Opinion
20-30751 Adv. 20-3027
07-30-2021
In re: DAVID W. CARMAN TERESA L. CARMAN, Debtors. v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, Defendant. David W. Carman, et al., Plaintiffs,
Chapter 13
DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANT'S AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOCS. 14 AND 26)
GUY R. HUMPHREY UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
I. Introduction
This adversary proceeding raises the issue of whether the debtor and plaintiff Teresa Carman encumbered her interest in real property through a mortgage loan modification and whether the defendant and creditor has a valid mortgage lien against her interest in the property.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiffs and debtors, David Carman and Teresa Carman ("David", "Teresa", and collectively, the "Carmans") filed a complaint initiating this adversary proceeding seeking to avoid defendant Nationstar Mortgage, LLC's ("Nationstar") mortgage lien as it pertains to Teresa's interest in the Carmans' residence at 1313 Rochelle Avenue, Dayton, Ohio (the "Property")pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) and (a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code. Nationstar filed an answer and then a motion for summary judgment, to which the Carmans responded with both a memorandum in opposition, and a cross-motion for summary judgment.
The Property is sometimes listed as having a Kettering, Ohio address.
Unless otherwise provided, all references to a statute shall be to the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 101-1532.
In February 2002 David executed a note to Eagle Bancorp and both Carmans executed a mortgage to Eagle Bancorp as security for the note. The mortgage was recorded on March 6, 2002 as Instrument No. 2002-000290049 in the Montgomery County, Ohio property records (the "Mortgage"). Complaint, Exhibit A at 1 (doc. 1). However, according to the limiting language connected to Teresa's name in the Mortgage, Teresa signed the Mortgage solely to release her dower interest in the Property.
"TERESA L. CARMEN IS SIGNING SOLELY TO RELEASE HER DOWER INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY." Complaint, Exhibit A at 14 (Doc. 1).
In November 2014 the Carmans executed a Loan Modification Agreement (the "Loan Modification") which became effective on December 1, 2014 and was recorded on December 3, 2014 as Instrument No. 2014-00065316 in the Montgomery County, Ohio records. Doc. 14, Exhibit D at 1. Teresa signed the Loan Modification under the following language:
The undersigned hereby acknowledges that the signatures below include the Borrowers on the Loan, and those of any non-borrower co-owner(s) of the Property, or a non-borrower spouse or domestic partner of a Borrower with rights of dower/curtesy/homestead and/or community property under applicable law. Such additional persons are signing solely to evidence their agreement that all of their right, title, and interest in the Property is subject and subordinate to the terms and conditions of this Agreement and the Loan Documents.Id. at 7.
The Carmans filed a bankruptcy petition for relief under Chapter 13 on March 17, 2020. Their Chapter 13 Plan (the "Plan"), in the Nonstandard Provisions section, provides:
Debtors' residence located at 1313 Rochelle Avenue, Kettering, Ohio 45429 is encumbered by a mortgage that is currently being serviced by Mr. Cooper. The real estate is titled to both Debtors, however, Ms. Carman only signed the mortgage to release her dower rights and thus her one-half interest in the property is unencumbered. Debtors will file an adversary proceeding to avoid the mortgage against Ms. Carman's the one-half interest. Upon completion of the adversary proceeding, Debtors will pay Mr. Cooper 1/2 of the total appraised value of the real estate through the Chapter 13 plan the amount of $32,250.00 as a Class 2 claim at 4.75% interest. The remainder of the claim of Mr. Cooper will be paid as a Class 4 claim the same percentage as all other Class 4 claims. Additionally, Debtors will pay the monthly real estate taxes through the Chapter 13 Plan and will pay the ongoing homeowners insurance on their own through the Chapter 13 Plan. Upon plan completion and discharge, Mr. Cooper shall release the mortgage against the real estate.Estate Doc. 10 at ¶ 13. The Plan provides 0% to be paid to nonpriority unsecured creditors (Class 4). Id. Thus, the Plan, which was confirmed in September 2020 (Doc. 29), pays neither Nationstar nor the unsecured creditors anything on account of Teresa's one-half interest in the Property if the Carmans succeed in this adversary proceeding. The parties agreed confirmation was subject a modification depending on the outcome of this adversary proceeding (Doc. 29).
III. Positions of the Parties
The Carmans contend that they never intended for Teresa's interest to be subject to the Mortgage, and that the Loan Modification did not alter the Mortgage to pledge Teresa's undivided one-half interest in the Property. They contend that the meaning of borrower has been different in a number of documents including the Mortgage, loan assignments, and the Loan Modification. Because of these varied definitions, David and Teresa contend that an ambiguity exists, and the court must look to the parties' intent. Ultimately, the Carmans believe the record shows that the Carmans did not intend for Teresa's interest to be subject to the Mortgage.
Nationstar argues that the Carmans are bound by the Loan Modification because the language of the document is not ambiguous and therefore the court should only look to the text of the Loan Modification itself and the language shows that the Loan Modification amended the Mortgage to encumber Teresa's interest in the Property.
For the reasons to be explained the court determines that Nationstar is entitled to summary judgment.
IV. Analysis
A. Jurisdiction
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334, this is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I) and (O), and this court has constitutional authority to enter a final judgment.
B. Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), made applicable to adversary proceedings through Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056, sets forth the standard to address the parties' filings. It states, in part, that a court must grant summary judgment to the moving party if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In order to prevail, the movant, if bearing the burden of persuasion at trial, must establish all elements of its claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986). All inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986).
C. The Nature of the Relief Sought Is for Declaratory Judgment, Not Avoidance Using the Trustee's Strong Arm Powers Under § 544
While the Carmans pled their claims to avoid a lien using the strong arm powers of a trustee provided by § 544, an analysis of their complaint and filings establish that, in reality, their request is for declaratory judgment as to the construction of the loan documents. Specifically, the Carmans request the court to interpret the loan documents, and declare that Teresa did not pledge her one-half interest in the Property to secure the Nationstar loan.
Section 544 of the Code grants to bankruptcy trustees certain powers to avoid transfers of the debtor's interest in property. This authority is commonly referred to as the trustee's "strong arm powers." See Noland v. Burns (In re Burns), 435 B.R. 503, 507 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010). Section 544(a)(1) provides a trustee with the power to avoid the transfer of an interest in the debtor's property as a hypothetical judgment lien holder on the date the bankruptcy is filed. Harker v. PNC Mortg. Co. (In re Oakes), 917 F.3d 523, 528-29 (6th Cir. 2019). Similarly, § 544(a)(3) provides a trustee with the power to avoid the transfer of an interest in the debtor's property as a bona fide purchaser of real property as of the date the bankruptcy is filed. Burns at 507; Bank of N.Y. v. Sheeley (In re Sheeley), Case No. 3:13-cv-136, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42748, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2014). The Carmans' first count is under § 544(a)(3), and the second count is under § 544(a)(1). Section 5.4.4 of the form Chapter 13 Plan for the Southern District of Ohio provides for the delegation of such authority in Chapter 13 cases to debtors ("To the extent that the Trustee has standing to bring such action, standing is hereby assigned to the Debtor, provided a colorable claim exists that would benefit the estate.").
There are two fundamental reasons why the Carmans' claims are not trustee strong arm claims under § 544. First, such authority can only be used on behalf of the bankruptcy estate - not by the debtors personally. See In re Rosenblum, 545 B.R. 846, 86-62 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2016); Tabor v. Davis (In re Davis), Adv. No. 07-0512, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 2311, at *43-45, 2016 WL 11696269, at *14-15 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. June 14, 2016). The Carmans' Chapter 13 plan does not provide any distribution to nonpriority unsecured creditors and there is no provision for use of the avoidance powers to benefit the bankruptcy estate. This defect could be cured by modifying the plan to provide for any value inuring from the avoidance of the lien on Teresa's one-half interest in the Property being recovered for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and paid to the bankruptcy estate and not the Carmans' individually. See Hearn v. Bank of New York (In re Hearn), 337 B.R. 603, 615-16 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006):
If the Debtor had successfully brought his § 544 action prior to confirmation, then the $103,000 lien that was avoided would have been preserved for the benefit of the estate. Creditors would therefore have had the pre-confirmation right to insist that this value be made available to them under the Debtor's plan to satisfy the best interest of creditors' test codified in § 1325(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. It would be unfair and violative of the Defendant's due process rights to permit the Debtor to first confirm a plan based upon a liquidation analysis that recognizes the efficacy of Defendant's lien in a Chapter 7 case, and then subsequently permit the Debtor to avoid that very lien post-confirmation without also placing the value of the avoided lien back into the estate for the benefit of creditors. That would grant the Debtor a windfall.
. . . But to truly place the parties back in the positions they would have been in if this cause of action had been prosecuted pre-confirmation will require a plan modification to enable unsecured creditors, including the Defendant as the holder of the largest unsecured claim, to insist that the Debtor's plan comply with § 1325(a)(4) by providing creditors at least as much as they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation . . . . We now know that in a Chapter 7 liquidation, a Chapter
7 Trustee would have successfully brought an avoidance action under § 544 to avoid the lien of the Defendant. That means then that the value of the avoided lien on the . . . property would have been preserved under § 551 and made available for unsecured creditors in a Chapter 7 estate. This result is not reflected in the liquidation analysis the Debtor submitted with his modified plan.
. . . Therefore, the Court requires that a plan modification be filed by the Debtor within thirty days from the date hereof accompanied by a Chapter 7 liquidation analysis that recognizes the value of the avoided lien in the event this case were a Chapter 7, and otherwise complies with the provisions of § 1329 governing post-confirmation plan modifications.
But another substantive reason exists for the Carmans' claims not being § 544 avoidance claims. The trustee's strong arm powers, whether it be as a hypothetical bona fide purchaser of property or a hypothetical judgment lien creditor, are used to avoid a defectively executed or recorded mortgage when the mortgage is otherwise valid and enforceable between the mortgagor and the mortgagee. See Bank of N.Y. v. Sheeley (In re Sheeley), Adv. No. 11-3028, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1374, 2012 WL 8969064 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Apr. 2, 2012). Accordingly, Nationstar's mortgage could be avoided for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate if it was defectively executed or recorded. However, the Carmans are not asserting that the mortgage is valid between Teresa and Nationstar, but nevertheless defectively executed or recorded. Rather, their argument is that Teresa did not mortgage her one-half interest in the Property and, therefore, the mortgage is not enforceable against that interest. The complaint requests the court ". . . . enter a declaratory judgment finding that Defendant's Mortgage does not encumber the Teresa Carman's interest in the real estate." Doc. 1, ¶¶ 18, 24. The relief sought is not avoidance of the Mortgage, but a declaration that the Mortgage does not encumber Teresa's interest in the Property. See Hardesty v. Huntington Nat'l Bank (In re Payne), 450 B.R. 711, 723 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2011) (finding the trustee's alternative relief sought under § 544(a)(1) and (3) moot when the court determined that the mortgage did not encumber the debtor's interest in the subject real property); Luedtke v. Commerce Bank N.A. (In re Luedtke), 394 B.R. 893, 896 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008); Bostic v. Nat'l City Bank (In re DeRee), 403 B.R. 514, 524 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2009) ("[T]he Trustee is not required to avoid the liens held by NCB because as set forth above, the Court has found the NCB's mortgage liens do not encumber the Debtor's interest in the Property."), aff'd No. 09-404 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2010).
The ability to avoid such defectively executed or recorded mortgages in Ohio using the trustee's strong arm powers has been significantly curtailed in recent years as a result of legislation enacted by the Ohio legislature. See Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1301.401, 5301.07, and 5301.071; In re Messer, 50 N.E.3d 495 (Ohio 2016); Messer v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA (In re Messer), 555 B.R. 656 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2016); Harker v. PNC Mortg. Co. (In re Oakes), 917 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2019).
For these reasons, the court will address the complaint as seeking declaratory judgment as to the enforceability of the mortgage as to Teresa's one-half interest in the Property, rather than as an avoidance action.
D. The Mortgage Documents are to be Construed Under Ohio Contract Law
In order for the court to determine whether Teresa's interest in the Property is subject to the Mortgage as a result of the Loan Modification, it must look to Ohio law. See Mortgage, ¶ 16 ("This Security Instrument shall be governed by federal law and the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located . . . ."). See also Morgeson v. Accredited Home Lenders (In re Morgeson), 371 B.R. 798, 804 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007) ("Since the mortgage deed takes effect as a contract between the parties, the deed must be interpreted according to Ohio contract law."); Rhiel v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Foster), 448 B.R. 914, 918 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2011), aff'd 458 B.R. 391 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2011) (The court applied Ohio law to interpret the language of a Mortgage.); Barger v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Barger), 490 B.R. 744, 750 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2012) (The court looked to state law to make a determination on dower issues.). Ohio law applies the same principles of construction to mortgages as are applied to the interpretation of contracts. Menninger v. Accredited Home Lenders (In re Morgeson), 371 B.R. 798, 804 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007); Payne, 450 B.R. at 718. Interpretation of the Mortgage is a legal determination. Foster, 448 B.R. at 918, aff'd 458 B.R. 391 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2011).
Based on Ohio law, a court may review the mortgage documents to make a determination as to whether an ambiguity exists. "When the language of a written contract is clear, a court may look no further than the writing itself to find the intent of the parties." Cin. Ins. Co. v. CPS Holdings, Inc., 875 N.E.2d 31, 34 (Ohio 2007). However, if an ambiguity is found, the determination would be for the trier of fact to resolve. Rhiel v. Bank of New York (In re Perry), 600 B.R. 584, 591-92 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2019). Only if an ambiguity exists within the document can a court resort to extrinsic evidence to construe the meaning of the document. See Kelly v. Medical Life. Ins. Co., 509 N.E.2d 411, 413 (Ohio 1987) ("A court will resort to extrinsic evidence in its effort to give effect to the parties' intentions only where the language is unclear or ambiguous, or where the circumstances surrounding the agreement invest the language of the contract with a special meaning.").
The parties disagree as to whether the language in the mortgage documents is clear or whether there is an ambiguity. The Carmans contend that the court should look to extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties and Nationstar contends that there is no ambiguity. Therefore, the court must determine whether an ambiguity exists and if so, summary judgment is not appropriate. The court examined the mortgage documents to make its determination as to whether an ambiguity exists.
E. The Only Documents Relevant to the Court's Determination are the Mortgage and the Loan Modification
The Carmans contend that the different uses of the term "borrower" in the various mortgage documents creates an ambiguity. Specifically, the Carmans reference the Note, Mortgage, the Loan Modification, and five assignments of the Mortgage. Doc. 26 at 5-6. The court does not find this argument persuasive.
The contractual documents between the Carmans and Nationstar are two-fold - the Mortgage, with any riders to the Mortgage, and the Loan Modification. Therefore, the Mortgage and the Loan Modification were signed by both the Carmans and Nationstar (or its predecessor).
While the Carmans refer to the multiple mortgage assignments to demonstrate an ambiguity as to the term "borrower," the assignments are not contractual documents between the Carmans and Nationstar. The Carmans did not sign the assignments, nor would a borrower like the Carmans typically sign the assignments. Mortgage assignments are agreements between the current holder of the mortgage and a party acquiring an interest in the mortgage and underlying note. See Noland v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (In re Williams), 395 B.R. 33, 46 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008) ("The language of [Ohio Revised Code] § 5301.31 stating that assignments of mortgages 'transfer not only the lien of the mortgage but also all interest in the land described in the mortgage,' can only mean that any lien held by the assignor and all interests of the assignor in the land reflected by that lien are transferred through the assignment-as the property owner, in this case the Debtors, are not joining in that assignment and therefore cannot be conveying any of their own interests in the property."). See also In re Moehring, 485 B.R. 571, 577 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2013) ("[T]he assignment of the Mortgage . . . is not relevant to the enforcement of the Note against the [mortgagor]."). Therefore, the Mortgage assignments are not pertinent to determining what was intended between the Carmans and Nationstar.
F. Teresa's Undivided One-Half Interest in the Property was not Originally Subject to the Mortgage as She Signed Solely to Release Her Dower Interest
Without doubt, Teresa failed to pledge her undivided one-half interest in the Property when she signed the Mortgage in 2002. The language is clear that Teresa signed the document "solely to release her dower interest" and not to encumber her interest in the Property. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Nelson, No. 1:09-CV-00090, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49550, at *10-11, 2009 WL 1651533, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 10, 2009):
As the Bankruptcy Court found, the loan documents are consistent because "[i]n addition to not signing the Note, Nicole signed the Mortgage as a 'Non-Borrower.' Further, in the granting clause of the Mortgage, Nicole's name is expressly followed by the qualifier 'signing to release dower.' Further still, Nicole signed the Adjustable Rate Rider as a 'Non-Borrower'". . . . The Appellant can point to nowhere in the loan documents that indicates Nicole Gehm is a "borrower" or signing for any reason other than to release dower. Therefore, consistent with the holdings in Creter and Morgeson, the Court finds that Nicole Gehm's release of dower did not convey a mortgage interest in her one-half interest of the property.
Therefore, since Teresa did not encumber her interest in the Property through the Mortgage, the Loan Modification is the only document remaining which the court must construe to determine whether an ambiguity exists.
G. Teresa Pledged Her Undivided One-Half Interest in the Property Through the Loan Modification
The Carmans contend that the Loan Modification, when viewed with the other mortgage documents, is ambiguous and therefore the court should look to extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties. This argument fails for two reasons. First, as already explained, the Loan Modification is the only relevant document to be construed. And second, the Loan Modification is not ambiguous, and therefore, the court cannot look beyond the Loan Modification to construe it. The court examined the language of the Loan Modification to determine whether there is an ambiguity on its face.
As explained by the Supreme Court of Ohio:
When confronted with an issue of contractual interpretation, the role of a court is to give effect to the intent of the parties to the agreement. We examine the . . . contract as a whole and presume that the intent of the parties is reflected in the language used in the [contract]. We look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used . . . unless another meaning is clearly apparent from the contents of the [contract]. When the language of a written contract is clear, a court may look no further than the writing itself to find the intent of the parties. As a matter of law, a contract is unambiguous if it can be given a definite legal meaning.Cin. Ins. Co., 875 N.E.2d at 33 (internal citations omitted). Doc 26 at 5. The court finds that the Loan Modification is clear as to whether Teresa encumbered her one-half interest in the Property.
In Foster, the court examined the mortgage documents at issue including the original mortgage document as well as a rider. 448 B.R. at 920. After examining these documents, the court determined that the language of the mortgage was "unambiguous" and showed the "clear intent" that debtor husband was intended to be the sole borrower. Id. However, the rider contained language specifically stating that the rider "amends and supplements the [m]ortgage," similar to the Loan Modification at issue here, and the court determined that the rider altered "the definition of the term 'Borrower' to 'the undersigned'" and "[t]he 'undersigned' includes [debtor wife], who signed the document." Id. at 921. As a result of this analysis, the court decided that debtor wife's interest in the subject property was indeed encumbered. Id. at 920-22. See also In re Barger, 490 B.R. 744, 752 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2012) ("[T]he language of the Mortgages and the Riders clearly and unambiguously provide that Mrs. Barger is a 'Borrower' and is bound by the terms of Mortgages and Riders."); Rogan v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co. (In re Rowe), 452 B.R. 591 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2011) (Bankruptcy court erred in concluding that a mortgagor's identity could not be incorporated from a rider to the mortgage).
The Loan Modification states that it "amends and supplements" the Mortgage and it also contains the following language under the heading TO BE SIGNED BY BORROWER ONLY:
The undersigned hereby acknowledges that the signatures below include the Borrowers on the Loan, and those of any non-borrower co-owner(s) of the Property, or a non-borrower spouse or domestic partner of a Borrower with rights of dower/curtesy/homestead and/or community property under applicable law. Such additional persons are signing solely to evidence their agreement that all of their right, title and interest in the Property is subject and subordinate to the terms of this Agreement and the Loan Documents.Doc 14, Exhibit D at 7.When examining this language of the Loan Modification, the court does not find an ambiguity in the language. It is clear on its face that: a) the Loan Modification amended and supplemented the Mortgage; and b) Teresa, as a "non-borrower spouse" of the borrower was signing the Loan Modification "solely to evidence [her] agreement that all of [her] right, title and interest in the Property is subject and subordinate to the terms of the [Loan Modification] and the Loan Documents." Id. Thus, because the Loan Modification amended and supplemented the Mortgage and Teresa was subjecting and subordinating her interest in the Property to the Mortgage and other loan documents, she unambiguously encumbered her one-half interest in the Property through the Loan Modification. For those reasons, there is no reason for the court to look beyond the four corners of this document because it is clear and unambiguous that the Carmans agreed to that modification of the Mortgage. Teresa signed under the language stating that the "undersigned" is "signing solely to evidence their agreement that all of their right, title, and interest in the Property is subject and subordinate to the terms of the Agreement." Id. In sum, the court determines that Teresa pledged her undivided one-half interest in the Property. Therefore, Teresa's interest is subject to Nationstar's lien on the Property.
H. The Alleged Violations of Federal Lending Laws Are Not Relevant to the Court's Determination
The Carmans also discuss in their briefing the potential violations of federal lending laws. They contend that Nationstar is subject to these laws and the failure to adhere to them with regard to Teresa shows Nationstar did not consider Teresa as a borrower on the Loan Modification. The court finds that this contention is not relevant to whether the Loan Modification is ambiguous. Whether Nationstar violated federal housing, or other consumer protection laws in the process of entering into the Loan Modification does not change the unambiguous meaning of the Loan Modification's terms. If the Carmans' allegations are correct, upon which the court is not opining, such violations may expose Nationstar to other remedies, but it does not alter the court's analysis.
V. Conclusion
Nationstar is entitled to summary judgment because, as a matter of law, Teresa encumbered her undivided one-half interest in the Property through the Loan Modification. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. The alternative relief requested by Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add additional counts "for violation for the Truth in Lending Act and other potential violations of Federal consumer protection statutes" is also denied. Doc. 26 at 12. The court is concurrently entering judgment through a separate order consistent with this decision.
The Defendant did not file a motion for leave to amend the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), but, instead without citation of authority or explanation, only mentions this alternative relief in the final sentence of the conclusion of his response and summary judgment cross-motion. Doc. 26 at 12. The only substantive discussion of consumer protection laws was an argument as to why the mortgagee's alleged violation of such laws demonstrated the intent of the parties as to the Loan Modification. Id. at 6-9. See also discussion in Section IV.H., supra. Having adjudicated all the relief sought by the Plaintiffs' complaint, the court is entering final judgment, and the burden on a party seeking to amend a complaint becomes significantly higher. Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish Wildlife Svce., 616 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2010).
Copies to:
Counsel for the Plaintiffs
Counsel for the Defendant
This document has been electronically entered in the records of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
IT IS SO ORDERED.