In re Chase

6 Citing cases

  1. State v. Daw

    904 S.E.2d 765 (N.C. 2024)   Cited 1 times

    Extending that logic, we repudiated earlier decisions barring habeas courts from examining whether a petitioner’s current condition permitted their continued detention. Id. (citing Ex parte Chase, 193 N.C. 450, 137 S.E. 305 (1927)). Nor was Harris an anomaly—it built on other cases extending habeas relief in the face of subsection 17-4(2).

  2. In re Wilson

    257 N.C. 593 (N.C. 1962)   Cited 8 times
    Reversing a commitment order when the respondent was denied notice of a hearing on and the opportunity to challenge findings from her medical records that were used as the basis for her commitment

    The amendment of 1957 now provides that one committed under G.S. 122-46 may be restored to sanity under G.S. 35-3, 35-4 and 354.1. Failure of any such previous tie-in is reflected in a number of decisions of this Court. In re Harris, 241 N.C. 179, 84 S.E.2d 808; In re Cook, 218 N.C. 384, 11 S.E.2d 142; In re Sylivant, 212 N.C. 343, 193 S.E. 422; In re Chase, 193 N.C. 450, 137 S.E. 305. The amendment removes from G.S. 122-46 the objection that a traditional trial by jury is not provided as a means of determining the issue of sanity. Apparently the requirement that a guardian be appointed and made a party is to give binding effect to an adverse verdict by the jury.

  3. In re Harris

    241 N.C. 179 (N.C. 1954)   Cited 4 times

    The recovery from a mental disease after commitment to an institution would seem to be an "event which has taken place afterwards," within the meaning of G.S. 17-33 (2), entitling an inmate to discharge under G.S. 17-32. The statement contra in In re Chase, 193 N.C. 450, 137 S.E. 305, may be treated as dictum rather than decision. Affirmed.

  4. In re Osborne

    205 N.C. 716 (N.C. 1934)   Cited 9 times

    When judicial proceedings of one state are drawn in question before the courts of another state their regularity and validity are to be determined, not according to the laws of the forum, but with reference to those of the state in which the judgment was rendered, and the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not affected by the fact that the procedure in the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which it is sought to be enforced or relied on." Ring v. Whitman, 194 N.C. 544; In re Chase, 195 N.C. 143; S. c., 193 N.C. 450; Bonnett-Brown Corporation v. Coble, 195 N.C. 491. The respondent, Mrs. Anna Harrell, relies on the case of Truelove v. Parker, 191 N.C. 430, and In re Shelton, 203 N.C. 75.

  5. In re Chase

    195 N.C. 143 (N.C. 1928)   Cited 6 times

    The cause was brought to this Court at the Spring Term of 1927 by certiorari to review a judgment which denied Mrs. Chase's petition for her discharge from a hospital in Asheville on a writ of habeas corpus. 193 N.C. 450. The facts with regard to her detention appear in the record of that proceeding.

  6. Blackwell v. Dibbrell

    9 S.E. 192 (N.C. 1889)   Cited 19 times
    In Blackwell v. Dibbrell, 103 N.C. 270, this Court held, that a defendant would not be allowed to show the pendency of a former action, when the only memorandum of his defense, entered on the docket of the justice of the peace, was, "general issue, and counterclaim amounting to $89.07."

    No error. Affirmed. Cited: Harrison v. Hoff, 102 N.C. 128; Montague v. Brown, 104 N.C. 163; Beville v. Cox, 109 N.C. 269; Curtis v. Piedmont, ibid., 405; Hicks v. Beam, 112 N.C. 645; Cotton Mills v. Cotton Mills, 115 N.C. 487; Fort v. Penny, 122 N.C. 233; Smith v. Lumber Co., 140 N.C. 378; Terrell v. Washington, 158 N.C. 281; Williams v. Hutton, 164 N.C. 223; In re Chase, 193 N.C. 450; Weston v. R. R., 194 N.C. 210. (276)