Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. J516720A-F, Yvonne E. Campos, Judge. Affirmed.
McINTYRE, J.
Sandra S. appeals an order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.22 denying return of her six children to her custody at the 18-month review hearing, based on the finding that return would create a substantial risk of detriment to the children. (All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Sandra contends the detriment finding is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2007 Sandra's six children, Carolyn, Crystal, Kassandra, Karina, Ramiro, and Jesus (collectively, the children) were taken into protective custody. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) filed petitions on their behalf under section 300, based on then 14-year-old Carolyn's report that the children's father had sexually abused her and Crystal, who was then 12 years old, and the children's statements that the father had kicked them, hit them with his hand and a belt and had hit Sandra. Carolyn reported that she told Sandra about the sexual abuse three months before the children's detention, and that Sandra initially said she did not believe her, but Carolyn later told Sandra "everything" in front of the father, and the father admitted the abuse.
The Agency's jurisdiction/disposition report noted Sandra questioned whether the sexual abuse allegations were true and denied having any conversations with the children about the abuse. At the jurisdiction hearing in July 2007, the court declared the children dependents of the court, removed them from the parents and ordered the parents to participate in reunification services.
In a status review report for the six-month hearing, Paige Coatney, the Agency social worker assigned to the case, reported that the father was convicted by guilty plea of forcible lewd acts and sentenced to state prison. All six children, whose ages then ranged from 7 to 15, were placed with their maternal grandmother. Sandra had undergone a psychological evaluation and the psychologist recommended she participate in a group therapy for people "who deny abusive behaviors on the part of their loved ones in the face of a great deal of evidence to the contrary." Sandra began regularly attending group therapy sessions, and her group therapist, Barbara Barrett, reported she had started to identify these goals and acknowledge the sexual abuse, but tended to focus on the hardship its disclosure had caused her and her husband.
At the six-month review hearing in February 2008, the court found Sandra had not made substantive progress with her case plan. The court ordered that her services be continued and terminated the father's services. Two months later, the father died as a result of an injury he suffered in prison.
Coatney's status review report for the 12-month hearing noted Sandra had begun individual therapy with social worker Sylvia Barragan. Barrett reported that Sandra had improved in focusing on her children as a priority, but still had a need to idealize her husband. The court scheduled a 12-month review hearing for September 19, 2008.
In July 2008 the Agency filed supplemental petitions under section 387 on behalf of the four younger children because the grandmother could no longer care for them and requested their removal. (The oldest two children had recently been placed with their maternal aunt.) In August 2008 the court sustained the petitions, removed the children from the grandmother and ordered the four younger children placed in a licensed foster home. The court continued the 12-month review hearing to October 2, 2008.
Coatney's addendum report for the October hearing showed Sandra had made minimal progress toward her individual therapy treatment goals. Sandra had continued to participate in group therapy, but her progress was reportedly minimal. Barrett recommended Sandra continue to participate in the group therapy for another six months, but added that she would terminate those services if Sandra failed to make significant progress.
Coatney noted that successful treatment for sexual abuse cases requires the victim to participate in conjoint therapy with the nonoffending parent and then progress to family therapy. However, Sandra had not been able to begin conjoint therapy with Carolyn and Crystal because she continued to deny the abuse occurred and failed to make substantial progress in her individual therapy.
Sandra was referred to family support worker Michele del Rio for "hands on" parenting education. Del Rio reported that Sandra was not engaged in those services and had shown no progress and very little connection with the children. Del Rio was unable to provide parenting education at one visit because Sandra's boyfriend and a female teenage acquaintance were there. When Coatney told Sandra not to have guests during those visits, Sandra said she no longer wanted hands-on parenting instruction, although she acknowledged that terminating this service would end her weekly visits with all six of the children together. Sandra's hands-on parenting education was cancelled to allow her more time to develop the necessary skills to benefit from that service.
Coatney recommended the children continue to be dependents of the court and Sandra's reunification services and educational rights be terminated. The court continued the October 2 hearing date to December 8, 2008. The December hearing effectively became the 18-month review hearing, since the parties and the court acknowledged the case had reached the 18-month date.
A treatment plan update prepared by Barragan in September 2008 reported Sandra had made "[m]oderate and minimal" progress in becoming able to meet the children's emotional needs and protect them from further victimization, moderate progress in reducing the number and severity of her depressive symptoms and substantial progress in creating and maintaining a social and supportive network. Barragan noted Sandra's boyfriend was in Sandra's home during a visit with the children. Coatney suspected the boyfriend was 18 years old, but Sandra told Barragan she thought he was 21 and was not a risk to the children because he was with her and had no interest in them. Sandra later reported she broke up with the boyfriend and did not intend to go back to him. Barragan concluded Sandra did not fully recognize the impact her dating choices could have on the safety of her children.
A December 2008 written report from Barrett noted Sandra had completed her group therapy. Sandra reportedly accepted responsibility for not protecting her children from abuse and was able to discuss the offense without using any cognitive distortions. She was empathetic to her children and appropriately concerned for their well-being. She had a relapse prevention plan in place, was highly motivated to participate in services and reunify with the children and appeared to have insight regarding the offense and its ramifications and what she needed to do to protect the children.
At the December 2008 hearing, Coatney testified that it was not appropriate to return any of the children to Sandra's custody. Although Sandra's progress had been moderate and steadily improving over the previous two months, Coatney did not think it was appropriate for any of the children to have unsupervised visits with Sandra because Sandra had not completed the goal of her individual therapy to make a safe environment regarding the history of sexual abuse, and she had not had a successful reconciliation meeting with the children. Coatney was not sure that all six children could be returned to Sandra if Sandra were to receive six more months of services, but she believed Sandra could get to the point of being in conjoint therapy with Carolyn and Crystal within six months if the court authorized additional services under section 366.3. Coatney testified that Sandra's visitation with the children was still supervised because she needed to be in conjoint therapy before the Agency would agree to unsupervised visitation. Barragan reported Sandra was not ready to start conjoint therapy. Before moving to unsupervised visits, Coatney wanted Sandra to make moderate progress toward the treatment goals of her individual therapy "with the idea that completion would soon come."
After Coatney testified, the court continued the hearing twice—first to January 9, 2009, and then to March 19, 2009. At the March 19 hearing, the court received a written report from Barragan into evidence along with an interim review report that Coatney prepared for the hearing.
Barragan reported Sandra had made substantial progress toward accepting her daughters' disclosure of sexual abuse, recognizing the signs of a perpetrator and being able to follow through with a safety plan to protect her children from future harm, including abstaining from relationships with men in their late teens. Sandra's progress toward reducing the number and severity of depressive symptoms was "between none to minimal," but she had made substantial progress toward prioritizing the children's emotional needs over her own and "minimal to substantial" progress toward creating and maintaining a social and supportive network. Barragan recommended conjoint therapy, but cautioned that the conjoint therapist should first meet with Sandra alone to reiterate the focus of the therapy.
Coatney's report acknowledged Barrett's December 2008 written report, but noted that in March 2009 Barrett reported Sandra had not successfully graduated from the group therapy program and had informed Barrett that "her time with CPS and the courts were completed and she was not coming anymore." Barrett further reported that Sandra had not met a number of specified "milestones," including reducing "denial and minimization related to molest."
Coatney reported that Sandra had failed to make substantial progress after 20 months of services and was prematurely terminated from the denier's group because she failed to meet its milestones. Although Barragan indicated Sandra had accepted her daughters' disclosure of the sexual abuse, Sandra had not met any of her treatment goals after one year of therapy. Sandra vowed she would seek partners closer to her age, but this did not address the initial protective issues of the father's abuse and recognizing the signs of a sexual perpetrator and sexual abuse. Sandra had not been able to initiate conjoint or family therapy, which Coatney viewed as essential components of sexual abuse treatment and prerequisites to Sandra's reunification with the children. Noting Sandra's visitation continued to be supervised, Coatney concluded she was not yet an appropriate placement option. Coatney recommended the children remain dependents of the court in their current placements and that Sandra's services be terminated.
The court found that return of the children to Sandra's custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to their emotional and physical well-being, but a section 366.26 hearing was not appropriate. The court terminated Sandra's services, ordered another planned permanent living arrangement as the permanent plan for each of the children, set the matter for a postpermanency planning review hearing in six months and ordered conjoint therapy for each of the children with Sandra in the child's best interest, as deemed appropriate by the child's therapist.
DISCUSSION
Under section 366.22, subdivision (a), the court must order the return of the child to his or her parents at the 18-month review hearing unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that returning the child to parental custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child's safety, protection, or emotional or physical well-being. The Agency bears the burden of establishing detriment. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) The parent's failure to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered programs is "prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental." (Ibid.) In making its determination, the court reviews and considers the social worker's report and recommendations, the efforts or progress demonstrated by the parent and the extent to which he or she availed himself or herself to services. (Ibid.) "[T]he question whether to return a child to parental custody is dictated by the well-being of the child at the time of the review hearing; if returning the child will create a substantial risk of detriment to his or her physical or emotional well-being [citations], placement must continue regardless of whether that detriment mirrors the harm which had required the child's removal from parental custody [citation]." (In re Joseph B. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 890, 900.)
We review a detriment finding for substantial evidence. (Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1345; Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 763.) "In so doing, we consider the evidence favorably to the prevailing party and resolve all conflicts in support of the trial court's order. [Citation.]" (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401.) We will uphold the order if it is supported by substantial evidence, even though there is substantial evidence to the contrary and the trial court might have reached a different result. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 230.)
We conclude substantial evidence supports the court's detriment finding. Because section 366.22, subdivision (a), specifically requires the court to "review and consider the social worker's report and recommendations" in determining detriment, the court properly gave Coatney's report and recommendations great weight in deciding whether returning the children to Sandra was appropriate. In her report for the March 2009 hearing, Coatney concluded Sandra had failed to make substantial progress with her case plan after being provided 20 months of services. Coatney's conclusion was based in part on a March 2009 report from Barragan. Although Barragan reported Sandra had made substantial progress in certain key areas, she reported Sandra's treatment was "on-going" in all categories and none of the treatment goals had been met.
Coatney's assessment of Sandra's progress was further supported by a March 2009 report from Barrett. Coatney reported that on December 8, 2008, Barrett told her Sandra had made "remarkable progress," as indicated on Barrett's written report dated a week earlier. That same day, Coatney drove Sandra to her group session and told her to confirm with Barrett that she had graduated from the program. In March 2009 Barrett reported that Sandra had not successfully graduated from the program and failed to meet 10 of its milestones. The reason for the apparent discrepancy between Barrett's December written report and March report (recounted by Coatney) is unclear from the record. However, resolving all evidentiary conflicts in support of the trial court's order, we view Coatney's report, based on reports from both Barragan and Barrett, as substantial evidence that Sandra had not made substantial progress in her treatment programs as of the March 2009 hearing.
The court's detriment finding stems in part from Coatney's uncontested observation that "[a] vital component of successful treatment for sexual abuse cases is for the victim to participate in conjoint therapy with the non[-]offending parent and then progress to family therapy." At the time of the March 2009 hearing, Sandra had not started conjoint therapy with any of the children, and the court noted there had been no recommendation on behalf of the children that they were ready for conjoint therapy. Although Coatney reported Sandra was ready to begin conjoint therapy, she noted the therapist recommended a very structured session and that there was a concern Sandra continued to have difficulty focusing on the children's needs.
The court also emphasized that Sandra's visitation had not yet "moved beyond the supervised setting." The record does not show that Sandra sought unsupervised visitation before the March 2009 hearing, and it would have been anomalous for the court to find the children could be safely returned to Sandra's custody when she had not yet progressed to unsupervised visitation with them. Visitation was still supervised at the time of the hearing in part because Sandra was reportedly unable to apply parenting skills she learned in a general parenting class to her parenting of the children. Coatney reported that according to del Rio, Sandra showed little connection with the children, had not shown she could differentiate between age appropriate behavior and discipline and tended to yell at the children without taking the time to parent them. Coatney recommended in-home parenting education as part of the "graduation to unsupervised visitation." However, those services were canceled after Sandra said she did not want to participate in them.
In explaining its detriment finding, the court also stated that Sandra's relationship with an 18-year-old was "problematic even for the boys. Even though they are younger, they are not too young to not understand that that would be out of the ordinary for an 8-year-old and 9-year-old to have as the dominant male figure in mother's life." The court concluded this relationship supported "the overall conclusion expressed by the therapist and others that, for a substantial amount of time that mother was in these services, her main focus was not on the children. It was on herself and her own needs." Coatney reported Sandra had vowed to seek partners closer to her age, but observed that "such a choice does not address the initial protective issues of sexual abuse by the father, nor recognizing the signs of a sexual perpetrator, nor recognizing the signs of sexual abuse."
Based on Coatney's report, and the reports it included from Sandra's service providers, the court could reasonably find that Sandra made insufficient progress with her case plan and treatment goals for the court to appropriately order the children returned to her custody. As noted, the failure of a parent to make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs is prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) We conclude substantial evidence supports the court's finding that return would create a substantial risk of detriment to the children. However, considering the significant progress Sandra has made toward reunification, and the fact that the court's order does not terminate parental rights, allows for continued visitation, and sets the stage for conjoint therapy between Sandra and the children, we expect the children eventually will be returned to Sandra's custody.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: NARES, Acting P. J., AARON, J.