Opinion
NO. 02-17-00216-CV
04-19-2018
FROM THE 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 323-103084-16 MEMORANDUM OPINION
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Appellant C.C., a juvenile, appeals the trial court's order revoking his probation and committing him to the custody of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD). We affirm.
Background
I. C.C.'s history of aggression and mental health issues
C.C., who was 16 at the time of the disposition hearing, has long struggled with aggression and self-destructive behaviors. From 2009 to 2017, C.C. was hospitalized multiple times for suicide attempts or ideations, self-harm behaviors, and aggressive actions toward his mother and sister, the family pet, other children in the neighborhood, and his teacher. C.C.'s mother reported that C.C. had difficulty with authority and with following rules, and she recalled that he would knock holes in the walls when he was angry or frustrated to the extent that she "[kept] sheetrock and spackle on hand at all times." While his mother and his younger sister were most often the targets of his lashing out, C.C. also did not get along well with his father. C.C.'s parents tried to help C.C. but also reported their own histories of mental health issues, and C.C.'s probation officer, Chris Shahan, noted that both parents had a history of being inconsistent and not following through with recommendations that would improve their parenting skills.
Three psychological evaluations of C.C. conducted during a prior delinquency proceeding and the instant proceeding resulted in diagnoses of bipolar disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and intermittent explosive disorder. Each of the psychologists who evaluated C.C. recommended medications to help manage his behavior. In addition to taking the prescribed medications, C.C. also attempted to self-medicate with marijuana and tested positive for the drug twice while on probation. According to Shahan, C.C. not only admitted to having used marijuana, but he also claimed to have used acid, ecstasy, molly, and Xanax.
II. C.C.'s first juvenile delinquency adjudication and probation placement
C.C. first entered the juvenile justice system in 2014 when he was charged with delinquency for assaulting a family member, assaulting a public servant, and criminal mischief. He was subsequently adjudicated delinquent for a felony assault on a public servant. In the 2014 proceeding, the trial court placed C.C. on probation in the Special Needs Diversionary Program (SNDP). At the disposition hearing in this case, Shahan described SNDP as "less intense" than residential treatment programs and described it as involving home visits by a therapist and probation officer more than once a week. According to Shahan, C.C. struggled with SNDP, and he left the program when his parents elected to place him in a residential treatment program. According to Shahan's 2017 social history report, although C.C. did successfully complete the one-year probation sentence, C.C.'s mother removed him from the residential treatment program after three months due to medication concerns.
III. The instant proceedings
A. Initial charge and probation sentence
In April 2016, when he was 15, C.C. was arrested and charged with engaging in delinquent conduct by committing the second-degree felony offense of burglary of a habitation. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(c) (West Supp. 2017). The trial court adjudicated C.C. delinquent and placed him on probation for a minimum of one year. C.C. was permitted to reside with his parents while on probation and was required to, among other things, avoid violating any laws, obey court orders, cooperate with Tarrant County Juvenile Services and his probation officer, and submit to random drug tests.
Beginning in June 2016, C.C. was placed in the REACH program, which Shahan described as the most intensive program available to juvenile probationers. REACH included a mentoring program, counseling, resources for C.C.'s parents to develop parenting and discipline techniques, assistance in developing strategies to prevent C.C. from associating with negative peers, development of a suicide safety plan, and drug testing. Despite the resources offered, C.C.'s parents were inconsistent with implementing household rules and continued to allow C.C. to associate with negative peers. Shahan reported that caseworkers "believed [C.C.] was able to control his emotions at most times, but ch[ose] not to do so." Ultimately, C.C. made no progress in the REACH program.
B. First probation violation and placement at Hector Garza RTC
While on probation, in August 2016, C.C. was charged with delinquency by committing theft of a firearm and burglary of a habitation. One month later, the State moved to modify the disposition in the instant proceeding on the basis of the burglary charge. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.05 (West Supp. 2017). At the hearing, C.C. stipulated to the State's evidence. The trial court extended his probation for six months and found that (a) it was in C.C.'s best interest to be placed outside his home, (b) reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate his removal from the home and to make it possible for him to return to his home, and (c) at his home, C.C. could not be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision that he needed to meet his probation conditions. See id. at § 54.05(m)(1). The trial court placed C.C. into the custody of Hector Garza RTC (Garza), the only residential treatment facility that accepted him for placement. The trial court ordered C.C. to "participate and successfully complete this residential placement."
Shahan's social history report noted the disposition of this charge was "Supervisor Cautioned by DA."
Unfortunately, while at Garza, C.C. continued his aggressive behavior, and he never progressed beyond the basic, entry level of the program. The staff tried to help C.C. to succeed by "scal[ing] down" expectations, shortening the amount of time he had to do well in order to earn a privilege and allowing him to have an overnight pass with his family even though he had not reached the program's requirements for that privilege, but to no avail.
According to Shahan, when C.C. was confronted with the consequences of his bad behavior, he "would just keep repeating that he was going to keep the same behaviors until he was committed to TJJD." Finally, on April 26, 2017, Garza staff discharged C.C. from the program due to "repeated maladaptive behaviors." At the disposition hearing, C.C. stipulated to the fact that he was unsuccessfully discharged
for a pattern of maladaptive behavior and refusing to accept responsibility for behaviors, participating in verbal aggression, including provoking other residents on the unit at the school, . . . also provoking and assaulting staff, including pushing, kicking and punching staff and refusing anger regression therapy and attempting to start what the facility deemed as a riot.The Garza staff recommended that C.C. be placed in "a strict locked facility with guidelines and consistent discipline." Shahan sought another placement option but could not locate another facility that would accept C.C. due to his history of aggression, suicidal ideations and attempts, and hospitalizations.
C. C.C.'s release with electronic monitoring
Upon discharge, C.C. was detained in county jail until May 10, 2017, when he was released into his parents' custody with an electronic monitor and under an order that allowed him to leave his home only for school and church. In the month between his release and the disposition hearing held on June 12, no major behavioral issues were reported to the probation department and C.C. passed four random drug tests. C.C. attended school, where he was placed in special education classes, and was passing all of his classes except one at the time of the disposition hearing.
Shahan admitted that C.C. did well overall while on electronic monitoring for that month but expressed his concerns that his mother had adjusted C.C.'s medication dosage because of Medicaid issues and that C.C. was isolating himself in his room playing violent video games. Shahan testified that when he expressed his concern about C.C.'s isolation, his mother responded that the video games "keep[] him quiet in his room."
D. The trial court's ruling and commitment to TJJD
The trial court found that C.C. violated his probation terms by failing to successfully complete the treatment program at Garza and committed C.C. to TJJD. The trial court further found that commitment was in C.C.'s best interest, that reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for his removal from his home, and that, at home, C.C. could not be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision that he needed to meet his probation conditions. See id.
Discussion
In his sole issue on appeal, C.C. challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's finding that C.C., in his home, could not be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision that he needed to meet the conditions of probation. In support of his argument, C.C. points to evidence that he did well while at home on electronic monitoring in the month between his unsuccessful discharge from Garza and the hearing.
A juvenile court has broad discretion to determine a suitable disposition for a child who has been adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent conduct. In re C.C.B., No. 02-08-00379-CV, 2009 WL 2972912, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 17, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re H.G., 993 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.)). An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court acts unreasonably or arbitrarily without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id.
A trial court does not abuse its discretion simply by basing its decision on conflicting evidence. See In re C.J.H., 79 S.W.3d 698, 702 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). And we will not find that a trial court abused its discretion as long as some evidence of substantive and probative character exists to support the trial court's decision. Id. In conducting our review, we engage in a two- pronged analysis: (1) did the trial court have sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion, and (2) did the trial court err in its application of discretion? C.C.B., 2009 WL 2972912, at *3.
The trial court may modify a disposition based on a finding of delinquent conduct in violation of the penal code to commit the child to TJJD if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the child violated a reasonable and lawful order of the court. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.05(f). On appeal, C.C. does not contest the trial court's decision in this respect. His complaint is limited to the trial court's required finding under section 54.05(m)(1) that C.C., in his home, cannot be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision that he needs to meet his probation conditions. Id. at § 54.05(m)(1).
Although C.C.'s brief refers us to section 54.04(i), we note that the applicable section is 54.05(m) because this was a modification proceeding. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.04(i) (West Supp. 2017) (requiring findings in original disposition of a juvenile delinquency charge), § 54.05(m) (requiring findings in proceeding to modify disposition).
We apply the civil standard of review to a complaint of factual insufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings at the disposition phase of a juvenile proceeding. C.J.H., 79 S.W.3d at 703. The evidence supporting the findings is factually insufficient only if it is so weak, or the evidence to the contrary is so overwhelming, that the answer should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Id.
C.C. essentially argues that the evidence of his good—or at least not bad—behavior for the one month while awaiting the disposition hearing outweighs the litany of evidence of C.C.'s continued bad behavior, including aggressive actions towards his parents, his sister, a teacher, Garza staff, and other participants at Garza. We disagree.
The trial court was presented with evidence of C.C.'s repeated misbehaviors and failures to participate in and complete at least three different programs that were offered to him by juvenile services—SNDP, REACH, and Garza—as well as his repeated criminal offenses. Furthermore, the trial court heard evidence that C.C. displayed no remorse for his poor behavior but instead boasted that he "would just keep repeating that he was going to keep the same behaviors until he was committed to TJJD." The trial court also heard evidence that C.C.'s parents were inconsistent in implementing household rules and following through with recommendations provided through the programs. During the one month he was on electronic monitoring at home, much of C.C.'s time was spent isolated in his room playing violent video games. And, finally, the trial court heard Garza's recommendation following C.C.'s unsuccessful discharge from its facility that C.C. should be placed in "a strict locked facility with guidelines and consistent discipline."
In light of the evidence of C.C.'s aggressive behavior, problems with authority, and failures to comply with rules, as well his parents' inability to provide the necessary disciplinary structure for C.C., the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that at home, C.C. could not be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision that C.C. needed to meet his probation conditions. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by committing C.C. to the custody of TJJD. See, e.g., In re M.J.A., 155 S.W.3d 575, 577-78 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.) (op. on reh'g) (holding evidence was sufficient to support removal from home where juvenile committed burglary, mother and mother's partner could not adequately supervise the juvenile, and juvenile was not forthright with his mother throughout the proceedings); In re A.D.B., No. 2-03-178-CV, 2004 WL 1858169, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence of juvenile's behavioral improvement in detention did not render evidence insufficient to support removal where numerous other types of intervention throughout previous years had been unsuccessful). We therefore overrule C.C.'s sole issue on appeal.
Conclusion
Having overruled his sole issue, we affirm the trial court's order committing C.C. to the custody of TJJD.
/s/ Bonnie Sudderth
BONNIE SUDDERTH
CHIEF JUSTICE PANEL: SUDDERTH, C.J.; KERR and PITTMAN, JJ. DELIVERED: April 19, 2018