Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2446-11T3
07-14-2014
STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF C.C., a Juvenile.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant C.C. (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Anthony P. Kearns, III, Hunterdon County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (Jeffrey L. Weinstein, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Sapp-Peterson and Hoffman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hunterdon County, Docket No. FJ-10-271-11.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant C.C. (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Anthony P. Kearns, III, Hunterdon County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (Jeffrey L. Weinstein, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
In this appeal, C.C., a juvenile, appeals from an adjudication of delinquency for committing an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted a petty disorderly persons offense, defiant trespass, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b). The court imposed a one-year period of probation, ordered 100 hours of community service, a substance abuse evaluation, and imposed a $30 Violent Crimes Compensation Board (VCCB) assessment. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the scope of defiant trespass statute extends to structures. We conclude it does and therefore affirm.
The facts upon which the Family Part judge concluded C.C. committed an act of defiant trespass unfolded on October 15, 2010. According to the testimony of K.W., his parents were out of town, and he hosted a party at his home. The party started to get out of control, and he requested that some of the attendees, including C.C. and C.B., leave. According to K.W., neither C.B. nor C.C. had been invited to the party. C.C. did not want to leave, became very angry and told K.W., "No, I'm not leaving." Other witnesses testified to hearing K.W. tell C.C. to leave, and observing C.C. become confrontational with K.W. about leaving, but eventually leaving after about one-half hour. K.W. admitted that he put his hands on C.B. in an effort to get her out of his house, which apparently angered C.C., who, in his testimony, described K.W.'s actions as shoving C.B. out the door, conduct which he believed was inappropriate towards females.
C.C. testified that when asked to leave the party, he, in fact, left. He denied knowing that K.W. had previously asked C.B. to leave. However, in a statement he provided to police, which was marked into evidence, C.C. stated that K.W. had asked he and his friends to leave "again."
Upon completion of the testimony, the court found that C.C. "did knowingly enter and remain on premises to which he was not invited and asked to leave by actual communication." Addressing the issue of how much time elapsed from the point when C.C. was asked to leave and when he actually left, the court stated: "The time which elapsed between being asked and/or told to leave and the time he actually left the premises ranges from five to [ten] minutes, to [thirty] minutes. But it is enough time to assume the status of a defiant trespasser." The court acquitted C.C. of the second offense for which he was charged, criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3.
On appeal, C.C. argues he cannot be adjudicated delinquent for defiant trespass, because adjudication under this subsection is limited to "open lands." To support this contention, C.C. relies upon our decision in State v. Braxton, 330 N.J. Super. 561, 567 (App. Div. 2000).
In Braxton, the court was asked to consider whether defiant trespass is a lesser-included offense of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(a), which prohibits unlicensed entry into structures. The panel determined that a close reading of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3, "as a whole, reveals that, as a general matter, defiant trespass is established by different facts than are required to prove unlicensed entry into a structure, and therefore usually cannot be considered a lesser included offense." Id. at 565-66 (emphasis added). The State disagrees with this interpretation of the defiant trespass statute and cites State v. Brennan, 344 N.J. Super. 136 (App. Div. 2001), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 43 (2002) in support of its position that the defiant trespass statute includes conduct as was committed by C.C. In Brennan, the defendant was convicted of defiant trespass after refusing to leave a municipal building after he became confrontational during a council meeting. We upheld his conviction for defiant trespass. Id. at 146-47. The issues raised in that appeal, however, had nothing to do with whether committing an act of defiant trespass is limited to open lands.
The State also cites to State v. Slobin, where we stated the "Casino Control Act, N.J.S.A. 5:12-1 to -210, recognizes the common law right of a casino licensee to exclude or eject permanently from its casino hotel any person who disrupts the operations of its premises[.]" 294 N.J. Super. 154, 158 (App. Div. 1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore upheld the convictions of defendants for defiant trespass when they returned to the blackjack table after being told they would no longer be welcomed to play blackjack, although they were not otherwise banned from the casino. Ibid.
Finally, the State references our decision in State v. Conk, 180 N.J. Super. 140 (App. Div. 1981), where we upheld the defendant's conviction for defiant trespass, after he returned to school premises despite having previously been asked to leave the school immediately after classes. Id. at 145-46.
While all of the cases cited by the State involve convictions for defiant trespass, which occurred within a structure, none raised the issue currently before us. We turn to the words of the statute for direction.
N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(a) proscribes conduct for the entry or surreptitious remaining in any "research facility, structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof," when the person knows he or she is "not licensed or privileged to do so[.]" Unquestionably, the reach of this provision is intended to apply to structures, as its prefatory language, "unlicensed entry of structures" states. On the other hand, the reach of prohibited activity under N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b) is to "any place as to which notice against trespass is given by: (1) Actual communication to the actor[.]" It is evident from the plain meaning of this subsection, its scope is much broader and is not limited, as C.C. urges, to open lands. Where the plain meaning of the statute is made clear in its language, we need not attempt to ascribe a contrary interpretation. Ryan v. Renny, 203 N.J. 37, 54 (2010). To the extent Braxton may be read to hold otherwise we respectfully disagree.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION