Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. J219741. A. Rex Victor, Judge.
Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Rhonda Cartwright-Ladendorf and Stacy Tyler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MILLER, J.
The juvenile court found true an allegation that C.H. (minor) committed petty theft from a retail merchant (Pen. Code §§ 484, subd. (a), 490.5), declared her a ward of the court, and placed her in her parents’ custody on probation with various terms and conditions. On appeal, minor contends insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s true finding. In addition, minor argues that the court failed to exercise its discretion in declaring her a ward of the court. We find minor’s contentions unavailing and, therefore, affirm the judgment in full.
FACTS
On December 18, 2007, Cameron Nelson, a loss prevention officer dressed in plain clothes (hereafter “LPO Nelson”), patrolled a Wal-Mart store for shoplifters. He observed minor select some bracelets off a rack and look around “to make sure nobody was around.” Minor was wearing a red, long-sleeved “hoodie.” Minor bit the price tag off the packet of bracelets, rolled her sleeve up, placed the bracelets on her wrist, and then rolled her sleeve down. Minor dropped the price tag from the bracelets on to the floor; LPO Nelson later recovered the price tag.
Minor walked to the front of the store where she met up with her sister and a friend. Minor then exited the store without paying for the bracelets. Thereafter, LPO Nelson detained minor. Video surveillance recorded minor in the store, but did not record her taking the bracelets because, at that time, she was out of the camera’s range. Minor wore other bracelets which were similar to those taken from the store. The bundle of bracelets was valued at approximately $5.93. The police were called.
San Bernardino Police Officer Douglas Heath responded. Officer Heath noted that minor was wearing a red, long-sleeved sweatshirt. After he gave minor Miranda advisements, minor indicated she understood her rights and agreed to waive them in order to speak with the officer. She told Officer Heath that she decided to steal the bracelets after entering the store because her bracelets were “faded.” Nevertheless, she denied actually stealing them. Instead, minor reported that her sister stole the jewelry. Minor did not have any money on her.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
Minor’s sister testified that minor was wearing a red, short-sleeved t-shirt and 15 to 20 silver bracelets prior to entering the store. The bracelets were given to minor as a birthday present from her best friend. LPO Nelson took five or six of those bracelets from minor alleging they had been stolen. Minor’s sister testified that she reported this to the police officer. Upon being recalled to the stand, Officer Heath reported that while he did speak with minor’s sister, she never reported that LPO Nelson had taken bracelets belonging to minor from her. When asked whether the bracelets that were stolen looked similar to the bracelets belonging to minor, Officer Heath responded, “I suppose so.”
DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
“‘The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. [Citation.]’” (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088.) “In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, the reviewing court must examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “‘“If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]”’” (Id. at p. 1054.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the court’s true finding on the theft allegation. Petty theft is the taking of the personal property of another, without the other’s consent, with the intent of depriving the owner of that property either permanently or for an extended period of time, and the movement of that property even a short distance. (CALCRIM No. 1800; People v. Brock (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1275.) Minor argues that it was questionable whether she actually took any bracelets belonging to the store. LPO Nelson testified that he witnessed minor take the bracelets, place them on her arm, and walk outside the store. He testified that he never lost sight of her. Minor never paid for the bracelets nor did she have sufficient funds to pay for them even if she intended to. LPO Nelson’s testimony alone was sufficient to support the true finding. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 [the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction].)
However, Officer Heath also testified that minor informed him she formed the intent to steal the bracelets while she was inside the store. While minor never admitted to the officer that she actually stole the bracelets, it is a rational inference of minor’s statement that she acted in accordance with her intent. Thus, minor’s statement further supports the trial court’s finding that she stole the bracelets. Finally, minor informed Officer Heath that her sister took the jewelry. The statement is susceptible to the reasonable inference that minor, out of a consciousness of guilt, was attempting to dispel suspicion away from herself.
Minor argues that since her sister testified that minor was already wearing bracelets when she entered the store and that both LPO Nelson and Officer Heath observed that minor was wearing other, similar bracelets, substantial evidence fails to support a conclusion that the allegedly purloined bracelets belonged to the store, i.e. that the bracelets did not actually belong to minor. This is especially true, minor contends, because minor’s sister testified that the bracelets LPO Nelson accused minor of stealing actually belonged to minor. However, the juvenile court was well within its discretion in finding minor’s sister’s testimony not credible. “‘[I]t is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends. [Citation.] Thus, if the [finding] is supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of the fact finder.’” (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)
Here, by finding the allegation in the petition true, the court necessarily concluded that the bracelets did not belong to minor; thus, the court obviously disbelieved minor’s sister’s testimony, finding good reason to believe she would testify falsely in order to protect minor because of the family relationship.
Moreover, minor’s sister’s testimony directly conflicted with the testimony of LPO Nelson, who witnessed minor take the bracelets, and who was not shown to have a motive to lie. Finally, the police officer contradicted minor’s sister’s testimony that she told him the bracelets belonged to minor. Thus, the testimony of both LPO Nelson and Officer Heath were eminently more credible than minor’s sister’s testimony and amounted to substantial evidence in support of the true finding.
B. Wardship
Minor claims the juvenile court failed to exercise its discretion in ordering wardship.
When the minor is a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, the court may declare the minor a ward of the court, order probation without a declaration of wardship, or order probation after a declaration of wardship. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 725 (a) & (b), 727; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.790(a)(2)(B) & (C).) In making this determination, the court must consider certain factors, including the minor’s age, the circumstances and gravity of the offense, and the minor’s prior delinquent history. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 725.5; In re John F. (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 182, 185 (John F.); see also In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329.) The court, however, is not required to make specific findings on the record. (John F., at p. 185.) Only where the court has demonstrably shown that it misunderstood the scope of its discretion or considered inappropriate factors in declaring a minor a ward of the court is remand required. (In re Michael G. (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 872, 875; John F., at p. 185.)
In this case, the probation officer discussed the relevant factors in recommending wardship. In the probation officer’s interview of minor, minor still failed to take responsibility for the theft. Minor had sustained prior referrals for discipline in school for “defiance and disruptive behavior.” At the dispositional hearing, minor submitted on the probation officer’s recommendation, objecting only to one of the proposed terms of probation. After both parties submitted on the matter, the juvenile court followed the probation officer’s recommendation. Under these circumstances, minor has forfeited the right to claim that the juvenile court failed to exercise its discretion. (In re Josue S. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 168, 170-171.) Moreover, where the record is silent, we must presume that the court considered the appropriate factors in exercising its discretion. (In re Fred J. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 168, 174-175.)
In this case, while the court did not discuss the factors listed in section 725.5, the court stated that it had read and considered the probation officer’s report. The report included information concerning the minor and the current offense. Since minor’s counsel did not raise an objection to the probation officer’s recommendation of a wardship declaration, even after the court indicated it was tentatively disposed to follow that recommendation, the court had no occasion to articulate any specific factors on the record. Nothing in the record suggests that the court failed to exercise its discretion in declaring minor a ward.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GAUT, Acting P. J., KING, J.