Opinion
W.C. No. 4-679-849.
April 29, 2009.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Cannici (ALJ) dated October 1, 2008 that denied her claim for benefits based on a mental impairment. We affirm.
Several of the ALJ's findings of fact are summarized as follows. In 2001 the claimant began working as a child and family therapist. In 2005 the employer reassigned the claimant to counsel addicts who had "lost their children" which, presumably, means that their parental rights were terminated. In 2006 the claimant reported to her personal physician symptoms of depression resulting from her job transfer. After discussing her stress and depression with the human resources manager, the manager referred the claimant to Dr. Pineiro for an evaluation in the context of a workers' compensation claim. Dr. Pineiro determined that the claimant suffered from depression with symptoms related to a job transfer. Dr. Moe, a forensic psychiatrist, opined that the claimant's depression was partly related to her job transfer and, also, that her job duties were only one of several contributing factors. The ALJ determined that the claimant failed to establish that she suffered a compensable permanent mental impairment. The ALJ therefore denied benefits.
The claimant argues on appeal that she established her entitlement to benefits based on a mental impairment. In support of her contention, the claimant refers to the opinions of her personal physician, together with statements by Dr. Moe, that tie the claimant's depression to her work. However, the ALJ's findings to the contrary prevent an award of benefits under the circumstances.
Section 8-41-301(2)(a), C.R.S. 2008 provides as follows:
(2) (a) A claim of mental impairment must be proven by evidence supported by the testimony of a licensed physician or psychologist. For purposes of this subsection (2), "mental impairment" means a recognized, permanent disability arising from an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment when the accidental injury involves no physical injury and consists of a psychologically traumatic event that is generally outside of a worker's usual experience and would evoke significant symptoms of distress in a worker in similar circumstances. A mental impairment shall not be considered to arise out of and in the course of employment if it results from a disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, layoff, demotion, promotion, termination, retirement, or similar action taken in good faith by the employer. The mental impairment that is the basis of the claim shall have arisen primarily from the claimant's then occupation and place of employment in order to be compensable.
Section 8-41-301(2)(a.5) states that "[f]or purposes of this subsection (2), "mental impairment" also includes a disability arising from an accidental physical injury that leads to a recognized permanent psychological disability."
The causes of a claimant's mental impairment and whether those causes are common to all fields of employment are questions of fact to be resolved by the ALJ. Public Service v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 68 P.3d 583 (Colo.App. 2003). Further, the questions whether a psychologically traumatic event is "generally outside a worker's usual experience," or whether it would evoke "significant symptoms of distress in a worker in similar circumstances," are also factual questions for resolution by the ALJ. Davison v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 84 P.3d 1023 (Colo. 2004).
Because these issues are factual in nature, we must uphold the ALJ's findings if supported by substantial evidence in the record. § 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2008. Substantial evidence is that quantum of probative evidence that would support a reasonable belief in the existence of a fact without regard to conflicting evidence or inferences. Monfort, Inc. v. Rangel, 867 P.2d 122 (Colo.App. 1993). This standard of review requires us to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and to defer to the ALJ's resolution of conflicts in the evidence, credibility determinations, and plausible inferences drawn from the record. If the record supports two possible inferences, it is the ALJ's prerogative to determine which inference to draw. Wilson v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1117 (Colo.App. 2003). Moreover, the ALJ only need enter specific factual findings concerning the evidence he found to be dispositive, and conflicting evidence and inferences are presumed to have been rejected. Magnetic Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 5 P.3d 385 (Colo.App. 2000).
The ALJ found that the claimant's depression was related, in part, to her job transfer and, also, that her job duties were only one of several contributing factors, which included personal matters. Order at 5-6, ¶ 15. The ALJ therefore concluded that the claimant's job transfer and factors not related to her employment caused her to suffer from depression. Order at 7, ¶ 6. The ALJ credited Dr. Moe's testimony that the claimant's job duties were only one of several contributing factors for her depression. Order at 5, ¶ 15. Dr. Moe testified by deposition as an expert in forensic psychiatric evaluation. Moe Depo. at 9. He is level II accredited by the Division of Workers' Compensation in psychiatry. Moe Depo. at 6. The psychiatrist indicated that, based on the claimant's testimony, her personal relationship problems were the "main thing" causing or contributing to her depression. Moe Depo. at 12-13. The claimant testified about seeking "couples counseling" regarding a personal relationship. Tr. at 51, 63-64. Dr. Moe would not expect the claimant to become depressed based on the challenging or negative aspects of her job. Moe Depo. at 18. He did not believe the claimant met the legal requirements to establish a compensable claim for her depression. Moe Depo. at 20, 23-24. The record supports the ALJ's dispositive findings.
The ALJ also made the following findings pursuant to § 8-41-301(2)(a). The claimant failed to demonstrate that she suffered from a permanent mental impairment as a result of a psychologically traumatic event that was outside of a similarly situated workers' experience. Instead the claimant's job transfer and other factors unrelated to her employment caused her to suffer from depression. We do not read the claimant's brief as challenging those findings. In any event the findings are supported by the opinions of Dr. Moe. Moe Depo. at 12-13.
The claimant refers to the opinions of her personal physician regarding the compensability of her depression and makes inferences from the record in support of her assertion that she established a claim of mental impairment. The fact that some evidence, if credited, might support a different result affords no basis for relief on appeal. Weld County School District Re-12 v. Bymer, 955 P.2d 550 (Colo. 1998). In this regard, we note that the credibility of expert witnesses is a matter within the province of the ALJ as fact finder. Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182 (Colo.App. 1990).
The claimant also avers that the plain application of the mental impairment statute to the circumstances of public servants such as police officers, paramedics and, presumably, mental health counselors, necessarily compels the denial of benefits to such workers as psychological trauma is generally within their usual work experience. We do not believe the mental impairment statute to be as constrained in its application as the claimant proposes. See, e.g., Loveland Police Dep't v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 141 P.3d 943, 952-54 (Colo.App. 2006) (upholding death benefits to widow of police captain based on claim under mental impairment statute).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated October 1, 2008 is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
_______________________ John D. Baird
_______________________ Thomas Schrant
PINNACOL ASSURANCE, Attn: HARVEY D FLEWELLING, ESQ./JEFFREY LABELLE, DENVER, CO, (Insurer).
RING ASSOCIATES, PC, Attn: JESS M PEREZ, ESQ., BUILDING C, FT COLLINS, CO, (For Claimant).
RUEGSEGGER SIMONS SMITH STERN, LLC, Attn: H ANDREW RPEPIENNIK, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (For Respondents).