Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County Super. Ct. No. DL020936, Ronald P. Kreber, Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey J. Koch and Kelley Johnson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
FYBEL, J.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Christopher V., a minor, was alleged to have been in possession of marijuana and of a controlled substance. After his motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5 was denied, defendant admitted the allegations of the petition against him, and was placed on probation.
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress because the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the patdown search. We disagree and therefore affirm. Under the totality of the circumstances, the arresting officer was justified in conducting a patdown search of defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At approximately 10:50 p.m. on September 22, 2006, Newport Beach Police Officer Antonio De La Torre and his partner responded to a report of a disturbance involving a large group of juveniles at the intersection of Ocean Street and Dahlia Street. Officer De La Torre saw about 40 juveniles standing on the sidewalk and in the middle of Ocean Street. Because the group was standing in the eastbound traffic lanes, eastbound traffic was forced to drive into the westbound lanes to avoid striking them. As he approached, Officer De La Torre saw several people holding red cups, and smelled alcohol.
The group began to disperse when another patrol car arrived. Defendant, however, remained in the center of the street, talking on his cell phone and failing to yield to oncoming traffic. Defendant was wearing “really baggy” clothing. Officer De La Torre approached defendant and told him to hang up his telephone and move on. Defendant did not respond to Officer De La Torre, but instead remained in the middle of the street and continued talking on the phone. After Officer De La Torre repeated his request several times, defendant turned to look at him.
Due to perceived concerns for his own safety, Officer De La Torre conducted a patdown search of defendant. While doing so, Officer De La Torre felt an object like a film canister. He testified that drugs can be carried in such objects. He therefore asked defendant for permission to search his pockets, and defendant agreed. Officer De La Torre found a plastic bag containing a white pill and a film canister, which itself contained marijuana. Defendant told Officer De La Torre the white pill was a generic form of Vicodin.
A petition was filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging defendant possessed a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a) [count 1]), and possessed marijuana (id., § 11357, subd. (b) [count 2]). Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the drugs found in his pants pocket, under Penal Code section 1538.5. Following a contested hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Count 1 was dismissed at the request of the prosecutor, and the trial court ordered the petition amended by inter lineation to add a charge of possession of a controlled substance (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4060 [count 3]). Defendant then admitted the allegations of the petition were true; the trial court declared defendant a ward of the court and placed him on probation. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. Defendant contends he was unlawfully detained when Officer De La Torre conducted a search, and his subsequent consent to a search of his pocket was invalid because it was the result of the illegal detention.
On a motion to suppress evidence, the moving party bears the initial burden of proving the search was undertaken without a warrant. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 127-128, 136 (Williams).) In this case, the parties stipulated the search was warrantless. The prosecution therefore had the burden of proving the warrantless patdown search was justified under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 130, 136-137; People v. Rios (1976) 16 Cal.3d 351, 355-356.) “The [prosecution] may discharge the foregoing burden[] by a preponderance of the evidence.” (People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 106, fn. 4; see also Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 127, 130.)
“As the finder of fact in a proceeding to suppress evidence [citation], the superior court is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences in deciding whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable.” (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673.) Thus, we review the facts in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s ruling, resolve all conflicts in its favor, and defer to those express or implied findings supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 969; People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 673.) We independently review the juvenile court’s application of the law to the facts. (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 969.)
In this case, the trial court explained its ruling denying the motion to suppress as follows: “There was a duty to investigate in this matter, and the street contained some 40 people. In this case, minor does not move from the street. I’m not quite sure why, nor did I have any explanation from the officer as to why minor was not moving from the street, if the street contained traffic. [¶] But the court would not suppress the evidence. Either minor did not understand the officer or he was confronting the officer at the time he was making a turn, at the time of the pat down. The court would find that there was a voluntary consent to search when the juvenile said, “yes.” [¶] And he had baggy clothing, certainly could hide a weapon. If minor would not follow the orders not to move from the street, I’m not quite sure what the officer was supposed to do. I’m not sure the officer really knew what he had. You know, did the person just not understand him, or was there other problems, or was the juvenile not paying attention? What was the officer going to do? What alternative did the officer have? [¶] He made a pat down, which seems reasonable. It was nighttime, along with all the other factors put into play in this particular case. Because three times the officer said to the juvenile, “hang up the cell phone,” and there was no reaction. I’m not quite sure at this time why. [¶] But we’re faced with the minor in the street, all the other minors in the same locality, and I didn’t find it was prolonged whatsoever. It was a pat down, and I found the officer to be very credible. I didn’t find that minor submitted to authority. There’s just no evidence in that. There might be a theory, but the fact that he’s patted down and the officer asked to search doesn’t automatically mean that there’s a submission to authority. [¶] So I looked at the case cited by the defense, their main case, and the court would find that there was a duty to investigate, the pat down was reasonable, and the consent was voluntary. For those reasons, the court would deny the motion.”
Defendant agreed at the hearing on the motion to suppress that there was probable cause for his initial detention. There was substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding the detention was not unduly prolonged. The record shows Officer De La Torre performed the patdown search immediately after getting defendant’s attention. The trial court found the patdown search was justified.
As the court explained in People v. Coulombe (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 52, 56, footnote omitted: “A police officer may temporarily detain and patsearch an individual if he believes that criminal activity is afoot, that the individual is connected with it, and that the person is presently armed. [Citation.] The issue is whether the officers can point to specific and articulable facts that give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and is determined in light of the totality of the circumstances. [Citation.] If the officer identifies himself and nothing acts to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, ‘he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.’ [Citations.] In determining the legality of a temporary detention, the court looks to the ‘totality of the circumstances’ to ascertain if it is supported by reasonable suspicion. [Citation.] The California Supreme Court has succinctly summarized the issue by stating, ‘A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.’ [Citation.]”
In this case, we agree with the trial court that the totality of the circumstances created a reasonable suspicion in Officer De La Torre’s mind sufficient to justify defendant’s detention and patdown. Officer De La Torre explained he conducted the patdown search of defendant for his own safety because (1) there had been numerous gang-related crimes in the area, including a robbery at a location about 200 yards from the spot of the current incident; (2) the officers were greatly outnumbered; (3) the officer believed defendant might be under the influence of an intoxicant; and (4) defendant’s baggy clothing could conceal a weapon.
Defendant is correct in arguing a reasonable suspicion must be based on more than the fact that a traffic stop was made at night in a high crime area. (People v. Medina (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 171, 176.) As explained above, more was shown in this case. Defendant also notes that facts such as wearing baggy clothing and continuing to talk on one’s cell phone while the police approach are not sufficient in and of themselves to justify a patdown search. But these facts, combined with the other facts described above which were known to and observed by Officer De La Torre are sufficient to justify a patdown under the totality of the circumstances of this case.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: SILLS, P. J., RYLAARSDAM, J.