In re Chambers

30 Citing cases

  1. In re Magar

    335 Or. 306 (Or. 2003)   Cited 9 times
    Viewing continuum of accused lawyer's representation of client, lawyer did not neglect client's legal matter

    As with competence, neglect is not interchangeable with negligence: "A lawyer's neglect of a client's business does not necessarily give rise to actionable negligence." In re Chambers, 292 Or. 670, 674 n 3, 642 P.2d 286 (1982). At the same time, however, this court recently has stated that, "[t]o prove a violation of DR 6-101(B), the Bar must show a course of negligent conduct."

  2. In re Complaint as to the Conduct of Gatti

    330 Or. 517 (Or. 2000)   Cited 18 times
    Rejecting equal protection claim for lack of supporting evidence

    2. This court has held that a lawyer violates DR 7-102(A)(5) by misrepresenting the lawyer's identity while engaged in the practice of law. See In re Chambers, 292 Or. 670, 680-81, 642 P.2d 286 (1982) (lawyer's knowing misrepresentation of self as independent insurance agent violates DR 7-102(A)(5)). Even assuming that the accused relied on the Bar's letters in making the calls, his reliance was not reasonable. The Bar's letters neither stated nor implied that lawyers in the private practice of law may misrepresent their identity or purpose in investigating a matter.

  3. In re Eadie

    333 Or. 42 (Or. 2001)   Cited 29 times
    Holding misplaced reliance on statute to excuse service not defense to violation of DR 7-110(B)

    However, in the case that is most similar factually to this case, this court imposed a lengthy suspension rather than disbarring the lawyer. In In re Chambers, 292 Or. 670, 642 P.2d 286 (1982), the lawyer negligently failed to prepare and return a proper summons and failed to communicate with his client. In a criminal matter, the lawyer was incompetent in conducting his investigation of exculpatory evidence on behalf of his client and subsequently trying the case "by the seat of his pants."

  4. In re Rudie

    662 P.2d 321 (Or. 1983)   Cited 3 times

    We have noted that "neglect" as used in DR 6-101(A)(3) is not synonomous with actionable negligence. In re Chambers, 292 Or. 670, 674, fn 3, 642 P.2d 286 (1982). We here note further that the relationship between DR 6-101(A)(3) and this court's statutory authority to discipline members of the bar under ORS 9.480 (6), referring to "gross or repeated negligence," may be deserving of exploration.

  5. In re Day

    362 Or. 547 (Or. 2018)   Cited 2 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Discussing and comparing previous disciplinary cases before explaining why, "[u]nlike those cases, this case requires at least a lengthy suspensionโ€”far longer than any suspension imposed in any prior case; stated differently, a more significant sanction than any previously imposed, short of removal from office"

    This court dismissed the cause of complaint, explaining that an attorney must be given "reasonable written notice of the charge against him." Id. ; see also In re Chambers , 292 Or. 670, 676, 642 P.2d 286 (1982) (rejecting trial board's finding that lawyer engaged in misrepresentation when pleadings contained no allegation putting lawyer on notice of misrepresentation charge; "[t]he proof supports this finding, but the pleadings do not"). The complaint against respondent did not allege 10 of the rule violations that the commission ultimately found.

  6. In re Ellis

    356 Or. 691 (Or. 2015)   Cited 6 times

    , 42 P.3d 887 (2002) (rejecting argument that complaint insufficiently alleged conversion for lawyer's own use because one aspect of allegation described and alleged that type of conversion), with In re Spencer,355 Or. 679, 689, 330 P.3d 538 (2014) (court did not address theory of โ€œpersonal interestโ€ not alleged as conflict of interest violation), and Magar, 296 Or. at 803, 806 n. 3, 681 P.2d 93 (Disciplinary Board erred in basing rule violation on certain aspects of problematic client representation not alleged or described in complaint), and In re Lasswell, 296 Or. 121, 128, 673 P.2d 855 (1983) (Disciplinary Board erred in basing rule violation concerning prosecutor's extrajudicial statements on particular events not charged in complaint; only factual event described in complaint provided basis to analyze alleged rule violation). See also State ex rel. Currin v. Comm'n on Judicial Fitness, 311 Or. 530, 533, 815 P.2d 212 (1991) (adequate notice is necessary component of due process); In re Chambers, 292 Or. 670, 676, 642 P.2d 286 (1982) (trial panel erred in reaching guilt determination as to misrepresentation; although proof supported panel's determination, complaint contained no allegation putting lawyer on notice that being charged with misrepresentation). As discussed earlier, in this case, the Bar's second cause alleged conflicts of interest among the accuseds' current clients during the SEC investigation.

  7. In re Spencer

    355 Or. 679 (Or. 2014)   Cited 5 times
    Holding Oregon's identical version of rule 32:1.8 requires client to "consent in a signed writing to the transaction's essential terms and the role that the lawyer will play in the transaction"

    Whatever the merits of the Bar's alternative theory, the Bar did not allege that theory in its complaint, and it is not properly before us. See In re Chambers, 292 Or. 670, 676, 642 P.2d 286 (1982); In re Ainsworth, 289 Or. 479, 487, 614 P.2d 1127 (1980). The Bar's claim under RPC 1.7(a) accordingly rests on its initial theory, which it did allege in its complaint, that โ€œ[a]t all relevant times there was a significant risk that the Accused's representation of Smithโ€“Canfield would be materially limited by the Accused's personal interest in a sales commission.โ€

  8. Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Zdravkovich

    362 Md. 1 (Md. 2000)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that just because a matter ended positively for a client does not mean the negligent actions of the attorney are immaterial

    Former DR 6-101(A)(2) precluded a lawyer from handling a matter "without preparation adequate in the circumstances," and the failure to make a proper investigation of the facts of a case prior to trial has led to discipline. 359 Md. at 75, 753 A.2d at 27 (quoting 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering, 2d ed. ยง 1.1:101 (1997)) (citing In Re Conduct of Chambers, 292 Or. 670, 642 P.2d 286 (1982); People v. Felker, 770 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1989)).

  9. Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Mooney

    359 Md. 56 (Md. 2000)   Cited 96 times
    Holding that respondent violated MLRPC 1.3 for the same reasons he violated MLRPC 1.1; the same rationale could be used for both violations

    Former DR 6-101(A)(2) precluded a lawyer from handling a matter "without preparation adequate in the circumstances," and the failure to make a proper investigation of the facts of a case prior to trial has led to discipline. See In Re Conduct of Chambers, 292 Or. 670, 642 P.2d 286, 291 (1982); People v. Felker, 770 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1989).

  10. Attorney Griev. Comm. v. Ficker

    349 Md. 13 (Md. 1998)   Cited 14 times
    Concluding that the difficulties of handling a high-volume caseload were worsened by the need to be in multiple jurisdictions across the State

    Former DR 6-101(A)(2) precluded a lawyer from handling a matter "without preparation adequate in the circumstances," and the failure to make a proper investigation of the facts of a case prior to trial has led to discipline. See In Re Conduct of Chambers, 292 Or. 670, 642 P.2d 286, 291 (1982); People v. Felker, 770 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1989).