In re Carpenter

5 Citing cases

  1. People v. Diamond

    59 Mich. App. 581 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975)   Cited 20 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In People v Diamond, 59 Mich App 581, 587; 229 NW2d 857 (1975), this Court first announced the rule that once a warrant for probation violation has been issued, the probation authorities must exercise due diligence in executing it.

    "Michigan recognizes this rule where the parole authorities have actual knowledge of the parolee's whereabouts. In re Carpenter, 348 Mich. 408; 83 N.W.2d 326 (1957), and In re Colin, 337 Mich. 491; 60 N.W.2d 431 (1953), but not merely constructive knowledge, In re Ginivalli, 336 Mich. 101; 57 N.W.2d 457 (1953) (18 years delay in executing warrant held proper). We think knowledge may be actual or constructive.

  2. Greene v. Michigan Department of Corrections

    339 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1964)   Cited 5 times

    If we may indulge the doubtful assumption that Greene was denied due process of law if his detention is void under Michigan law, see United States ex rel. Meiner v. Ragen, 199 F.2d 798, 799 (CA7, 1952), but see, e.g., Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 554-555, 82 S.Ct. 955, 8 L.Ed.2d 98 (1962); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7, 11, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497, 504 (1944); United States ex rel. Sieg v. Ragen, 247 F.2d 638, 639-640 (CA7, 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 900, 78 S.Ct. 276, 2 L.Ed.2d 197 (1957), we do not consider that such law calls for Greene's release. In In re Ginivalli, 336 Mich. 101, 57 N.W.2d 457 (1953), and In re Carpenter, 348 Mich. 408, 83 N.W.2d 326 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 850, 78 S.Ct. 77, 2 L.Ed.2d 59 (1957), the Michigan Supreme Court announced Michigan's rule that long delay between a parole violation and the execution of a warrant therefor does not deprive an offender of due process of law in the absence of intervening knowledge of the parolee's whereabouts and opportunity to take him into custody. We are not persuaded that the failure of the Michigan State Police to transmit to the Department of Corrections the information that Greene had been in Seattle, or the failure of Michigan to act on that information, if we may assume that the Corrections Department was charged with that information, taints Michigan's later arrest of Greene with constitutional invalidity.

  3. Greene v. Michigan Department of Corrections

    315 F.2d 546 (6th Cir. 1963)   Cited 47 times
    Reversing and remanding for hearing to determine from facts whether delay was reasonable where parole officials waited nine years before executing arrest warrant for parole violation

    Michigan recognizes this rule where the parole authorities have actual knowledge of the parolee's whereabouts. In re Carpenter, 348 Mich. 408, 83 N.W.2d 326, and In re Colin, 337 Mich. 491, 60 N.W.2d 431, but not merely constructive knowledge, In re Ginivalli, 336 Mich. 101, 57 N.W.2d 457 (18 years delay in executing warrant held proper). We think knowledge may be actual or constructive. Deputy Commissioner of Agriculture v. O. A. Electric Co-Operative, Inc., 332 Mich. 713, 716, 52 N.W.2d 565; The Cleveco, 154 F.2d 605, 613 (C.A.6); 66 C.J.S. Notice § 11, pp. 642-644, 646. It may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence.

  4. Carpenter v. Dethmers

    253 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1958)   Cited 1 times

    This same conclusion of the inapplicability of the Colin case was reached in appellant's habeas corpus proceeding in the Supreme Court of Michigan. In re Carpenter, 348 Mich. 408, 83 N.W.2d 326. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

  5. In re Evans

    18 Mich. App. 426 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 8 times
    Concluding that a parole board's delay in executing a warrant on an incarcerated parole violator in federal prison constituted a waiver of the violation

    The thrust of the defendant's argument is that under MCLA § 791.238 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.2308) it is directed not to credit against a term any time from the date of declared delinquency until the alleged delinquent is taken into actual custody by the parole board and returned to the institution from which he was released. After careful examination of this statute and the cases of In re Ginivalli (1953), 336 Mich. 101, and in In re Carpenter (1957), 348 Mich. 408, we find the present case is distinguishable from the cases and is not within the purview of the particular clause of the cited statute. The clause upon which the defendant relies deals with prisoners on parole who violate the provisions of their parole and remain at large.