In re Cirino

7 Citing cases

  1. People v. Michael W.

    32 Cal.App.4th 1111 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 31 times
    In People v. Michael W., 32 Cal. App.4th 1111, 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 556 (Cal. App. 1st 1995), the state appellate court applied the abuse of discretion review standard to a trial court ruling on a petition for a grounds pass filed by a defendant committed after being found not guilty of robbery by reason of insanity.

    " Special Order: Judicially committed patients shall be allowed unescorted access outside the secured areas of a state hospital only when approved by the court of commitment in response to a request as specified in the attached procedures. " Authority: By authority of the Deputy Director of the Division of State Hospitals; Sections 1026.6, 1603 and 1604 of the Penal Code; and In re Cirino, 28 Cal.App.3d 1009. " Purpose: To grant conditional leave to judicially committed patients for the purpose of implementing treatment plans designed for community re-entry and to ensure that any conditional leave granted to judicially committed patients is in full conformity with statute and case law.

  2. People v. Alvarez

    32 Cal.App.5th 1267 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 2 times

    The state moved to quash both subpoenas on the grounds that (1) no law authorizes a defendant to promulgate wide-ranging discovery on third parties untethered to an active case or controversy; (2) the subpoenas were overly broad, ambiguous and uncertain; and (3) they sought materials that were privileged and confidential or can only be obtained through a Pitchess motion. In opposition, Alvarez cited In re Cirino (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 1009, 105 Cal.Rptr. 194 ( Cirino ) as authority for the committing court’s continuing power to "make whatever orders are necessary to make the confinement effective" until it determines that sanity has been restored and argued the discovery was appropriate because his case remains " ‘active’ and ‘pending’ " until he is either deemed restored to sanity or conserved.Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305.

  3. Dominguez v. Dep't of Mental Health

    No. CIV S-06-0301 GEB CKD P (E.D. Cal. May. 3, 2012)

    Gram does not attempt to reconcile its decision with the Edde holding, nor is there any mention of the cases in which California appellate courts have held that a superior court's authority over an NGI defendant does not come to an end when he is committed to a state hospital. See, e.g., People v. Michael W., 32 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1116 (1995); In re Cirino, 28 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1014 (1972)(stating that "[t]he court's duty, and therefore its authority, does not end, as it does in the case of the sentencing of a criminal, with execution of the commitment"). Plaintiff may or may not have to address this inconsistency in his attempt to gain release from CDCR's custody, but the existence of this unsettled aspect of California law has no bearing on whether he will, one way or another, have the opportunity to present his constitutional attack on DMH's refusal to take him back.

  4. People v. Gray

    No. F085699 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2024)

    Put differently, we acknowledge that unlike criminal judgments, in NGI cases a trial court does retain some limited jurisdiction over an acquittee's case regarding future hearings to determine whether his or her sanity has been restored. (See, e.g., In re Cirino (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1014 (Cirino) [section 1026's imposition of a duty on the superior court to direct that the defendant be confined in the state hospital "carries with it the power to make whatever orders are necessary to make the confinement effective until such time as the court, after notice and hearing, shall find and determine that his sanity has been restored"]; People v. Michael W. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1116 ["the committing court has continuing power to 'make whatever orders are necessary to make the confinement effective' until the court determines that sanity has been restored"].)

  5. State Dep't of State Hosps. v. Superior Court

    No. C076447 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020)

    The population cap in section 7200.06 existed for the public benefit, e.g., to limit the potential for escapes and walkaways from a population of individuals who pose a threat to themselves and others. (In re Cirino (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1015, fn. 1.) The rule against enjoining the execution of a public statute is subject to four judicially recognized exceptions: (1) where the statute is unconstitutional and irreparable injury is shown; (2) where the statute is valid but enforced in an unconstitutional manner; (3) where the statute is valid but does not apply to the party enjoined; and (4) where the public official's action exceeds his or her authority. (Jamison v. Department of Transportation, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 363-364; Alfaro v. Terhune (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 492, 501.)

  6. People v. Lemus

    2d Crim. No. B286817 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2019)

    She cites to section 1026 and argues that the court has "continuing power" to determine whatever orders necessary until sanity is restored. (People v. Michael W. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1116; In re Cirino (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1014.) But none of the legal authorities Lemus cite gives the court this power.

  7. People v. Lucero

    A133706 (Cal. Ct. App. May. 29, 2012)

    (See, e.g., Peoplev. Michael W. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1116-1117 (Michael W.); In re Cirino (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1014-1016.) But, first of all, we have been cited to no authority which holds that a trial court has the authority to order the Department of Mental Health to transfer a specific detainee to another of that Department's facilities.