Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Caryl Lee, Judge. Super. Ct. No. DP013481.
Rich Pfeiffer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Paula A. Whaley, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the Minor.
Van Deusen, Youmans and Walmsley and Ted R. Youmans for De Facto parents.
OPINION
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
After denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 (all further statutory references are to that code), the court terminated appellant Dawn W.’s parental rights to her daughter Cassidy W. Mother bases her appeal on two contentions: the court failed to properly consider her sister Denise for relative placement, and the court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition without a full evidentiary hearing. We considered both contentions and affirm the judgment.
FACTS
The child, now about 18 months old, was taken into protective custody in May 2006, after mother was arrested on drug charges. Mother was a chronic user of illicit drugs and had an extensive criminal history, and her attempts to comply with the rules of several sober living houses proved unsuccessful. Eight years earlier her parental rights to her two sons were terminated. After her arrest, and concurrent with the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, the criminal court ordered mother to a residential drug treatment program. Additional facts relevant to our decision affirming the judgment are incorporated in our discussion.
DISCUSSION
1. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the section 388 petition without a full evidentiary hearing.
In her section 388 petition, filed on January 29, 2007, mother sought return of the child or reunification services. Her supporting declaration stated that she had stayed at a residential inpatient recovery program from July 11 until October 8, 2006 followed by a stay in a sober women’s center until January 2, 2007. Thereafter she moved to a certified sober living home for the homeless. She also recited that she participates in Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous once a week and had obtained a sponsor. In addition she had been enrolled in a perinatal program, attending two group sessions per week. Mother also stated that, since the previous month, she had been employed at a bakery, working 30 to 40 hours a week. She noted she has weekly monitored visits with the child. Finally, she acknowledged she was still on probation but claimed to be in compliance. “[T]o the best of [her] knowledge” her drug tests had been negative. Mother’s declaration was supported by letters from the women’s center, the sober living home, and her AA sponsor, and by various documents confirming her factual statements.
Section 388, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part: “Any parent or other person having an interest in a child who is a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action in which the child was found to be a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court.” To be entitled to a hearing, mother’s petition had to make a prima facie showing not only that there was a change in her circumstances or new evidence, but also that the proposed modification would be in the child’s best interest. (§ 388, subds. (a), (c); In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 188-189.) She failed to show either.
We admire mother’s efforts, so far successful, to change her life and circumstances, and we join the trial court in commending her. However, after a three decades long troubled history, including prior lapses in attempted sobriety, as the trial court found, the petition shows only a half year of sobriety; this demonstrates only “changing” not “changed” circumstances, which is insufficient. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 49.) Further, the petition is silent as to why it would be in the child’s best interests to reunify with mother. The court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct a full evidentiary hearing.
2. The time to appeal from a placement order has expired.
Mother also claims the court erred in failing to properly consider placing the child with her sister. As noted above, mother’s section 388 petition sought return of the child or reinstatement of reunification services; it did not deal with relative placement. Nor was the issue of relative placement raised at the section 366.26 hearing. The proper time to have brought up relative placement was at the dispositional hearing, which mother did not do. (See In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 53-54.) And the time to appeal from the order following the dispositional hearing is long past.
We also question mother’s standing to appeal this issue. Since her parental rights were terminated, any errors regarding the relative placement preference issue would not affect her. ‘“An appellant cannot urge errors which affect only another party who does not appeal.’ [Citations.]” (Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1035.)
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O’LEARY, J., IKOLA, J.