In respondent’s responsive papers, he states that he "will not attempt to defend or excuse [him]self in this matter" and consents to "the entry of an order imposing reciprocal discipline." Accordingly, "[b]ased on respondent’s concession to the imposition of discipline and his failure to otherwise raise any affirmative defenses pursuant to Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters (22 NYCRR) § 1240.13(b), he has waived his ability to do so" (Matter of Brammer, 227 A.D.3d 1219, 1221, 210 N.Y.S.3d 816 [3d Dept. 2024]; see Matter of Chechelnitsky, 192 A.D.3d 1453, 1453, 143 N.Y.S.3d 470 [3d Dept. 2021]). Accordingly, we turn to the sanction to be imposed, as well as the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.
In respondent's responsive papers, he states that he "will not attempt to defend or excuse [him]self in this matter" and consents to "the entry of an order imposing reciprocal discipline." Accordingly, "[b]ased on respondent's concession to the imposition of discipline and his failure to otherwise raise any affirmative defenses pursuant to Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters (22 NYCRR) § 1240.13 (b), he has waived his ability to do so" (Matter of Brammer, 227 A.D.3d 1219, 1221 [3d Dept 2024]; see Matter of Chechelnitsky, 192 A.D.3d 1453, 1453 [3d Dept 2021]). Accordingly, we turn to the sanction to be imposed, as well as the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.
Based on respondent's concession to the imposition of discipline and his failure to otherwise raise any affirmative defenses pursuant to Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters (22 NYCRR) § 1240.13 (b), he has waived his ability to do so (see Matter of Chechelnitsky, 192 A.D.3d 1453, 1453 [3d Dept 2021]). Accordingly, we turn our attention to the sanction to be imposed, as well as the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.
AGC opposes this proposed sanction, noting respondent’s extant suspension in Pennsylvania and Maryland, as well as the current prac- tice conditions imposed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. [2] Based on respondent’s concession to the imposition of discipline and her failure to otherwise raise any affirmative defenses pursuant to Rules for Atty Disciplinary Matters (22 NYCRR) § 1240.13(b), she has waived ability to do so (see Matter of Chechelnitsky, 192 A.D.3d 1453, 1453, 143 N.Y.S.3d 470 [3d Dept. 2021]). Accordingly, our attention is directed to the sanction to be imposed, as well as the relevant aggravating factors and mitigating factors.
We are not required to impose the same discipline that was imposed by the foreign tribunal, but we are instead charged with crafting a sanction that protects the public, maintains the honor and integrity of the profession or deters others from engaging in similar misconduct (see Matter of Jenkins, 222 A.D.3d 1319, 1320 [3d Dept 2023]). As respondent seeks to have the same discipline imposed in this matter as was levied in the District of Columbia and seeks that it be imposed nunc pro tunc, a request which AGC opposes, we acknowledge that we have imposed nunc pro tunc suspensions in situations where certain circumstances warranted it (see e.g. Matter of Chechelnitsky, 192 A.D.3d 1453, 1454-1455 [3d Dept 2021]; Matter of Donohue, 171 A.D.3d 1295, 1296 [3d Dept 2019]). We also take note of the aggravating factors cited by AGC, including respondent's prior history of discipline, in the District of Columbia (see In re Haar II, 698 A.2d 412, 425 [DC Ct Appeals 1997]), which prompted his discipline in this state (see Matter of Haar, 212 A.D.3d at 1075; see also ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions standard 9.22 [a]).
[2, 3] We are not required to impose the same discipline that was imposed by the foreign tribunal, but we are instead charged with crafting a sanction that protects the public, maintains the honor and integrity of the profession or deters others from engaging in similar misconduct (see Matter of Jenkins, 222 A.D.3d 1319, 1320, 201 N.Y.S.3d 804 [3d Dept. 2023]). As respondent seeks to have the same discipline imposed in this matter as was levied in the District of Columbia and seeks that it be imposed nunc pro tunc, a request which AGC opposes, we acknowledge that we have imposed nunc pro tunc suspensions in situations where certain circumstances warranted it (see e.g. Matter of Chechelnitsky, 192 A.D.3d 1453, 1454–1455, 143 N.Y.S.3d 470 [3d Dept. 2021]; Matter of Donohue, 171 A.D.3d 1295, 1296, 96 N.Y.S.3d 762 [3d Dept. 2019]). We also take note of the aggravating factors cited by AGC, including respondent’s prior history of discipline, in the District of Columbia (see In re Haar II, 698 A.2d 412, 425 [D.C. Ct. Appeals 1997]), which prompted his discipline in this state (see Matter of Haar, 212 A.D.3d at 1075, 181 N.Y.S.3d 783; see also ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions standard 9.22[a]).
Based on respondent's concession to the imposition of discipline and her failure to otherwise raise any affirmative defenses pursuant to Rules for Atty Disciplinary Matters (22 NYCRR) § 1240.13 (b), she has waived ability to do so (see Matter of Chechelnitsky, 192 A.D.3d 1453, 1453 [3d Dept 2021]). Accordingly, our attention is directed to the sanction to be imposed, as well as the relevant aggravating factors and mitigating factors.