The effect of this was to impose a condition not imposed by the statute, which provides, Nationality Act of 1940, sec. 307(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 707(a): "No person, except as hereinafter provided in this chapter, shall be naturalized unless such petitioner, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing petition for naturalization has resided continuously within the United States for at least five years and within the State in which the petitioner resided at the time of filing the petition for at least six months, (2) has resided continuously within the United States from the date of the petition up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during all the periods referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States." See also In re Caroni, D.C., 13 F.2d 954; In re Ross, C.C., 188 F. 685; In re Kornstein, D.C., 268 F. 172; United States v. Kichin, D.C., 276 F. 818; In re McNeil, D.C., 14 F. Supp. 394; In re Paoli, D.C., 49 F. Supp. 128; In re Taran, D.C., 52 F. Supp. 535; In re Laws, D.C., 59 F. Supp. 179; In re Balestrieri, D.C., 59 F. Supp. 181; Petition of Gabin, D.C., 60 F. Supp. 750; In re Spenser, 22 Fed.Cas. No. 13,234, page 921. The learned judge below did not distinguish, we think, between considering evidence of crimes committed prior to the five year period as bearing upon the question of character within that period and denying a petition for naturalization on the basis of such crimes.
The exclusive control over the admission of individuals to citizenship by the process of naturalization is vested in Congress by the Federal Constitution, article I, section 8, whereby Congress is given power "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization * * * throughout the United States." Persons are admitted to citizenship only when it is to the interest and advantage of the nation and not at all to gratify persons' desire or serve their interest [in re Caroni, 13 F.2d 954 (1926)]. "(n)ot only is United States citizenship a `high privilege', it is a priceless treasure" [Mr.
This matter, * * * is not to be determined along such narrow lines. * * *" In re Caroni, supra, 13 F.2d at page 955, "* * * Undoubtedly the interest of society requires the rehabilitation of the criminal * * * but this does not import * * * (bestowal) * * * of * * * citizenship." The liberality shown in the cases in Note 8 supra was as to the offense or conduct which would not preclude awarding citizenship and in allowing reapplication albeit not until five years later.
The statute does not say either expressly or impliedly, as we construe it, that petitioner's record further back than these five years may not also be treated as ground for denying the petition, if the court, in the reasonable exercise of discretion, determines that such record is so bad or if good, is so relatively recent as to raise a material doubt as to whether petitioner should be treated as worthy of citizenship, in the sense of being capable of satisfactorily exercising its high duties and privileges, at least until he has stood the test of longer residence in this country. See In re Bookschnis, D.C., 61 F. Supp. 751; Petition of Gabin, 60 F. Supp. 750; In re Laws, D.C., 59 F. Supp. 179; In re Balestrieri, D.C., 59 F. Supp. 181; In re Taran, D.C., 52 F. Supp. 535; In re McNeil, D.C., 14 F. Supp. 394; In re Caroni, D.C., 13 F.2d 954; In re Ross, C.C., 188 F. 685. Each case must be decided on its own particular facts.
But the court is not restricted in its inquiry concerning the fitness of wouldbe citizens to the five year period. In re McNeil, D.C., 14 F. Supp. 394; In re Ross, C.C.Pa., 188 F. 685; In re Caroni, D.C., 13 F.2d 954; In re Laws, D.C., 59 F. Supp. 179; In re Balestrieri, D.C., 59 F. Supp. 181. The aforesaid period merely fixes the minimum requirement which petitioners for citizenship must meet. 8 U.S.C.A. § 707(a).
While the statute imposes upon applicants for citizenship the burden of proving five years good character, it does not restrict or limit in point of time, the power of the court to examine petitioner's qualifications for citizenship. In re McNeil, D.C., 14 F. Supp. 394; In re Ross, 3 Cir., 188 F. 685; In re Caroni, D.C. 13 F.2d 954; In re Laws, D.C. 59 F. Supp. 179. The Court has examined the records pertaining to petitioner's parole and pardon and has also interviewed the trial judge who presided over the trial of the petitioner in 1913.
Furthermore, it has been held that citizenship may, in the discretion of the court, if the facts of the case so warrant, be denied or postponed, even if good behavior for the five year period is shown. In re McNeil, supra; In re Ross, 3 Cir., 188 F. 685; In re Caroni, D.C., 13 F.2d 954. These holdings have full legal justification, for the statute in no way imposes any limitation upon judicial inquiry as to the petitioner's character. All that the statute does is to make ineligible for citizenship those who cannot show good moral character for at least five years prior to the application for citizenship. It follows therefore that whether the petitioner has the burden of showing five on one year's good behavior, the inquiry of the court on the subject matter is not statutorily circumscribed.
Where there has been a conviction of a felony, the Court may deny citizenship although a petitioner for naturalization is able to prove good conduct for a long period of years. In re Caroni, D.C., 13 F.2d 954; In re Ross, C.C., 188 F. 685. The denial of an application for citizenship on the ground that the petitioner was not a person of good moral character is a judicial determination that at the time he was not, and it requires proof of good moral character for a period of at least five years from the date of the denial; consequently, the candidate is debarred from again seeking citizenship for five years thereafter.
There are cases in which courts have declined naturalization where the crime was committed and the sentence served prior to the commencement of the five year period irrespective of the question of any pardon. In re Ross, C. C., 188 F. 685; In re Caroni, D.C., 13 F.2d 954; In re Spenser, 22 Fed. Cas., p. 921, No. 13,234. Indeed, these decisions have been based on varying grounds, but each is relevant as bearing on the extent of judicial discretion. The cases, however, particularly stress the nature of the crime in that connection.
In Re McNeil, D.C., 14 F. Supp. 394, citizenship was denied because of a prior conviction. The same ruling was made in Re Caroni, D.C., 13 F.2d 954. The decision in the latter case was put squarely upon the rule announced in Re Ross, supra. A similar situation was presented to a New York state court. In the case of In re Capozzi, 160 Misc. 200, 289 N.Y.S. 869, 874, it was said: "It is in exceptional cases only that persons who have been convicted of a felony should be admitted to citizenship.