Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. J32048, J32049, J32050
NICHOLSON, J.
Appellant N.L. is the presumed father of minors, six-year-old C.L., eight-year-old J.L., and 10-year-old M.G., all dependents of the juvenile court in Butte County. The juvenile court denied appellant reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6); appellant appeals the trial court’s ruling. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion, failed to comply with its statutory obligation to find he was the perpetrator of sexual abuse suffered by the minor children, and failed to state the factual basis for its findings on the record. We affirm.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise designated.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This family’s history with the juvenile system is vast. During a 10-year period beginning in 1997, at least 23 referrals of abuse and neglect were made in two different counties. Seven of those referrals included allegations of sexual abuse against the parents, and three resulted in the children being detained as a result of their living conditions.
During a welfare check in 2004, Contra Costa County detained the children after the county found their living conditions to be “deplorable.” The family agreed to a voluntary case plan, which ended abruptly when the family relocated to Butte County in April 2005.
Three months later, in July 2005, the minor children were detained by the Department of Children’s Services in Butte County (Children’s Services), as a result of their “substandard” living conditions and their parents’ ongoing substance abuse. (The parents also were arrested, charged and later convicted, of child endangerment.) The parents submitted to the petition, jurisdiction was taken, and the family was ordered to begin reunification services.
After the order for reunification services, J.L. underwent a medical exam that uncovered evidence of sexual abuse. Specifically, that J.L.’s vagina had been repeatedly penetrated. J.L. named her brother as the perpetrator. Nevertheless, after 13 months of reunification services, the children were returned to their parents and jurisdiction was terminated in August 2006.
A short four months later, in December 2006, the children were detained again due to the substandard living conditions of their home. When the children were found, their home was littered with empty beer cans, garbage, and urine soaked clothing. Children’s Services found animal and rodent feces all over the house in various stages of calcification, including in M.G.’s bed. There was a plastic bucket filled with stagnant water under the sink, and rotting food on the counters, in the refrigerator, and on the floor.
The parents were arrested and charged with child endangerment, and a petition for jurisdiction over the minor children was filed with the court. The parents submitted to the petition, with one minor amendment, and the family was ordered to begin reunification services.
As part of the reunification services, the children participated in counseling. During one of her counseling sessions, J.L. revealed that appellant had sexually abused her on at least one occasion, penetrating her vagina with his penis. J.L.’s statements were substantiated by her siblings, who “acknowledged their involvement in sexual activity in the home,” and by the sexualized behavior of all the children in their respective foster homes.
As a result of J.L.’s revelation, Children’s Services filed subsequent petitions under section 342, alleging appellant sexually abused J.L. and the other children were at substantial risk of sexual abuse as a result. At the jurisdictional hearing, the parents submitted the matter without argument, asking the court to include their denial of the abuse on the petition itself, which the court did in its own handwriting. The court then sustained the petition, finding the allegations to be true.
Pending the dispositional hearing, Children’s Services prepared a report recommending no reunification services for appellant. According to Children’s Services, appellant met the criteria for denial of services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), because “the Court sustained the [section] 342 petition alleging severe sexual abuse regarding the child [J.L.]. In addition, the court sustained the [section] 342 petition alleging substantial risk to the siblings.”
At the contested dispositional hearing, counsel for appellant made an offer of proof: if he were to testify, he would deny the allegations of sexual abuse and illuminate discrepancies in J.L.’s statement, including her statements that their house was blue (it was gray) and they had four dogs (they had three). County counsel accepted appellant’s offer of proof, and the court adopted the findings prepared by Children’s Services, ordering no further services be provided to appellant. Appellant appeals that order.
II
DISCUSSION
Appellant makes several claims of error on appeal: (1) the court failed to specify on the record the factual findings used as the basis for refusing services; (2) the court failed to consider the six factors outlined in section 361.5, subdivision (h); (3) the court failed to find appellant was the perpetrator of the sexual abuse inflicted on J.L.; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in finding further services were not in the children’s best interest. We affirm.
A. Failure to State Factual Findings on the Record
Appellant claims the court committed reversible error because it failed to “read into the record the basis for a finding of severe sexual abuse . . . and . . . specify the factual findings used to determine that the provision of services to the offending parent would not benefit the child[ren]. [(§ 361.5, subd. (i).)]” The claim is forfeited because appellant failed to object in the trial court. (In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501-502; see also In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2 [forfeiture is the proper term].) Regardless, the claim fails.
When denying appellant further services, the trial court stated, “I think under the code severe sexual abuse would include the kind of vaginal findings that were made by the nurse practitioner in this case when they did the pelvic examination of J.L. I think the conclusion and opinion of that professional person was that there had been vaginal penetration and that to the Court would lead me to conclude that there was a severe sexual abuse.”
The court also adopted the findings prepared by Children’s Services, which included the following:
“The child or child’s sibling has been sexually abused, or is at substantial risk of being sexually abused, by a parent, guardian, or member of the child’s household, or other person known to the parent. There are no reasonable means by which the child can be protected from further sexual abuse or risk of abuse without removing the child from the custody of the parent or guardian, or the child does not wish to return to the parent or guardian. [¶] . . . [¶] 2. Reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal of the child [from] the home. [¶] a. The social worker has assessed the situation of the child and family and determined that, due to the concerns of the child’s safety, no further efforts would prevent or eliminate the need for immediate removal.”
We find the court’s statements on the record satisfy the requirements of section 361.5, subdivision (i). Accordingly, even if the claim were preserved for appeal, there was no error.
B. Failure to Consider Statutory Factors
Appellant further claims the trial court erred in failing to consider the six factors listed in section 361.5, subdivision (h). His claim fails for numerous reasons. First, appellant failed to raise his objection at trial. The claim is, therefore, forfeited. (In re Dakota S., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 501-502; see also In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293, fn. 2 [forfeiture is the proper term].)
Second, appellant provides scant analysis on this claim, burying it under the following heading: “The court violated [appellant’s] due process rights when it did not specify the factual findings it used to determined that the provision of services to [appellant] would not benefit the children.” (Unnecessary capitalization omitted.)
The California Rules of Court are clear. In addressing his claims to this court, appellant must present each point separately in the opening brief under an appropriate heading, showing the nature of the question to be presented and the point to be made. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); People v. Harper (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1419, fn. 4 [argument may be forfeited if it is not set forth under a separate argument heading and is raised in a perfunctory fashion (i.e., one paragraph) without any supporting analysis and authority].) Thus, even had this claim been preserved in the trial court, it would be forfeited for failure to properly raise the issue on appeal. The claim fails in any event.
Appellant argues the court erred in denying him further services because it did not consider the six factors in section 361.5, subdivision (h), but considered only J.L.’s pelvic exam, which uncovered injuries consistent with repeated penetration. Appellant contends this is insufficient because J.L. named her brother as the perpetrator of those injuries. Appellant ignores the plain language of the statute, as well as the facts before the trial court.
In denying services, the trial court must consider “any information it deems relevant, including the following factors: [¶] (1) The specific act or omission comprising the severe sexual abuse or the severe physical harm inflicted on the child or the child’s sibling or half sibling. [¶] (2) The circumstances under which the abuse or harm was inflicted on the child or the child’s sibling or half sibling. [¶] (3) The severity of the emotional trauma suffered by the child or the child’s sibling or half sibling. [¶] (4) Any history of abuse of other children by the offending parent or guardian. [¶] (5) The likelihood that the child may be safely returned to the care of the offending parent or guardian within 12 months with no continuing supervision. [¶] (6) Whether or not the child desires to be reunified with the offending parent or guardian.” (§ 361.5, subd. (h).)
Nothing in the statute requires the court to consider all of the factors listed or any of those listed. (§ 361.5, subd. (h).) In denying appellant services here, the trial court indicated it was considering more than the 2005 pelvic exam: “But the facts show that, at least to this Court, it would not be beneficial to provide the unification service for [appellant] and I do not feel that it would benefit the children.
“I share the hope of counsel that in the future the damage done to these children may be repaired, emotionally. The history shown in the disposition report is not a single episode. And it is a continuing series of abuse and neglect for these children by the parents.”
Thus, it is evident the juvenile court considered those facts it deemed relevant in denying services, including some of the factors listed in section 361.5, subdivision (h), i.e., the substantial emotional trauma suffered by the children and the history of abuse and neglect suffered by all of the children. We find the trial court satisfied its burden under section 361.5, subdivision (h).
C. Failure to Find Appellant to be the Perpetrator
Appellant also contends the trial court committed reversible error by failing to find appellant was the perpetrator of the sexual abuse suffered by the J.L. In support of his contention, appellant relies on the following statement made by the trial court at the dispositional hearing: “There was some question about who the perpetrator of [the sexual abuse] was.”
Appellant ignores the trial court’s adoption of the findings prepared by Children’s Services. Those findings include the following: “Reunification services shall not be provided to the . . . father . . . as the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that: [¶] . . . [¶] 6. The child has been adjudicated a dependent due to severe physical or sexual abuse to the child or a sibling or half-sibling by a parent or guardian and it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with the offending parent or guardian.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, regardless of the offhand remark made by the court at the dispositional hearing, the record reflects the trial court did find appellant was the offending parent, as required under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6).
D. Abuse of Discretion
Appellant also argues the trial court abused its discretion by finding reunification services were not in the children’s best interest. We disagree.
“Section 361.5, subdivision (c) prohibits the court from ordering reunification for a parent who, like appellant,” falls within one of the enumerated exceptions of subdivision (b), “‘unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.’ [Citation.]” (In re Kobe A. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1123; see also Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 92, 107; In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1137-1138.) However, “‘the court may still order reunification services be provided if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interests of the child. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 745.) The burden of affirmatively demonstrating that reunification is in the best interests of the children is upon the parent. (In re Ethan N. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 55, 66.)
“[A] court called upon to determine whether reunification would be in a child’s best interest may, indeed, consider a parent’s current efforts and fitness as well as the parent’s history.” (In re Ethan N., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 66.) The gravity of the problem that led to the dependency, the strength of relative bonds between the dependent child and both parent and caretakers, and the child’s need for stability and continuity are all relevant considerations in determining the best interests of the minors. (Id. at pp. 66-67; In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530-532.) “The court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accord with this discretion. [Citations.]” (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006.) “As a reviewing court, we will reverse a juvenile court’s order denying services only if that discretion has been clearly abused.” (In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 509, 523-524.)
Appellant’s dismal history of parenting, conviction and arrest for child endangerment, along with the substantiated allegations of sexual abuse, auger in favor of a finding that the minors’ best interests are not served by granting him reunification services. The seriousness of the neglect and dysfunction that resulted in the current dependency, coupled with the unmitigated history of appellant’s failure to gain control of his life and maintain custody of his children, provides ample support for the finding that reunification is no longer in the best interests of the minors. (See In re Ethan N., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 67; Randi R. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 67, 73-74.) The court did not abuse its discretion by finding that it is not in the best interest of the minors to prolong the lengthy dependency process to continue to provide reunification services to appellant. (In re Brooke C. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 377, 383; Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 601; In re Diamond H., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1137-1138; In re Jasmine C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 78.)
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: DAVIS , Acting P. J. HULL , J.