Opinion
10-P-2142
10-18-2011
JOSE CHICO'S CASE.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The employee, a Massachusetts resident, appeals from the decision of the reviewing board of Department of Industrial Accidents (board) affirming an administrative judge's denial of the employee's claim against the Massachusetts Workers' Compensation Trust Fund (trust fund). The employee contends that the board erred in affirming the denial, on the grounds that the administrative judge erred in his dismissal of the claim under G. L. c. 152, § 65(2)(e)(i). We affirm.
An employment recruiter hired the employee in 2005 to work for a New Hampshire employer, doing business only in New Hampshire. In 2006, the employee was injured while working for the New Hampshire employer and filed a claim for compensation in accordance with New Hampshire law. Liberty Mutual voluntarily paid benefits for a period of time and then moved to discontinue those benefits. The request to terminate was granted by the workers' compensation division of the New Hampshire Department of Labor.
This court has ruled that workers' compensation is only available to those employees who enter into employment contracts in Massachusetts. See Conant's Case, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 695, 695-696 (1992). The parties disagree as to who actually 'hired' the employee, the employer or recruiter, and thus disagree as to the State where the employee was hired. Because we find that the statute precludes payments to claimants who properly received benefits in a jurisdiction outside Massachusetts, we do not reach this issue.
Because the employer did not maintain workers' compensation coverage on its own in New Hampshire, the State of New Hampshire placed the employer into an assigned risk pool, whereby Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) was assigned payment on claims. Liberty Mutual was subsequently reimbursed by the State of New Hampshire.
The employee thereafter filed the present claim against the trust fund in Massachusetts, relying on G. L. c. 152, § 65(2)(e)(i), to assert his entitlement to workers' compensation benefits to be paid by the trust fund. Section 65(2)(e)(i), obliges the trust fund to pay claimants in such circumstances only if 'the claimant is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits in any other jurisdiction' (emphasis added). Here, the administrative judge held, because the employee was entitled to benefits in New Hampshire, the statute precluded payment. The board affirmed, stating that the employee's purported interpretation of the statute is contrary to its plain meaning, in that Liberty Mutual's 'acceptance of the claim, and its payment of benefits to the employee under New Hampshire law . . . invalidated his right to receive benefits from the Trust Fund.' We review the decisions of the board pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), and will only set aside a decision if it is 'arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.' See Scheffler's Case, 419 Mass. 251, 258 (1994). '[W]e consider whether the board correctly decided that the administrative judge properly applied [the statute] and whether the decision is factually warranted . . . in the sense of having adequate evidentiary and factual support.' Ibid.
The board concluded: 'It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its application would not otherwise contravene the legislature's clear intent, a court must follow it. The employee would have us ignore the plain meaning of § 65(2)(e)(i), and require the Trust Fund to pay benefits when an employee, due to an out-of-state termination of benefits or settlement, is no longer entitled to additional benefits there. We reject this interpretation because it is contrary to the statute's plain meaning' (emphasis omitted). (Citation omitted.)
The heart of the employee's argument is that the board and the administrative judge misinterpreted G. L. c. 152, § 65(2)(e)(i), to disqualify the employee's claim, and that public policy and legislative intent require the trust fund to pay benefits in this case. In its review, the board looked to the plain meaning of the statute and accepted rules of statutory construction, namely, that when the language of a statute is 'plain and unambiguous,' and its application is consistent with the legislative intent, a court must follow the language of the statute. See Morales's Case, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 424, 426-427 (2007). The board properly reviewed the administrative judge's application of § 65(2)(e)(i) and the relevant evidence of intent. As stated by the board in its decision, CNA Ins. Cos. v. Sliski, 433 Mass. 491, 498-499 (2001), is controlling on the issue of legislative intent. The court in Sliski interpreted the amendments to § 65 as an attempt to 'narrow[] the Trust Fund's obligation to pay benefits to employees of uninsured employers.' Id. at 499 n.8 (citations omitted). The employee's contention that the statute permits him to make a claim against the trust fund because he is no longer entitled to continued benefits in New Hampshire, notwithstanding that he has already collected workers' compensation benefits there, depends upon an overly restrictive view of the statute, and one that ignores the guidance of the Supreme Judicial Court. We agree with the board's interpretation of this statute and discern no error. We therefore affirm for substantially the reasons given by the board in its decision.
See St. 1991, c. 398, § 85, which added to G. L. c. 152, § 65(2)(e), the limitation at issue here: ('provided, however, that [i] the claimant is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits in any other jurisdiction '). This same amendment added the further limitation on access to the trust fund discussed in CNA Ins. Cos. v. Sliski, supra ('[ii] no benefits pursuant to section twenty-eight and no interest pursuant to section fifty shall be payable out of the trust fund').
In light of our decision, the employee's request for attorney's fees is denied.
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Decision of reviewing board affirmed.
By the Court (Kantrowitz, Graham & Fecteau, JJ.),