Opinion
22-cv-01616-JD
05-25-2022
IN RE RAINA M. CARDONI, Debtor.
ORDER RE STAY
JAMES DONATO, United States District Judge.
The request for a stay pending appeal by appellant Ruby Creek Ranch, LLC (Ruby Creek) is denied. Dkt. No. 6.
A stay is “an exercise of judicial discretion, and the propriety of its issue is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case. [Ruby Creek has] the burden of demonstrating that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2009) (cleaned up). The Court will consider: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Id. at 434. The first two factors “are the most critical, ” and “simply showing some possibility of irreparable injury fails to satisfy the second factor.” Id. at 434-35 (internal quotations and citation omitted). A stay will be denied to movants who do “not meet the applicable irreparable harm threshold, regardless of their showing on the other stay factors.” Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Winding Creek Solar LLC v. Peevey, No. 13-CV-04934-JD, 2018 WL 1912136, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2018).
Ruby Creek has not established a threat of irreparable injury, or that money damages would be inadequate for any injury it might sustain. Ruby Creek's sole point is that “with a property sold at less than full value . . . any lien remaining to Ruby Creek” on the proceeds of the proposed sale “would be measurably less than the one Ruby Creek had before the sale.” Dkt. No. 6 at 9. But as Ruby Creek acknowledged, the bankruptcy court order provides that Ruby Creek's lien will “attach to the sale proceeds [with the] same force, effect, validity, and priority” to which it had attached to the property. Id. at 8. Consequently, Ruby Creek's apprehension of injury is difficult to follow, and that vagueness undercuts the possibility of finding irreparable harm. See In re Howrey LLP, No. 14-CV-03062-JD, 2014 WL 3427304, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2014).
In addition, a diminution in the value of the lien is ready made for a money damages award, should circumstances ever warrant that. This eliminates any genuine threat of irreparable harm to Ruby Creek. See Lydo Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Las Vegas, 745 F.2d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Irwin, 338 B.R. 839, 853-54 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (finding no irreparable harm to lien holder from sale of property because “any injury may be remedied by a damage award”).
At the hearing on the stay request, the Court pressed Ruby Creek for a good reason to reach a different conclusion. None was presented, and so a stay is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.