This seems to us the correct understanding of the treaty, and is the view taken by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in the Chryssikos case cited in the footnote; and indeed by all the courts in the cases which we have examined, for all reach the conclusion that the words "so far as the laws of each country will permit" refer not only to special administration, but as well to the last clause in the treaty article providing for general administration. Austro-Hungarian Consul v. Westphal, 120 Minn. 122, 139 N.W. 300; In re Chaoussis's Estate, 139 Wn. 479, 247 P. 732; Pagano v. Cerri, 93 Ohio St. 345, 112 N.E. 1037, L.R.A. 1917A, 486; In re Servas' Estate, 169 Cal. 240, 146 P. 651, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 233; Chryssikos v. Demarco, 134 Md. 533, 107 A. 358, 362; Matter of D'Adamo, 212 N.Y. 214, 106 N.E. 81, 84, L.R.A. 1915D, 373. Any other view, we think, would be clearly inadmissible either from the standpoint of right or necessity.
"That in view of the laws of Sweden and in view of the fact that the will is being probated in Sweden and that the probate is domiciled in Sweden, the administration of the estate in the State of Washington will have to be done in compliance with the laws of Sweden. That the Treaty between the United States and Sweden recognizes the proper procedure in probate as to the respective countries." See In re Chaoussis' Estate, 139 Wn. 479, 247 P. 732 (1926). The motion to dismiss was heard before the Honorable Henry Clay Agnew, one of the judges of the Superior Court for King County, who, at the conclusion of the hearing, stated in some detail his reasons for removing the administrator.
-consul of the nation to which the deceased may belong, . . . shall, so far as the laws of each country will permit and pending the appointment of an administrator and until letters of administration have been granted, take charge of the property left by the deceased for the benefit of his lawful heirs and creditors, and, moreover, have the right to be appointed as administrator of such estate." We have been favored with excellent briefs by both sides; and cases from many jurisdictions are cited, a few of them being: In Re Estate of D'Adamo, Deceased, 212 N.Y. 214, 106 N.E. 81, L.R.A. 1915D, 373; Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 56 L.Ed. 453, 32 S.Ct. 207; Estate of Servas Fontana v. Hynes, 169 Cal. 210, 146 P. 651, Ann. Cas. 1916P, 233; Pagano, Admr., etc. v. Cerri, Italian Consular Agent in and for Northern Ohio, 93 Ohio St. 345, 112 N.E. 1037, L.R.A. 1917A, 186; Lely, Acting Consul v. Kalinoglu, 61 App. V. C. 213, 76 F.2d 983, 100 A.L.R. 1523; In Re Chaoussis' Estate (Liliopoulos, Consul of Greece v. Grunbaum, et al.,), 139 Wn. 479, 247 P. 732; and Schneider v. Hawkins, et al., 179 Md. 21, 16 A.2d 961. But under the view we take of this case, it is unnecessary to decide the points so splendidly briefed and argued, because we believe that 79 of the said Probate Code Act 140 of 1949 (as now found in 62-2210 of the Cumulative Pocket Supplement of the Arkansas Statutes), settles all practical questions here presented.