Opinion
02-24-00070-CV
08-29-2024
In the Matter of C.J.
On Appeal from the 323rd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 323-118683-22.
Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
In October 2022, Appellant C.J. judicially confessed to having committed murder, and the trial court found him delinquent and sentenced him to a seventeen-year determinate sentence. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 53.045(a)(1).
See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(c) (requiring protection of a minor's identity in an appeal arising out of a case under Title 3 of the Family Code).
In December 2023, the Texas Juvenile Justice Department notified the trial court that C.J. would be unable to complete his statutory three-year minimum period of confinement by the time of his nineteenth birthday and was therefore subject to a hearing to determine whether he would be transferred to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's Institutional Division or released to the Parole Division. See Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 244.014(a). After a hearing, see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11, the trial court ordered C.J. transferred to the Institutional Division to serve the remainder of his sentence, and from that order, C.J. appeals.
C.J.'s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief in which he asserts that after thoroughly examining the record, he has "conclude[d] that no legitimate grounds for direct appellate review are able to be presented and that the appeal is wholly frivolous." Counsel's brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). See In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (applying Anders procedure to juvenile proceedings).
Counsel provided a copy of the brief to C.J., informed C.J. of his right to review the record and to file a pro se response to the Anders brief, and informed him of his right to file a petition for review with the Texas Supreme Court if we affirm the trial court's judgment. C.J. did not file a pro se response. The State declined to file a brief but indicated in a letter that it agreed with C.J.'s counsel that C.J. "has no meritorious grounds upon which to advance an appeal in this case."
Because C.J.'s counsel filed an Anders brief, we must independently examine the record to decide whether counsel correctly concluded that the appeal is frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). After carefully reviewing the record and counsel's brief, except for the court costs addressed below, we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal; thus, we agree with counsel that the appeal is frivolous. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
We do, however, find error in the court costs assessed against C.J. Juvenile cases are governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.17(a), under which the definition of "costs" includes fees charged by the clerk for preparation of the appellate record, Tex.R.Civ.P. 145(a). "For a party who files an affidavit of inability to pay costs, there are no costs to bill." Campbell v. Wilder, 487 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Tex. 2016) (explaining that under Rule 145, the affidavit is in lieu of paying or giving security for costs, and that an uncontested affidavit of inability to pay is conclusive as a matter of law).
The bills of costs in the clerk's record and in the sealed clerk's record state, "Clerk's Record & Cert/Seal Fee Not Paid by Appellant," but they do not state that C.J. has not been charged for those costs.
The record reflects that in April 2022, C.J. (via his mother) filed an affidavit of indigence in the trial court and received appointed counsel. There is no showing that C.J. ever ceased to be indigent or that his indigency was ever contested. Nonetheless, the trial court clerk assessed costs of $205 (district-clerk fees, clerk's record fees, and certification and seal) for the preparation of the clerk's record and $56 (clerk's record fees and certification and seal) for the preparation of the sealed clerk's record. Because of C.J.'s indigence, we delete these charges from the bills of costs, see id.; affirm the trial court's judgment; and grant counsel's motion to withdraw.