Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County No. DL030960, Joy W. Markman, Judge.
Amanda F. Benedict, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey J. Koch and Pamela Ratner Sobeck, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.
Christian G. appeals from an order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) based upon the court’s finding he participated in gang-related drug sales. He contends he could not have participated in the subject sales because, at the time they were going on, he was attending court on another matter. We find sufficient evidence to support the court’s findings and affirm its order.
FACTS
On June 11, 2008, the Santa Ana Police Department, in conjunction with several other law enforcement agencies, conducted a surveillance operation along the block of 1700 Evergreen Street in Santa Ana. The operation was designed to target a criminal street gang called F.T.L. (Fuck the Law), which peddled drugs in the area. Appellant was no stranger to the gang or the area. In fact, he lived just a block away and was a documented member of F.T.L.
Santa Ana Police Corporal Carol Leiva, a highly experienced narcotics officer, was the eyes of the operation. She was parked about 50 to 100 yards from the targeted area and began her surveillance at about 2:00 p.m. Although she used her binoculars from time to time, she was close enough to the scene that she could see people’s faces without visual assistance. As she watched the area, she broadcast her observations to other officers who were staked out in the vicinity.
People were coming and going, as would be expected, and there was a vending truck doing business in the area. But that wasn’t the only business going on. Leiva also noticed several people selling drugs, including Francisco Sanchez. He would either personally contact the customers (some of whom arrived by car in an alley behind Evergreen), or direct other people to carry out the sales. Sanchez appeared to be a key player in the sales ring, so Leiva kept a close eye on him. Leiva also noticed about a dozen other people who appeared to be involved in the operation, in one way or another.
Some of those people, including codefendant Angel Q. and a boy known as “Junior,” were acting as lookouts, keeping a watch out for the police and potential customers. And others, like appellant, were involved in what Leiva described as a “broker’s” role. Appellant would approach people in their cars and talk to them briefly. Then he would gesture to one of the dealers — usually Sanchez — and that person would come over and consummate the sale. Leiva did not see appellant engage in any actual drug transactions. Rather, he would simply find out what the customers wanted and hook them up with a dealer.
The buyers had a wide choice of drugs that day, including rock cocaine, cocaine base and methamphetamine.
Over the course of her surveillance, Leiva saw appellant do this about four or five times. She broadcast her observations over the radio and provided a description of appellant to the other officers in the area. However, she did not include any time references in her broadcasts. And at trial, she was unable to recall what time it was when she saw appellant working the street with Sanchez.
Santa Ana Police Officer Roland Andrade testified he received Leiva’s description of appellant at approximately 2:30 p.m., which comports with what he wrote in his report. Andrade explained that time “was based upon my estimate as to when Corporal Leiva had announced that [appellant and] Marco Garcia had come onto the street. I recall referencing my watch [and writing the time] on my notes.”
At approximately 4:00 p.m., Andrade gave the signal, and roughly 25 police officers descended on the area. The officers detained about 15 suspects, and after they were handcuffed and lined up on the ground, Leiva came over to identify them. She did not recognize five of the suspects, and they were released. However, she recognized all the other suspects, including appellant, based on their clothing and physical appearance. She also described what role each of the suspects played in the drug operation. Some of the suspects had drugs and cash on them, but appellant was carrying neither. He denied being involved in any of the drug sales and claimed he was just walking home. When asked if he had been acting as a lookout, he hesitated and then shrugged his shoulders. He did admit being a member of F.T.L.
Andrade recognized appellant after he was detained and commented he was “good to go” because he was on probation for selling drugs. However, appellant was not arrested until after Leiva identified him. And the court did not consider Andrade’s comment or appellant’s probation status in assessing his culpability. This was the correct thing to do. (See Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).)
The defense was misidentification. Court records and testimony from court personnel established that appellant personally appeared for a truancy hearing in Department L-21 of the Lamoreaux Justice Center at approximately 3:20 p.m. on the day in question. The hearing lasted just three or four minutes, and after it was over, appellant boarded a bus with his mother Ana and sister Alejandra. Ana testified they caught the bus about 3:30, and Alejandra testified it took them about 12 to 15 minutes to make the six-mile trip to their neighborhood. After getting off the bus at Edinger and Standard, they began walking toward their house, which is on Cedar Street, a block over from Evergreen. Ana was in a hurry to get home, so she took Cedar Street, while Alejandra and appellant walked down Evergreen. According to Alejandra, they intended to get to their house by crossing through the alley, but appellant stopped at the vending truck on Evergreen for a soda. When he did, the police descended on the area and detained him.
In closing argument, defense counsel argued appellant was “in the wrong place at the wrong time” and had nothing to do with the drug activity that had been going on in the area. However, the court found otherwise. Describing Leiva as a “credible” witness, the court noted she did “not seem to hesitate or equivocate at all or appear uncertain in her testimony regarding her observations.” The court was less taken by Andrade’s testimony. Although he testified he received Leiva’s description of appellant at 2:30 p.m., just 45 minutes before appellant appeared for his truancy hearing, the court surmised he may have “had the wrong time.” In any event, based on the strength of Leiva’s testimony alone, the court found that appellant was involved in the subject sales activity and that he participated in, and acted for the benefit of, a criminal street gang.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings. In fact, he claims it would have been downright impossible for him to be involved in the drug sales that Leiva described. We disagree.
“‘“In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the question we ask is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” [Citation.] We apply an identical standard under the California Constitution. [Citation.] “In determining whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, ‘[we]... presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Meija (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 86, 93.) We do not resolve credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts: “‘Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. [Citation.] Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support’” the challenged finding. (Ibid.; see also In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371 [the same standard of review applies in juvenile court cases].)
The challenged finding in this case is that appellant participated in the drug sales that Leiva observed and reported on during her surveillance. As the trial court noted, Leiva was quite certain in her testimony that appellant brokered several of the sales and worked in conjunction with the head dealer, Sanchez. Leiva also identified appellant following his arrest as one of the individuals who was involved in the sales activity. Therefore, unless Leiva’s testimony was physically impossible or inherently improbable, it would be sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding.
In challenging Leiva’s version of events, appellant contends the evidence indisputably established he was in truancy court from 1:00 p.m. until 3:20 p.m. on the day in question. That is not so. According to the staff and records of Department L-21, the afternoon session of the truancy calendar usually begins around 1:30 p.m. However, on the day in question, it did not commence until around 3:00 p.m., and appellant’s case was not called until around 3:20 p.m. And although appellant personally appeared at his hearing, the evidence did not establish when he arrived at the courtroom for the hearing. If, as is possible, he showed up just before his case was called, he could have participated in the subject drug sales before going to court, even by Andrade’s testimony.
Andrade testified he heard Leiva broadcast her description of appellant at 2:30 p.m. And, according to Leiva, appellant’s role in the operation was rather limited, in that all he did was “broker” sales between buyers and sellers. This simply entailed appellant flagging down buyers, seeing what they wanted, and then calling over a seller to consummate the deal. Leiva testified she saw appellant do this about four or five times, so it’s conceivable appellant’s participation in the operation could have lasted as little as 15 minutes. If that were the case, he would have been able to leave the scene by around 2:45 p.m. and arrive in time for his court appearance at 3:20 p.m. Moreover, if, as the court surmised, Andrade got the time wrong, and Leiva saw appellant on the scene earlier than 2:30, appellant would have had even more time to make his court hearing. This is not beyond the realm of possibility.
It is also possible that appellant participated in the drug sales after he appeared in court. According to the defense testimony, appellant boarded a bus near the courthouse with his mother Ana and sister Alejandra at around 3:30 p.m., and the ride to their neighborhood took about 12 to 15 minutes. Upon exiting the bus, Ana went straight home on Cedar Street, but appellant and Alejandra took Evergreen, and appellant was detained near the vending truck at around 4:00. Given that they arrived in the neighborhood around 3:45, this would have given appellant enough time to participate in the sales activity before the police swooped in. Again, appellant’s window of opportunity to participate would not have been that wide, but given the limited role he played, he conceivably would have had enough time to broker a few sales. Suffice it to say, Leiva’s testimony implicating him in the operation was not physically impossible or inherently improbable. Therefore, we must uphold the trial court’s findings.
At oral argument, appellant’s attorney alleged that, in making its ruling, the trial court “misrecollected” the facts and confused appellant with codefendant Angel Q. However, that is not the case. At page 434 of the reporter’s transcript, the court separately analyzed each defendant’s role in the drug operation and correctly described appellant as a “broker” and Angel as a “lookout.” The court also observed that a boy known as “Junior” assisted Angel in “looking up and down the street” for the police and customers. This is an accurate description of Leiva’s testimony.
Unfortunately, appellant’s attorney has not been entirely accurate in her description of Leiva’s testimony. In her brief, and during oral argument, she claimed Leiva testified that in addition to brokering some of the drug sales, appellant also conversed and socialized with many of the dealers who were selling drugs that day. The claim was designed to undermine Leiva’s identification of appellant, because appellant’s theory of the case was that he was only at the scene for a very short period of time. As it turns out, however, Leiva was actually describing Angel’s interaction with the dealers, not appellant’s, when she testified “[t]hey were very friendly. They seemed to be joking around. They were laughing [and] having short conversations. They would walk over to the vending truck a short distance away, buy things, come back and talk and eat, and things of that nature.” We have no reason to believe appellant’s attorney intentionally misrepresented the facts in this regard, but it is clear to us that — just as counsel accused the trial court of doing — she inadvertently “misrecollected” the facts and confused her client with Angel.
Having said that, we fully acknowledge the strength of appellant’s defense. Appellant and a lot of his witnesses must have been singularly unconvincing and Corporal Leiva powerfully credible for the trial court to have arrived at its decision. But because these things are neither impossible nor inherently incredible, the judgment must be affirmed.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: MOORE, J., ARONSON, J.