Opinion
No. COA15-1176
05-17-2016
IN THE MATTER OF: C.D.L.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Stephanie A. Brennan, for the State. Mark L. Hayes for juvenile-appellant.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Alamance County, No. 06 JB 87 Appeal by juvenile from orders entered 6 April 2015 by Judge Kathryn W. Overby in Alamance County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 May 2016. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Stephanie A. Brennan, for the State. Mark L. Hayes for juvenile-appellant. McCULLOUGH, Judge.
C.D.L. ("the juvenile") appeals from adjudication and disposition orders finding him to be a delinquent juvenile for communicating threats. The trial court placed the juvenile on probation for twelve months, ordered him to complete fifteen hours of community service, required him to comply with a curfew of 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., and directed him to cooperate with a treatment assessment. The juvenile's sole argument on appeal is that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the allegations against him because no reasonable person would have believed the juvenile posed a real threat and the victim did not actually believe the juvenile was threatening him. We disagree and affirm.
This Court reviews "a trial court's denial of a juvenile's motion to dismiss de novo." In re J.F., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 766 S.E.2d 341, 347 (2014) (citation omitted).
Where the juvenile moves to dismiss, the trial court must determine whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, . . . and (2) of juvenile's being the perpetrator of such offense. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. When reviewing a motion to dismiss a juvenile petition, courts must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, which is entitled to every reasonable inference of fact that may be drawn from the evidence.In re S.M.S., 196 N.C. App. 170, 171-72, 675 S.E.2d 44, 45 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Additionally, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, "[t]he trial court must also resolve any contradictions in the evidence in the State's favor. The trial court does not weigh the evidence, consider evidence unfavorable to the State, or determine any witness' credibility." In re B.C.D., 177 N.C. App. 555, 558, 629 S.E.2d 617, 618 (2006).
A person commits the offense of communicating threats where, without lawful authority:
(1) He willfully threatens to physically injure the person or that person's child, sibling, spouse, or dependent or willfully threatens to damage the property of another;
(2) The threat is communicated to the other person, orally, in writing, or by any other means;N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-277.1(a) (2015). Here, the juvenile challenges only the State's evidence regarding the third and fourth elements of the offense of communicating threats, i.e., whether a reasonable person would believe the threat is likely to be carried out and whether the person threatened believed the threat would be carried out.
(3) The threat is made in a manner and under circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to believe that the threat is likely to be carried out; and
(4) The person threatened believes that the threat will be carried out.
At the adjudication hearing, the State's evidence tended to show that on 10 December 2014, Mr. Currie Bryan, an assistant principal at Graham Middle School, was called to escort the juvenile from a classroom to the school's in-school-suspension room. The juvenile, however, refused to enter the in-school-suspension room, and Mr. Bryan escorted the juvenile to his office. Mr. Bryan informed the juvenile that he would be sent home for the day, whereupon the juvenile became very agitated and began pacing around the office. Mr. Bryan told the juvenile to calm down, at which point the juvenile stepped into the doorway of Mr. Bryan's office and said something to the effect of, "I really want to hit you right now," or "I want to hit you so badly." Mr. Bryan believed the juvenile's threat was "plausible" and would not have been surprised if the juvenile had lunged at him. Mr. Bryan had prior dealings with the juvenile for the juvenile's aggressive behavior at school and knew that the juvenile could quickly become agitated.
Upon hearing the commotion caused by the juvenile, Rhoda Graves, another assistant principal at the school, came to assist Mr. Bryan. Ms. Graves saw the juvenile standing in the doorway to Mr. Bryan's office, "communicating his feelings." Ms. Graves described the juvenile as intense and angry with escalating actions. The juvenile was addressing Mr. Bryan loudly with an aggressive posture, and he was giving Mr. Bryan a threatening stare that he would not break. Ms. Graves spoke with the juvenile and attempted to de-escalate the situation and calm him down. After three requests from Ms. Graves to go sit down in a common area outside of Mr. Bryan's office, the juvenile calmed down enough to take a seat.
On appeal, the juvenile's arguments focus on the specific words used to threaten Mr. Bryan and how they suggest that he would not actually hit Mr. Bryan; but the juvenile ignores the context in which he made the threat. Although the juvenile phrased his threat in terms of what he wanted to do, rather than what he would do, the context within which he delivered the threatening statement negated any suggestion that the threat was hypothetical and indicated a present intention to act on the threat. See State v. Hill, 227 N.C. App. 371, 379, 741 S.E.2d 911, 917 ("[E]ven conditional threats, if made and communicated by a defendant in a manner and under circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to believe that the threat was likely to be carried out, can constitute a violation of section 14-277.1, if the victim in fact believed the threat would be carried out." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)), disc. rev. denied, 367 N.C. 223, 747 S.E.2d 577 (2013). The juvenile had a known history of aggressive behavior at school. He made his threat to Mr. Bryan while he was extremely angry and he presented himself to Mr. Bryan in a threatening and aggressive manner. The juvenile's anger was escalating and his actions were forceful enough to draw the attention of another administrator who intervened to calm him down. Mr. Bryan found the threat to be plausible, and thus believed the threat would be carried out.
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold the State presented sufficient evidence that, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed the juvenile was likely to carry out his threat, and that Mr. Bryan believed the juvenile would carry out the threat. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in denying the juvenile's motion to dismiss.
The juvenile has not otherwise challenged the trial court's adjudication order finding him to be a delinquent juvenile or the court's disposition order. Thus, we affirm those orders.
AFFIRMED.
Chief Judge McGEE and Judge ZACHARY concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).