Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 5737
OPINION
BUTZ, J.
The juvenile court found a charge against Christopher T. (the minor) for vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851) to be true. The court committed him to juvenile hall for approximately one year (minus 225 days of credit), and aggregated three prior sustained petitions with his current offense for a maximum term of confinement of six years.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
The minor contends on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding of vehicle theft, and that his maximum term of confinement was not properly calculated. The People concede the minor’s second contention. We shall accept the People’s concession and direct the juvenile court to modify the dispositional order of September 18, 2006, to reflect the correct maximum term of confinement. In all other respects, we shall affirm the judgment (dispositional order).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ashley Johnson reported her car, a gold 1985 Nissan 300ZX, stolen on August 8, 2006. Johnson reported a rumor that Joe Mullen might have been the person who stole her car.
In the early morning hours of August 8, 2006, Lacey Roach and her boyfriend, Cliff Brown, whom she had just picked up from work, were driving in the town of Quincy. Roach and Brown noticed a gold Nissan driving fast, swerving and flashing its lights. The driver, whom Roach recognized as the minor, made a U-turn in the middle of an intersection and pulled up alongside Roach’s car. Mullen was in the passenger seat, and an unidentified girl was seated in the back. Mullen stuck his head out the passenger window and asked Roach and Brown to stop at the 76 gas station.
Roach and Brown pulled into the 76 station and drove up next to the other car. The two vehicles were approximately six feet apart, and the windows of both were down. The minor was sitting in the driver’s seat with the engine running. Mullen got out of the front passenger seat and walked over to Roach’s car. In a voice loud enough for the minor to hear, Mullen told Roach and Brown the car was stolen and that they were on their way to Stockton, and asked if Roach and Brown would buy them some beer.
There was some discrepancy between Roach and Brown’s testimony as to which one of them was driving Roach’s car, and regarding the direction Roach’s car was facing in relation to the other car at the 76 station.
The minor was arrested several days later and charged with vehicle theft (§ 10851) and driving without a valid driver’s license (§ 12500, subd. (a)).
At a contested hearing, the juvenile court found the charge of vehicle theft to be true and dismissed the remaining count of unlicensed driving for lack of evidence. The court continued the minor as a ward of the juvenile court, placed him on probation and committed him to a juvenile hall facility for 367 days (minus 225 days of credit). In calculating the maximum term of confinement, the court aggregated three of the minor’s previously sustained petitions with his current offense for a combined term of six years.
The minor filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
The minor first contends there is insufficient evidence to sustain the allegation of vehicle theft because there was no evidence that he actually drove the car after learning it was stolen. His claim lacks merit.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, “‘[t]he test on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the trier of fact, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court must view the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment (order) to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence--that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value--such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the minor guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In making such a determination we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to [the People] and presume in support of the judgment (order) the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’” (In re Paul C. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 43, 52.) “‘Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends. [Citation.] Thus, if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of the fact finder.’” (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)
“Before the judgment [(order)] of the trial court can be set aside for the insufficiency of the evidence, it must clearly appear that on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict of the [trier of fact].” (People v. Hicks (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 423, 429.)
Section 10851, subdivision (a) provides that “[a]ny person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or without intent to steal the vehicle . . . is guilty of” vehicle theft.
Viewed most favorably to the judgment (order), the evidence shows the minor was driving the car erratically at 4:00 a.m., just hours after it was reported stolen. His passenger, Mullen, was rumored to have stolen the car. After pulling into the 76 gas station, the minor remained in the driver’s seat with the engine running while Mullen talked to the occupants of the other car (first from the passenger seat and then standing beside their car). According to Brown, Mullen said, “We just stole this car. We’re going to take this girl to [Stockton].” Roach testified that Mullen said the car was stolen, but did not specify who had stolen it. Both Brown and Roach testified that, when Mullen told them the car was stolen, the minor was present and in a position to hear that statement, given the proximity of the two cars, the fact that the windows were open and the absence of ambient noise.
In the absence of evidence that the minor drove the car away from the 76 station, we must infer that the juvenile court believed Brown’s version of the statements made by Mullen. Those statements provide substantial evidence that the minor knew the car was stolen as he drove it to the gas station.
Equally significant is the inference to be drawn from the fact that the minor was in possession of the stolen car under questionable circumstances. Knowing possession by a defendant of recently stolen property raises a strong inference he or she was aware it was stolen. (People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 985; People v. Bugg (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 811, 817 [possession of stolen property accompanied by suspicious circumstances justifies drawing an inference that property was received with knowledge it had been stolen].) “This inference is so substantial that only ‘slight’ additional corroborating evidence need be adduced in order to permit a finding of guilty.” (People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 421.)
It is undisputed the car was stolen. It is also undisputed the minor drove the car to the 76 gas station (a fact that was corroborated by both witnesses) just hours after it was reported stolen. He remained in the driver’s seat with the engine running as Mullen--the minor’s passenger and the acknowledged car thief--conversed with Roach and Brown. He remained silent when Mullen bragged that they had stolen the car, expressing no surprise at the fact the car was stolen and making no protest at Mullen’s inclusion of him in the crime. Those facts, in conjunction with the minor’s undisputed possession of the stolen car, provide sufficient corroboration that the minor knew the car was stolen when he drove it to the 76 station.
The minor’s second contention, that the maximum term of confinement for the vehicle theft and his three prior misdemeanors is four rather than six years, is conceded by the People. We accept that concession and direct a modification of the judgment (dispositional order) accordingly.
DISPOSITION
The judgment (dispositional order of September 18, 2006) is modified such that the minor’s maximum term of confinement is four years. The juvenile court is directed to amend the dispositional report to reflect that modification. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MORRISON, Acting P. J., ROBIE, J.