Nevertheless, proceedings involving the termination of parental rights involve fundamental liberty interests and invoke some constitutional concerns akin to those implicated in criminal cases. In re J.R., 342 Ill. App. 3d 310, 316 (2003); see also In re Charles A., 367 Ill. App. 3d 800, 802 (2006) ("A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining custody of his or her child."); Bernice B., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 175. As such, the procedures employed in terminating one's parental rights must comport with the requirements of the due process clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law")).

Nevertheless, proceedings involving the termination of parental rights involve fundamental liberty interests and invoke some constitutional concerns akin to those implicated in criminal cases. In re J.R., 342 Ill. App. 3d 310, 316 (2003); see also In re Charles A., 367 Ill. App. 3d 800, 802 (2006) ("A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining custody of his or her child."); Bernice B., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 175. As such, the procedures employed in terminating one's parental rights must comport with the requirements of the due process clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law")).

¶ 53 Two years after In re Bernice B., we considered whether the denial of a parent's motion for a fitness to stand trial hearing violated the parent's due process rights. In In re Charles A., 367 Ill. App. 3d 800, 801 (2006), the mother's attorney filed a motion asking the court to hold a fitness to stand trial hearing and the juvenile court denied the motion. On appeal, we again applied the three Mathews factors to determine whether this denial violated the mother's due process rights.

¶ 53 Two years after In re Bernice B., we considered whether the denial of a parent's motion for a fitness to stand trial hearing violated the parent's due process rights. In In re Charles A., 367 Ill. App. 3d 800, 801 (2006), the mother's attorney filed a motion asking the court to hold a fitness to stand trial hearing and the juvenile court denied the motion. On appeal, we again applied the three Mathews factors to determine whether this denial violated the mother's due process rights.

Respondent further contends he was denied due process because he was not provided with the services recommended to him while detained, "thereby setting [respondent] up to lose." ¶ 14 Under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, an individual cannot be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1; In re Charles A., 367 Ill. App. 3d 800, 802, 856 N.E.2d 569, 572 (2006). It is well settled that a parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining custody of his or her child.

In re Charles A., 856 N.E.2d 569, 573 (Ill.App.Ct. 2006). Such an indefinite postponement would frustrate the State's "parens patria interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child." Id.

Because of this erroneous denial, this cause must be remanded. For that reason, we do not reach the respondent's arguments concerning the evidence of neglect and jurisdiction. In coming to this conclusion we note that we have reviewed the First District's decision in In re Charles, 367 Ill. App. 3d 800, 856 N.E.2d 569 (2006), and find it distinguishable. There, the State filed a juvenile neglect petition on the basis that the respondent suffered from schizophrenia.

Courts in Georgia, Illinois, Missouri, and Texas have found that awaiting competency prejudices the best interests of the child. See, e.g. , In re N.S.E. , 293 Ga.App. 171, 666 S.E.2d 587, 589 (2008) ; In re Charles A., 367 Ill.App.3d 800, 305 Ill.Dec. 764, 856 N.E.2d 569, 573 (2006) ; In re W.J.S.M. , 231 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) ; In re R.M.T. , 352 S.W.3d 12, 23 (Tex. App. 2011). On the other hand, some courts have held that district courts violate due process when they fail to continue a trial when a parent has recently been deemed incompetent.

(quoting In re D.L., 191 Ill.2d at 13). Here, continuing the hearing frustrated the State's parens patriae interest in promoting the welfare of the child because the delay frustrated Dalton's interest in finding a permanent home (see In re Charles A., 367 Ill.App.3d 800, 803-04 (2006)) especially where, as seen here, Dalton was in substitute care for over three years and no definite date of availability was provided by respondent. Accordingly, we find, after consideration of the governmental interest, this factor weighs heavily against Dallen's claim of a due process violation.

As this case involves the liberty interest of a parent in the custody of her children, we will address whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying respondent's motion to continue. See In re Charles A., 367 Ill.App.3d 800, 802 (2006).