Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. J966501, Emily A. Stevens, Judge Presiding.
M. Elizabeth Handy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Amir Pichvai for Plaintiff and Respondent.
WOODS, J.
L.R. appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her children Christian A., Geneva G., and Monique G. Specifically she complains the court erred in terminating her parental rights in light of her “bond” with her children and in view of the relationships the minors shared with each other. Appellant’s claims lack merit. As set forth below, appellant failed to carry her burden to establish any exception to the termination of her parental rights and the court had sufficient evidence to support its order terminating parental rights. We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant, Her Children and the Dependency Petition.
Appellant has eight children. Her youngest three, Christian A. born in 1997, Geneva G. born in 1999, and Monique G. born in April 2000, are the subjects of this appeal.
In the original petition, detention reports and at the detention hearing the newborn Monique was referred to as “Melissa.” The parties subsequently notified the court that the newborn’s name had been changed to Monique.
The juvenile dependency court had previously declared the minors’ five older siblings dependents because of appellant’s history of drug abuse and because several of them had been born with drugs in their system. One of those siblings was adopted in 1999.
In late April 2000, a few days after Monique was born, the Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition alleging that the minors were in need of protection from their mother as the newborn Monique tested positive for cocaine and appellant had a 14-year history of drug abuse. The petition stated that the whereabouts of the minors’ fathers were unknown.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
Christian has a different father than Geneva and Monique. The alleged fathers are not parties to this appeal.
The detention report filed with the petition also disclosed the appellant’s apartment was dirty and that there was no food for the children. The report also revealed, among other information, that: (1) Monique was appellant’s fourth child born testing positive for drugs; (2) appellant had been in several drug treatment programs; and (3) for the prior two and a half years appellant and her children had resided in a number of locations -- including stays at a homeless shelter, various apartments, and stays with relatives. The court ordered the minors detained in DCFS foster care placement, and that appellant have monitored visits with the minors.
In 1986 appellant gave birth to the first of her four children who had tested positive for drugs as a newborn.
In June 2000, the juvenile dependency court sustained the section 300 petition, finding true the material allegations against appellant (and the alleged fathers). The court also ordered services and drug testing and drug treatment, counseling, and domestic and parenting program for appellant.
The children remained in their initial placements -- Christian was placed in a foster home and Geneva and Monique were placed together in a separate foster home.
Dependency Proceedings from June 2000 to November 2003
By mid-2000, appellant began a drug treatment program, had enrolled in a parenting program, and was testing “clean” for drugs. She also had monitored visits with the minors twice a week for an hour and a half. But by December 2000, appellant’s compliance with the court-ordered reunification plan became inconsistent. She had failed to attend a number of her parenting education and substance abuse counseling sessions, and had missed several drug tests. Nonetheless, appellant continued to visit the minors regularly.
In the report for the 6-month review hearing the DCFS recommended the court terminate reunification services and that the case be set for a selection and implementation hearing. The DCFS had initiated an adoption assessment, including a request for the identification of an adoptive family for all three minors. The children remained as placed in their foster homes and Geneva and infant Monique showed normal and healthy development. DCFS reports indicated that Christian suffered some developmental delays in socialization, cognitive and motor skills.
At the section 366.21, subdivision (e), hearing in early February 2001, the parties stipulated to three more months of reunification services for the minors’ parents, and the court stated, “[T]he record will reflect that I’ve had a very extensive conference with counsel, both before and after the noon hour. County counsel indicated to the Court his client would be willing to grant both mother and father three months more of family reunification. I’ll be honest. They’re looking more to the father[s], more probable family reunification . . . .”
By the 366.21, subdivision (f), hearing in June 2001, appellant’s compliance with the plan had not improved, though she had continued to visit the children. Likewise the alleged fathers had failed to comply with the reunification plan. The DCFS reported that the children had adjusted well to their foster homes. The DCFS requested the court terminate reunification services, and that the matter be set for a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing.
Though the minors were adoptable, their current caretakers were not interested in adopting them, and the permanent plan for them was adoption through recruitment of an adoptive family. The court found the parents had not complied with the case plan, terminated reunification services, and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing on October 30, 2001, to select a permanent plan for the minors.
At the selection and implementation hearing in late October 2001, the DCFS requested an additional six-month time to locate a prospective adoptive home.
As of April 2002, DCFS had not yet located an adoptive home for the minors, although adoption remained the plan. The DCFS also indicated that appellant’s whereabouts had become unknown to DCFS after she had left her drug treatment without completing the program. The DCFS also advised the court that appellant had not visited with the minors during the prior six months. The court ordered the minors into long-term foster care, although the plan remained adoption of all three minors by the same family because the DCFS identified them as a sibling group. In addition, the court believed that because the children were so young it might be possible to find an adoptive home for all three of them together.
By October 2002 when the court held a hearing to review the permanent plan, appellant had filed a section 388 petition, alleging she had now complied with the court-ordered case plan, and that she had regularly visited the minors. She requested a reinstatement of family reunification services. She presented evidence from a drug treatment center indicating that she had been in a residential drug treatment program since June 2002. She had completed a parenting program and was testing clean for drugs. As for the children, the DCFS reported Christian was diagnosed with mild mental retardation, and was a regional center client. Monique had some speech and language delays, and Geneva had been referred for speech evaluation. All three minors continued to reside in the same foster home where they had been placed -- Geneva and Monique together, and Christian in a separate foster home. The respective placements had been “stable and productive,” and appellant had visited the minors once a week.
In mid-February 2003, the court held a hearing on the section 388 petition and ultimately granted the petition for six more months of reunification services on condition that appellant remain in her drug program and continue to drug test. The court recognized the long history of this case but given that the DCFS was looking to place the minors together out of state with strangers, the court believed that it was in the minors’ best interest for appellant to be provided additional reunification services to see if the minors could go back to her. The court continued the proceedings to late April 2003 for further review and receipt of a report from DCFS regarding appellant’s progress.
On August 1, 2002, DCFS notified the court an adoptive parent of a biological sibling of the minors in Texas was interested in adopting the minors. The court ordered that a Foster Care ICPC be initiated with a Texas foster agency to conduct a home study. However, approximately six months later, the Texas social worker notified the DCFS that the home was not suitable.
By the end of April 2003, DCFS reported that mother was in counseling, taking psychotropic medication, drug testing and had been consistently visiting. The DCFS stated that the visits had gone well for all. The DCFS recommended unmonitored day visits. The court ordered six more months of reunification services, and unmonitored day visits, but kept the minors in a permanent plan of long-term foster care.
By the end of October 2003, it appeared appellant was in full compliance with the case plan and had rented a three-bedroom house in Van Nuys in anticipation of the minors returning to her care. The DCFS recommended the court terminate the prior placement order and that the children be returned to appellant. Thereafter, the court ordered the return of the minors to appellant and on November 18, 2003, consistent with DCFS’s continued recommendation, the children were placed in appellant’s home. The court also set the matter for a review hearing in six months.
Dependency Proceedings from December 2003 to January 2005
At the review hearing in late April 2004, pursuant to section 364, the DCFS informed the court appellant had shown some instability. Appellant had lost the house in Van Nuys due to the house not being up to code; and had difficulty finding a new residence. Appellant was waiting family preservation services and had reenrolled in a substance abuse program. The DCFS recommended the court retain jurisdiction over the case.
By the review hearing on October 27, 2004, the instability had continued, prompting DCFS to recommend that the court maintain jurisdiction over the case and continue the matter for another six-month review hearing. Although family preservation services were put into place in June 2004, appellant had missed case management meetings and was at risk of being terminated from the program. Appellant had also missed a number of drug tests. In addition, the family preservation in-home counselor generally described the family home life to be in disarray -- there were incidents of Christian walking home from school unsupervised; appellant not taking Christian to the doctor after he had been hurt; and appellant not attending parenting, counseling, and drug testing regularly. The counselor stated appellant was non-compliant with her family preservation case plan.
On January 5, 2005, the minors were detained from appellant. DCFS filed a petition pursuant to section 387 (incorrectly filed as a section 300 petition and subsequently amended by the court) alleging appellant had resumed drug use. Appellant admitted to the DCFS she used cocaine on January 2, 2005, and had missed two drug tests in December 2004. In addition, appellant and the minors had been evicted from their apartment approximately a month earlier and had been residing in a homeless shelter for the past two weeks. On January 10, 2005, the court ordered once again that the minors be detained in DCFS protective custody, and that mother’s visits be monitored.
The DCFS report for the adjudication and disposition hearing on the section 387 petition indicated appellant admitted her drug problem, and had once again enrolled in a drug treatment program. Appellant denied leaving the children unsupervised, but admitted that she had difficulty ensuring the minors’ school attendance. The DCFS report indicated that the minors had missed more school days than they had attended. The report further stated that the minors appeared to have a strong bond with their mother, but she had not visited them in approximately two weeks. The DCFS recommended the court deny appellant reunification services in light of her extensive drug history, and because previous services had proven to be ineffective in resolving her substance abuse problem. A letter from mother’s family preservation case worker described the family’s participation in the program as “extremely poor.” Among other things the letter highlighted the instability of the family’s housing and that during the preservation period, the minors did not bathe on a daily basis and wore the same clothes for several days at a time.
At the hearing on January 31, 2005, the court found that mother had not been in compliance with the case plan, and sustained the section 387 petition finding it true that appellant had a 19-year drug abuse history, and that she had resumed drug use, all of which placed the minors at risk of physical and emotional harm. The court terminated the home-of-mother order (made on November 18, 2003), and continued the matter to March 2005 for a determination on whether reasonable services should be offered to appellant.
Dependency Proceedings from January 2005 to Termination of Parental Rights in July 2007
In March 2005 the DCFS reiterated its request for no reunification services for appellant, and further recommended adoption of the minors. The DCFS informed the court appellant had been arrested on January 24, 2005, for possession of drug paraphernalia, for driving with a suspended license and without vehicle registration. Appellant visited the minors on one occasion only since they had been detained in January 2005, and that appellant had been subsequently terminated from her drug program for her failure to attend. The court denied appellant’s request for additional reunification services telling her: “The problem isn’t that you didn’t get child care and get them to school. The problem is that you went back to using. [¶] The fact that the children had been home for all of this time and that the services that have been out there and available to you and the counseling services did not help you stay away from drugs is of great concern. [¶] This case couldn’t go on forever, even in family maintenance services. The children are supposed to be able to go home with some family maintenance services. In this case it appears that that’s not gonna happen, not in the foreseeable future. Because if you are overwhelmed, you don’t go to the available resources that you need so you don’t start using again. [¶] It looks as if rather than utilize the services and the supports and the tools that you’ve been given, you fall back into old habits. [¶] The Department has provided the appropriate services, you have not resolved the issues . . . .” Thereafter, the court ordered that mother not be provided reunification services.
In April 2005 the foster family who had provided care to all three minors together since they had been detained in January 2005 could no longer keep them. Consequently Christian was placed in a new foster home, and Geneva and Monique were returned to the foster parents who had cared for them from 2000 until late 2003. Appellant had one visit with the children from February 2005 through the end of April 2005.
Adoption remained the appropriate plan, and DCFS continued in its recruitment efforts to locate an adoptive home for the minors. All three minors were having weekly weekend visits with each other in the home of their adult half-sibling. A DCFS report of October 2005 noted that the foster parents for Geneva and Monique observed behavioral changes in the girls after their sibling visits. According to the foster mother: “Geneva has been fighting at school and that she was not having this problem prior to the visits . . . [and] that the children are getting into more conflicts with each other and that when they play together they fight.” Christian remained in treatment for ADHD and poor impulse control, but was responding well to his new foster mother.
As of April 2006 the children remained in their respective foster homes where they continued to do well and thrive. The children referred to their caretakers as “grandma” and “granny” respectively. The DCFS report indicated the minors had two monitored visits with appellant -- one in late November 2005 and a second in December 2005. The minors’ caregivers were only interested in pursuing legal guardianship over the minors, and DCFS recommended the court set a section 366.26 hearing for a guardianship hearing. The report also indicated that the siblings continued to visit each other twice a month in the home of an adult sibling, but the report did not disclose how those visits had gone.
By the fall of 2006 the children were thriving in their placements and had bonded with their foster families. Adoption remained the permanent plan for the minors. Christian’s foster mother wanted to adopt him. Appellant had not visited with the minors since December 2005.
As of April 2007, Geneva and Monique’s foster mother was willing to adopt the girls, and Christian’s foster mother now had an approved adoptive home study. Appellant did not visit Geneva and Monique during this time period, and appellant had one visit with Christian on March 17, 2007. Although the social worker who monitored the visit stated that Christian and his mother appeared “bonded,” Christian’s school reported that Christian had behaved inappropriately at school around the time of his mother’s visit. There was concern Christian was exhibiting signs of regression after the visit.
The minors’ adult half-brother and adult half-sister were also interested in adopting the minors. Both Geneva and Christian told the social worker that they liked visiting with their half-siblings, but wished to remain in their respective foster homes. The minors visited with each other twice a month; the foster parents stated that the visits have “gone well.”
As of July 2007, DCFS recommended the court terminate parental rights. The minors’ respective caregivers were interested in adopting them, and the minors were bonded to their caregivers.
On July 9, 2007, the court conducted the section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing. Appellant testified at the hearing that she visited with Christian twice, and once a week with Geneva and Monique. In addition, mother testified that she had been in a drug treatment program for two months. She told the court she did not oppose the minors being adopted provided they were adopted by her adult children. On cross-examination, appellant testified she had three visits with the minors in May 2007, no visits in June 2007, and no visit thus far in the month of July. She further testified that she visited with Geneva and Monique at their T-ball games “at least two [times] for sure,” and that they would have ice cream after the games.
Appellant’s counsel argued that the parental relationship exception to termination applied based on her visitation with the children. In the alternative, counsel asserted the sibling relationship exception applied because “it would be detrimental for these siblings to be separated and adopted by different families since Christian is not going to be able to have visits with his siblings.”
Thereafter the court observed, “[o]ver the years, . . . other [of appellant’s] children have come into the system. And I now have 12 volumes in this file. . . . And it is not in their best interest to remain in the system until they are 18. The case itself has been here for more than 20 years. They are not going to be reunited with their mother.” The court found that the minors were adoptable and that there were families, including their adult siblings, who wished to adopt them. The court found the exceptions to adoption did not apply as mother did not have regular visits with the children, nor was there any “evidence whatsoever that there is any kind of relationship that would cause the court to find that the children would benefit from continuing that relationship under the circumstances. That if I did not terminate the parental rights at this time, the children would remain in the system. That they have a right to have a permanent and stable home. That any relationship with the parent is not of the parental nature. The mother does not provide the kind of relationship and activities that indicate a parental involvement. She visits more as a relative or friend. And those visits have remained monitored. And I do not find that the children would - that it would be detrimental to sever -- the relationship.” In addition, the court found that there was no evidence regarding sibling relationship that would point to detriment if parental rights were terminated. The court terminated mother’s parental rights.
Appellant timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
At the section 366.26 hearing the court must select and implement a permanent plan for the dependent child. The court has a number of alternatives in doing so: (1) termination of parental rights and adoption; (2) identification of adoption as the plan but without immediate termination of parental rights; (3) appointment of a guardian without termination of parental rights; or (4) long-term foster care. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (b); In re Jessie G. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1, 3.) Because the express purpose of section 366.26 is to provide stable permanent homes for dependent minors, the preferred placement plan among the four alternatives is adoption. (In re Ronell (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.)
Thus, in selecting a placement plan, the court must determine whether the child will be adopted based upon DCFS’s assessment concerning the likelihood of adoption if parental rights are terminated. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); 366.21, subd. (i).) If the court finds the child is adoptable, findings made at previous status review hearings are sufficient to support the termination of parental rights unless the court finds the termination would be detrimental to the child under one of the six exceptions to termination listed under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B). “The statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)
Effective January 1, 2008, the statutory exceptions to termination formerly in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A)-(F) have been re-numbered as 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i)-(vi).
In this court appellant does not challenge the court’s finding the minors are adoptable. Instead she asserts the court erred in terminating her parental rights because she presented sufficient evidence: (1) the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination in the former section 366.26(c)(1)(A) (now section 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i)) applied; and/or (2) sibling bond exception in the former section 366.26(c)(1)(E) (now section 366.26(c)(B)(v)) applied. Finally, rather than terminating parental rights, appellant argues that the court should have appointed a guardian for the minors.
A party claiming an exception to adoption has the burden of proof of establishing by the preponderance of the evidence that the exception applies. (In re Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 449.) Generally, challenges to a juvenile court’s determination under the parental relationship exception are governed by a substantial evidence standard of review. (See, e.g., In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576; In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 52-53.) Regarding the sibling relationship exception, appellate courts apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (See, e.g., In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1017; In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 250-251.) Under a substantial evidence standard of review “‘“the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,” to support the findings below. [Citation.] We must therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor in accordance with the standard of review so long adhered to by this court.’ [Citation.]” (Bickel v. City of Piedmont (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1040, 1053, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Eller Media Co. v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1219-1220, fn. 3.) We do not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 52-53.) With these principles in mind we turn to appellant’s claims.
Other courts have applied an abuse of discretion standard of review. (See, e.g., In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351; In re Aaliyah R., supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 449.) Under an abuse of discretion standard of review, we will not disturb the juvenile court’s decision unless the juvenile court exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination. (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) In this case, we need not decide whether a juvenile court’s ruling on the parental relationship exception is reviewed for abuse of discretion or substantial evidence, because, under either standard we affirm the juvenile court’s decision.
1. Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception
Under the parental relationship exception, the juvenile dependency court may forego adoption and refrain from terminating parental rights only if a parent establishes he or she has “maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” Thus the parental relationship exception is two-pronged, focusing on visitation and contact with the minor and benefit to the minor of continuing the relationship. (In re Aaliyah R., supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 450.)
“[T]o establish the [parental relationship exception], the parents must do more than demonstrate ‘frequent and loving contact’ [citation], an emotional bond with the child, or that the parents and child find their visits pleasant. [Citation.]” (In re Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1108.) Interaction between a natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. Even so, the parental relationship exception “requires that the parent-child relationship promote the well-being of the child to such a degree that it outweighs the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1342.) This exception must be considered in light of the legislative preference for adoption at this stage in the proceedings. The exception does not permit a parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child to derail an adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307, 309.)
To trigger the parental relationship exception, the parent must show the parent-child relationship is sufficiently strong that the child “would be greatly harmed” by its severance. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The court must take into account the many variables affecting a parent-child bond, including the age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between the parent and child, and the child’s particular needs. (Id. at p. 576.) In short, a “parental relationship” is necessary for the exception to apply, not merely a friendly or familiar one. (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th 1348-1349.) A relationship sufficient to support the visitation exception “aris[es] from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences.” (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 51.) “While friendships are important, a child needs at least one parent. Where a biological parent . . . is incapable of functioning in that role, the child should be given every opportunity to bond with an individual who will assume the role of parent.” (In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 854.)
Appellant failed to provide evidence sufficient to invoke the parental relationship exception. Considering the various factors used to assess whether the parent-child relationship is beneficial and important, we cannot say the juvenile court erred in terminating parental rights. As the record reflects, appellant failed to meet the prong of the parental relationship exception, regular visitation. Appellant visited the minors with some consistency from their original detention in 2000 until they were reunified with her in November 2003 and that visitation progressed from monitored weekly visits to unmonitored visits. However, after January 2005 when the children were detained for the second time, her visits became sporadic and infrequent; for months at a time she did not see them. The few times she did see the girls such as at a T-ball game, those visits were brief and merely like a friendly visitor, and in the case of Christian appeared to cause him some distress resulting in behavioral problems afterwards. Indeed throughout the lengthy history of this case it has emerged that appellant’s ability to maintain contact with her children depended on whether she was using drugs or in drug treatment. When she abused drugs she failed to maintain any contact with the children or the DCFS, and during her sober periods she did somewhat better. However, after 2005 none of the visits progressed beyond monitored.
In addition, there is little evidence to suggest that she is capable of functioning as a parent for any substantial period of time. The children have spent relatively little time in their mother’s custody. Before their original detention in 2000 Christian spent approximately his first two and one-half years with his mother, Geneva lived with her for a year and Monique was detained at birth. Even when she was able to regain custody for a little over a year (from November 2003 until January 2005), the record shows that she had difficulty acting as a parent for the children and difficulty in maintaining stable housing for them. As the court noted, she failed to consistently use family maintenance services and it proved too difficult for her to meet her children’s housing, hygiene and educational needs with regularity. Furthermore we note that both Christian and Monique faced developmental, educational and behavioral challenges, which required parenting skills appellant has not demonstrated that she can provide on a daily basis. Thus, we conclude she failed to show she occupied the role of a parent as required by the case law interpreting this parental relationship exception.
Moreover, appellant failed to demonstrate the children would be greatly harmed or suffer a substantial detriment from the termination of parental rights. While the children had some “bond” with appellant and identify her as their mother, appellant has not demonstrated the bond was so significant or unique that it outweighed the relationships they had formed with their caretakers or those they would develop in a permanent home with adoptive parents. The children bonded to all of their caretakers; the evidence showed they were resilient and adaptable children who forged connections with various people, notwithstanding their several placements from 2000 until 2007.
In light of the history of this family, the broad deference given the lower court in making these determinations and the substantial burden appellant had to meet to overcome the preference for adoption, we cannot say the court erred in failing to apply this exception.
2. Sibling Bond Exception
Appellant insists the juvenile court erred in terminating parental rights in light of the application of the sibling bond exception. Specifically, she argues that Christian shares a significant sibling relationship with his sisters Geneva and Monique which will suffer detriment if the children are adopted outside the family.
A closely bonded relationship between siblings may, in rare cases, constitute sufficient reason to preclude the termination of parental rights of an otherwise adoptable child. The exception applies where “[t] here would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) Application of this exception requires a two-step analysis. First, the juvenile court must determine whether terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with a sibling relationship, evaluating the nature and extent of the relationship, including whether the children were raised in the same home, share significant common experiences, and have close and strong bonds. Second, if the court concludes termination of parental rights would substantially interfere with a sibling relationship, it must then weigh the child’s interest in continuing the sibling relationship against the benefit the child would gain from adoption. (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 951-952.)
The mere existence of a friendly sibling relationship does not trigger the exception. “To show a substantial interference with a sibling relationship the parent must show the existence of a significant sibling relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the child. Many siblings have a relationship with each other, but would not suffer detriment if that relationship ended. If the relationship is not sufficiently significant to cause detriment on termination, there is no substantial interference with that relationship.” (In re L. Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952, fn. omitted.) The juvenile court must “balance the beneficial interest of the child in maintaining the sibling relationship, which might leave the child in a tenuous guardianship or foster home placement, against the sense of security and belonging adoption and a new home would confer. [Citation .]” (Id. at p. 951; see also In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1017.) Because adoption is the Legislature’s strongly preferred permanent plan for children for whom reunification is no longer possible, the significant benefits of adoption may outweigh even a substantial detriment. (In re Jacob S., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018.) A parent asserting the sibling bond exception bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of a strong sibling relationship, and showing its severance would be detrimental to the child for whom a permanent plan of adoption is being considered. (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952.)
We note that “[i]n enacting this exception, the legislature was concerned with preserving long-standing relationships between siblings which serve as anchors for dependent children whose lives are in turmoil.” (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 404.) Given their young age and the relatively brief period they lived together, Christian and his sisters Monique and Geneva do not have the type of relationship this exception was designed to protect. The evidence in the record does not show this is that rare case of a significant and strong sibling bond sufficient to defeat the termination of parental rights. Christian has never spent any substantial period of his life living with sisters Geneva and Monique. He lived with Geneva for the first year of her life when he was a toddler and he lived with Monique for a little over a year when she was a toddler. In addition, appellant has not pointed to any evidence to support her conclusory assertion that the children shared significant common experiences or have close and strong bonds. The record reflects the siblings had visits together twice a month in the home of their adult sibling. Some reports of those visits indicated the visits went well, while others indicate that the girls experienced some behavioral problems after visiting with Christian. At most this shows a friendly relationship. While the minors have some connection and may enjoy visiting each other, we are not convinced termination of parental rights will substantially interfere with these relationships. In addition the fact that in 2002 the DCFS characterized the three children as a “sibling group” and the court indicated a preference to place them together in the same home does not demonstrate they had a significant sibling relationship as that term is used in this exception. Instead it reflects the court’s view that given their young ages (at that point four, three and two years old, respectively) it was possible they all might be adopted by the same family.
Although their adoption will necessarily effect a legal change in the siblings’ relationship, no evidence reveals the emotional connections among them will be weakened, let alone severed. Moreover, even if termination of parental rights will effect a change in the siblings’ relationship, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that the benefits the children will surely reap in a secure, stable home with a loving and supportive adoptive family vastly outweigh maintaining a “legal” sibling relationship, the fundamental tenor and closeness of which will likely remain unaffected. The juvenile court properly concluded the sibling relationship exception did not apply.
3. Guardianship
Appellant also argues that legal guardianship was a viable option and should have been ordered rather than the termination of her parental rights. However, under section 366.26, once the court determines a child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights unless it finds one of the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1070.) If no exception applies, it is in the child’s best interests to terminate parental rights. (Ibid.) Only if the court finds adoption of the child or termination of parental rights is not in the best interest of the child does it then consider whether to order guardianship or long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(A).) Appellant does not contend the minors are not adoptable, as they clearly are. Because the court found no exception exists, the court was not required to consider guardianship. (In re Tabatha G. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164-1165.)
In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808, upon which appellant relies, is inapposite. The juvenile court there selected a permanent plan of legal guardianship after finding the sibling relationship exception applied. (Id. at pp. 820-821.) Demeanor evidence played a large role in the juvenile court’s decision. It observed that each of Naomi’s siblings while testifying had “‘a happy, joyful expression on their face when they talked about Naomi’” and was persuaded Naomi herself enjoyed the visits since the siblings chose to spend their Saturdays with her even though they could have better things to do. (Id. at p. 821.) The juvenile court was “not convinced” by the prospective adoptive parent’s demeanor and had doubts about her intentions. (Ibid.) The appellate court affirmed the juvenile court’s order selecting legal guardianship as the permanent plan. (Id. at p. 824.)
Here, in contrast, the juvenile dependency court found that neither of the exceptions urged by appellant to the termination of parental rights applied. Appellant has provided no persuasive argument why guardianship, which is revocable and thus falls short of the secure and permanent future the Legislature had in mind for dependent children, would be preferable in this case and would better serve the interests of these children.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: PERLUSS, P.J., ZELON, J.