In short, does Bergman in fact have any financial interest at stake in the property sufficient to deal with change in the conditions or terms of payment, to change the rate of interest or agree to surrender the title to the property or the profits of same? In re Chalkley, 34 F.Supp. 969, 970 (E.D.Tenn. 1940). Appendix Vol. II pp. A-622-624.
Thereafter he acknowledged that a waiver can be made by the holder of a fractional interest but stated that not all interest holders here had waived and two had objected. In re Chakley, 34 F. Supp. 969 (E.D.Tenn. 1940), the principal case cited, was a case where no issue as to delegation of authority was raised. The record discloses that an attempt to circularize all interest holders was discontinued under court order.
Title VII's protections do not insulate an employee from dissatisfactions and annoyances arising in the work place nor from the "unpleasantness of a surly, strict or even personally insufferable and demanding supervisor." Settle v. Baltimore County, 34 F. Supp. 969, [ 34 F. Supp.2d 969], 991 (D.Md. 1999), aff'd 203 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999). There is no evidence in the record here that Rodrigues used racial or other discriminatory language in her dealings with plaintiff, nor has plaintiff produced evidence of any other verbal or written statements tending to indicate that defendant discriminated against her on account of her race or national origin.
Rather, since they constitute interlocutory or mediate decisions which had no immediate effect on plaintiffs' employment conditions, they are not separately actionable under Title VII. See Settle v. Baltimore County, 34 F. Supp. 969, 987-89 (D. Md. 1999); Caussade v. Brown, 924 F. Supp. 693, 700-702 (D. Md. 1996); Kortan v. State of California, 5 F. Supp.2d 842, 853 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Clearly, plaintiffs may present to the jury their claims that they were discriminatorily denied promotions because of their sex and/or race.
The Seventh Circuit, in In re Tinkoff, 156 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 820, 67 S.Ct. 675, 91 L.Ed. 1271 (1947), recognized the jurisdictional limitation of section 406(6) and dismissed a Chapter XII petition where the petitioner lied concerning her real property holdings. See also In re Chalkey, 34 F. Supp. 969 (E.D.Tenn. 1940). Professor Weinstein, one of the principle draftsmen of Chapter XII has stated that the definition of "debtor" in section 406(6), was "specifically fashioned to conform to the restricted scope of this chapter."
Actually, the Hawaii Circuit Court held, with ample evidence to justify its holding, that the partnership was a general partnership at that time, beween the individual general partners and KDC, and the latter, being a corporation, rendered Chapter XII inapplicable to this partnership (Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 406(6), 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 806(6), even if we ignore the fact that the bankruptcy proceeding was filed in behalf of a purported limited, not general, partnership designated as KGA. (3) If, as this Court holds, the general partners had terminated the original KGA as of June 30, 1961, or on some later date in 1961 or 1962 (it could not be later than January 3, 1962), and their interests in the limited partnership had been conveyed to KDC, this also would make the Chapter XII proceeding invalid, both because KGA had no title to or interest in the land in question on January 17, 1967, (See In Re Chalkley (E.D.Tenn. 1940) 34 F. Supp. 969), and because a corporation can not file a Chapter XII action (Bankruptcy Act, See. 406(6), supra) and in any event the bankruptcy proceeding was not filed in behalf of KDC, a corporation. Finally, the conclusive and short answer to the entire case is that, as ruled ante in the last portion of PART I of this decision, and in PART II of Ellis et al. v. Yumen et ux, supra, Civil No. 2954, the entire proceeding, Bankruptcy 67-17, was void on its face, for joining two separate alleged partnerships in a single Chapter XII action, and therefore the Hawaii Circuit Court was justified in ignoring said Bankruptcy 67-17 on that ground, as well as the other grounds above stated.