Opinion
NO. COA12-875
12-18-2012
IN THE MATTER OF: C.C.B., T.S.G., minor children.
Twyla Hollingsworth-Richardson, for petitioner-appellee Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services. Edward Eldred, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by Edward Eldred, for respondent-appellant mother. Laura Gail Bodenheimer, for Guardian ad Litem.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Mecklenburg County
Nos. 09 JT 13-14
Appeal by respondent from order entered 2 May 2012 by Judge Dennis J. Redwing in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 December 2012.
Twyla Hollingsworth-Richardson, for petitioner-appellee
Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services.
Edward Eldred, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by Edward Eldred, for
respondent-appellant mother.
Laura Gail Bodenheimer, for Guardian ad Litem.
MARTIN, Chief Judge.
Respondent-appellant ("mother"), the biological mother of half-sisters C.C.B. and T.S.G., appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to the juveniles. After careful review, we affirm.
On 12 January 2009, the Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services' Division of Youth and Family Services ("DSS") filed a petition alleging that C.C.B. and T.S.G. were neglected and dependent juveniles. DSS alleged that it received a referral regarding mother's family on 5 January 2009 after C.C.B. "presented to school [sic] . . . with a small, deep cut to her forehead. When questioned about the cut, [C.C.B.] reported to her teacher and school psychologist that her mother pulled her head back and pushed her head forward into the bathtub faucet." The juvenile said that the injury occurred while she was out of school during Christmas break, and the school nurse "noted that the injury may have required stitches at the time the injury was received."
The next day, DSS interviewed mother at her home. Mother's initial response was that DSS "should take the juveniles into custody." DSS "noticed the mother's behavior to be erratic and out of control." Mother denied causing the injury to C.C.B. and claimed that the juvenile was "a [expletive] liar." At the conclusion of the interview, mother went to C.C.B.'s school and "threatened school personnel with physical violence." In the succeeding two days, C.C.B. was observed wearing the same clothes as she had worn on previous days, which the child reported was due to mother being upset at DSS having visited their home. On 8 January 2009, mother again appeared at the school "in an erratic, uncontrollable state." Mother then verbally threatened both C.C.B.'s teacher and school principal in the presence of the juvenile and other students. Consequently, mother was banned from the school. DSS scheduled a child and family treatment meeting for 9 January 2009 in order to address its concerns and to explore placement options for the juveniles. Although mother initially consented to appear at the meeting, she failed to appear and later informed DSS that "her kids would disappear before she allowed DSS to take them."
In addition to the claims of inappropriate discipline and concerns about mother's behavior, DSS alleged that mother was not meeting C.C.B.'s needs. Specifically, DSS alleged:
According to school personnel, the juvenile [C.C.B.] was recommended to participate in therapy to address issues of poor self[-]concept and poor self[-]esteem. [Mother] refused. School personnel have informed [mother] on more than one occasion that the juvenile is in need of eye glasses due to the result of vision impairment. As of this date, [mother] has not obtained eye glasses for the juvenile. The juvenile has been diagnosed as ADHD. In October 2008, [C.C.B.] was prescribed Concerta due to the diagnosis. The juvenile's primary care physician confirmed that [mother] has not filled the prescription.DSS further alleged that the family had been previously investigated by child protective services in New York in 2005, 2006, and 2008 due to reports of "physical abuse and inappropriate discipline." Accordingly, DSS obtained non-secure custody of both C.C.B. and T.S.G. and placed them in foster care. The juveniles were subsequently adjudicated neglected and dependent based on stipulations by the parties.
On 9 May 2011, DSS filed petitions to terminate mother's parental rights to C.C.B. and T.S.G. On 2 May 2012, the trial court entered an order terminating mother's parental rights to the juveniles after concluding that grounds existed to terminate her rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (3). Mother appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by concluding that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights to the juveniles. We disagree.
Mother first contends the trial court erred by concluding that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). Specifically, mother argues that the juveniles were removed from her care solely due to inappropriate discipline, and that DSS failed to prove that she had willfully failed to make reasonable progress as to this issue. We are not persuaded.
Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), the court may terminate parental rights upon a finding that "[t]he parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2011). "[T]o find grounds to terminate a parent's rights under G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), the trial court must perform a two part analysis." In re O.C. & O.B., 171 N.C. App. 457, 464, 615 S.E.2d 391, 396, disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 64, 623 S.E.2d 587 (2005). First, "[t]he trial court must determine by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that a child has been willfully left by the parent in foster care or placement outside the home for over twelve months." Id. at 464-65, 615 S.E.2d at 396. Next, the court must determine "that as of the time of the hearing, as demonstrated by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, the parent has not made reasonable progress under the circumstances to correct the conditions which led to the removal of the child." Id. at 465, 615 S.E.2d at 396. "Willfulness may be found where[,] even though a parent has made some attempt to regain custody of the child, the parent has failed to show reasonable progress or a positive response to the diligent efforts of DSS." In re Clark, 159 N.C. App. 75, 84, 582 S.E.2d 657, 662 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re McMillon, 143 N.C. App. 402, 410, 546 S.E.2d 169, 175 ("Willfulness is established when the respondent had the ability to show reasonable progress, but was unwilling to make the effort."), disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 218, 554 S.E.2d 341 (2001). Since mother does not dispute that the juveniles were outside the home for a period of over twelve months, we address only whether there was clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that mother had not made reasonable progress under the circumstances to correct the conditions which led to the removal of the juveniles.
Here, the trial court found that "the issues which caused DSS to remove the juveniles included, among other things, inappropriate discipline by the mother; mental health concerns and not properly meeting the needs of [C.C.B.] (needed glasses and not taking prescribed ADHD medications or participating in school recommended therapy)." In addition, mother stipulated to the facts outlining DSS's concerns about her behavior and her failure to meet the needs of the juveniles in the order adjudicating the juveniles to be neglected and dependent. To address these same concerns, mother entered into a case plan which included substance abuse treatment, a mental health assessment, domestic violence counseling, and compliance with a parenting capacity evaluation. The trial court found, however, that "for over three years, the mother has not made sufficient progress [in her case plan] for reunification to occur."
In accordance with the recommendations of her case plan, mother began substance abuse treatment in 2009; nevertheless, she tested positive for marijuana on 31 December 2009, and in June 2010, July 2010, August 2010, and September 2010. Consequently, the court found that mother was dependent on marijuana, and noted her failure to complete substance abuse treatment in a timely manner. The court also noted that the group tasked with mother's substance abuse treatment determined that mother "was exhibiting mental health issues beyond the scope of what [it] could offer."
The trial court also found that mother, who is a veteran, had been "offered full assistance by the Veteran's Administration . . . for issues [mother] identified regarding her physical or mental health that needed treatment," which "included therapeutic help for Post-Traumatic Stress and other issues the mother reported she was dealing with." The court found, however, that mother had waited over a year after her case plan was put in place before even attempting to begin therapeutic services.
The court further found mother had "completed parenting education but there is no proof she ever improved her parenting." Moreover, as a result of her Parenting Capacity Evaluation ("PCE"), the court made the following additional unchallenged—and therefore binding, see In re P.M., 169 N.C. App. 423, 424, 610 S.E.2d 403, 404 (2005)—findings of fact:
[T]he mother has minimal insight to the psychology of raising children and has difficulty in admitting flaws. The mother's psychological testing illustrated that she is likely to be self-centered to a degree that is detrimental to others as she is unable to consider their needs. Additionally, the PCE notes and the Court finds, the mother is psychologically stuck. The mother struggles to understand and meet her own psychological needs. Her ability to meet the psychological, developmental, and safety needs of her children is predicated on her ability to accept feedback, work with outside resources, work with her daughters to understand their psychological/developmental needs, and make herself psychologically available to her children. As noted in the PCE, the Court finds, the mother's inability to meet her children's psychological needs stem in part from her being unable to comprehend how her actions influence the lives of her daughters. Additionally, regarding respondent mother's use of marijuana, she commented to the PCE evaluator, "What I do on my own time is my business." The respondent mother refused to see how marijuana may impact her ability to care for the juveniles and herself. The most challenging aspect of the mother's ability and willingness to engage in services is her acceptance that she has psychological concerns that need addressing and will require her to seek assistance from others in resolution of those concerns. Additionally, the PCE notes and the Court finds, the respondent mother internalizes the assistance from outside sources not as a
negative reflection of her skills and ability as a mother, but as a personal assault on her with little regard for her daughters. She does not address that outside sources are concerned about the safety and well-being of her children. Any improvement in this area will require the mother's acceptance and understanding of the problems she has in dealing with other people, a desire to change her behavior, an increase in her willingness to work with others, and her responsibility in her relationships.
The trial court further found that C.C.B.'s therapy was to include family therapy with mother. A therapist conducted a few family sessions but discontinued them because the therapist indicated, and the court found,
that the mother needed to first participate in and make progress in individual therapy because the mother would not take responsibility for the abuse of [C.C.B.], was displaying symptoms of depression, was continuing to be unable to take much responsibility for the problems that led the juveniles into custody and [mother] often blamed "the system."The court then found that there was no evidence that mother was participating in or making progress in individual therapy.
Finally, the trial court made findings regarding mother's "level of adaptive functioning," which "refers to the skills needed to live independently (or at the minimally acceptable level for an individual's age)." The court found that "[c]ertain skills are important to adaptive behavior, such as communication skills, such as understanding what is said and being able to answer; social skills with peers, family, adults and others." The court found that "there did not seem to be any cognitive/intelligence or adaptive limitations in reference to respondent mother."
Thus, after reviewing the unchallenged findings in the record before us, we conclude that the findings of fact support the trial court's conclusion that mother had not made reasonable progress under the circumstances to correct the conditions which led to the removal of the juveniles. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err when it determined there were grounds to terminate mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). Although mother argues that the trial court further erred by concluding that grounds also existed to terminate her parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (3), as a result of our disposition with respect to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), we need not address mother's remaining arguments. See In re Humphrey, 156 N.C. App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 426 (2003) ("A finding of any one of the enumerated grounds for termination of parental rights under N.C.G.S. 7B-1111 is sufficient to support a termination.").
Affirmed.
Judges ERVIN and BEASLEY concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).