that, unlike the court in Aline D., the court in the instant case did not commit minor to CYA solely because there were no alternative placements. The court was fully satisfied that minor would benefit by the treatment provided by CYA. Likewise, Aline D. was decided before the amendment of Welfare and Institutions Code section 202, which introduced protection of society and punishment as goals of the juvenile law. As stated above, minor is not simply a placement problem. He had a lengthy history of criminal behavior, which included several serious offenses.
The statutory scheme guiding the juvenile court in its treatment of juvenile offenders “‘contemplates a progressively restrictive and punitive series of disposition orders in cases such as that now before us—namely, home placement under supervision, foster home placement, placement in a local treatment facility and, as a last resort, Youth Authority placement.’” (Aline D., supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 564.) Nonetheless, while CYA is considered a final treatment resource (In re Michael R. (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 327, 337), “there is no absolute rule that a Youth Authority commitment should never be ordered unless less restrictive placements have been attempted.” (In re Ricky H. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 176, 183, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1396.) Instead, the record need only show, as it does here, probable benefit to the minor from commitment to CYA and that less restrictive alternatives were considered and rejected. (In re George M. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 376, 379; In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 576.) Moreover, the juvenile court had repeatedly tried less restrictive placements in the instant case, to no avail.
The court articulated reasonable concerns for the community and minor’s rehabilitation, concerns that can only be addressed by CYA given minor’s history and the nature of the current offense. Minor’s arguments to the contrary are to no avail. We thus conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by committing minor to CYA.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Richli, Acting P.J., Gaut, J.