Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD225391
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.
In this consolidated appeal, J.C. (appellant), the mother of C.C. (the minor), appeals from the juvenile court’s orders prohibiting contact between appellant and the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 388, 395.) Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the orders. For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm.
On August 12, 2009, this court ordered the two appeals consolidated for all purposes.
Hereafter, undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In February 2007, Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services Department (DHHS) filed an original juvenile dependency petition on behalf of the 14-year-old minor. That petition alleged there was a substantial risk the minor would suffer serious physical harm or illness in that appellant was arrested on methamphetamine manufacturing charges and for allegedly endangering the life of the minor. The petition also alleged appellant and her partner engaged in domestic violence in the minor’s presence, and that appellant left the minor without any provision for care and support.
The juvenile court sustained the petition, adjudged the minor a dependent child, and removed her from appellant’s custody. The court also granted appellant regular visitation with the minor. The minor told DHHS that she wanted to return to appellant’s custody. The minor also stated that living at home was “okay,” and her relationship with appellant was “great.”
In an August 2007 report, the minor stated she was not visiting appellant, but spoke to her by telephone at least once weekly. According to the minor, she did not believe appellant had participated sufficiently in services for the minor to return home soon. Moreover, the minor did not want to see appellant during the latter’s incarceration.
A February 2008 report noted there had been “inappropriate telephone contacts” by appellant. Moreover, appellant had been discharged from four different residential drug treatment programs. She also tested positive for methamphetamine. Finally, appellant had “significant mental health needs” requiring two psychiatric hospitalizations.
Appellant and the minor had participated in supervised weekly visitation sessions. According to the social worker, the quality of the visits ranged from “very good to very poor....” Appellant allegedly “often times has cried during the visits, causing significant discomfort for [the minor]....” Moreover, the minor requested that many visits be cancelled.
In June 2008, the juvenile court established a guardianship as the permanent plan for the minor. In its June 2008 report, DHHS stated in part: “With respect to the matter of visitation, historically and presently, contact remains volatile in that it appears that [appellant] continues to demonstrate an inability and/or unwillingness and frequently fails to comply with [DHHS’s] directives regarding visitation rules and does not engage the [minor] in a manner that is appropriate for the [minor’s] age and developmental level. It further appears that supervised visitation places an inordinate amount of pressure upon the [minor] manifested through undue anxiety and a parentified disposition demonstrated by the [minor] as expressed through words and behavior. Most recently at the [March 2008] Permanency Hearing..., an incident occurred in which [appellant] attempted to engage the [minor] in a verbal altercation in which [appellant] cornered [minor] and informed her that she had a biopsy and may have breast cancer. Overall, it appears [appellant] is without insight as to how her statements impact the [minor’s] welfare and appears unable and/or unwilling to place the [minor’s] best interests, needs and feeling before her own as it relates to role reversal and parentified behavior for the [minor]. Specifically, the [minor] informed the social worker, ‘Quite frankly, I don’t want to deal with my mother.’ Nonetheless, the [minor] recognizes that at a future date she may wish to reestablish contact with [appellant] and the caregiver remains willing to facilitate this relationship. Therefore, the undersigned social worker shall be requesting a Court order that visitation between the [minor] and [appellant] is to occur as arranged and directed by the guardian, to include supervision as deemed necessary.”
The juvenile court ordered visitation between appellant and the minor, as arranged with the guardian. Thereafter, counsel for the minor filed a petition for modification seeking to prohibit contact between appellant and the minor. According to that petition, the minor and the guardian had expressed concerns about “the [nonverbal] actions” of appellant, and the social worker was concerned that appellant’s behavior was “jeopardizing permanency” for the minor.
At a September 2008 hearing on the minor’s petition for modification to prohibit contact between the minor and the appellant, the juvenile court granted the petition, pending the next review hearing. The court based its decision on information contained in the petition, what it heard at court, the wishes of the minor, and “other information presented....” Appellant filed an appeal from that order.
In November 2008, DHHS recommended that the no-contact order remain in effect. According to the social worker, the minor told her she wanted that outcome because she “[felt] like [she was] doing better.” Moreover, the minor’s therapist believed the no-contact order was in the minor’s best interests. The report also repeated the problems occurring during past visits.
At the December 2008 review hearing, the juvenile court ruled the no-contact order should continue “until further order of the [c]ourt.” The court based its ruling on the social worker’s report. Appellant also has filed an appeal from that order.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s orders prohibiting contact between the minor and appellant. According to appellant, no evidence in support of the orders was adduced, and the court failed to make any finding of detriment to the minor likely to be caused by resumption of visitation or other contact. Therefore, appellant asserts, reversal of the no-contact order is required.
Appellant’s claim in part is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment. To review that claim, we apply the substantial evidence rule. In determining whether a judgment is supported by substantial evidence, “‘the [appellate] court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [that [denial of visitation is appropriate].’ [Citations.]” (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924.)
In this case, at both the September 2008 hearing on the modification petition and the December 2008 review hearing, appellant opposed the no-contact order. At each hearing, the juvenile court granted the order, based on the contents of the modification petition, evidence of the minor’s wishes, other information in the record, and the social worker’s report. Appellant proffered no objection to the court’s procedure at either hearing. Accordingly, she has forfeited any claim of error. (Cf. Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 264-265.)
At the December 2008 review hearing, the juvenile court indicated it had read and considered the social worker’s report, and the matter was submitted on the basis of that report. As that report made clear, appellant’s continual inappropriate behavior during her visits with the minor caused the latter undue anxiety. That evidence alone would be sufficient to constitute detriment to the minor.
The social worker’s report also contains the minor’s opinion that the no-contact order should continue, as well as the therapist’s assessment that continuation of that order would serve the best interests of the minor. In guardianship matters, ordinarily visitation is granted, unless the juvenile court finds it would be detrimental to the minor. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(C).) Here, although the court did not say so explicitly, based on the petition filed by the minor, overwhelming evidence before it, and the orders it made, it is reasonable to imply the required finding of detriment. (Cf. In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1825.)
Subdivision (c)(4)(C) states: “The court shall also make an order for visitation with the parents... unless the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the visitation would be detrimental to the physical or emotional well-being of the child.”
The general rule in visitation matters is that the juvenile court is accorded broad discretion. On appeal, absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion, the reviewing court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion. (In re Megan B. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 953.) An abuse of discretion means the juvenile court exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)
Here, whether reviewed using the substantial evidence rule or under the abuse of discretion standard, the record provides ample support for the orders of the juvenile court prohibiting contact between appellant and the minor, on the implied ground that such contact would be detrimental to the minor.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P. J., ROBIE, J.