Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Superior Court No. 73481
Lambden, J
Appellant Jennifer Z. (mother) seeks to reverse the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 and requests this matter be remanded, contending there were defects in the notice provided below pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). We affirm the juvenile court’s order.
All further statutory references herein are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise stated.
BACKGROUND
We have already stated significant background facts in Jennifer Z. v. Superior Court, case No. A112766, filed on March 14, 2006, a previous nonpublished opinion in which we denied mother’s previous writ petition. We quote from its summary of the background facts:
To obtain context, maintain consistency, and economize judicial resources, we take judicial notice of this prior opinion. (Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (a); see In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 674, fn. 3.)
“Christopher was born in April 2004. On November 15, 2004, the San Mateo County Human Services Agency (agency) filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) and (e) alleging that Christopher came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court because he had suffered severe nonaccidental injuries caused by his father.
“At the initial detention hearing on November 16, 2004, the court found that there was substantial danger to the physical health of Christopher and ordered his removal from the home. The court order stated that mother was to have unlimited visits with Christopher. The court also issued a ‘no contact order’ as to the father.
“Agency filed an amended petition on November 24, 2004, pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) and (e). The petition alleged that, on November 11, 2004, Christopher ‘suffered extensive retinal hemorrhaging, a subdural hematoma to the right side of the head requiring neurosurgical procedures, two bruises on the left anterior chest wall, two left side rib fractures, abrasions to the right eyelid and above the right eye, and a bruise under the mandible, and the father, who was the sole caretaker of the child at the time, provided conflicting stories as to how the injuries occurred, and medical professionals indicate the explanations are not consistent with the sustained injuries which are indicative of non-accidental trauma[.] Further, the parents did not seek timely emergency medical attention for the child’s injuries, and the mother has stated to the social worker that regardless of the medical opinions, she believes the father accidentally dropped the child.’
“The agency’s addendum to the detention report dated December 6, 2004, stated that staff at the Santa Clara Valley Medical Center ‘was concerned about the mother’s unwillingness to accept the strong medical evidence suggesting that the child’s injuries were the result of non-accidental trauma, specifically, of shaking.’ There was concern that the ‘mother appeared to be in some state of denial.’ The social worker indicated that when she contacted the mother, the mother verified that hospital staff told her that Christopher’s injuries indicated Shaken Baby Syndrome, but the mother believed that the father accidentally dropped him. The mother’s relatives reported that they have unsuccessfully tried to convince mother that Christopher’s injuries were not accidental but likely the result of shaking. The child’s maternal grandmother reported that she was concerned ‘that the mother has remained primarily attached to the father rather than to the child . . . .’
“Christopher was released from the hospital on December 13, 2004, and placed in a medically fragile infant home . . . . Mother participated in his physical and occupational therapy; she also attended his medical appointments.
“The jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on March 14, 2005. The agency’s report dated March 10, 2005, stated that mother’s inability or unwillingness ‘to critically assess the father’s likely culpability in causing the child’s injuries, despite the considerable evidence that has been represented to her[,]’ placed the child at risk for further harm. The social worker for the agency observed that mother continued to wear a diamond engagement ring and stated ‘that she still hopes to marry the father because “we still love each other,” but that currently “we’re waiting to see what happens in court.” ’
“The agency’s report stated that psychologist Mark Patterson conducted a mental evaluation of mother. He noted that mother appeared to be of average intelligence but her self-insight was ‘limited.’ Mother told him that she trusted the father to care for Christopher regardless of the child’s injuries. He recommended that mother ‘may benefit from services as she does appear “capable and willing” to accept assistance for herself and her child; however, she “does not appear ready to dissociate herself from her fiancé.” ’ He believed that mother could benefit from services and that she should be provided the opportunity to develop into a protective parent. He stated that ‘it is his hope that the mother may be able to forge a trusting relationship with a skilled clinician such that this denial [that the father abused their child] can be pierced, thereby allowing her to develop the necessary protective parenting qualities.’
“At the conclusion of the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, Christopher was made a dependent child. Services were bypassed as to father and reunification services were offered to mother.
“For the six-month family reunification services review hearing held on October 31, 2005, the agency provided a report dated September 1, 2005, and an amended report dated October 26, 2005, for this hearing. The initial report stated that mother had attended 10 out of 18 GED sessions for her first set of GED classes, but the amended report indicated that she did not attend any of her GED classes in the second session. Thus, she did not attend the GED program from June 2005 until mid-October 2005, when she reenrolled in the GED program.
“The agency’s amended report indicated that mother had completed the agency’s parenting class, and was attending a parenting class that was tailored specifically for mother’s needs. Mother was attending therapy sessions and her therapist stated the sessions were ‘going “okay.” ’ The agency reported that mother continued to attend physical therapy, occupational therapy, and infant development classes. In addition, mother visited Christopher each week and attended his medical appointments.
“The agency, however, expressed concerns about mother’s progress. In spite of mother’s participation in classes and attendance at medical appointments, mother ‘inconsistently’ utilized the skills during her visits and she admitted that she ‘cannot learn the skills in the manner in which they are demonstrated even though . . . [she] has the capacity to learn the skills in the manner in which the teachers and therapist demonstrate them.’ Although she attended sessions regularly, she did not incorporate this information into her time with Christopher and therefore did not benefit from these services. In addition, the social worker for the agency opined that mother was still not ready to dissociate herself from the father. The agency recommended termination of reunification services for mother due to her ‘inability to benefit and demonstrate substantive progress from the services . . . .’
“Despite the agency’s recommendations to terminate reunification services, the court ordered that reunification services continue for mother.
“On December 7, 2005, mother attended a hearing before the juvenile court regarding her other child, who was also a dependent of the court.
“On December 8, 2005, the agency filed a modification petition pursuant to section 388. The social worker for the agency stated that, on December 7, 2005, while attending a rap concert, she saw mother with father; mother had her arm around father’s waist. The social worker again observed them walking together in the parking lot. The following day, the social worker met with mother and told her that she saw mother with the father of Christopher at the concert. Mother ‘stared blankly’ when told this information and provided no response.
“On December 9, 2005, the court held a hearing on the section 388 motion. The court set the motion for a contested hearing on December 23, 2005. Subsequently, the court set the section 388 hearing for January 3, 2006.
At the same time, the court also heard the section 387 petition regarding Christopher’s sister. After hearing the evidence at the hearing, the court declared Christopher’s sister a dependent child of the court and sustained the section 387 petition.
“At the hearing on January 3, 2006, the social worker testified about seeing mother with Christopher’s father. She also stated that mother had failed to make progress with her therapist. She acknowledged that the petition did not specifically state that the failure to make substantive progress in therapy was a basis for terminating reunification services, but she explained that having no contact with the father and disassociating from him was part of her therapeutic plan. In the agency’s report dated December 28, 2005, the social worker reported that she had spoken to mother’s therapist. The therapist reported that mother ‘is so guarded’ that she ‘will not take it any further/deeper during sessions.’
“The court terminated mother’s reunification services and granted the section 388 motion as to Christopher. The court explained that mother had ‘repeatedly sat in this courtroom and heard this court admonish her as to the need to avoid all contact with’ Christopher’s father. Further, ‘[s]he has been admonished repeatedly in the past in court for dressing for court as if it were a date with [the father] and carried on in front of the court in this courtroom when [the father] was present as if things were just very, very cozy and was admonished of that fact on prior appearances. [¶] . . . [Mother] does not think for a moment that [the father] harmed Christopher.’ The court continued: ‘[Mother] obviously placed her relationship with [the father] above the importance of her relationship with her children.’ The court noted that Christopher was not in as grave danger as his sister because mother’s visits with him were supervised. The court emphasized that mother had flagrantly disobeyed the court orders knowing that she risked losing her other child and if, she would do this knowing she risks losing her child, ‘then she is someone who would risk anything and everything to do what she wants to do.’
“The court stated, even though it was terminating reunification services, it was allowing mother ‘to continue to attend all of the therapy sessions and to keep up the same visitation plan. [¶] I think realistically looking down the line, if we are not going to find an adoptive family for Christopher, I think it would be detrimental for his mother not to have the same amount of visiting time and contact with him. So I don’t want her contact with Christopher to change in any way.’
” After the court ordered the matter set for a section 366.26 hearing, mother filed the writ petition in this court, which we denied.
Section 366.26 Hearing
According to the agency’s April 2006 section 366.26 WIC report, an occupational therapist had determined that Chris was developmentally at seven months of age, with grasping motor skills of a 10-month-old. He was walking, and wore a protective helmet because he was very active and not always stable on his feet. It was unknown how much of his cognitive ability would progress and how long he would continue to suffer from seizures, but he had demonstrated the ability to progress in his development through his caretaker’s consistent support and daily implementation of occupation and physical therapy skills. The report also stated that “Christopher is facing life long challenges as ordinary child development and learning is a very, very slow process for him due [to] brain damage. Because of his extraordinary needs, it requires longer search time to find that special family who will raise and love him.”
The agency reported that the foster parents did not intend to adopt Christopher, and that his “extraordinary needs” made him difficult to place. The agency further reported that Christopher separated easily from his mother at the end of her visits, and asked that her visitation rights be terminated because, in the social worker’s experience, “such continued visitation is a barrier in the search for a permanent family for a child. . . . [T]he Agency records indicate that the mother’s visits are in a friendly visitor capacity at best, it would not be detrimental to terminate the visits.”
The court reduced the mother’s visits to once a week and ordered that the grandparents be evaluated for placement. The hearing was continued to August 14, 2006.
In its addendum to its section 366.26 WIC report, the agency reported that multiple families had expressed an interest in adopting Christopher, and that a social worker had traveled to Pennsylvania to meet with one prospective adoptive family.
At the August 14, 2006 hearing, a social worker testified that she ruled out Christopher’s grandparents for adoption purposes for various reasons. The juvenile court found that there was “abundant evidence beyond clear and convincing” that Christopher was adoptable, and that the agency had not just “latched on to the first couple that extended an interest” in adopting Christopher. The court stated that a doctor’s letter regarding Christopher was “extremely optimistic and very compelling” and that there was no reason Christopher would not continue to make progress. The court terminated parental rights and granted the agency permission to send Christopher to Pennsylvania for an extended visit, if that would not disrupt his medical coverage. The court denied mother’s request to stay Christopher’s visit or placement in Pennsylvania or continue mother’s visits pending an appeal.
Mother subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal. After the parties submitted their appellate briefs, they also provided supplemental briefing at our request regarding whether or not the juvenile court made an implied finding that the ICWA did not apply as part of its March 14, 2005 findings and orders, and whether or not any purported notice defects raised in this appeal should in any event be considered harmless error.
ICWA Notice and Responses
The agency indicated in its initial section 300 petition and its detention report that the ICWA might apply to Christopher’s case. The agency reported in a December 2004 addendum to its detention report that on November 17, 2004, a social worker notified the Sacramento Area Direction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Blackfeet Tribe of Browning, Montana, the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma in Tahlequah, Oklahoma, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians in Cherokee, North Carolina, and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokees in Park Hill, Oklahoma about the juvenile proceedings. The agency’s notices, which it did not submit to the court until its April 2006 section 366.26 WIC report, did not include information about Christopher’s paternal great-grandparents on his grandmother’s side. Along with the notices, the agency sent a letter to each of the tribes and the BIA, as well as to father and mother, which stated that “the Department has requested the father and paternal grandparents to provide any and all known demographic and identifying information with regards to the child and Indian ancestry. The father and paternal grandparents have been unable to provide some of the information requested. Any and all information we have obtained are included in the attached forms.”
The BIA wrote to the agency that the family had provided insufficient information substantiating any federally recognized tribe. The letter indicated that the family “must provide a history back to the year 1900 with names, birth dates and/or birthplaces of ancestors to help in establishing a biological link with the original ancestral tribal member(s).” The letter indicated that further information was needed on both the paternal and maternal side.
The social worker reported in the agency’s March 14, 2005 dispositional report that she had received letters from all four Indian tribes notified indicating that Christopher was not eligible for consideration under the ICWA, and she attached these letters to her report. The United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma stated that there was no evidence that Christopher was a descendant of anyone on the Keetoowah Roll, that he was not eligible for enrollment in the tribe, and that the tribe “will not intervene in this case.” The Cherokee Center for Family Services stated that, based on the information provided, Christopher was not eligible to register as a member of the tribe, was not considered an “Indian Child” under the ICWA in relation to the tribe, and that the tribe was “not empowered to intervene in this matter.” The Indian Child Welfare Act Program of the Blackfeet Tribe wrote that it had not found any of the persons identified in the agency’s notice in the Blackfeet tribal enrollment records, that Christopher was not an “Indian Child” under the ICWA, and that if the agency was “able to gather more information on the ancestry of the parents,” the program would review the tribal rolls again. The Cherokee Nation wrote that its Indian Child Welfare Program had examined its tribal records, that Christopher could not be traced in their tribal records through the adult relatives listed in the agency’s notice, that Christopher was not an “Indian Child” under the ICWA in relation to the Cherokee Nation, and that the Cherokee nation was “not empowered to intervene in this matter.”
The agency did not provide to the court all of the notice documentation to the BIA, the Indian tribes and the parents until it submitted its section 366.26 WIC report in April 2006, where it also included its letters indicating that it had attempted to obtain all known demographic and identifying information regarding Christopher’s Indian ancestry, but that some information could not be obtained.
At the March 14, 2005 jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, both mother and father submitted to the court’s jurisdiction on the basis of information provided to the court, including the March 14, 2005 social study report. The court found that notice had been provided as required by law. It also indicated that it had read and considered the social study report and admitted it into evidence, and that “[t]he factual grounds to support the findings requiring the assumption of custody are those stated on the record and/or in the report of the social worker.”
After the juvenile court’s March 14, 2005 findings and orders, the agency stated in numerous reports that the ICWA did not apply to this case. This included its June 27, 2005 interim review report, December 2, 2005 interim review report, December 9, 2005 interim review report, and December 27, 2005 jurisdiction/disposition report, as well as the 366.26 WIC report of April 2006 . These assertions were not challenged in the juvenile court at any time.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues that we must reverse the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights because of deficiencies in the ICWA notices sent by the agency. We disagree with mother about what constitutes deficiencies in these notices, and in any event conclude that any deficiencies amounted to harmless error in light of the tribes’ responses.
A. Legal Standards
“In 1978, Congress passed the [ICWA], which is designed to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum standards for removal of Indian children from their families and placement of such children ‘in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of child and family services programs.’ [Citations].)” (In re Marinna J. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 731, 734.) “The ICWA presumes it is in the best interests of the child to retain tribal ties and cultural heritage and in the interest of the tribe to preserve its future generations, a most important resource. [Citation.] Congress has concluded the state courts have not protected these interests and drafted a statutory scheme intended to afford needed protection. (25 U.S.C. § 1902.) The courts of this state must yield to governing federal law.” (In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460, 469.)
When the social services agency has reason to know the proceeding involves an Indian child, the agency must notify the Indian child’s tribe or the BIA (if the tribe’s identity cannot be determined) of the pending proceedings, and of the right to intervene. (In re Marinna J., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 739-740, fn. 4.) The agency’s duty is to inquire into the possibility of Indian ancestry and to act upon the information the family provides. The agency is not required to conduct an extensive independent investigation or to “cast about, attempting to learn the names of possible tribal units to which to send notices[.]” (In re Levi U. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 199.)
Former California Rules of Court, rule 1439 (rule 1439) provided in relevant part that if at any time after the filing of a section 300 petition the court has reason to know that a child may be an Indian child under the ICWA, notice of the proceedings is to be given to the relevant Indian tribes of the proceedings and their right to intervene. (Former rule 1439(f).) Among other things, the rule required that notices be sent “to the tribal chairperson unless the tribe has designated another agent for service” (former rule 1439(f)(2)), and “for every hearing thereafter unless and until it is determined that the act does not apply to the case.” (Former rule 1439(f)(5).) The agency providing notice is required to file with the court “a copy of the notice sent and the return receipt, as well as any correspondence received from the Indian entity relevant to the minor’s status.” (In re Marinna J., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 739, fn. 4; In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 175-176 [noting that “[m]ost appellate courts considering the issue have held the ICWA notice, and return receipts and responses of the Bureau or tribe, if any, must be filed with the juvenile court”].)
In 2005, when the agency provided the ICWA notice discussed herein, former rule 1439 contained the governing rules. Certain Welfare and Institutions Code sections have now become a part of the ICWA notice framework, most notably Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, and former rule 1439 has now been revised as California Rules of Court, rule 5.664. These new authorities are essentially the same in substance as former rule 1439.
As this court has previously observed in In re I.G. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1246, “[n]oncompliance with ICWA has been a continuing problem in juvenile dependency proceedings conducted in this state, and, by not adhering to this legal requirement, we do a disservice to those vulnerable minors whose welfare we are statutorily mandated to protect.” (Id. at p. 1254.) As we also stated in that case, “we agree with those courts that have emphasized the importance of strict compliance with ICWA notice requirements and, if necessary, have remanded the matter for the juvenile court to ensure that proper notice is given.” (Ibid.)
At the same time, we recognize that substantial compliance with ICWA notice requirements may be sufficient under certain circumstances. (In re Christopher I. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 533, 564.) Moreover, “errors in ICWA notice are subject to harmless error review” (Nicole K. v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 779, 784), and reversal and remand is not necessarily required if “the tribe has . . . expressly indicated no interest in the proceedings.” (In re Desiree F., supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 472.) However, in such circumstances it must be established that proper notice was given, or at the very least that the person indicating no interest has the authority to do so on the tribe’s behalf. (See In re H.A. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1213-1215; In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 509.) In short, “[d]eficient notice under the ICWA is usually prejudicial [citation] but not invariably so.” (In re Antoinette S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1411.)
B. Ancestor Information
Mother first contends that the agency’s ICWA notices were deficient because they did not contain information about Christopher’s paternal great-grandparents on his father’s side, although it was “apparent” from the grandmother’s testimony at the section 366.26 hearing that the paternal grandparents were not separated, and “there was no evidence that the grandfather was unable to remember even the names of his own parents[.]” Mother asserts that the information was relevant because both Blackfeet and Cherokee ancestry was claimed for the grandfather, stating “[i]t appears from the notices and also from respondent’s brief that its’ social worker missed the fact that a person has four, not just two, paternal great-grandparents.” Moreover, mother contends that “the juvenile court made no findings or comments regarding the ICWA notices, or whether or not ICWA applied[,]” and that it is for the trial court, rather than this court, to determine if the agency’s notice efforts comply with the ICWA standards.
Mother’s argument must be rejected. The record contains undisputed evidence that the agency satisfied its duties regarding ancestry information in its ICWA notices. “The Agency must provide all known information to the tribe, particularly that of the person with the alleged Indian heritage.” (In re Louis S. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 622, 631, italics added.) As we have indicated, the agency accompanied its notices with letters, which were sent to mother and father as well as the tribes and the BIA, stating that it had requested the father and paternal grandparents to provide “any and all known demographic and identifying information with regards to the child and Indian ancestry. The father and paternal grandparents have been unable to provide some of the information requested. Any and all information we have obtained are included in the attached forms.” Despite receiving this letter, nothing in the record indicates that mother or father, or any members of their family, ever submitted further information to the agency. We can only conclude from this record that, contrary to mother’s contentions on appeal, the agency provided all of the available information on Christopher’s ancestry to the Indian tribes in its notices, thereby fulfilling its obligation.
Mother’s argument implies that the agency was somehow obligated to further inquire about Christopher’s ancestry after the March 14, 2005 jurisdictional/dispositional hearing because the court never made any findings regarding the ICWA. We do not agree. Although appellate courts are not in complete agreement on the point, and the issue is not addressed by the parties in the present appeal, we are of the view that a juvenile court’s finding that the ICWA does not apply may be implied from the record. Division Three of this district has stated that “[w]hile the record must reflect that the court considered the issue and decided whether ICWA applies, its finding may be either express or implied. [Citations.]” (In re Asia L, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 506; but see In re Antoinette S., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413 [stating that the court “recently suggested juvenile courts should make an explicit rather than implicit determination as to the applicability of the ICWA,” citing also to In re Jennifer A. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 692, 705].)
In her supplemental briefing, mother argues the record does not indicate the court considered the ICWA at the March 14, 2005 hearing. We disagree. The record indicates that the juvenile court considered whether or not the ICWA applied. The juvenile court found that all notices had been provided as required by law, indicated that it had read and considered the March 14, 2005 social study report (which referred to and attached the tribe’s responses), and stated that “[t]he factual grounds to support the findings requiring the assumption of custody are those stated on the record and/or in the report of the social worker.” The court’s failure to make an express finding is understandable in light of the mother and father’s submission to the court’s jurisdiction on the basis of, among other things, the social study report itself. We conclude from these circumstances that the court found that the ICWA did not apply to Christopher. Thus, the agency appropriately stated in five subsequent reports to the court that the ICWA did not apply to this case. As we have indicated, the agency’s obligation to provide ICWA notices under the governing California Rules of Court at the time was limited to the period of time prior to a determination that the ICWA did not apply to the case. (Former rule 1439(f)(5).) The agency had no duty to make further inquiries to the family about Christopher’s ancestry after the court’s implied finding in March 2005 that the ICWA did not apply.
Mother also argues in her supplemental briefing that the juvenile court could not make a proper ICWA finding, implied or otherwise, in March 2005 because the agency did not submit to the court at that time the notices sent to the tribes and the return receipts. (See In re Marinna J., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 739, fn. 4; In re Karla C., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 175-176; In re Asia L, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 509, citing In re H.A., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1213-1214.) We reject this argument because the agency did submit these documents as a part of its section 366.26 WIC report in April 2006, and they are a part of the appellate record. Based upon our review of these documents, the tribes’ responses, and our discussion herein, we find the agency’s failure to submit these documents to the juvenile court prior to the March 2005 hearing was harmless error. (In re Asia L., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 509 [indicating that the failure to submit necessary documents is harmless error if the response from the tribe comes from a person who the evidence indicates has the authority to speak for the tribe or is the authorized agent].)
C. Any Deficiencies in the Notices Were Harmless Error
Mother further argues that the notices to the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians, the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, and the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians were not properly addressed because they referred to the tribes only, and did not also name the tribal chair or agent designated by the tribes in the Federal Register at the time. Moreover, notice to the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians was sent to an address other than that listed in the Federal Register. The governing rule and the record supports these contentions. (See former rule 1439(f)(2) [directing notice “to the tribal chairman unless the tribe has designated another agent for service”]; 68 Fed. Reg. 68408 (Dec. 8, 2003) [listing “Dallas Proctor, Chief” as the designated agent for the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians and “Chadwick Smith” as the “Principal Chief” of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma], and [the “Director Family Support Services” for the “Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians”].) Nonetheless, mother is incorrect that any reversal or remand is necessary here.
Mother incorrectly cites to “68 Fed. Reg. 235,” although she correctly states the relevant date as December 8, 2003.
First, regarding the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, mother concedes that “the Director of Family Support Services signed the letter sent back to the social worker. This may demonstrate notice received by the correct tribal agent for the Eastern Band.” We agree that this response disposes of any issue about the adequacy of this notice under harmless error analysis because the responding party undoubtedly had the authority to speak on behalf of her tribe. (See In re Desiree F., supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 472; In re H.A., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1213-1215; In re Asia L., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 509.).
Respondent concedes that there was no ICWA finding by the court at the section 366.26 hearing, and that the address for the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians was incorrect, and “requests a limited remand to the juvenile court for findings and decision on the applicability of ICWA.” Despite mother’s arguments and the agency’s apparent concession prior to its supplemental briefing that at least a limited remand should occur here, we do not think any reversal or remand is appropriate. Although the address for the notice to the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians is incorrect, the designated agent for these tribes is not listed on the notices, and the tribes’ chiefs or designated agents do not sign the tribes’ letters to the social worker, we nonetheless conclude that any deficiencies in these notices are harmless error in light of the tribes’ responses. This is because the designated agent for each of these tribes (Dallas Proctor, Chief for the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians and Chadwick Smith, Principal Chief for the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma) are listed with these same titles on the letterhead of each tribe’s response letter. This evidence leaves us with no doubt that the person responding, in each case on behalf of an “Indian Child Welfare” division of the tribe, had the authority to speak on the tribe’s behalf. Accordingly, we find the issues raised by mother regarding these notices amount to harmless error. (See In re Desiree F., supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 472; In re H.A., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1213-1215; In re Asia L, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 509.)
To be exact, the Cherokee Nation’s letter lists “Chad ‘Corntassel’ Smith” as its Principal Chief.
In her supplemental briefing, mother contends these letters were deficient, citing other cases which refer to letter responses; however, those cases do not indicate that the person responding was from the tribe’s Indian child welfare division, or that the tribe’s designated agent was listed on the letter itself. (See In re Desiree F., supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 472 [also referring to hearing testimony indicating that only the tribal council could determine tribal membership, not the letter’s signatory, a former tribal chairman, and indicating that the letter should not have been considered over the tribe’s objection when it was not admitted into evidence]; In re Asia L., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th 509; In re H.A., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1213-1214 [also criticizing that the actual response was not submitted to the court].) The courts’ findings regarding these letters are inapposite here.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
We concur: Kline, P.J, Haerle, J.