Opinion
Nos. H12-CP07-011640-A, H12-CP07-011641-A, H12-CP07-011642-A, H12-CP07-011643-A
June 10, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On September 30, 2009, the petitioner, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families ("the department") filed petitions pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 to terminate the parental rights of respondents Jessica B. and Edberto A., the mother and father of Christal A., born October 15, 1999, Miguel A., born October 25, 2000, and Javonny A., born June 3, 2003, as well as a petition to terminate the rights of Jessica B. and respondent, Efrain N., the mother and father of Laurelis N., born July 10, 2004. All three respondent parents were properly served notice of the petitions for termination of parental rights and appeared to defend the petitions. All three were assigned counsel by the Chief Child Protection Attorney. The court is aware of no other proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of these children. No parent claims Indian Tribal affiliation. This court has jurisdiction. Trial was held on May 21, 2010.
The court has considered the petitions, the credible evidence, including the testimony presented, and the arguments of counsel. For the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner and terminates the parental rights of the respondent mother in all four children, the rights of Edberto A. in Christal, Miguel and Javonny A., and the rights of Efrain N. in Laurelis N.
I LEGAL STANDARD A. Termination of Parental Rights
At the commencement of these contested actions, the mother presented to the court properly executed forms consenting to the termination of her parental rights to all four children. On May 21, 2010, this court thoroughly canvassed the mother on her consents, and found that she had been represented by competent counsel who was present with her when she executed the consent forms. This court further found by clear and convincing evidence that mother's consents have been knowingly and voluntarily entered with a full understanding of the legal consequences of her actions. Her consents were accepted. See General Statutes § 17a-112(i).
Subsequently, the department, through counsel, orally moved to amend each of the petitions to withdraw the non-consensual ground alleged against mother and to allege the ground of consent. The oral motion to amend all the petitions was granted by the court.
The petitions for Christal, Miguel and Jovanny each allege two identical statutory grounds for termination of their father, Edberto A.'s, parental rights. The first is the ground of failure to rehabilitate, General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), which, in pertinent part, provides for termination if "(B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court . . . to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child." The second ground alleged for the termination of Edberto A.'s parental rights is the ground of abandonment. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) states: "the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child."
In its petition to terminate the parental rights of father, Efrain N., in Laurelis N., the department alleges only the ground of failure to rehabilitate, General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).
Termination of parental rights proceeds in two stages: adjudication and disposition. In the adjudicatory phase, the court must determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that at least one ground pleaded exists to terminate parental rights as of the date of the filing of the petition or last amendment. In re Javon R., 85 Conn.App. 765, 769, 858 A.2d 887 (2004); In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842, cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901, 599 A.2d 1028 (1991); Practice Book §§ 32a-3(b), 35a-7. However, where the ground alleged involves failure to rehabilitate under General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B), "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 495, 816 A.2d 697, cert denied, 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d 770 (2003); In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 527, 939 A.2d 16 (2008); In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000). "What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 231; In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000). "Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than `any' rehabilitation . . . Successful completion of the petitioner's expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation." (Citations omitted.) In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 500. "[E]ven if a parent has made successful strides in [the parent's] ability to manage her life and may have achieved a level of stability within [the parent's] limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period of time, [the parent] could assume a responsible position in the life of [the parent's] children." In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 260, 881 A.2d 450 (2005). The issue is not whether the parent has improved his ability to manage his life but whether he had gained an ability to care for the specific needs of the children at issue. See In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 261, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 104 (2001).
If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court must then consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest. See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 756, 936 A.2d 638 (2007). Procedurally, it is permissible to hear evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases at the same trial without first determining if the state has proven a statutory ground for adjudication before consideration of the dispositional question. See In re Jason P., 41 Conn.Sup. 23, 24, 544 A.2d 286 (1988); In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 257, 471 A.2d 1380 (1984); State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172-73, 425 A.2d 939 (1979); Practice Book § 35a-7.
II FACTUAL FINDINGS
At trial, the department introduced six exhibits, some voluminous, without objection, and the testimony of two witnesses: Tracey Wright, the treatment worker assigned to the children's cases from October 2009 to October 2010, and Karen Gadola, the current permanency worker assigned to all four cases. None of the other parties introduced any exhibits or testimony.
The court also indicated it would take judicial notice of procedural filings, filing dates, specific steps, preliminary and final, and court orders in the pending juvenile matters files regarding the respondent parents and the children. Counsel was advised of the court's intention to take judicial notice of these matters and no objections were posed. See In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 402, 852 A.2d 643 (2004); In re Mark C., 28 Conn.App. 247, 254, 610 A.2d 181, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 922, 614 A.2d 823 (1992).
The court also indicated an intent to take judicial notice of similar materials in prior neglect proceedings concerning the children which had been initiated in 2005, but a search by the clerk's office revealed that those files no longer exist. Nevertheless, there was information as to this prior involvement contained in some of the exhibits.
The credible and relevant evidence offered at trial, and a review of the judicially noticed court records, supports the finding of the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 7, 2007, the department filed neglect petitions on behalf of Christal, Miguel, Javonny and Laurelis. On February 19, 2008, all four children were adjudicated neglected on the ground of being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally. Upon adjudication, the court entered a disposition, by agreement, of six months protective supervision and issued final specific steps directed to the parents and the department. Subsequently, the department moved to reopen and modify the dispositions. On December 18, 2008, the court extended the period of protective supervision an additional four months, from August 19, 2008 to December 29, 2008. The children remained in the care of their mother until September 23, 2008, when the department invoked a 96-hour hold on all of them. On September 26, 2008, the department filed ex parte motions for temporary custody of the children, which were granted, and motions to reopen and modify their dispositions from protective supervision to commitment. At the preliminary hearing on October 3, 2008, the court sustained the temporary custody orders to the department and issued new, preliminary specific steps for all three parents. On December 9, 2008, the motions to modify the dispositions of the three older children were granted and they were committed to the department. On December 18, 2008, Laurelis N.'s disposition also was modified from protective supervision to commitment. The preliminary specific steps ordered by the court on October 3, 2008 were affirmed and adopted as final specific steps at the time of these commitments. On September 15, 2009, the court approved a permanency plan for the four children of termination of parental rights and adoption. The termination of parental rights petitions were filed on September 30, 2009.
The one-week delay for Laurelis' case was due to the absence of father's counsel on December 9, 2008.
B. Prior Family Involvement with the Department
"An inquiry regarding personal rehabilitation requires . . . a historical perspective of the respondent's child-caring and parenting abilities." In re Galen F., 54 Conn.App. 590, 594, 737 A.2d 499 (1999); In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 499.
A social worker affidavit prepared by Glendaly Rodriguez on September 26, 2008 in support of the department's motions for ex parte temporary custody orders regarding the four children, submitted as a portion of Exhibit C, sets forth in detail the chaotic, transient, neglectful and abusive family life these children have endured since 2002. The children, while primarily in the custody of their mother, were often left with relatives, many of whom had disturbing criminal histories or substance abuse issues and were not appropriate caretakers. Their educational, medical and dental needs were seriously neglected. For example, in the summer of 2004, four-year-old Christal was hospitalized for a dental abscess due to poor dental hygiene. Follow-up appointments were missed which could have prevented a second dental admission for a second abscess, which occurred in February 2005. In July 2005, one-year-old Laurelis appeared at a local hospital with a cigarette burn on her forearm. This incident prompted the department to file neglect petitions and seek an order of temporary custody on July 15, 2005, but the petitions were withdrawn, apparently because mother agreed to engage in voluntary ongoing services. The department also referred mother to intensive family preservation services due to concerns of the conditions of her home, the children's hygiene, her transient lifestyle and parenting skills. For a brief period of time, mother and the children benefited from voluntary services and achieved a level of stability. By August 2007, however, mother and the children were living in a motel. Mother quickly managed to rent a home but after just a few months, she and the children were being evicted for nonpayment of rent.
On November 7, 2007, the department filed a second set of petitions alleging neglect of the children. Service agreements provided mother with a number of referrals at the time to assist her in properly caring for the children and maintaining adequate housing, but shortly after the children were adjudicated neglected on February 19, 2008, mother received a notice to quit. In April 2008, the school that Christal and Miguel attended reported an excessive amount of absences, 25 days for Christal and 28 for Miguel. This had negatively impacted their academic progress. In May 2008, mother and the children were evicted. The department assisted mother with storage fees and a truck when she found a new apartment in New Britain in June 2008, but by July, her new landlord informed the department that no rent had been paid, although there was a brand new flat screen television in the apartment. In August 2008, mother again was evicted and told Rodriguez that she planned to move to her parents' home, which Rodriguez informed mother was unsuitable because her brother also resided there and he had pending, drug-related criminal charges. In addition, during a visit to the grandparents' home, Rodriguez observed the maternal grandmother to be under the influence of alcohol. Mother agreed that she would not let her children reside where her brother lived and signed another service agreement, which she violated by the middle of September 2008. On September 20, 2008, the department hotline social worker, David Cohen, visited the grandparents' home and found the children there. When mother could not provide the department with a more suitable residential plan for her children and had apparently violated, a third service agreement not to permit the children to have contact with her drug-dealing brother, the department sought orders of temporary custody and filed motions to reopen and modify the dispositions on September 26, 2008.
There was no evidence presented at trial that either Edberto A. or Efrain N. made any effort to assist mother or rescue their children from an alarmingly dysfunctional, unstable and unhealthy existence prior to the children's entry into foster care. Mother reported that Edberto A. seldom visited his children during this time period. On December 13, 2007, when apprised of the department's involvement, Efrain N. stated he had no concerns about the care of his daughter, Laurelis, although for a brief period of time, she had been left with his very elderly paternal great grandparents. Edberto A. stated at that time that the family, consisting of him, mother and the children, had no weaknesses.
Although the fathers' criminal involvements, discussed in greater detail below, may have prevented them from stepping forward to assume primary care for their children, they made no effort to assist or support mother, demand that mother cooperate more with department services, or prevail upon paternal relatives who might have qualified as decent, reliable placements. In fact, both fathers expressed that their children's predicament was primarily the mother's fault.
C. Respondent Father, Edberto A.
Edberto A. was born in Brooklyn, New York in 1973. He and his brothers were raised by his paternal grandparents. He describes his grandmother as loving and his grandfather as an abusive alcoholic. He dropped out of school in the ninth grade but eventually obtained a G.E.D. while incarcerated. He has a criminal history, commencing with an arrest for robbery as youthful offender. In 1995, he was arrested due to a sexual relationship with a fourteen-year-old female when he was 22. In 1998, he was convicted of Risk of Injury to a Minor under General Statutes 53-21(a)(2), and sentenced to a ten-year suspended sentence with ten years of probation. He also is required to register as a sex offender and as a condition of probation, is not to have any unsupervised contact with minor children. On two separate occasions, he was convicted of violating this probation and also convicted of failing to register as a sex offender. Consequently, his probation, including the condition of no contact with minor children, has been extended to 2014. He finally completed sex offender treatment after having his probation violated for failing to attend that treatment.
Edberto A. met mother in 1998. He reported that they were in a relationship for four years and described it as a good one. The couple separated after he was incarcerated, and mother met and became involved with Efrain N.
On October 17, 2007, the department contacted Edberto to inform him that his children were being evicted, but he was unable to provide a concrete, safe plan for his children. His probation officer made it clear to the department that Edberto was not to have any unsupervised contact with any children. Mother reported at the time that Edberto had not seen any of his children since June 2007 and that she didn't speak to him because he did nothing for them. In January 2008, Edberto reported he still had not seen his children and had no way of contacting mother, although she called him and asked for money. He reported at the time that he was paying over $600 in child support a month and was struggling financially to meet his basic needs.
When the children were adjudicated neglected and allowed to remain in the care of their mother under protective supervision in February 2008, Edberto was allowed to stand silent as to the neglect allegation. He was issued final specific steps, which he also signed, indicating he understood what was expected of him and agreed to comply with them. He was to participate in a substance abuse assessment, individual counseling and parenting education at Klingberg, but there is no evidence he engaged in any services while the children remained in mother's care under the department's protective supervision throughout 2008.
After the children were removed from mother's care in September 2008, Edberto was issued amended preliminary specific steps at the preliminary order of temporary custody hearing on October 3, 2008. Again, he was expected to submit to a substance abuse evaluation and treatment, attend parenting classes, family and individual counseling. These amended final steps were affirmed as final specific steps by the court when his three children were committed to the department on December 9, 2008. Edberto was to keep appointments with the department, cooperate with department home visits, keep his whereabouts known to the department, participate in counseling and a substance abuse assessment and treatment, if recommended, submit to random drug screens, cooperate with parenting education and family counseling, maintain adequate housing and legal income, have no further involvement with the criminal justice system, comply with the conditions of his probation, cooperate with the children's therapy and visit the children as often as the department permitted.
Edberto did not maintain consistent contact with the department and stated on more than one occasion that he would not engage in the services recommended to reunify with his children. Department social worker Tracey Wright met with him near his place of employment on October 22, 2008. They discussed services, specific steps and placement resources. During this meeting, Edberto reported that it was difficult for him to engage in services, but he would think about it. On December 29, 2008, he signed a release of information for a substance abuse evaluation, but failed to attend on the scheduled date. On January 30, 2009, he reiterated that he was not going to cooperate with the department or adhere to the specific steps ordered by the court. He indicated that everything was the mother's fault. By the spring of 2009, Edberto was upset about his unemployment and told Wright he would not adhere to any state requirements. He said he would visit, but not engage in services. At one point, Wright lost contact with Edberto and had to locate him through his brother. On March 27, 2009, the department made an attempt to contact him by telephone, which was unsuccessful. On April 17, 2009, the department began to mail monthly certified letters to Edberto reminding him of his specific steps and informing him to contact the department. On May 5, 2009, the department received a returned, unclaimed certified letter addressed to him. On June 9, 2009, an attempt to reach him by phone revealed a disconnected line. Up until October 15, 2009, Edberto generally refused to sign releases to permit the department to make referrals for him for individual counseling, substance abuse evaluation and treatment or parenting education. On that date, he informed Gadola that he had participated in a substance abuse evaluation at Catholic Charities, but that he was unable to continue with treatment due to lack of payment. After October 28, 2009, Gadola began to mail monthly letters to Edberto reminding him of his specific steps and visitation rights, and asking him to contact the department.
As of February 2010, Edberto was living in New Britain with his brother's family. He had provided a cell phone number for the department to maintain contact. His housing situation was not suitable and he was still subject to the probation condition of no unsupervised contact with minor children. He had completed his sexual offender treatment, but his probation does not expire until 2014. He claimed to have attended substance abuse counseling at Catholic Charities, but the department confirmed that he had not successfully completed that program, which he described as a joke and told Gadola he did not feel it was beneficial. Gadola offered him another substance abuse program, but he didn't accept a referral. In March 2010, Edberto's probation officer advised Gadola that Edberto gave a specimen positive for cocaine at a meeting with the probation officer on March 1. After that report, (substance abuse could be grounds to violate his probation), Edberto appeared motivated and requested a substance abuse program. Gadola referred him to the Wheeler Clinic. He attended an evaluation at Wheeler, which recommended that he attend group therapy. He was sent a letter to begin that therapy on May 11, but he did not attend.
Edberto's employment for the past decade has been sporadic, and he has never provided the department with proof of employment, although he has been asked to produce pay stubs. Although he claims to have paid child support, there is no proof of such contributions. He has not always maintained contact with the department and has had to be located through his brother.
Edberto's visitation with his children has been very inconsistent. He has been offered two visits per month, arranged and supervised by Children's First. From October 2008 to October 2009, he only visited the children four or five times. Since October 2009 he has only visited them three times up to the date of trial on May 21, 1010. Gadola testified that after she assumed responsibility for the case, she urged him to visit, by letter and in person. She advised him that his children were asking for him.
Edberto did exhibit a degree of concern when he finally provided the department with two possible placement resources with relatives in Puerto Rico, the paternal grandmother and paternal uncle. The efforts of the department to obtain an investigation of these placement resources through Puerto Rico have not gone smoothly. One problem is that Puerto Rico is not a signatory to the Interstate Compact on Children, so no sister government agency has cooperated. The court, on January 7, 2010, ordered the department to obtain home studies through a private agency. There have been conflicting reports from Puerto Rico as to these relatives' suitability or willingness to assume the care of the Edberto's children. The grandmother only has a one-bedroom apartment. At one point, the uncle indicated he was not willing to assume the children's care, and then changed his mind. Neither relative has contacted the department nor visited the children during the 21 months they have been in foster care. Edberto's attorney claims he allowed the children to speak to the grandmother on his cell phone during several of his infrequent visits, but there was no evidence of this. As of the date of trial, there was nothing to indicate that moving the three older children to Puerto Rico was a viable option, although the department doggedly continues trying to ascertain the suitability of these paternal relatives, who have never contacted any of the workers. There is no law of which the court is aware that requires the department to rule out these relatives before other permanent options can be explored. The court notes here the concerns of the children's attorney that these children have had very little contact with these relatives during their lives, cannot even describe what they look like, and do not speak Spanish well. How conversant the relatives are in English is unknown. Their removal from this state also might hamper continued contact with their sister, Laurelis.
D. Respondent Father, Efrain N.
Efrain N. was born in 1984 in Brooklyn, New York. He and his siblings were being raised by his grandmother until he was 11 years old, but they were separated when she passed away. Efrain dropped out of high school in the tenth grade and has never obtained a high school diploma or a G.E.D. He met mother in 2001 through her brother, the drug dealer. They had a five-year relationship and in 2007, he reported they were attempting to reconcile. He admitted to the department social worker in 2007 that the family's weakness was selling drugs, but he was careful not to sell them from the home. His criminal history reflects his persistent resort to this illegal pursuit.
After the department filed the neglect petition on behalf of Laurelis in 2007, Efrain had been released on parole and was residing in a halfway house in Hartford. He and mother were no longer in a relationship, but Efrain had contact with Laurelis which mother agreed with the department she would supervise. He was seeking employment.
When Laurelis was adjudicated neglected on February 19, 2008, Efrain plead nolo contendere to the neglect allegations and agreed to protective supervision with mother. In July 2008, he again was incarcerated and not released until December 3, 2008. There is no evidence that Efrain engaged in services between February and July 2008, although he had been issued specific steps at the time of Laurelis' adjudication.
On October 3, 2008, at the preliminary hearing on the order of temporary custody for Laurelis, the court issued amended preliminary specific steps addressed to Efrain. At this point, he was incarcerated, but nearing release. He was ordered to keep appointments with the department, keep his whereabouts known, participate in parenting, individual and family counseling, submit to a substance abuse evaluation and follow recommendations, submit to random drug screens, sign release for the department, secure and maintain adequate housing and income, have no further involvement with the criminal justice system, and visit Laurelis as permitted. These amended preliminary specific steps were adopted as final steps for Efrain when Laurelis was committed on December 18, 2008
After social worker Wright was assigned these cases in October 2008, she brought Laurelis to a correctional facility for visits with Efrain. Efrain was released on parole in December 2008 and was living at a shelter in Hartford, which required that he obtain employment and submit to random drug screens. Initially, Efrain appeared to have good intentions. He attended a substance abuse assessment and submitted a sufficient number of negative screens to convince the department he did not require further treatment. He was complying with the conditions of his parole and working steadily. He found an apartment with his new girlfriend and secured an adequate home. He was visiting Laurelis regularly, showing her appropriate care and attention. He participated in a "Real Deal Drug Dealers Group," described by an Open Hearth shelter official as intensive group counseling to promote critical thinking and conflict resolution. This program was supposed to teach Efrain how to change past behaviors, which already had led to multiple convictions for possession and/or sale of narcotics, and avoid negative influences. When he was allowed to move into an apartment with his girlfriend, he was placed on an ankle bracelet. He found a job at the end of December at a recycling business and provided proof of paystubs. Wright visited the apartment and was encouraged by good feedback from the program manager at Open Heath, negative drug screens during the first three months of 2009, Efrain's consistent employment and visits with Laurelis regularly. The interaction during visits was loving and appropriate. She determined to increase her efforts to reunify Laurelis with Efrain, and even looked into a special study so Efrain could assume the care of Christal. Unfortunately, his parole officer, during an unannounced visit to Efrain's apartment, found heroin on the premises. Efrain was again incarcerated in July 2009 and convicted of possession of narcotics on September 23, 2009. He was sentenced to an additional sixteen months in jail, where he remained as of the date of trial. Absent early release, he is supposed to remain incarcerated until the end of this year. If he is again released on parole, he will probably be required to reside in a halfway house for a period of time.
When Gadola was assigned these cases, she contacted Efrain by telephone at the end of October 2009. She has been unable to refer him to the services noted on his specific steps so long as he is incarcerated, but she has been providing him with visits with Laurelis once a month. The only program he has been able to participate in while in jail dealt with victims' perception of crime, and not with issues he would need to address to become a responsible parent.
E. Christal A.
Christal was in the second grade when the department removed her from her home and placed her in a non-relative foster home. On December 12, 2008, a school meeting was held to address her stealing behaviors. A plan was developed to have the school psychologist search Christal's belonging each morning and afternoon, and the behavior soon ceased. At the end of 2009, when mother was missing visits, Christal again regressed to stealing behaviors, although this behavior has now abated. Christal is of above-average intelligence and does not require any special education. She is able to speak English and Spanish, but her reading and writing skills are stronger in English. She was not promoted in the second grade as she had changed school too many times. After being placed, she began to excel academically and often helps other children in her classroom. Her teacher noted that her report card reflected one of the best the teacher has completed in her careers. A story she wrote was published in the school's book. In March 2009, Christal was recognized as student of the month and a ceremony was held in the gym in her honor. Neither of her parents attended; mother was late and missed the ceremony.
Christal had a strong attachment to her mother and family and excused her mother's inconsistency in visiting, which the therapist noted was a threat to Christal's emotional stability, although Christal seems to have endured the separation quite well and is no longer receiving therapy. She is comfortable in her current placement, which includes Laurelis, and her foster parents are willing to adopt her. Her foster parents also have worked to encourage contact between Christal and Laurelis and their brother. Christal continues to receive straight A's in school and is described as easy going and friendly. Her relation with her foster mother is very natural. She follows the rules and her foster mother is very supportive of her.
Christal suffers from asthma and must take a prescription to address episodes as they appear. Her foster mother has paid careful attention to Christal's dental issues, as prior to placement, she was twice hospitalized for abscesses.
F. Miguel A.
After being removed from his mother's care, Miguel was placed in a non-relative foster home with his brother, Jovanny. He has been able to visit with his two sisters. He is a regular education student and progresses well academically, but does exhibit some behavioral issues at home and in school, which were exacerbated when his parents, especially his mother, missed visits. The department placed Miguel in therapy at the Manchester Child Guidance Clinic in June 2009. He reportedly engages in self-injurious behaviors and expresses thoughts that no one loves him and he would be better off dead. After one episode of self harm, Miguel wrote a note of apology to his foster mother expressing that he hit himself because he didn't like himself. His therapist noted concerns to Gadola in December 2009:
Over the past two months, there have been increasing reports by you, Miguel's foster family and his school of intense emotional distress including impaired self esteem, self harming behaviors and suicidal statements. As children need consistency, predictability and appropriate boundaries in order to feel emotionally secure, it seems the highly inconsistent and `chaotic' visits contribute to Miguel's emotional disregulation and exacerbate his emotional distress. In planning for future visitation, it will be critical that these issues are taken into consideration in order to provide Miguel with a sense of safety and security both during and between visits.
On December 23, 2009, mother missed a visit just before Christmas and the two boys cried uncontrollably for an hour, regretting that they were unable to give her their present. On January 7, 2010, the court reduced the number of visits mother was allowed with the children and ordered that the boys be visited separately from the girls. Mother continued to miss visits. Miguel now sees a psychiatrist monthly and a therapist weekly and receives medication to address a depressive disorder. He may also suffer from post traumatic stress disorder. Although he is only 9, there are concerns about use of cannabis. His academic performance is average. Miguel was recently evaluated and not identified as a special education student despite his increasing emotional needs and some difficulties with comprehension. He is described as needy, clingy, very sweet, smart and articulate. He is hard working and eager to please and wants to improve his academic performance.
Miguel also has asthma and requires regular prescriptions and an inhaler. His asthma must be monitored by a doctor on a quarterly basis. His foster mother reports that he is generally a good kid and she is very attached to him, although she cannot be a permanent adoptive resource. His foster parents are willing to keep him and Jovanny until an adoptive home can be located for them. He calls his foster parents "auntie" and "uncle."
G. Javonny A.
Jovanny began kindergarten the same month he was removed from his mother's custody. His teacher reports that he is doing well in school. Unlike his older siblings, he did not initially require therapy, although recently he was referred for individual therapy since he is revealing serious symptoms, some disturbing, attributable in part to anxiety about what is going to happen to him. Jovanny expresses that he likes his foster parents, who are also foster parents for Miguel, and his foster mother states that he is well-behaved and cooperative. Jovanny also has asthma and needs several prescription medications and quarterly check ups to monitor it. There have also been tests to insure his thyroid is functioning properly because there are concerns that he is not growing in height. The tests, however, were normal.
Javonny is now in the first grade and is a regular education student. He is reading at or above grade level in all academic areas and is part of a 45 minute reading program because he does so well, after starting out below grade level. He also does well in mathematics. He follows directions and is meticulous and neat.
H. Laurelis N.
Laurelis started attending a Head Start Program after her placement into foster care. Her Head Start teacher reported to the department that Laurelis is a happy little girl whom everyone loves, smart as a whip and eager to please. There are no concerns about Laurelis medically, although academically, she started school a little bit behind, seemed socially immature and needed to overcome shyness. She is making progress and learning to read. She also sings in church and she and Christal are involved with the Girl Scouts. Laurelis' foster parents, who also care for Christal, are attentive and loving, and Laurelis is well-cared for and content. Neither she nor Christal express any discontentment with their foster parents, who are willing to adopt them both.
III ADJUDICATION
Each statutory basis set out in General Statutes § 17a-112(j) is an independent ground for termination. In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 618 A.2d 1 (1992). The petitioner is required to prove at least one ground alleged as to each parent in its petition by clear and convincing evidence. In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 42, 46, 907 A.2d 126 (2006).
A. Reasonable Efforts Finding — General Statutes § 17a-l12(j)(1).
In order to terminate parental rights based on a non-consensual ground, the department must show, by clear and convincing evidence, as a prerequisite, that it "has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1); In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 47, 887 A.2d 415 (2006); In re Brendan C., 89 Conn.App. 511, 524, 874 A.2d 826, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 910, 882 A.2d 669 (2005); In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 640, 809 A.2d 119, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 934, 815 A.2d 136 (2003). "Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 347, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 361, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 566, 718 A.2d 997 (1998).
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify Edberto A. with Christal, Miguel and Jovanny, and further finds by clear and convincing evidence that Edberto was unable and unwilling to benefit from such efforts.
The court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify Efrain N. with Laurelis, and further finds that Efrain, too, was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services due to his failure to overcome his persistent pattern of criminal behavior involving the possession and sale of narcotics.
Prior to the adjudicatory date, the department made extensive efforts to promote reunification, and these efforts included two lengthy periods of prior involvement with this family that included numerous services that failed to permanently improve the familial dysfunctional lifestyle before they entered care.
The department offered timely and appropriate services, to the extent possible, to both fathers to facilitate reunification. Services offered to Edberto A. included case management services, supervised visitation, referrals for substance abuse assessment and treatment and parenting education. The department also monitored his compliance with his probation conditions, which included sex offender treatment and random drug screens.
The department offered Efrain N. case management services, a substance abuse assessment, which recommended no need for treatment in early 2009, mental health treatment at Wheeler Clinic and supervised visits. Intensive reunification services were to be put in place; but he again became incarcerated. In addition, the department monitored his placement at the Open Hearth shelter, where he participated in an intensive "Real Deal Drug Dealers group" to address criminal recidivism. In order to locate an apartment, he was able to obtain a security deposit through the Department of Social Services.
The full extent of the department's efforts are discussed in Part II of this decision.
Efforts to promote reunification with the fathers were hampered by their early, inexplicable dependence on mother's clearly inept parenting abilities and their criminal involvement, which restricted access to their children and for Efrain, access to services. Edberto never had any real desire to engage in services to improve his ability to serve as even a support for mother.
The children were provided with foster care, therapy, where needed, and medical services, including dental care. The department also attended a special education meeting for Miguel.
B. Failure to Rehabilitate — General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).
This is the first ground for termination alleged against Edberto A. in the petitions concerning his three children. It is the only ground alleged against Efrain N. in the petition for Laurelis.
If the parent of a child who has been found by the superior court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding where specific steps were provided to the parent, and that parent fails to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, he could assume a responsible position in the life of the child, this ground for termination exists.
The evidence is undisputed that all four children were adjudicated neglected on July 31, 2007. Edberto and Efrain were provided with specific steps on several occasions between February and December 2008.
"Personal rehabilitation, as used in the statute, refers to the restoration of the parent to a constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [Section 17a-112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jeisean M., supra, 270 Conn. 398; In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706; 741 A.2d 873 (1999). Whether the age and needs of the child do not support allowance of further time for the parent to rehabilitate must also be considered. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989). Also, in determining whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient and allowance of a reasonable period of time would promote rehabilitation further, a court can consider efforts made since the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights. See In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 485; In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230; In re Sarah M., 19 Conn.App. 371, 377, 562 A.2d 566 (1989).
The evidence in this case is clear and convincing that neither of the respondent fathers, as of the date of the filing of the termination petitions on September 30, 2009, had achieved a reasonable degree of rehabilitation. Further, there is no evidence of conduct prior or subsequent to the date of the filing of the petition which would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the ages and intense needs of their children, either father could assume a responsible position as a parent.
A parent's compliance with specific steps set during the pendency of the neglect case is a relevant and important consideration in reaching a rehabilitation finding. In re Luis C., supra, 210 Conn. 167-68; In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 179, 743 A.2d 165 (1999). The ultimate question is whether the parent at the time of the filing of the termination petition is more able to resume the responsibilities of parenting, and has corrected any of the factors that led to the initial commitment. See In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 126, 614 A.2d 832 (1992). To terminate parental rights for the failure to achieve rehabilitation, both prongs of the test incorporated in § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) must be met: (1) that the parent has failed to achieve rehabilitation; and (2) there is no reason to believe that the parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child. In re Danuael D., 51 Conn.App. 829, 843, 724 A.2d 546 (1999).
1. Edberto A.'s Failure to Rehabilitate
The evidence is clear and convincing that Edberto had not achieved a reasonable degree of rehabilitation as of the adjudicatory date, September 30, 2009. Since the neglect adjudication in February 2008, the children had to be removed from their mother's care and have now spent 21 months in foster care. Edberto A. was issued specific steps on three occasions. The most recent set of final specific steps set for him were ordered by the court on December 9, 2008. He has failed to comply with most of his specific steps and consistently expressed an unwillingness to participate in the recommended services. His efforts to maintain visits with his children were negligible and harmed the children emotionally. There is no evidence to conclude that rehabilitation into the role of constructive parent for Christal, Miguel and Javonny could be achieved within a reasonable period of time by Edberto. Not only does his status as a convicted sex offender prohibit his assuming the care and custody of the children for several more years, the fact that he once sexually assaulted a fourteen-year-old girl will always raise concerns about his ability to parent minor children. Furthermore, he has rather unconcernedly violated the conditions of his sex offender sentence on several occasions. He was recently arrested for a breach of the peace. He has consistently shown no real inclination to parent these children, continued to miss visits with them after these petitions were filed, and still has not begun a substance abuse or parenting program. The best he has been able to do is suggest, long after the children entered foster care, that a couple of relatives in Puerto Rico assume the care of his children without any real appreciation for the disruption such a placement would have for them.
Further delay in this case in an attempt to renew efforts to rehabilitate Edberto would be time wasted and seriously injurious to these three children, who have suffered through an extensive period of loss, fear and exposure to an inappropriate lifestyle. After 21 months in foster care, they are in stable, safe and loving foster homes that are capable of providing them with the assistance they need to achieve their full potential. The three older children need to be monitored for their asthmatic conditions and the two boys continued to address behavioral and emotional issues in therapy. Miguel takes medication for depression which also must be carefully monitored. Christal's foster parents are willing to offer her a permanent home, and she is thriving. Miguel and Jovanny require a sober, reliable, consistent caretaker to address their emotional problems, and in the case of Miguel, his academic delays. Even if Edberto had achieved some stability in his own life, which he has yet to do, as of the date of the trial, he could not assume their care for several more years due to his probation restrictions, and he has never displayed the level of attentiveness to his children's needs that they will require in the foreseeable future. The three children and their sister, Laurelis, have a bond with one another and the foster parents are willing to continue to ensure they have contact with one another.
The ground of failure to rehabilitate pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), alleged for termination of respondent Edberto A.'s parental rights, has been established by clear and convincing evidence.
B. Abandonment as to Edberto A.
This ground, alleged as to Edberto A. in all three of his children's petitions, is established when a child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child.
Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts and financial support are indicia of "interest, concern or responsibility." In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 209, 504 A.2d 533 (1986). "The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes: (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 53, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998); In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17-18, 632 A.2d 1122 (1993). Indicia of interest, concern and responsibility includes "attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts and financial support." In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 129, 702 A.2d 647 (1997). "Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare." In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn.App. 41, 46-47, 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918, 943 A.2d 475 (2008).
Statutory abandonment on the part of Edberto A. has not been proven by clear and convincing evidence. While Edberto has never fulfilled commonly understood parental duties and obligations, he has manifested some degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to his children's welfare, although it has been inconsistent and insufficient. When he did find the time to visit, he was loving and affectionate. Unfortunately, his probation restriction that he not have any unsupervised contact with minor children cemented his tendency to leave child care to the mother even when the mother had obviously failed at it. Despite mother's obvious limitations, he, again and again, was willing to concede responsibility to the mother or other relatives. Although he certainly did little to generate any specific plan to find a safe and permanent home for his children, the court cannot find that he abandoned them as statutorily defined.
C. Efrain N.'s Failure to Rehabilitate
Efrain N. was in jail, or had just been released, when his daughter, Laurelis' case first started with the filing of her neglect petition in July 2007. As of the adjudicatory date, September 30, 2009, he was incarcerated, and remained so at the time of trial on May 21, 2010. On several occasions, he, like Edberto, was issued specific steps by the court, the final set of steps being issued on December 19, 2008, when he was actually in the best position he had been to achieve reunification. In early 2009, the department became quite optimistic that Efrain had turned a corner and was going to establish himself in a stable and law-abiding fashion that was not only sufficient to parent Laurelis, but also Christal. Unfortunately, despite group therapy, employment, housing assistance and the offer of intensive reunification services, Efrain never did turn over a new leaf. Instead, he made a conscious choice to connect to the drug underworld again, losing his short-lived freedom for the third time and sabotaging what had been a realistic chance to assume the care and custody of his daughter. Obviously, being incarcerated as of the adjudicatory date prevents the court from finding that he had achieved rehabilitation at that point. Under Connecticut law, in considering whether he could assume a responsible position in Laurelis' life within a reasonable time, the fact of incarceration alone would not be sufficient to terminate a parent's rights. However, here the court has viewed the whole parent-child relationship as it existed while Efrain was in and out of jail since the date of Laurelis' birth. As her mother struggled from one dysfunctional setting to another, Efrain was hardly present and made little effort to protect his daughter, even when he was at liberty. During his periods of incarceration, he did not or could not avail himself of parenting education, substance abuse counseling or other programs that might have improved his ability to remain in the community and improve the plight of his daughter. He always had the ability to participate in the child protection proceedings and visitation was available to him while he was in prison. Efrain's criminal history — several convictions for narcotics possession or sale in the last decade — his prior failure to benefit from probation supervisions, his inattention to mother's shortcomings, the fact that he has never attempted to parent Laurelis full time, the age and needs of Laurelis, and, upon his next release, the length of time he will need to verify the durability of his rehabilitative efforts, given his past failures, lead to the conclusion that given this child's sense of time and longstanding need for stability and permanency, Efrain is not a reasonable option for permanent placement of Laurelis in the foreseeable future. Despite numerous probations, Efrain has yet to achieve a state where the court could optimistically conclude that he will not resort again to criminal behaviors, certainly not within a reasonable time, given his lengthy criminal history. Even if Efrain were not presently incarcerated, he has parenting skills he has yet to acquire, substance abuse issues and no high school education. He will, upon release, first need to cope with his own personal need for employment, housing and other supports. The prospect of him being able to care, protect, support, house and educate his five-year-old daughter in the foreseeable future is unlikely. Given his persistent past predilection to engage in illegal behaviors involving narcotics, further delay in Laurelis' case to await his release and renew efforts to rehabilitate him would be unfair to Laurelis, who already has spent 21 months in foster care, where she is happy, content and thriving. Her foster parents are willing to adopt her and her older sister.
The ground of failure to rehabilitate pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), alleged for termination of respondent Efrain N.'s parental rights, has been established by clear and convincing evidence.
IV DISPOSITION A. Section 17a-112(k) Criteria
The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that in each of the four petitions, a statutory ground alleged by the petitioner for the termination of each of the father's parental rights has been proven. Mother has consented to the termination of her parental rights, and the court has found that both fathers have failed to rehabilitate.
Where a parent has not consented, before making a decision whether or not to terminate parental rights, "the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112(k)]." In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 835, 863 A.2d 72, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 403 (2005); In re Vanna A., 83 Conn.App. 17, 26-26, 847 A.2d 1073 (2004). These criteria and this court's findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows with respect to the two fathers:
These findings are not required as to the consenting parent, Jessica B.
The department offered timely and appropriate services, to the extent possible, to facilitate reunification. Services offered to Edberto A. included case management services, supervised visitation, referrals for substance abuse assessment and treatment and parenting education. The department also monitored his compliance with his probation conditions, which included sex offender treatment and random drug screens.
The department offered Efrain N. case management services, a substance abuse assessment, which recommended no need for treatment in early 2009, mental health treatment at Wheeler Clinic, and supervised visits, including carting Laurelis to correctional facilities. Intensive reunifications services were to be put in place, but he again became incarcerated. In addition, the department monitored his placement at the Open Hearth shelter, where he participated in an intensive "Real Deal Drug Dealers group" to address criminal recidivism. In order to locate an apartment, he was able to obtain a security deposit through the Department of Social Services.
The children were provided with foster care, therapy, where needed, and medical services, including dental care. The department also attended a special education meeting for Miguel.
(2) "Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended."The department made reasonable efforts to reunite the children with their family, including offering mother, Edberto and Efrain a variety of services toward reunification. Eventually, Edberto A. and Efrain N. proved themselves unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services. They were unable to fulfill their obligations regarding the timelines, nature and extent of services offered or provided to them to facilitate reunification.
(3) "The terms of any court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which the parties have fulfilled their expectations."On more than one occasion, both respondent fathers, with the advice and assistance of counsel, agreed to specific steps in order to regain custody of her children. These specific steps were approved as orders of the court. The department fulfilled its obligations pursuant to these steps, making extensive efforts to reunify the children with their mother and to reunify Laurelis with her father. The terms of the specific steps and the level of each father's compliance, or lack of compliance, are noted in more detail in Part II of this decision.
Both fathers were unable or unwilling to comply with all of their specific steps. Neither has rehabilitated to the point where he could responsibly parent his children as of the date the termination petitions were filed or in the foreseeable future.
(4) "The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardians of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties."All four children, during observed interactions, appeared comfortable, unafraid and loving with their fathers. Christal and Laurelis are comfortable, happy and thriving in the care of their foster parents, with whom they have been placed for over a year. Their foster parents are willing to adopt the girls. Miguel and Jovanny are well-cared for in the foster home where they have resided for over a year. There are no serious behavioral issues in the foster home. The tender note Miguel addressed to his foster mother, which is in evidence, displays the respect and affection he feels toward her. Miguel refers to them as "auntie" and "uncle." Miguel told his attorney he would like to stay there and Jovanny, although expressing no preference, has indicated he likes his foster home. Both boys endeavor to do well academically and appreciate the efforts of their foster parents, who are willing to continue as a stable, familiar resource until an adoptive home can be identified for the boys.
(5) "The age of the child."
Christal is 10, Miguel is 9, Javonny is 7 and Laurelis is 5.
(6) "The effort the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to his home in the foreseeable future including but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided that the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communications with the guardian or other custodian of the child."
Neither father was willing and/or able to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the any of the children to return to their father's home in the foreseeable future. Edberto has had his access to all children limited by probationary conditions and is unable to be a reunification resource due to his criminal past and sex offender status. He also made it very clear to both assigned workers that he was unwilling to comply with court-ordered specific steps. He continues to violate the conditions of his probation, despite prior convictions for such violations which resulted in an extension of his probation and a lengthy sentence potentially being imposed. Despite the potential for his incarceration and his awareness of his children's plight, he is unable to conform his behavior appropriately. Just recently, on March 1, 2010, he produced a positive drug test result revealing the use of cocaine, which could be cause to violate his probation again. He also had a recent arrest for a breach of the peace. Edberto also missed a significant number of scheduled visits with his children.
Efrain was, for a brief period of time, considered seriously as a potential reunification source for not only his daughter, Laurelis, but Christal as well. Unfortunately, his past predilection for criminal behavior involving narcotics resurfaced. His incarceration in July 2009 severely limited his visitation, communication, ability to engage in services and contributions to his daughter's life. Despite past incarcerations and probations, and intensive group counseling, he has not been rehabilitated by considerable time spent in the penal system, which does not promote confidence in his ability to rehabilitate into a useful role as a parent. Even if he is released in the near future, he will be required to live in a halfway house for the first part of his parole. Then he would need to find an adequate income and housing and refrain from criminal behavior and substance abuse for an extended period of time before he could ever be considered as a suitable custodian for Laurelis. Given his extensive criminal history, the court has no reason to assume that his latest sentence will be the "charm" that finally sets him on the road to permanent reform.
(7) "The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship by the unreasonable acts or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent."There is no evidence that indicates that the department or any other person interfered with the ability of Edberto A. or Efrain N. to maintain and improve their relationships with their children, other than sanctions and orders which resulted from their own criminal misbehavior, which have severely limited their ability to access their children and prevented the delivery of services to prepare them for reunification. Certainly the actions of the criminal courts with respect to these two probation violators were not unreasonable acts or conduct. Visitation with their children was offered for the fathers and the children were transported consistently. Edberto's visits were few and far between. Until Efrain's incarceration in July 2009, the department was contemplating reunification of Laurelis to his custody and care, and even contemplated licensing him specially to care for Christal as well. There is no evidence that economic circumstances have constituted a significant factor in either parent's failure to maintain a meaningful relationship with the children. Extensive legal, treatment and reunification services were made available to the parents and the children at no cost to either father. When he was able, Efrain availed himself of services, but clearly did not fully benefit from them. Edberto refused or failed to complete all services.
B. Best Interests of the Children
The court must now address the issue of whether the termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children. This is the dispositional phase of a termination proceeding. "If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In this phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Alejandro L., supra, 91 Conn.App. 258; In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 469-70, 816 A.2d 707 (2003). The trial court "must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the [respondents'] parental rights is not in the best interest of the child." In re Vanna A., supra, 83 Conn.App. 17, 26-27.
The federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq., as amended, and General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(1) mandate that after 12 months in foster care, a child must have a plan for a permanent home. See In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 479, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd. 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d (1998), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 902, 732 A.2d 177 (1999). Our supreme court has noted consistently the importance of permanency in children's lives. See, e.g., In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 646, n. 4, 436 A.2d 290 (1980) (removing child from foster home or further delaying permanency would be inconsistent with child's best interest.) "Virtually all experts, from many different professional disciplines, agree that children need and benefit from continuous, stable home environments." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 285, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). Foster care should be a strictly limited episode in the life of a child.
In finding that termination of all of the respondents' parental rights would be in the children's best interest, the court has considered numerous relevant factors, including the mother's voluntary consent, the children's interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of their environment, any specialized needs of the children, their length of stay in foster care; the nature of their relationship with foster and biological parents, the degree of contact maintained with their biological parents; and their bond to the respondents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000).
With a statutorily mandated twelve-month limit prior to the institution of a permanency plan, 21 months of foster care with no parent being even remotely close to achieving reunification is unacceptable, and the time period that has elapsed since the dates of the children's entry into foster care does not even include the additional years the department, prior to and after the 2007 initiation of the neglect cases, attempted to mitigate the family's dysfunction to avoid removal of the children from the home. Their removal from their mother's care only took place after an extensive period of reasonable efforts was made to prevent it. The children are bonded to their parents, but they have suffered physically and emotionally, even after their entry into foster care, most notably due to the inconsistent pattern of contact maintained by their mother and Edberto. To date, no competent or reliable relative has been approved that could offer these children a home as suitable as the one being offered to the girls, who have proven more resilient than their brothers. Miguel and Jovanny both have more serious needs than their sisters, and whatever permanent home is located for them is going to have to be capable of consistently addressing their issues. There is no evidence that the relatives put forth by Edberto in Puerto Rico are capable of addressing the emotional harm that has been done to Miguel and Jovanny. Moving any of the children abruptly from their schools and other familiar surroundings without an appropriate transitional plan will undoubtedly prolong their anxiety, stress and emotional maladjustment.
Edberto A. has never filed a motion to revoke his children's commitments and transfer guardianship to his relatives.
The children's lack of permanency and the ongoing effects of that uncertainty should not be allowed to occur any longer. To wait any longer for either father's parental rehabilitation will only exacerbate the emotional damage removal from the only family has already caused, especially to Miguel and Jovanny. Both boys still require therapy and will suffer if it is not consistent.
All of the children show considerable promise. They are having their medical needs adequately addressed for the first time in their lives, and are progressing or excelling academically and are exceedingly likable. The last thing that should be permitted is a regression on any of these fronts. The children's attorney advocates termination of parental rights and adoption as being in the best interests of the children. The two sisters have an identified potential adoptive home which will keep them together as a sibling unit, and freeing the boys for adoption will undoubtedly enhance their options. The department and the current foster parents are committed to ensuring that the siblings, even if they cannot all be adopted together, maintain contact with one another.
Based upon the foregoing findings, and having considered the exhibits, testimony and arguments of counsel, the court concludes that the evidence is clear and convincing that the best interests of Christal, Miguel and Jovanny A. and Laurelis N. are served by the termination of the respondent mother and fathers' parental rights so they may be free for adoption.
CONCLUSION
The petitions for termination of parental rights are granted and judgment may enter terminating Jessica B.'s and Edberto A.'s parental rights in Christal, Miguel and Javonny A., and terminating Jessica B.'s and Efrain N.'s parental rights in Laurelis N. Pursuant to General Statutes Sec. 17a-112(m), it is ordered that the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families be appointed statutory parent for each of the four children so that they may be placed for adoption. In securing the adoptions, the court urges, but is not ordering, the department to give first preference to the present foster parents of Christal and Laurelis. The court also encourages, but is not ordering, the department to allow, if therapeutically indicated and agreed to by the adoptive families, appropriate and regular contact among the four siblings if they are not all adopted by the same adoptive parent(s).
Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(o), the statutory parent will file a written report on the case plan for each child with the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford on or before July 10, 2010 at 9 A.M. Written status reports will be due on September 9, 2010, December 9, 2010 and March 10, 2011. Motions to review permanency plans for these children, if necessary, are to be filed on or before April 14, 2011. A hearing to review the permanency plans will be held on May 26, 2011 at 12:00 P.M. Additional reports and/or motions to review the permanency plans for each child will be filed in accordance with state and federal law at least every three months until such time as each child's adoption is finalized.