Opinion
No. 111,349.
2014-12-12
In the interest of C.B. and A.B., Minor Children Under the Age of Eighteen.
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; Jean M. Schmidt, Judge.Randy R. Debenham, of Debenham Law Office, LLC, of Topeka, for appellant natural mother.Darren E. Root, assistant district attorney, and Chadwick J. Taylor, district attorney, for appellee.
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; Jean M. Schmidt, Judge.
Randy R. Debenham, of Debenham Law Office, LLC, of Topeka, for appellant natural mother. Darren E. Root, assistant district attorney, and Chadwick J. Taylor, district attorney, for appellee.
Before STANDRIDGE, P.J., LEBEN and POWELL, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
POWELL, J.
A.H. (Mother), the natural mother of C.B. and A.B., appeals the district court's termination of her parental rights. She contends the State failed to provide reasonable preventative and rehabilitative services to reintegrate the family and the district court erred in finding the State made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the family. The children's biological father relinquished his parental rights, so he is not a party to this appeal. After considering Mother's arguments and reviewing the record on appeal, we find there is clear and convincing evidence to support the district court's unfitness finding and we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother's parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm the district court.
Factual and Procedural History
Leann Southard worked for the Department for Children and Families (DCF) in spring 2011 when she first met Mother and the children. Southard had received a claim of physical abuse and neglect concerning both children. After she was admitted to Mother's house, Southard noted there was clutter all over the floor, with urine and feces in C.B.'s room. The children's rooms had locks on the outsides of the doors. C.B. had a bruise on his forehead; he explained the bruise was caused by him banging his head on the wall. C.B. was also very thin and pale.
At Southard's suggestion, Mother took C.B. to the doctor. C.B. was immediately admitted to the hospital and placed in police protective custody because of the severity of his condition. C.B. was so malnourished that he had to be fed a liquid diet because hospital staff feared he would not be able to tolerate solid food. C .B. improved dramatically after spending approximately 2 weeks in the hospital.
A child in need of care (CINC) petition was filed in May 2011. The children were removed from Mother's home and placed in DCF custody. After an evidentiary hearing, the children were adjudicated children in need of care. Mother appealed that finding to this court, which affirmed the district court. See In re C.B., No. 108,626, 2013 WL 1010725 (Kan.App.2013) (unpublished opinion).
In October 2013, the State filed a motion to terminate Mother's parental rights. In the motion, the State claimed Mother was unfit due to several of the statutory factors found at K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269, including Mother's mental illness, abusive conduct, neglect, and lack of effort by Mother to adjust her circumstances to meet the children's needs.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing to evaluate testimony from witnesses and arguments from counsel. After hearing the evidence, the district court determined by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was unfit under K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269(b)(1), (2), (4), (7) and (8), and (c)(1) and (3) and that Mother had failed to rebut a presumption of unfitness due to the children being in out-of-home placement for roughly 2 years pursuant to K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2271(a)(5). After finding that Mother's unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future and termination was in the children's best interests, Mother's parental rights were terminated.
Mother timely appeals.
Was There Clear and Convincing Evidence To Support the Termination of Mother's Parental Rights?
Among other things, the district court found that Mother's mental illness and the failure of reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the family made her unfit. On appeal, Mother claims the State failed to adequately assist her in meeting her reintegration tasks. Mother believes she could have succeeded under the right conditions, which included counseling appropriate for her multiple personality disorder. Mother also contends she should have been provided with a therapist with whom she felt “connected and engaged.” Instead, Mother claims she was given a social worker she neither liked nor trusted.
If a child is adjudicated a child in need of care, parental rights may be terminated “when the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit by reason of conduct or condition which renders the parent unable to care properly for a child and the conduct or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.” K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269(a). The Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2201 et seq ., lists a number of nonexclusive factors the district court must consider in determining a parent's unfitness. See K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269(b) and (c). Any one of the factors may, but does not necessarily, establish grounds for terminating a parent's rights. See K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269(f). The district court is not limited only to the statutory factors in making a determination of unfitness. See K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269(b).
When reviewing a district court's findings on this point, our standard of review is clear: The district court's findings must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269(a). We determine whether such evidence could have convinced a rational factfinder such facts were highly probable by clear and convincing evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the State. In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. 686, 705, 187 P.3d 594 (2008). In making this determination, we do not weigh conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or redetermine questions of fact. 286 Kan. at 705.
If present unfitness is found, our next step is to determine whether clear and convincing evidence supported the district court's determination that the parent's behavior was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. See K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269(a). The term “ ‘foreseeable future’ “ is measured from the child's perspective and takes into account a child's perception of time. In re S.D., 41 Kan.App.2d 780, 790, 204 P.3d 1182 (2009). This court has considered periods of time as short as 7 months to be the foreseeable future from a child's perspective. 41 Kan.App.2d at 790. A court may predict a parent's future unfitness based on his or her past history. In re Price, 7 Kan.App.2d 477, 483, 644 P.2d 467 (1982).
If a parent is found unfit, the district court must then determine whether terminating parental rights is in the child's best interests. See K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269(g)(1). Because it hears the evidence directly, the district court is in the best position to determine the best interests of the child, and an appellate court cannot overturn the determination without finding an abuse of discretion. In re K.P., 44 Kan.App.2d 316, 322, 235 P.3d 1255, rev. denied 291 Kan. 912 (2010). An abuse of discretion occurs when no reasonable person would agree with the district court or when the court bases its decision on an error of fact or an error of law. See Critchfield Physical Therapy v. The Toronto Group, Inc., 293 Kan. 285, 292, 263 P.3d 767 (2011). In determining whether the district court has made a factual error, we review any additional factual findings made in the best-interests determination to see that substantial evidence supports them (recognizing that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies in the district court). In re R.S., 50 Kan.App.2d ––––, 336 P.3d 903, 910 (2014).
The issue of Mother's mental health was frequently discussed at the termination hearing. Dr. David Rodeheffer performed Mother's psychological evaluation. Mother told Dr. Rodeheffer that she suffered from multiple personality disorder plus other diagnoses including bipolar disorder; Mother described herself as “crazy.” Dr. Rodeheffer testified that he noticed some changes in Mother's tone of voice during their meeting after she pointed them out, but he indicated the changes were not apparent to him at the time.
Dr. Rodeheffer described Mother as viewing the world as potentially threatening and carrying a skeptical view of mental health evaluation and treatment. It was his opinion that Mother's “egocentric” view of the world caused her to personalize everything and frame it inside a conflict, making it difficult for her to accept help and, in fact, difficult for her to even acknowledge that she needed help.
This reluctance to accept help was confirmed by Lacey Villamar, who served as the therapeutic case manager for Mother and the children. Villamar arranged for Mother to have $200 that could be used for four counseling sessions. Unfortunately, Mother rescheduled her first appointment because she overslept; she attended one session but missed several more appointments, once when she was incarcerated.
Mother's therapist believed that Mother's needs were beyond what the therapist was able to provide and she wanted to refer Mother to a different therapist who specialized in dissociative disorder. Mother failed to meet with her therapist to wrap up their work and then failed to get the number for the new therapist. Villamar spent several months prompting Mother to get the phone number for the new therapist and eventually provided Mother with the number. Mother provided several excuses for her failure to make contact, including the idea that she did not need therapy and the fact that she could not afford therapy. When Villamar gave Mother the option to see an entirely different provider—Valeo Behavioral Health Care—Mother reported that she did not like Valeo, either. Mother eventually met with someone from Valeo but then refused therapy because she was not willing to participate.
Mother testified she did not like Villamar and Villamar did not like her. Mother believed Villamar was unnecessarily critical and focused only on Mother's missteps while ignoring her progress. Villamar testified she believed Mother blamed her for the move to termination. She explained that Mother threatened her numerous times over the course of the case.
Ultimately, we are unpersuaded by Mother's complaint that she was never offered therapy to address her multiple personality or bipolar disorders because it ignores the fact that Mother refused to attend any of the therapy she was offered. As we have already discussed, the record on appeal shows Mother failed to avail herself of any of the treatment offered. It is impossible for us to evaluate if the treatment offered was adequate when Mother never attempted to participate. Moreover, Mother's refusal to acknowledge her own failings made it apparent there was likely no therapy that could have been effective.
Finally, and more broadly, it is significant that Mother does not challenge whether there was clear and convincing evidence to support the district court's other findings of unfitness, nor does she explain why the district court's decision to terminate her parental rights was not in the children's best interests. At the termination hearing, there was testimony that Mother failed to take responsibility for anything that happened, Mother would not admit to starving the children, and Mother blamed a urinalysis sample that tested positive for methamphetamine on being around a cousin who was smoking.
Accordingly, given the totality of the record on appeal, we conclude there was clear and convincing evidence to support the district court's unfitness finding and the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding it was in the children's best interests to terminate Mother's parental rights.
Affirmed.