Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Deborah A. Daniel, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.), Super.Ct.Nos. J212281 & J212282
Jennifer Mack, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Ruth E. Stringer, County Counsel, and Julie J. Surber, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for minors.
OPINION
McKINSTER, J.
Defendant and appellant Elaine A. (mother) is the natural mother of C.M., age seven, and Carissa M., age five, who were removed from mother’s custody by orders of the juvenile court. Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that the children came within Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). Mother contends that the evidence was insufficient to support that particular finding and argues that there were reasonable alternatives, short of removing the children from mother’s custody, to protect the children. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In January 2007, Robert M. (father) brought the children to the San Bernardino County Department of Children’s Services (DCS) with a report that mother’s live-in boyfriend hit five-year-old Carissa in the head with a belt buckle. Father’s fiancé had discovered a gash on Carissa’s head while combing her hair. The previous day, mother had brought Carissa to father’s home, telling him to “deal with” Carissa because mother “couldn’t handle her.”
The social worker interviewed mother, who denied that Carissa had been hit with a belt buckle. Instead, mother stated that Carissa had fallen approximately two weeks earlier. Mother said that the injury from the fall was on the back of Carissa’s head. Mother had no explanation for the current injury to the top of Carissa’s head.
DCS had documented an earlier abuse report against mother. In June 2006, Carissa had suffered bruising and scratches to her face; Carissa reported that mother had slapped her. Mother had denied any abuse. At that time, Carissa was removed from mother’s care and placed with father. C. remained with mother. In the earlier case, mother had been required to complete parenting classes as part of her reunification plan. Carissa was returned to mother’s care in October 2006.
After the report in January 2007, the social worker removed both children from mother’s custody and placed them with father. DCS filed dependency petitions for both children, alleging that they came within Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) (risk of serious physical harm), (b) (failure to protect), and (j) (as to C., risk of abuse because of abuse of a sibling).
The juvenile court detained the children and placed them temporarily with father. The court ordered supervised visitation for mother.
The social worker’s report for the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing recommended finding the allegations of the petition true, placing the children in the custody of their father, and dismissing the dependency case. The social worker reported that mother continued to deny that either she or her boyfriend had abused the children.
Mother testified at the hearing. She denied that Carissa had a gash on her head when mother took her to father’s home. She denied that her boyfriend would hit or spank the children. Mother did not believe Carissa’s report that the boyfriend had hit her in the head with a belt buckle. Mother maintained instead that Carissa had fallen and hit her head on the bed; she only had a scratch on the side of her head. Mother blamed Carissa, testifying that Carissa was jealous of the attention mother had given to her boyfriend’s children.
Mother admitted spanking the children. She acknowledged that Carissa had been removed from her home when Carissa suffered a bruise on her face, but mother denied slapping her. Rather, mother testified that Carissa had been bruised when a playmate threw a shoe and a toy at her. Mother participated in parenting classes until Carissa was returned to her custody.
As to mother’s current circumstances, she testified that she had ended her relationship with the boyfriend. Mother was now living in the maternal grandmother’s home. Mother would abide by a court order prohibiting the former boyfriend from having contact with the children.
The court found that Carissa came within Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and C. came within Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (j). The court stated on the record its concerns that mother had not learned adequately from her reunification services in the previous adjudication. Despite mother’s attendance at interactive parenting classes during the earlier family maintenance proceedings, mother was still unable to deal effectively with the children and had taken Carissa to the father’s home out of frustration. The court found the allegations of injury to Carissa were credible, and made the findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), by clear and convincing evidence.
The juvenile court made orders awarding physical custody to father, joint legal custody to both parents, and visitation to mother. All parties were ordered to refrain from using corporal punishment on the children. The court entered a family law custody order and dismissed the dependency case.
Mother appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jurisdictional Findings
Mother argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), that mother failed to protect Carissa from abuse. We disagree.
Carissa reported both to father and to the social worker that mother’s boyfriend had hit her on the head with a belt buckle. Father observed a gash on the top of Carissa’s head. Mother consistently denied that her boyfriend had done anything to Carissa, but mother’s explanations for the injury were inconsistent with the physical circumstances. In addition, mother had already had an adjudicated dependency based upon her own abuse of Carissa, but mother also consistently denied having slapped and bruised Carissa’s face. Despite participating in family maintenance services, including interactive parenting classes, mother was still unable to deal with Carissa and instead dropped Carissa off at father’s home, telling him that she could not handle Carissa. Mother accepted responsibility for nothing, instead accusing five-year-old Carissa of fabricating the accusation out of jealousy.
In urging that there was no “substantial” risk of “serious” harm to Carissa, to support the allegations, mother has simply viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to her own point of view. The proper standard of review on appeal requires this court to resolve all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. (In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329.) We also give deference to the trial court’s determinations of credibility. (In re Tanis H. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1226-1227.) The court below found mother’s testimony was not credible.
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional orders were supported by substantial evidence.
II. The Dispositional Order Was Proper
Mother also attacks the dispositional order removing the children from her custody. Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c), upon which mother relies, provides in relevant part that, “[a] dependent child may not be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents . . . unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence of any of the following circumstances: . . . [¶] (1) There is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s or guardian’s physical custody.”
Mother argues that there was no “clear and convincing” evidence of any danger to the children if they remained in mother’s custody: Mother had terminated her relationship with her boyfriend, who was the alleged source of the abuse in this case. By the time of the hearing, mother had moved in with her parents. The home was adequate to accommodate all the members of the household, and the children would have been residing with mother and extended family members. Mother contends that there was no evidence that placing the children with mother would have posed any risk of harm. In addition, mother urges that, if the court were concerned about mother’s parenting skills, it could have placed the children with her under a program of supervision and services. Thus, mother contends there was no evidence to support a finding that removal from her custody was necessary.
Mother’s emphasis on the “clear and convincing evidence” requirement in the statute focuses on the wrong standard for purposes of appellate review. An appellate court reviews the juvenile court’s dispositional orders under the substantial evidence test. (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 828.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s orders removing the children from mother’s custody and awarding physical custody to father. Even though mother had broken up with her boyfriend and moved into her parents’ home, she steadfastly denied that Carissa had been injured, harmed, or abused by anyone. Mother herself had previously been adjudicated to have abused Carissa, but mother continued to deny that she had done anything wrong. Instead, mother projected blame onto the five-year-old victim. The court had ample reason to believe that mother would be unable to protect the children from abuse.
“The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child. [Citations.]” (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136, overruled on another point in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6.)
Here, there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s determination that the children were not safe in mother’s custody, in view of mother’s past history of failure to protect the children from harm. Indeed, mother was herself the abuser in one adjudicated instance. As to the argument that the children would have been safe in mother’s custody under a program of supervised services, mother had apparently failed to benefit from similar services in the past. She was still unable to appropriately parent Carissa, she abandoned Carissa to father in frustration, she blamed Carissa for the family’s circumstances, and she denied that any abuse had occurred.
Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s orders removing custody from mother and awarding custody to the nonoffending parent. (See In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 697.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s dispositional orders are affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ, P. J., KING, J.