Opinion
Nos. N05-CP05-014990-A, N05-CP06-015719-A, N05-CP06-015720-A
March 25, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PETITIONS FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
The commissioner of the department of children and families (DCF, the department or the petitioner) seeks termination of the parental rights (TPR) of the respondent mother, Amie M., (Mother) and the respondent father, Kelly G., (Father) the biological parents of Chevol G. (Chevol), Trinity G. (Trinity) and Lazarus G. (Lazarus). Mother and Father were each represented by legal counsel at trial and opposed the termination of their respective parental rights.
In addition, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129(k), on July 22, 2008 and May 26, 2009, DCF filed Motions to Review Permanency Plan for each child. Each plan proposed by the petitioner was termination of the parental rights and adoption. Mother and Father objected to such plans. On August 27, 2008 and July 1, 2009, each permanency plan was approved; however, the objections thereto were consolidated with the TPR trial.
On April 14, 2009, Mother filed a Motion to Revoke commitment with respect to the three children. The hearing on the Motion to Revoke was consolidated with the TPR trial.
The court finds it has jurisdiction and there is no known action pending in any other court affecting custody of these children. There is no claim of Native American affiliation of the children.
The proceedings relative to the TPRs are governed by General Statutes § 17a-112 et seq. In a TPR proceeding, the petitioner must first prove, in the adjudicatory phase, a ground for termination alleged in the petition, as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment, by clear and convincing evidence. In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63 (1991).
If a ground for termination is proven, the court must next consider the disposition stage. Therein, the court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interest.
The permanency plan hearing is governed by General Statutes § 46b-129 et seq. The petitioner must prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the plan is in the best interest of the child.
The Motion to Revoke Commitment is governed by General Statutes § 46b-129(m) and Practice Book § 35a-14. With respect to such motion, Mother has the burden to prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the cause for commitment no longer exists. If Mother meets that burden, then the petitioner, as the party opposing the revocation has the burden, again by a fair preponderance of the evidence, to show that revocation would not be in the best interest of the child. See In re Sarah S., 100 Conn.App. 576 (2008).
I FACTUAL FINDINGS
The trial was conducted over three days on March 9, 10 and 11, 2009. The mother was present for all three days of trial. The father was present for the first day of trial. On the second day of trial, Father, after having disclosed to the court that he was not feeling well, chose to leave the courtroom shortly before the lunch break for the remainder of the day and he requested that a habeas corpus not be issued for him to be brought to the courthouse for the third day of trial. His attorney remained and zealously represented his interests.
The petitioner presented a total of eleven witnesses and thirty-one full exhibits. The respondent Mother presented one witness, herself, and two exhibits. The respondent Father did not present any witnesses or introduce any exhibitions. The petitioner filed on March 8, 2010, a Motion for Judicial Notice. The Motion for Judicial Notice was granted without objection. The credible and relevant evidence offered at trial and a review of the judicially noticed court orders, memoranda and findings supports the finding of the following facts. Unless otherwise specified, all facts, including without limitation those set forth in section II below, are found by clear and convincing evidence.
The court has also taken judicial notice of court records including court memoranda and orders made in these cases for their existence, content and legal effect. See Tait Prescott, Tait's Handbook of Connecticut Evidence §§ 2.3.4(d), 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. (4th ed. 2008).
A. Procedural History
On February 5, 2003, the department filed neglect petitions for Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus and for their five older siblings: Kelly, Takashi, James, Vaughn and Yaminah. All eight children were adjudicated neglected by the court, Esposito, J., on April 29, 2003 and the dispositional order was protective supervision for six months. The protective supervision was extended on September 29, 2003 and subsequently expired.
Neglect petitions were filed for Kelly, Takashi, James, Vaughn, Yaminah, Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus on February 15, 2005. On March 15, 2005, Kelly, Takashi, James, Vaughn, Yaminah and Chevol were adjudicated neglected and an order of six months of protective supervision entered by the court, Brenneman, J. On November 15, 2005, protective supervision was extended from December 15, 2005 to March 15, 2006 for Kelly, Takashi, James, Vaughn, Yaminah and Chevol.
On February 1, 2006, ex parte orders of temporary custody were filed by the department and granted by the court, Conway, J., with respect to Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus and neglect petitions were filed for Trinity and Lazarus.
On February 8, 2006, Motion to Modify Disposition from Protective Supervision to Commitment was filed by the department with respect to Takashi, James, Vaughn, Yaminah and Chevol.
On February 10, 2006, the court, Conway, J., sustained the order of temporary custody as to Trinity and Lazarus and granted the motion to modify disposition to commitment for Takashi, James, Vaughn, Yaminah and Chevol. Chevol has remained committed to date. On the same date, the neglect petition was withdrawn as to Kelly.
On May 17, 2006, the court, Conway, J., found Trinity and Lazarus neglected and entered a dispositional order of commitment. Trinity and Lazarus have remained committed to date.
On May 17, 2007, the court, Conway, J., approved the revocation of Takashi's commitment and a transfer of his guardianship to maternal grandmother. On March 18, 2008, the court, Conway, J., revoked maternal grandmother's custody of Takashi and his custody and guardianship reverted to Mother.
On December 18, 2008, the department filed a TPR for Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus.
On April 14, 2009, Mother filed a Motion to Revoke commitment of Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus.
On June 11, 2009, the court, Conway, J., granted a revocation of James' commitment and his custody and guardianship reverted to Mother.
On September 21, 2009, the court, Brown, J., granted a revocation of Vaughn's and Yaminah's commitment and their custody and guardianship reverted to Mother.
The court in setting forth the procedural history of the case elected to include the history of Kelly, Takashi, James, Vaughn and Yaminah as the child protection history of the siblings of Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus is relevant to the findings made by the court. The evidence of the other children of Mother and Father is relevant and reflective of the parent-child relationship. See In re Angelica W., 49 Conn.App. 541, 548 (1998).
B. Mother
Mother was born on March 9, 1972 in New Haven, Connecticut. She has one sibling. Her parents were never married. Mother has reported she knows nothing about her father as he abandoned her before she was born. She spent her early years living with her mother and a stepfather, however, the stepfather left the home while Mother was still young.
She did not complete high school, but did obtain her General Education Degree (GED) through adult education. She has taken classes at Gateway Community College and has a nursing certificate. She has held various jobs in the past and for approximately one year (while this matter was pending) was employed as an in-home caretaker for her grandparents. She is currently unemployed. She receives Section 8 housing assistance and food stamps.
She was married to Father for approximately fifteen years. She met Father when she was sixteen and he was nineteen. They dated from 1986 to 1991. She became pregnant with the oldest of their eight children, Kelly, in 1989. Mother and Father married in 1991 and divorced in April 2005. Mother reported a history of domestic violence in her relationship with Father; she also reported that the children "were asleep" when the violence occurred. (Exhibit 26, notes from October 25, 2007 visit.)
The department has been involved with the family since 1998. There were fourteen referrals to the department before February 2006 and five of such referrals were substantiated for physical neglect, inadequate supervision, educational neglect, inadequate shelter, and emotional neglect.
In early 2006, Mother, Father and their eight children were living together in a three-bedroom apartment in New Haven. On January 30, 2006, the department received a referral from the Hamden Police Department stating the condition of the home was deplorable. There were reports of urine and feces all over, dirty diapers being strewn around the living areas, there was no food in the apartment and no working refrigerator. The police reported the children were sleeping on the floor and on couches. The younger children were reportedly found to be wearing soiled underwear. Mother and Father were arrested on seven counts of risk injury on January 31, 2006. The charges were subsequently dismissed.
The family lived in various apartments while these matters have been pending. As of the close of evidence, Mother was residing in Bridgeport in a four-bedroom apartment. Mother testified that Kelly, James, Vaughn and Yaminah are living with her in the apartment.
Mother characterizes herself as a "people person" and as someone who gets along with everybody. (Exhibit 6, page 60.)
Additional facts will be set forth below as warranted.
C. Father
Father was born on April 3, 1969 in New Haven. He has five sisters. His parents are deceased. He reported his family moved around a lot and that he would get beat up as a result of being the new kid in the neighborhood.
Father attended high school, but did not graduate. He took classes while incarcerated to receive his GED. He has held various jobs generally in the retail or service sector.
Father met Mother when he was nineteen. He was recuperating from being shot when they met. He is divorced from Mother and is currently involved in a relationship with another woman.
Father has been incarcerated twice during the pendency of this matter. His criminal history consists of the following: a failure to appear charge in October 1996; an arrest on November 17, 2005, for breach of peace 2, possession of narcotics; an arrest for failure to appear on February 14, 2006; a subsequent violation of probation arrest on February 8, 2007; an arrest on December 19, 2005, for violation of protection order and criminal trespass 1; an arrest on July 17, 2007, for sale of narcotics; a subsequent arrest for violation of probation on September 23, 2009, for which he received a sentence of one year of incarceration; and an arrest, on September 11, 2009, for possession of narcotics and possession of narcotics with intent to sell for which he received a sentence of ten years, suspended after forty-one months and a five-year conditional discharge to run concurrently with the sentence for the violation of probation. He is currently incarcerated and has a maximum release date of February 21, 2011.
Additional facts will be set forth below as warranted.
D. The Children
Chevol was born in May 1999. He is the sixth child born to Mother and Father.
When the OTC was filed, Chevol was six years old. In January 2006 his therapist reported that Chevol was frustrated in school as his peers were academically well ahead of him. It was reported that he had missed thirty-two days of school. Chevol repeated kindergarten twice and, was still not functioning at grade level.
After entering DCF custody, he was placed in a foster home with Miss H. It was reported that he enjoyed being the only child in the house and he was doing well. His brother Lazarus was placed in the same home in May 2007 and Chevol thereafter had difficulty sharing the attention of Miss H. His level of aggression escalated. In one incident he attacked another child in the neighborhood after repeatedly kicking his foster mother in the knee to escape her grasp. Chevol was hospitalized at Saint Raphael's Psychiatric Hospital. On May 12, 2008, upon his discharge from Saint Raphael's, he was placed at the Children's Center of Hamden. The disposition recommendation from the center indicated Chevol needs a "structured, nurturing and consistent environment." (Exhibit 30, page 2.) The treatment team recommended Chevol be referred to therapeutic foster care with a concurrent plan of placement in a pre-adoptive home. In March 2009, he was discharged from the center and transitioned to a professional foster home. He experienced some breakdowns while in that home. He was hospitalized for one day on October 16, 2009, for an overnight on October 19-20, 2009 and then for one week commencing on October 25, 2009. During his last hospitalization, a foster family who had earlier provided respite care for Chevol came to visit him. On November 3, 2009, he was discharged from the hospital and went to live with that foster family. He continues to reside in that professional foster home. He is attending school at Connecticut Children's Medical Center (CCMC) where he receives academic instruction and therapy. He also receives weekly therapy at the Wheeler Clinic.
Chevol has been in therapy continually since he came into the care of the department. His therapists continue to state that Chevol is a child who needs structure, and a nurturing, consistent environment.
Dr. Green, the court-appointed evaluator, diagnosed Chevol with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder; psychotic disorder NOS; neglect of child — victim (by history); identity problem; rule out bipolar disorder NOS; rule out schizophrenia, paranoid type; and rule out reactive attachment disorder (RAD). Dr. Green, who was qualified as an expert in forensic psychology, adult and child assessment and child development, testified that RAD develops early in a child's life, when the child is less than one and one-half years of age, as a result of a disjuncture between parent and child. Chevol was removed well after he was one and one-half years old and, accordingly, the RAD was not predicated by his removal and subsequent foster home placements. Dr. Green further testified that something in Chevol's home had to have happened early in his life for RAD to have developed, i.e., very, very poor parenting so that the child doesn't feel adequately cared for.
Dr. Green reported that Chevol sees aggression as an integral part of relationships and thusly acts aggressively. He has fragile self-esteem and compares himself unfavorably to others. Reportedly, depression and aggression were a normal part of his past experiences. His story telling revealed maladaptive responses to normal events. For example, Chevol made up a story about a girl who killed another girl because "she took a dollar from her." (Exhibit 7, page 11.) During the 2009 evaluation, Chevol clearly described having auditory hallucinations to Dr. Green. The hallucinations involve a male voice telling him to kill someone, but not anyone in particular. (Exhibit 8, page 17.) Chevol was characterized by Dr. Green as a "very sick, good child."
For the Record (FTR) March 11, 2010 10:50:39 a.m.
Additional facts will be set forth below as warranted.
Trinity was born December 5, 2000. She is the seventh of the eight children of Mother and Father.
Trinity, like Chevol, has been in therapy since her removal. Trinity was exhibiting sexualized behavior in 2006-2007. She disclosed witnessing her parents having sex. She further disclosed to her therapist that she was sexually abused in her first foster home by her foster brother and his friend. She was removed from that home. An investigation ensued and the abuse was confirmed. As of the fall of 2008, her therapist indicated such sexualized behavior was no longer present.
After her evaluation with Dr. Green, he reported that her projective drawings reveal an impulsive and unhappy child. He opined that her relationships with others are likely to involve aggression. He noted in his 2007 report that she admires aggressive people. In 2009, he felt that the anger she harbors is greater than that ordinarily seen in children of her age. He diagnosed Trinity with adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct; neglect of child — victim (by history); and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder.
She has been in her current foster home for almost four years. She attends public school in Wallingford through the Project Choice program. She is in the third grade.
Trinity's therapist testified that Trinity experiences anxiety around visitation with her family. Trinity also worries about her mother; she does not feel that her mother is safe.
Additional facts will be set forth below as warranted.
Lazarus was born in October 2002 and he is the youngest of the eight children.
He is in his third foster home. He was placed in this home in May 2007 to be with Chevol. After Chevol was removed from this home, Lazarus has had minimal problems with discipline although he continues to exhibit some defiance and aggressive behaviors.
He started first grade in Wallingford in September 2009. In May 2009, due to his excessive and difficult to manage behaviors he was transferred to an alternative educational school in Wallingford. At one time his classroom had to be cleared due to his aggressive behaviors. He was hospitalized for a week thereafter. In June 2009 he was returned to his nexus school district, New Haven, and he was placed in a school which specializes in working with children who are struggling with behavioral issues.
He has been receiving weekly therapy as he was displaying disruptive and antagonistic behaviors such as hitting, verbal assaults and tantrums. He has been with his current therapist since September 2007. She testified that he needs a home that provides a lot of structure. He does not yet have a discharge date due to his continuing inability to remain at a base level of stability; he cannot yet reliably manage his behaviors.
Dr. Green noted that although Lazarus has an understanding of social conventions that is within social norms, Lazarus has no problem indicating that he doesn't keep promises nor does he expect others to keep them. He is disrespectful of societal norms. Lazarus' drawings were indicative of a depressed child. Lazarus has been diagnosed with adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct; relational problems NOS (associated with depression and aggression); neglect of child — victim (by history); attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder; rule out impulse-control disorder NOS; rule out oppositional defiant disorder; and rule out reactive attachment disorder.
Additional facts will be set forth below as warranted.
E. Specific Steps
Specific steps for both respondents were ordered by the court. The court finds the following with respect to the Specific Steps and as to Mother's and the Father's compliance therewith:
As to Mother and Father: Keep all appointments set by or with DCF. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced and unannounced and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney or guardian ad litem.
Mother cooperated in keeping all scheduled appointments with the department.
Father, when not incarcerated, cooperated in keeping many appointments at the department.
As to Mother and Father: Keep child's whereabouts and your own whereabouts known to DCF, your attorney and the attorney for the child.
Mother and Father were generally compliant with this step.
As to Mother and Father: Participate in counseling and make progress toward identified goals.
Mother's general goals were parenting, individual and domestic violence. Mother completed The Positive Parenting Group through The Coordinating Counsel for Children in Crisis in November 2006. Even after completing the program, Mother modeled inappropriate behavior in front of her children. For example, during one supervised visit in July 2007, when the therapist was attempting to explain that the visits with the children would be split up (so that less than eight children would be visiting at one time), Mother, in front of the children, lost her composure and was using incredibly inappropriate language towards the staff at the visitation center. Mother after being asked to leave the visitation said she would, but she did not move. After repeated attempts to have her leave, the center director called the local police. James, who was at that time fourteen, was trying to calm mother down. James had to be the one to restrain and calm Lazarus after he witnessed Mother's outburst.
Mother was referred for individual therapy and anger management services at The Connections. She was scheduled for intakes on November 26, 2007, December 10, 2007, January 4, 2008, February 7, 2008 and March 10, 2008, but she failed to attend any of those sessions. She did attend an intake on March 14, 2008, but was discharged on April 21, 2008, after failing to attend any groups. She attended The Connections from May 21, 2008 through August 2008 and successfully completed a Woman's Stress and Anger Management program. She again attended The Connections from March 19, 2009 through October 2009 and successfully completed an individual and group anger management program.
As to individual counseling, Mother was referred to Catholic Charities in September 2006. She was unsuccessfully discharged for failure to attend. Mother was also referred to Hill Health Center in 2007, but was discharged for failure to attend. In November 2008, Mother was referred to St. Raphael's outpatient clinic, but Mother reported she did not want to attend — as she believed it was only for treatment for patients having substance abuse issues. That belief was not supported by information provided to the department. She was later referred for counseling to Northside, but failed to attend the initial intake which was scheduled for March 16, 2009. She was again referred to Saint Raphael's out-patient services, but she did not engage in the services. Mother has not engaged in the individual counseling recommended for her.
Father's steps required, as general goals, parenting, individual, anger management and domestic violence counseling.
Father was referred to Advanced Behavioral Health, Project Safe in July 2006. Despite the service attempting home visits and sending letters to get Father to attend, Father chose not to engage in the service. Father was referred to The Male Involvement Network, New Haven Family Alliance in September 2006. He attended a few classes — the last class he attended was held on October 19, 2006 — but did not follow through with the programs or classes. He was unsuccessfully discharged from the program in March 2007. He was further referred to The Hospital of Saint Raphael's and the Intensive Family Preservation Partnership. He did not comply with any of those programs. He did successfully complete domestic violence classes and parenting classes while he was incarcerated. He has not obtained individual counseling to date.
As to Mother and Father: Accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF.
Mother was not offered in-home services as the children remained in the custody of the department.
As Father did not have children in his home, he was not eligible for in-home support services.
As to Mother and Father: Submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment, including in-patient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention. Submit to random drug testing; time and method of testing to be at the discretion of DCF. Not engage in substance abuse.
In May 2006, Mother submitted to a substance abuse evaluation and testing at the Apt Foundation. She tested negative and no further treatment was recommended.
Father did not comply with this step. He was referred to Grant Street Partnership and failed to attend three scheduled substance abuse evaluations and screens. When he did submit to a drug screen at Advanced Behavioral Health, in February 2009, he tested positive for cocaine and other illicit substances.
As to Mother and Father: Cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or testing and follow recommendations.
The first court-ordered evaluation with Dr. Green was occurred over three days in June 2005. Mother was not fully cooperative. On the first day of the evaluation, Mother left the premises for two and one-half hours as she felt she ought not to have to complete the questionnaires. On the second day of testing, Mother arrived three hours late. On the same day, Mother and the rest of the family left the evaluation to get food from the cafeteria in the building and were expected to return in ten to fifteen minutes — but Mother and the children instead decided to go to a fast food restaurant and returned one hour later. On the last day, Father indicated to Dr. Green that Mother was not planning on returning as she believed she had finished the required paperwork; however, Dr. Green had informed Mother on the second day that she would have to return because she had not completed her paperwork. A child behavior checklist for each of the children was among the paperwork Mother was to complete. Although she did, technically, complete the checklists, she did so by filling them exactly the same for each child. Dr. Green, accordingly, felt the validity of the checklists was in doubt. Dr. Green also thought that Mother may have provided other invalid test data in an effort to look good.
The 2005 evaluation included, in addition to Mother and Father, Kelly, Takashi, James, Vaughn, Yaminah and Chevol, but not Trinity and Lazarus.
There was update of the 2005 evaluation in 2007. Trinity and Lazarus, as well as Mother, Father, James, Vaughn, Yaminah and Chevol, were included in the 2007 evaluation.
Another update was done in 2009, which included Mother, Father, Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus. Mother arrived one hour late for her evaluation in 2009.
Dr. Green's diagnosis of Mother, in 2009, was, Axis I: rule out impulse-control disorder NOS and rule out cyclothymic disorder; and Axis II: personality disorder NOS with narcissistic personality disorder traits.
Father's compliance with the court-ordered evaluation was not perfect either. He arrived one and one-half hours late on the second day of the 2005 evaluation and two hours late for the third day of such evaluation. At the time of the 2009 evaluation, Father failed to appear for his scheduled evaluation and interactional with the children. His evaluation and interactional had to be rescheduled for a date in April 2009, which he did attend.
Dr. Green's diagnosis of Father, as of the 2009 report, was Axis I: major depressive disorder and dysthymic disorder; and Axis II: personality disorder NOS with avoidant traits.
As to Mother and Father: Obtain and cooperate with a restraining/protective order and other appropriate safety plan as approved by DCF to avoid further domestic violence incidents.
Neither Mother nor Father reported any incidents of domestic violence during the course of these proceedings.
As to Mother and Father: Sign release within 30 days authorizing DCF to communicate with service providers to monitor attendance, cooperation and progress toward identified goals, and for use in future proceedings before the court.
Mother and Father complied with this step.
As to Mother and Father: Secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income.
In 2008, Mother reported being evicted from an apartment in New Haven. She is currently residing in Bridgeport in an apartment. She is unemployed.
Father has not complied with this step; he does not have housing and he is unemployed.
As to Mother and Father: Have no involvement or further involvement with the criminal justice system.
There are no reports of Mother being involved with the criminal justice system since the 2005 and 2006 neglect petitions were filed, except for the risk of injury charges which were dismissed.
Father has not complied with this step.
As to Mother and Father: Immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household. When the older children ran away from their respective foster families, Mother, while perhaps not immediately nonetheless did report their presence in the home to the department.
Mother has generally maintained a stable household. She also informed the department when her boyfriend moved in with her.
Father has kept the department informed in his living situation, such as it has been.
As to Mother and Father: Cooperate with the children's therapy.
Mother and Father have not been asked by the clinicians to participate in the children's therapy.
As to Mother and Father: Visit the child as often as DCF permits. Mother and Father did visit the children.
The family participated in visits at Southern Connecticut State University from March 2006 to June 2006. The visits were loud, inappropriate and chaotic. Mother was verbally inappropriate to and abusive of staff. The visits at SCSU were so loud and chaotic (with the children running around out of control) that they interfered with others. The staff determined that they could not provide the level of structure and supervision needed by the family and so the visits at SCSU were terminated.
After visits could no longer be held at SCSU, a visit was held at a facility at a church. The visit was so loud and chaotic the family was not allowed back.
Visits were then held at a police substation for about one month.
Visits were, after the substation, conducted at Family Matters for the period of June 2007 through December 2007. The visits continued to be loud, chaotic and inappropriate. Mother was reported as being volatile and inconsistent. Mother and Father were observed to handle the visits better when there were fewer children present at one time. In order to reduce the chaos and to be better able to provide therapeutic intervention, the visitation center, in September 2007, recommended the visits be rotated so that the older children in the care of the department (Yaminah, James and Vaughn) would visit one week, the younger children (Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus) the next week and all children would visit the third week. Despite the efforts of the staff, the Family Matters center terminated their services in December 2008 due to Mother's refusal to follow the rules of the center in addition to her being disrespectful to staff, unwilling to benefit from the therapeutic intervention offered by the staff and openly hostile in front of the children. Mother continued to maintain that she did not need any outside intervention.
The visits were then moved to the DCF office.
In March 2008, Chevol's therapist recommended that visits be held only once a month as Chevol was angry, aggressive and displaying out of control behaviors after attending visits. In June 2008, Trinity's therapist noted that Trinity's behaviors were worse after visits and her medications were increased to address her increasing anxiety. In December 2008, Lazarus's therapist noted that visitation did not have a positive effect on him; it caused dysregulation, angry, aggressive and out of control behaviors. He was modeling the inappropriate behaviors of his older siblings, for example, he was gesturing gang signs during visits and Mother made no effort to redirect him.
In May 2008, after the children witnessed Mother choking and slapping James during a visit, the department decreased the visits to one time a month. Mother failed to attend a visit with Trinity and Lazarus which was scheduled for May 8, 2008. She has otherwise continued to visit monthly.
As for Father, he visited relatively regularly until he was incarcerated in 2008. He was informed in January 2008 that he had to contact the department if he wanted visitation. He did request a visit in March 2008. The children's clinicians recommended against visits with Father while he was incarcerated due to the children displaying anxiety about visiting him while he was in prison. After his release, he did not visit regularly. He appeared, without notice, at one of Mother's visits in February 2010 and informed the children that he was going to be incarcerated again. The timing and manner of his delivery of the information was traumatic for the children and also indicative of his failure to benefit from the parenting classes he completed during his prior incarceration.
II MOTION TO REVOKE COMMITMENT
On April 14, 2009, Mother filed a motion to revoke the commitment of Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus. She alleges the cause for commitment no longer exists as she has adequate housing and as she has been cooperating with services provided by the department and has completed or is participating in services. She further alleges the revocation of commitment would be in the best interest of the children.
General Statutes § 46b-129(m), which governs revocation of commitment, provides in pertinent part: "The commissioner, a parent or the child's attorney may file a motion to revoke a commitment, and, upon finding that cause for commitment no longer exists, and that such revocation is in the best interest and welfare of such child or youth, the court may revoke the commitment of any child or youth." "Clearly the burden is upon the person applying for the revocation of commitment to allege and prove that cause for commitment no longer exists. Once that has been established . . . the inquiry becomes whether a continuation of the commitment will nevertheless serve the child's best interest. On this point, when it is the natural parent who has moved to revoke commitment, the State must prove that it would not be in the best interests of the child to be returned to his or her natural parent." In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 659, 420 A.2d 875 (1975).
Mother has not yet participated in mental health services. As set forth above, her visitation, at the recommendation of the children's therapists, has been reduced to one time a month due to the children's regression after visits. The court finds, based on the credible testimony at trial, that the older children who have been returned to Mother's care are not having their needs met. The commitment of the older children was revoked at the request of the department because the children were refusing services and refusing to remain in foster care. James' commitment was revoked in June 2009 and yet as of March 11, 2010 he was still not enrolled in school — although Mother was, finally and belatedly, making progress in that regard. Dr. Green testified that the older children he evaluated in 2005 and 2007 need anger management therapy and therapy to address their anxiety and depression. Yaminah in the 2005 evaluation described having hallucinations to Dr. Green: "I hear people talking, sounds, water gushing" and no one else hears it. (Exhibit 6, page 15.) Dr. Green felt if the older children in Mother's home did complete counseling and if they were discharged with a good prognosis, then, perhaps, their presence in the home would be workable in the event Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus were returned home. In the absence of the older children receiving treatment, he was unable to imagine that their presence in the home would allow for the structure that would be needed to allow the younger children to be safely returned to the home. None of the children in the home have re-engaged in counseling. Mother, as of the date of trial, was looking into counseling for Yaminah, but it was not yet arranged. The court finds Mother is continuing her pattern of failing to meet the needs of the children in her home. Even if it is reasonable to assume that Mother would make efforts to obtain counseling for Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus (and the court does not find such assumption to be reasonable, but is making the same nonetheless for this purpose), the fact that the older children are in the home with unaddressed anxiety, depression and anger means the home would not be conducive to the needs of the younger children.
There was credible testimony of the special needs of Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus. They each continue to require therapy to address their mental health issues. Dr. Green testified that Mother does not, at present, have the skill set to address the special needs of these children.
Based on all of the findings made herein, the court, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, finds Mother has clearly failed to prove that the cause for commitment of Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus no longer exists.
As Mother has not met her burden to prove that the cause for commitment no longer exists and further as the court does not find that the children's best interests would be served if custody and guardianship were returned to Mother, the Motion to Revoke Commitment is denied.
III ADJUDICATION ON TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
The petition filed by DCF for the termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights alleges one ground in General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3) — ground B(i).
A. Location and Reunification § 17a-112(j)(1)
In order to terminate parental rights, unless the court grants the petition due to the consent of the respondent parent, DCF must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the statutory element requiring "reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1). "The court need not make that finding, however, if the evidence establishes that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts." In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 47 (2005).
"The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof." Id. at 48. "Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) In re Ryan R., 102 Conn.App. 608, 619 (2007); In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000). The court must look to events prior to the date the petition was filed to determine whether reasonable efforts at reunification were made, In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 47-48 887 A.2d 415 (2005).
Mother: The court finds by clear and convincing evidence the department made reasonable efforts to reunify Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus with Mother. To do so, as detailed elsewhere in this decision and as evidenced by the exhibits and testimony presented, the department offered services and made referrals to Mother, including, without limitation, case management services, assistance with transportation including medical cabs, supervised visitation, substance abuse evaluation, individual counseling referrals, domestic violence and anger management counseling referrals, and parenting education. The department also offered services to the children, including counseling and medical care. The court finds further despite the services offered to Mother, she continued to (i) fail to recognize the role she played that led to the removal of the children and to take the steps necessary to facilitate their return to her care; (ii) be openly hostile, at times, towards service providers, (iii) fail to address her mental needs through individual counseling and (iv) demonstrate an ability to act as a stable parent of these children. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that, although this case has been pending since 2005, Mother has not engaged in the counseling she requires and, further, has not retained or been able to apply the lessons imparted to her during her attendance at services and therefore Mother is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
Father: As detailed in this decision and supported by credible testimonial and documentary evidence offered at trial, DCF made referrals and offered services to Father, including case management services, assistance with transportation, substance abuse evaluation, parenting education, referrals for counseling and supervised visitation. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify Father with Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus. The court further finds that Father failed to engage in counseling when he was in the community. Through his own poor choices, he continued to be involved with the criminal justice system and is incarcerated at this time. Father also demonstrated that he did not benefit from the services he received while incarcerated. The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, Father is unable and unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
B. Termination of Parental Rights on Ground B(i)
The petitioner alleges that respondent Mother's and Father's parental rights to Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus should be terminated because each such respondent has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
On March 15, 2005, Chevol was adjudicated neglected. He was committed to the department on February 10, 2006 and has remained committed to date. On February 21, 2006, Trinity and Lazarus were adjudicated neglected and committed to DCF and they have remained committed to date. Thus, the critical issue for this court is whether Mother and Father have achieved a sufficient degree of rehabilitation as would allow the court to find that they, individually and respectively, would be able to care for Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus within a reasonable time considering the age and needs of the child.
"Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [The statute] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time . . . [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [she] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in her child's life." In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384-85 (2001) quoting In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 706. In assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385. "Terminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate; it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying her a safe, permanent home with proven, competent care-takers because her biological mother has tried hard but continues to be incapable of providing such a home for her." In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd, 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998).
In assessing rehabilitative progress, the question is not simply how far the parent has come, but have they come far enough to encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, the parent can assume his role as parent in the life of the child. In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App., 230. See also In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 479-80 (2001). "What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 231 (quoting In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694 (2000)). Further, the court may, in considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may assume or resume within a reasonable time a useful role in the child's life, rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the termination of parental rights petition. In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230. Additionally, the court, in assessing the ability of the respondent parent may make inquiry into the full history of the respondent's parenting abilities. See, In re Galen F., 54 Conn.App. 590, 594, 737 A.2d 499 (1999).
Mother: With the above standards as the court's parameters, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Mother has failed to achieve such a degree of rehabilitation so as to encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, she could resume her role as a parent for Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus. At the time of the neglect adjudication, Mother's presenting problems arose from her mental health needs, domestic violence, and the physical and educational neglect of the children.
Mother successfully completed a parenting class. In the 2009 evaluation, Dr. Green observed Mother to be interacting appropriately with children. In so doing, she demonstrated an ability to control the children for one hour in a structured setting. Dr. Green testified that what Mother has gained is an ability to say, but not necessarily do, that which constitutes appropriate child care and parenting techniques. Mother did not change her psychopathology, depression or self-centeredness. She has not developed an appreciation of the impact on her children of her aggressive responses to situations that confront her. Her anxiety, depression and narcissism all contribute to her poor parenting. Dr. Green testified further that her self-centeredness prevents her from being able to put herself in the role of others. As children have unexpressed needs, a parent needs to be able to look beyond him or herself to learn what the child is feeling inside. Mother has not gained the inability to do so.
Mother's and the children's behavior at visits has been so abysmal that they were asked not to return to SCSU, a church facility and Family Matters. Mother has, in front of her children, been profane, openly hostile, aggressive and abusive towards others. Her behaviors have lead to increased anxiety in her children, so much so that the children's clinicians implored the department to reduce visitation.
During the 2009 evaluation Mother discussed with Dr. Green the reduction in the frequency of her visits with the children. She told Dr. Green, "[w]hen I visited with Dr. Akbar [Lazarus' therapist] she told me she never recommended once a month [for visits]. . ." (Exhibit 8, page 22.) After the 2009 evaluation report was received by the court, an order was issued permitting Dr. Green to have collateral contact with the clinicians involved with the family. In doing so, Dr. Green learned from Dr. Akbar that Mother's claim was not true and that Dr. Akbar had in fact written several letters to the department beseeching them to stop the visitation between Mother and Lazarus. (Exhibit 9, page 3.) Dr. Green testified that Mother's flagrant dissimilation is indicative of her poor reality testing; in other words, did she really think he would not find out that her representation was false? It is also indicative of her self-centeredness and sense of entitlement.
Mother testified that her children never had "these problems and labels that they have now — their doctor never said" they had any such diagnoses. However, Mother ignores the fact that the prior neglect these children suffered also played a role in the development or causation of their psychological issues. Mother is, understandably and justifiably, upset that Trinity was abused while in foster care. The court is not condoning the abuse or mistreatment of any child in foster care. This court abhors the abuse Trinity suffered while she was in her first placement; however the court is also considering that her current placement, in conjunction with the therapy she is receiving, is helping her to make progress. The court is bound to consider the present best interest of each of these children and not what would have been in the child's best interest at a previous time. See In re Joshua S., 260 Conn. 182, 209-10, 796 A.2d 1141 (2002).
FTR March 11, 2010 12:57:34 p.m.
Father: Applying the standards set forth above, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Father has failed to achieve such a degree of rehabilitation so as to encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, he could resume the role as a parent for Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus. At the time of the neglect adjudication the presenting problems for Father were domestic violence, mental health concerns (including anger management) and the physical and education neglect of the children. To that, could fairly have been added, ongoing criminal involvement.
As set forth above, has not been able to avoid involvement with the criminal justice system — he has been re-arrested and re-incarcerated.
Father, like Mother, exhibits self-centeredness. This was demonstrated at one of the interactional evaluations Dr. Green observed when Father took a protein bar meant for one of the children despite being told not to by Mother. While that is admittedly, a small example, it is also an example of smallness by Father. A nurturing parent does not literally take food meant for their child.
Dr. Green testified that Father over the period from 2005 to 2009 actually got worse. His depression has deepened and he has not made any effort to address it.
Father must, before he can successfully parent a child, learn to accept responsibility for his own actions and the consequences of such actions. There have been no reports of further domestic violence while the case has been pending and Father has acknowledged his poor choices that lead to his incarceration, but he has not addressed his underlying depression and anxiety.
As to Mother and Father: The linchpin to a determination of rehabilitation necessarily includes a finding that the parent can begin or resume parenting within a reasonable period of time. The question is not simply one of rehabilitation; it is whether the particular needs of the child can be met within a reasonable timeframe.
As set forth above, Mother and Father did comply with many of the specific steps. Compliance with steps is not all that is needed for Mother and Father to demonstrate that they have rehabilitated. A parent's compliance with court ordered expectations or specific steps is relevant, but not dispositive to the rehabilitation finding. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 554 A.2d 722 (1989). Further, compliance with specific steps is not sufficient to demonstrate that a parent has rehabilitated to a degree that the children could be returned to such parent's care. See In re Trevon G., 109 Conn.App. 782, 791 (2008).
Dr. Green testified that given the psychological profile of the children and Mother's psychological profile, she does not have the skill set to address the special needs of these children. "[M]otivation to parent is not enough; ability is required." In re G.S., 117 Conn.App. 710, 718 (2009).
Dr. Green reported that it is important for Mother to understand that her sense of entitlement and her personality disorders can be expected to have a devastating effect on her relationships with her children until such time as she has obtained appropriate treatment. He opined that it is equally important for Father to reach such an understanding as well.
Mother has not achieved such an understanding. Although she does have a home for the children, the stability thereof is seriously in doubt. Dr. Green testified that if none of the other children lived at home so that Mother could offer Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus a well structured home life and if Mother had successfully completed at least four months of individual or group therapy to address her self-centeredness, depression and anxiety (and made progress during those months — so participation as well as attendance would be required) it is possible the children could be reunified with her — in stages. The children would likewise need to be stabilized before returning home.
None of that has happened. Mother has had four years since the applicable neglect petitions were filed in which to address her underlying mental health issues (she has had a longer period of time when one considers the department has been involved with Mother and her older children since 1998). Despite many referrals for counseling, she chose to only engage in counseling that addressed her anger management issues. The court does not find credible Mother's statements that she did not know what kind of counseling she needed. If she did not, she need only have asked — again and again, if necessary.
Father is in no position to offer a safe, structured, consistent and nurturing home to these children. When in the community he failed to engage in and complete any recommended counseling. The counseling he received through the department of corrections was wholly inadequate to address his anxiety and depression. Dr. Green testified that Father has regressed from 2005 to 2009.
The court, in this matter, found Dr. Green's testimony to be credible and persuasive. The court may, in its discretion, give great weight to the opinion of a professional in a TPR proceeding. See In re Emerald C., 108 Conn.App. 839, 860 (2008), cert. den., 289 Conn. 923 (2008), In re Christina V., 38 Conn.App. 214, 221, 660 A.2d 863 (1995) and In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn. App. 167, 176, 743 A.2d 165 (1999).
These children need permanency. It was clear to the court that one of the difficulties these children continue to face is the uncertainty of where they will be living and where they can build a future. They cannot continue to wait for Mother and Father to address all of their presenting issues.
Due to the age of the children, their significant mental health needs, their length of time in placement and the denial by Mother of the significance of her problems and the failure of Father to address his underlying mental health issues and his inability to offer a home to the children, the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, neither Mother or Father have rehabilitated to a degree as to allow for any reasonable assurance that the children could safely be returned to their respective care. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence, the petitioner has met her burden and, Ground B(i), the "failure to rehabilitate" ground for termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights to Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus is proven by clear and convincing evidence.
To conclude, the petitioner has established, by clear and convincing evidence, that a statutory ground exists for the termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights to Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus. Having so determined, the court must consider, in the dispositional phase, whether clear and convincing evidence has been presented that it is in the best interests of the child that the parental rights of the respondents to children be terminated.
IV DISPOSITION
"During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 103, 758 A.2d 863, cert. den. 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000). "In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in General Statutes [17a-112(k)]." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 528 (2001) (quoting In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 833 (1999)). The court considers each of them in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section. The court makes the following seven written findings:
(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the children by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the children with respondents: the court, in reliance of the findings made above, finds the department offered timely and appropriate services to Mother and Father, as well as to Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus.
(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended. The court finds that DCF made such efforts as to Mother, Father and the children.
(3) As to the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order, the court finds specific steps were ordered as to respondent Mother and Father. As set forth above, Mother did comply many steps, but she did not comply with the step requiring counseling. Father did not comply with the significant steps of avoiding further involvement with the criminal justice system, maintaining housing and employment and participating in counseling. He did comply with other, less significant steps. The department complied with such steps.
(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect to the children's parents, any guardian of such children's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties. The court made findings in this regard above. Further, the court finds that the children do have positive feelings and emotional ties to Mother and Father. Chevol has positive memories of his life with the family. Trinity has a bond with Mother. Lazarus does have a relationship with Mother; however, his therapist testified that his relationship with Mother is not a strong bond. The credible evidence is that the children unrealistically view Mother and Father as being able to meet their needs. Lazarus' therapist believes that he has an "unrealistic fantasy about his life" while with the respondents. (Exhibit 19, page 1.) Trinity and Lazarus are conflicted. They, as well as Chevol, express a desire to live with their Mother. Trinity has reported wanting to live with her foster mother and also with Mother. Trinity is very affectionate with and bonded to her foster family and them to her. Lazarus is also very bonded with Miss H. and her to him. Miss H. is actively involved in his therapy. The foster families of all of these children are providing them with a structured and stable home.
(5) As to the age of the children: Chevol is ten and will be eleven in May. Trinity is nine. Lazarus is seven.
(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to return such children home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parents have maintained contact with the children as part of an effort to reunite the children with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the children; the court, in addition to the findings made elsewhere herein, finds as follows: Mother has maintained contact with the department. She has also maintained visitation with the children, although it was inconsistent at times, she subsequently attended on a regular basis. The visits, however, have been reduced to one time a month as the children dysregulated after visits. Based on the findings made elsewhere in this decision, the court finds the efforts made by Mother to rehabilitate have fallen short and she has not adjusted her behavior to make it in the best interest of Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus that they be returned home in the foreseeable future. Father maintained contact with the department. He did not maintain consistent contact with his children. After his release from incarceration in 2008 he visited inconsistently. He is currently incarcerated and the children have experienced difficulty with visiting him in that setting. Father has not adjusted his behavior to make it in the children's best interest that they be returned to his care in any foreseeable time. Giving Mother or Father additional time would not likely bring their performance as a parent for these children, with their special needs, to an acceptable level. The court finds that neither respondent is willing to embark on the very difficult journey of self-discovery; they deny and minimize their mental health needs.
(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parent(s) or third parties nor does the court find economic circumstances of the respondents preventing a meaningful relationship with Chevol, Trinity or Lazarus.
The court has considered the fact that the commitment of the older children, James, Vaughn, Takashi and Yaminah has been revoked and their custody and guardianship returned to Mother. The commitment was revoked as the older children were refusing to cooperate with the department and participate in services. They were running from the foster homes — sometimes directly to Mother's home, but other times to stay with others.
The court does not find that Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus are similarly situated. The younger three children were, obviously, removed at a younger age. They have been in placement for a longer period. The youngest two, Trinity and Lazarus, have bonded with their foster families. Chevol is a disturbed child who is in desperate need of specialized services and individual attention. All three of them need a stable, consistent home to enable them to flourish. They are not yet old enough to see to their own needs.
As of the close of evidence James was not enrolled in school although he was returned to Mother's care in June 2009. None of the children were in therapy although Mother reported she has been looking into therapy for Yaminah.
The evidence is clear that Mother was overwhelmed trying to give attention to all of her children during supervised visits. The evidence is also clear that this is a family that deals with life by being aggressive and combative; the behavior of the children and the parents during visits bears that out.
The children state that they want to return home. Even assuming the children have a real and true bond, the court may still find termination of parental rights to be in the children's best interest. See, e.g., In re Ryan R., 102 Conn.App. 608, 627, 926 A.2d 690, cert. den. CT Page 7509 284 Conn. 923, 933 A.2d 724 (2007).
The attorney for the minor child advocated for a denial of the TPR petitions and for the granting of the motion to revoke with the children being returned to Mother in stages and with wrap around services in place. In making his argument, counsel indicated that he has been on this case for ten years. Ten years . . . and Mother and Father have still not rehabilitated to a degree where they could assume the role as a responsible, nurturing parent for these special needs children. Our courts have previously recognized the deleterious effects of prolonged temporary placement. See In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). That effect is present in this case.
In general, pursuant to the Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act, termination of parental rights petitions are to be filed for any child in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. 42 U.S.C. 675(5)(F). The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, recognizing that prolonged uncertainty for children is frightening and can seriously and permanently damage a child's sense of trust and security, indicate that good practice dictates that the hearing on the termination of parental rights petition should begin with in ninety days after the filing of the petition. (Emphasis added.) See "Adoption and Permanency Guidelines: Improving Court Practice in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, published by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Reno, Nevada" copyright 2000, page 27. In this case more than one year has passed since the filing of the TPR petitions.
In considering the appropriate disposition for these children, the court has considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding each of the children, including their sense of time, their need for sustained growth, development, well-being, stability, continuity of their respective environment, length of stay in foster care, the nature of their respective relationship with the foster and biological parents and the degree of contact maintained with the biological parents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). The court has also balanced the child's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with the biological parents. Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).
The court has considered that the foster families are willing to adopt Trinity and Lazarus. As to Chevol, his foster family is open to adoption, but the topic has not been fully explored due to his relatively short time with them. The fact that Chevol does not have an identified pre-adoptive home does not preclude the court from finding it is in Chevol's best interest to terminate the respondents' parental rights at this time.
Although subsequent adoption is the preferred outcome for a child whose biological parents have had their parental rights terminated; In re Juvenile Appeal (83-BC), 189 Conn. 66, 79, 454 A.2d 1262 (1983); accord In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 274, 618 A.2d 1 (1992); it is not a necessary prerequisite for the termination of parental rights. While long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development; In re Romance M., [ 229 Conn. 345, 356, 641 A.2d 378 (1941)]; adoption provides only one option for obtaining such stability.
In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 709; see also In re Theresa S., 196 Conn. 18, 30, 491 A.2d 355 (1985) ("parents' rights can be terminated without an ensuing adoption"); In re Tyqwane V., 85 Conn.App. 528, 535, 857 A.2d 963 (2004) (same); In re Dorrell R., 64 Conn.App. 455, 467-68, 780 A.2d 944 (2001) (same); In re Rebecca W., 8 Conn.App. 92, 94-95, 510 A.2d 1017 (1986) (same).
In re Davonta V., 285 Conn. 483, 492 (2008).
It is accordingly not necessary for the court to find that an adoption is imminent or likely at all before the court finds that termination is in the best interest of a child. The court notes, however, that such finding is not to be construed as indicative of the court's belief that Chevol will not be adopted. That inference is not intended in the least.
The court has also considered that the guardian ad litem for the children advocated for the termination of the respondents' parental rights.
Based upon all of the foregoing, the court by clear and convincing evidence finds termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father as to Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus is in the best interest of each and every one of the children.
V REVIEW OF PERMANENCY PLANS
The Department further seeks to have the court approve the permanency plans of termination of parental rights and adoption filed for each of Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus on July 22, 2008 and May 26, 2009. Mother and Father objected to such plans. The plans were approved, but the objections were consolidated with the trial on the TPR petitions.
General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(1) provides in pertinent part: "Nine months after placement of the child or youth in the care and custody of the commissioner . . . or removal of the child . . . pursuant to section 17a-101g or an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, whichever is earlier, the commissioner shall file a motion for review of a permanency plan." The court is required to hold a permanency hearing even absent an objection. The department has the burden of proving that the proposed permanency plan is in the best interests of the child. General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(1). At a permanency hearing held in accordance with this provision, the court shall approve a permanency plan that "is in the best interests of the child . . . and takes into consideration the child's . . . need for permanency. The child's . . . health and safety shall be of paramount concern in formulating such plan." General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(2). Having considered the evidence presented at the consolidated permanency plan hearing and the termination of parental rights trial, the court hereby finds by a preponderance of the evidence the plan for termination parental rights and adoption is in the best interests of the children.
The court hereby approves the plans filed on July 22, 2008 and May 26, 2009. The objections to the plans are overruled.
The court further finds DCF has made reasonable efforts to achieve the plans.
VI ORDERS
It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Mother to Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus are hereby terminated.
It is further, ORDERED, that the parental rights of Father to Chevol, Trinity and Lazarus are hereby terminated.
The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for these children.
The Commissioner will file, within 30 days hereof, a report as to the status of this child as required by statute and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.
The Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of each of these children shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at New Haven of the date when any adoption is finalized.
Judgment may enter accordingly.
It is so ordered this 25th day of March 2010.