Opinion
No. 05-16-01392-CV
05-22-2017
IN THE INTEREST OF C.E.C., A MINOR CHILD
On Appeal from the 255th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DF-08-10464
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Evans, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Evans
Following a bench trial, the trial court signed a judgment terminating the parent-child relationship between C.E.C. and her father. On appeal, Father raises three issues in which he contends (1) the order of termination is not supported by the evidence, (2) the trial court erred by continuing the trial without his participation in the proceedings, and (3) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient for the trial court to terminate his parental rights and that such termination is in the best interest of the child. We reverse on the procedural, second issue and do not address the merits of this case.
BACKGROUND
On May 26, 2016, C.E.C.'s paternal grandmother filed an original petition to terminate the parent-child relationship of Father. On January 1, 2016, Grandmother was married. On July 7, 2016, Grandmother and her husband (petitioners) filed a first amended petition. On July 20, 2016, petitioners filed a second amended petition in which they sought to terminate both parents' parental rights and adopt C.E.C. At the final hearing on September 20, 2016, Father appeared by his attorney's cell phone for trial due to his incarceration. Father advised the trial court that he did not believe his appointed attorney was acting in his best interest and asked to represent himself. Father's attorney submitted an oral motion to withdraw which the trial court granted. Because Father's attorney need to leave with his cell phone, the trial court then advised Father that he had five minutes to call back into the court or the court would move forward with the trial. Before the call was terminated, Father advised the trial court that "the institution is having an issue with their phone service" and the "phone service has an issue with calling long distance." The trial court waited for Father to call in and, after twenty-four minutes, the trial resumed without Father's telephonic presence. On October 10, 2016, Father filed a motion to reconsider and rehearing in which he alleged he was harmed by not being allowed to participate in the trial. On October 20, 2016, the trial court signed a final order terminating Father's parental rights. On November 8, 2016, Father filed a second request to reconsider and to request a rehearing. Father now appeals from the trial court's order of termination.
ANALYSIS
In his second issue, Father contends that he was denied due process of law under the United States Constitution and due course of law under the Texas Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19. Specifically, Father asserts that he was denied a fair trial because he was not permitted to participate either by counsel or by teleconference.
A. Deprivation of Procedural Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against deprivation of life, liberty, or property by the State "without due process of law." See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Texas Constitution provides that "[n]o citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law to the land." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19. The Texas "due course" and federal "due course" have been interpreted to be "without meaningful distinction." In re R.M.T., 352 S.W.3d 12, 17 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.). Therefore, Texas courts have traditionally followed federal due process interpretations of procedural due process. Id.
Procedural due process guarantees the right to a fair procedure. Id. In analyzing a claim of deprivation of procedural due process, we apply a two-part test: (1) whether the complaining party has a liberty or property interest entitled to protection; and (2) if so, what process is due. Logan v. Zimmerman, 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982). Parents have a fundamental liberty interest "in the care, custody, and management of their child." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). This fundamental liberty interest does not evaporate simply because the parents have not been "model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State." Id.
Having recognized that a constitutionally-protected parent-child relationship is at stake, we now turn to what process is due to Father. The proper test for analyzing the constitutionality of a procedure in the parental rights termination context is the three-part balancing test established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754. The balancing test includes the consideration of the following factors: (1) the private interest affected by the proceeding or official action; (2) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged proceeding; and (3) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest due to the procedures used. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must weigh these factors to determine whether the fundamental requirements of due process have been met by affording an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner under the circumstances of the case. In re D.W., 498 S.W.3d 100, 112 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
B. The Eldridge Factors
1. Private interests affected by the proceeding
In a parental termination case, the private interest affected is the right of a parent to raise his or her child, which is "an interest more precious than any property right." See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 273 (Tex. 2002) (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S at 758-59). For this reason, the Supreme Court has termed the private interest in a parental termination case "a commanding one." Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759. Both the parent and the child have a substantial interest in the accuracy and justice of this decision. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003). The considerations in this case—Father's fundamental liberty interest in maintaining custody and control of C.E.C., the risk of permanent loss of the parent-child relationship between them, and Father's and C.E.C.'s interest in a just and accurate decision—weigh heavily in favor of permitting Father with an opportunity to participate in the termination proceedings.
2. The State's interest in the proceeding
The second factor is the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. In parental termination cases, this interest has included protecting the best interest of the child, having an accelerated timetable and a final decision that is not unduly prolonged with negative psychological effects on the children left without resolution of this matter. In re D.W., 498 S.W.3d at 113.
In this case, it is the grandparents and not a state agency who are seeking to terminate the parent-child relationship. Regardless, the trial court has an interest in protecting the best interest of the child, respecting the accelerated timetable and reaching a final decision that is not unduly prolonged. Here, the record shows that the original petition was filed on May 26, 2016. The case was set for trial on July 11, 2016, and Father moved for a continuance. The trial court granted the continuance and continued the trial until September 20, 2016. Father initially appeared via his attorney's telephone for the September 20th trial date but requested that he represent himself. The trial court advised he had five minutes to call back into the court and Father advised that the "phone service has an issue with calling long distance." While Father does not have an absolute right to appear personally in court in a civil case, an inmate may not be denied reasonable access to the courts. In re T.L.B., No. 07-07-0349-CV, 2008 WL 5245905, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 17, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). Even though granting another continuance to allow Father to participate by telephone may have increased the amount of time that it took to resolve the case, "the State's interests in economy and efficiency pale in comparison to the private interests at stake, and to the risk that a parent may be erroneously deprived of his or her parental rights and the child may be erroneously deprived of the parent's companionship." In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 548. In short, the record does not show that granting a continuance to allow Father to appear by telephone would have greatly harmed the State's interest. We give less weight to the State's interest in this case to achieve an expeditious resolution than we give to the private parties' interests. In re D.W., 498 S.W.3d at 115.
3. Risk of erroneous deprivation of parent-child relationship
The third factor involves the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest due to the procedures used. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. In regard to this element, the supreme court noted as follows:
The parent's, child's, and government's interest in a just and accurate decision dovetails with the third Eldridge factor—that of the risk of erroneous deprivation. Termination of parental rights is traumatic, permanent, and irrevocable. This fact has been pivotal for the United States Supreme Court. And it is to us. For this reason, any significant risk of erroneous deprivation is unacceptable.In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 549. Here, Father was not represented by counsel and was unable to appear by telephone at the trial. Father was not present to mount a defense, cross-examine any witnesses, or present any argument. Accordingly, we conclude that there was "significant risk of erroneous deprivation" of the parent-child relationship.
We now turn to whether the denial of due process to Father was harmful error. To obtain reversal of a judgment based on trial court error, an appellant must show that the error probably caused rendition of an improper judgment or probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case to the appellate court. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a). Here, Father was effectively denied Father any meaningful participation at trial and was not allowed to introduce evidence. Thus, the denial of procedural due process in this case "probably prevented [Father] from properly presenting the case" on appeal. Id. Accordingly, we sustain Father's first issue.
CONCLUSION
As Father's first issue is dispositive of his appeal, we need not address his alternative issues. We reverse the trial court's judgment with respect to the termination of the parent-child relationship between Father and C.E.C. and remand that issue to the trial court for further proceedings.
/David W. Evans/
DAVID EVANS
JUSTICE 161392F.P05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 255th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DF-08-10464.
Opinion delivered by Justice Evans. Justices Bridges and Schenck participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is REVERSED with respect to the termination of the parent-child relationship between Father and C.E.C. and this cause is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings on this issue consistent with this opinion.
It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal. Judgment entered this 22nd day of May, 2017.