" Id. The Debtor's only business between 2004 and his bankruptcy petition was the company he owned, Dotson Brothers Sewer, Inc., which was undisputedly located in and operated in Elgin, Illinois. See, e.g., In re Canavos, 108 B.R. 55 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (finding that, although individual debtor's residence and domicile was New Jersey, venue was proper in Pennsylvania where the situs of debtor's principal and only business venture as an entrepreneur was located in Pennsylvania, even where that business was dormant). Therefore, the Court finds that venue in this district was not improper.
Section 1408 also permits a debtor to file in the district in which his principal place of business is located or in which his principal assets lie. 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1). The district in which one's "principal place of business" is located is an appropriate venue only to a debtor who has a business of his or her own. Henderson, 197 B.R. at 151 (citing In re Canavos, 108 B.R. 55, 57 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989)). Here, the debtors are not in business.
Additionally, I agree with those courts which have held that the term "principal place of business" applies only to businesses and business owners, and that place of employment does not equate to a debtor's principal place of business. See In re Higgins v. State Loan Co., 114 F.2d 25, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1940); In re Blagg 223 B.R. 795 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998); In re Oliver, 111 B.R. 540, 544 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989); In re Canavos, 108 B.R. 55,57 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1989); In re Lipphart, 201 F. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1912). Accordingly, Paul J. Shaughnessy, is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE, in writing, on or before February 28, 2002, why this case should not be dismissed for improper venue, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1408.
He is employed in Randolph County, which is in the Middle District; however, place of employment is not relevant to a determination of principal place of business. In re Canavos, 108 B.R. 55, 57 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1989). The category "principal place of business" is relevant only to a debtor who has a business of his or her own.
In re Uslar, 131 B.R. 22, 23 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1991). See also, In re Canavos, 108 B.R. 55, 57 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1989); and In re Oklahoma City Associates, 98 B.R. 194, 197 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1989). It is rather clear that the Debtor has no basis other than the location of its "principal assets" on which to assert that § 1408 is satisfied by the instant filing.
The Debtor's only possible connection with Nevada for venue purposes is her employment with the Golden Nugget Hotel and Casino in Laughlin, Nevada. This, however, is not sufficient for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1408. It is well-settled that the term "place of business" contained in § 1408 does not refer to a salaried individual debtor's place of employment. See, e.g., Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193, 203-205 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Oliver, 111 B.R. 540, 544 (Bankr.D.Md. 1989); In re Canavos, 108 B.R. 55, 57-58 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1989); In re Vann, 3 B.R. 192, 193-194 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1980). Moreover, future earnings of the debtor do not qualify as "principal assets" for venue purposes.
The burden of proving that § 1408(1) has not been satisfied in this case is upon Huntington. In re Canavos, 108 B.R. 55, 57 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1989). Huntington has failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that debtor's principal place of business was not located in this district for a longer portion of the required 180-day period than in any other district. That is to say, it has not shown that debtor's principal place of business was located in any other district — in particular in the Northern District of Ohio — for more than sixty-seven (67) days during the 180-day period immediately prior to September 18, 1991.