Opinion
B187138
12-7-2006
In re CHRISTOPHER H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER H., Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Bruce Zucker and Bruce Zucker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Marc E. Turchin and Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Christopher H. appeals from a juvenile court order after an adjudication under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he violated Penal Code section 314, subdivision 1. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
Section 602 provides that, with certain exceptions, any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any state law is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 16, 2004, appellant admitted the allegations contained in a petition filed pursuant to section 602 that he had made a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422) and committed battery (Pen. Code, § 243.2, subd. (a).) The juvenile court ordered appellant into camp community placement and continued probation conditions that had previously been imposed from a prior petition.
The incidents giving rise to the charges in the instant case occurred on October 25, 2004, when appellant approached Rachel and Crystal M. Appellant showed Rachel his penis, and said "You know you want this. We can go to the room." On October 27, 2004, Crystal M. was below Rachel on the stairwell, when she saw appellant following Rachel. Crystal M. yelled at Rachel to move, but appellant grabbed Rachels buttocks. Rachel turned, cursed at appellant and tried to hit him. Appellant then slapped her in the face. Crystal M. testified that she was upset, and that she thought appellants actions were "nasty." In response to appellants counsels questions, she stated that appellant was smiling and laughing, trying to be funny.
The briefs and the record do not indicate a last name or initial for Rachel.
On November 9, 2004, a notice of probation violation was filed which alleged appellant committed three separate violations: Refusing to follow instructions given by the assistant principal; being involved in a gang-related verbal altercation; and failing to maintain proper conduct in school. Appellant admitted to being in violation of probation, and the juvenile court ordered him suitably placed.
On February 14, 2005, a petition was filed against appellant pursuant to section 602 which alleged that appellant committed: A criminal threat under Penal Code section 422 (count 1); battery on school, park, or hospital property under Penal Code section 243.2, subdivision (a) (counts 2 and 4); sexual battery under Penal Code section 243.4, subdivision (e)(1) (counts 3 and 5); and indecent exposure under Penal Code section 314, subdivision (1) (count 6).
After counts 1, 2, and 3 were dismissed on the prosecutors motion, the juvenile court held a contested hearing. The juvenile court subsequently found the remaining three counts true and ordered appellant to be placed in a camp community placement for a term of three months.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Whether sufficient evidence supported a finding that appellant violated Penal Code section 314, subdivision (1)
We disagree with appellants contention that there was insufficient evidence that he violated Penal Code section 314, subdivision (1).
In reviewing a claim based on the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the verdict below to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) All conflicts in the evidence and questions of credibility are resolved in favor of the verdict, and every reasonable inference the jury could draw from the evidence is indulged. (People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.) The same standard is applicable in reviewing a conviction of a juvenile. (In re Miguel L. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 100, 105.)
Penal Code section 314, subdivision (1), punishes a person who willfully and lewdly exposes his person, or private parts, in any public place, or in any place where there are persons to be offended or annoyed.
A person who acts "lewdly" within the meaning of Penal Code section 314, subdivision (1), intends by his conduct to direct public attention to his genitals for purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or affront. (In re Smith (1972) 7 Cal.3d 362, 365 [defendant who sunbathed in the nude on an isolated beach, without the intent to engage in sexual activity did not willfully and lewdly expose private parts of his body].)
In People v. Archer (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 402, 404, the defendant exposed his penis to the female victim during an incident of "`road rage" while yelling at her, "`suck [my] dick." The court rejected the defendants contention that his actions did not come within the definition of lewd conduct because he did not intend to sexually arouse the female victim. Rather, the court concluded that a person does not have to act for purposes of either sexual arousal or gratification to violate Penal Code section 314, as long as he acts for purposes of "`sexual affront." (People v. Archer, supra, at p. 406.) The court held the defendants actions of angrily exposing his penis, accompanied by the comment, "`suck [my] dick," could reasonably be characterized by the jury as an act for purposes of sexual affront, rather than for purposes of nonsexual affront. (Id. at pp. 406-407.)
Here, appellant exposed his penis to Rachel while telling her, "You know you want this. We can go to the room." The evidence supports the inference that appellant exposed himself for purposes of sexual gratification, arousal, or affront. That conclusion is also supported by the fact that appellant later grabbed Rachels buttocks.
Nor is appellant assisted by his citation to In re Dallas W. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 937. In that case, Division One of this District found that there was no evidence that the defendant teenager bared his buttocks "`lewdly" when he twice "moon[ed]" oncoming traffic. (Id. at p. 939.) Appellant claims that Crystal M.s testimony showed that he was only joking. However, Crystal M. also stated that she was upset, and that his actions were nasty. Appellants action of grabbing his penis, and telling Rachel that he knew she wanted it, and they could go away to a room, constitutes sufficient evidence that appellant exposed himself in order to obtain sexual gratification, arousal, or affront.
We note that the court in People v. Archer disagreed with In re Dallas W., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at page 940 to the extent it may have suggested that a person does not violate Penal Code section 314 "if he does not intend `"to arouse himself or a third person by his act." [Citation.]" (People v. Archer, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 406.) Rather, the defendant must also have not intended exposure for the purpose of "`sexual affront" in order to escape the meaning of Penal Code section 314. (People v. Archer, supra, at p. 406.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur:
BOREN, P.J.
CHAVEZ, J.