DiBIASO, Acting P.J. In the published portion of this opinion, we extend the principle of In re Charmice G. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 659 to all orders, regardless of their nature, entered at a hearing at which an order is issued setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanency planning hearing. All references to code sections are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
” “In Charmice G. [(1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 659], we held that a party cannot challenge by appeal at any time the decision to set a section 366.26 hearing if the party does not comply with subdivision (l)(1)(A) and (B). (66 Cal.App.4th at p. 671; accord, Anthony D. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 149, 158 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d 479]; Wanda B. v. Superior Court (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1395 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 175]; Joyce G. v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1507 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 805]; Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 812, fn. 5 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 731].) We also held that an order setting a section 366.26 hearing is a nonappealable order.
Section 366.26, subdivision ( l)(1) currently provides that "An order by the court that a hearing pursuant to this section be held is not appealable at any time unless" a timely writ petition was filed, which "substantively addressed the specific issues to be challenged and supported that challenge by an adequate record" and which "was summarily denied or otherwise not decided on the merits." As recently observed by Division One of this district in In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 490], "In In re Charmice G. [(1998)] 66 Cal.App.4th 659 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 212], the Court of Appeal held section 366.26, subdivision ( l) bars direct appeals from orders setting a section 366.26 hearing. The appellate court explained that its statutory interpretation is in keeping with recent legislative efforts to expedite finality in dependency proceedings and to achieve permanency for children in the system.
1. Procedural Background(5) All court orders, regardless of their nature, made at a hearing in which a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing is set must be challenged by a petition for extraordinary writ. (§ 366.26, subd. ( l)(1); rule 39.1B; In re Anthony B. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1021-1024 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 594]; In re Charmice G. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 659, 671 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 212].)
Moreover, when the arguments by petitioner "only tend to establish a factual context which, had it been credited by the trial court, might have led to a different decision," such arguments are facially meritless in light of the standard of review in this court. (In re Charmice G. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 659, 664 (Charmice G.).) "The question here is whether substantial evidence supports the finding that [M.R.] was, at the time of the hearing, a person described in section 300, subdivision (b).
An order by the court setting a permanency hearing is not appealable unless "A petition for extraordinary writ review was filed in a timely manner." (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1)(A).) "Failure to file a petition for extraordinary writ review . . . shall preclude subsequent review by appeal of the findings and orders made pursuant to" section 366.26. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(2); In re Charmice G. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 659, 668.) At the section 366.26 permanency hearing, the only question before the juvenile court was whether mother had established a parental relationship with the minors.
Moreover, when the arguments by petitioner “ ‘only tend to establish a factual context which, had it been credited by the trial court, might have led to a different decision, ’ ” such arguments are facially meritless in light of the standard of review in this court. (In re Charmice G. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 659, 664, italics added.) We need find only one ground is supported by substantial evidence to affirm the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction.
Moreover, when the arguments by petitioner " 'only tend to establish a factual context which, had it been credited by the trial court, might have led to a different decision,' " such arguments are facially meritless in light of the standard of review in this court. (In re Charmice G. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 659, 664, quoting In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214, italics added; see Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) B. Juvenile Court Ruling
Moreover, when the arguments by petitioner “‘only tend to establish a factual context which, had it been credited by the trial court, might have led to a different decision,’” such arguments are facially meritless in light of the standard of review in this court. (In re Charmice G. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 659, 664 (Charmice G.), quoting In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214 (Jason L.), italics added; seeAngela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) Mother’s sufficiency of evidence argument is facially meritless because it presupposes, contrary to the juvenile court’s implied finding, that Father was not credible.
(FN6) Thus, the trial court impliedly determined that any hearing and ruling on the section 388 petition would be untimely after hearing and determination on the section 366.26 hearing. As stated by the court in In re Charmice G. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 659, "The return of a dependent child to parental custody and the development of a permanent plan for the child are mutually exclusive issues; the former has no place in a hearing for the latter. Thus, the juvenile court does not have discretion at a section 366.26 hearing to consider evidence that return to parental custody is appropriate.