Opinion
No. 337950
12-19-2017
In re L.J. CAMPBELL, Minor.
UNPUBLISHED Oakland Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 2016-846153-NA Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and GADOLA and O'BRIEN, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent mother appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), (j) (likelihood of harm to child if returned to parent), and (l) (parent's right to another child previously terminated). We affirm.
On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding that a statutory ground for termination was established by clear and convincing evidence, and that the trial court erred in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that termination was in the child's best interests. We disagree with respect to both challenges.
"To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground under MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established." In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). This Court "review[s] for clear error a trial court's finding of whether a statutory ground for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence." Id. "A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App 713, 723; 858 NW2d 143 (2014). "Appellate courts are obliged to defer to a trial court's factual findings at termination proceedings if those findings do not constitute clear error." In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 90; 763 NW2d 587 (2009).
Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), a trial court may terminate parental rights when "[t]he parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age."
In the instant case, respondent had an ongoing issue with substance abuse. Her rights to four other children were previously terminated due in part to respondent's inability to address this issue. Respondent testified that she was admitted to the hospital in January 2016 while she was pregnant with the child and tested positive for cocaine. At that time, she was informed by hospital staff that she was pregnant, but she did not believe them and continued using substances. As a result, in March 2016, respondent tested positive for alcohol while still pregnant.
Respondent testified that she believed that the hospital staff was wrong because she thought that she could not become pregnant. According to respondent, she did not "find out" that she was pregnant until the six-month mark. The trial court found this claim to be incredible, and we defer to the trial court on issues of credibility. See In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989) (stating that "regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it").
Respondent also had an untreated mental illness that she failed to adequately address. Respondent testified that she had struggled with schizoaffective disorder since she was a child. While respondent was pregnant, her mental illness was inconsistently treated, which resulted in her being involuntarily committed on two occasions. Following the child's birth, respondent had a violent outburst involving the hospital staff, which led to her being housed in the psychiatric ward. Because respondent was housed in the psychiatric ward after her outburst, she was unable to care for the child once the child was ready to be released from the hospital. Respondent attempted to set up a plan for the child's care and requested that the child be placed with her sister, Shameka Woodson. However, the Department of Health and Human Services determined that Woodson was not a suitable placement because Woodson had a prior substantiated case with Child Protective Services. Thus, the child had no one to care for her upon her release from the hospital, and she was placed in foster care. After respondent was released from the psychiatric ward and while the child was in foster care, respondent's erratic behavior continued. During the initial hearings of these proceedings, respondent continually interrupted and, when she was asked to stop by her counsel, she left. And while the caseworker was interviewing the child's then-putative father, respondent confronted the caseworker and began calling her vulgar names. Thus, at the time of the termination in this case, respondent's untreated mental illness remained an ongoing concern.
Also, while respondent was pregnant, she lacked suitable housing and was consistently homeless. At the time of the child's birth, respondent continued to lack suitable housing. Respondent had consistent income in the form of supplemental security income (SSI) benefits, but respondent was unable to manage this income and eventually had a guardian appointed to handle her finances.
Lastly, respondent had repeated run-ins with the law throughout these proceedings. Respondent was arrested on three occasions between her release from the psychiatric ward, which occurred in late August 2016, and September 29, 2016. Respondent eventually pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct for her actions leading to her arrest on September 29, 2016, and was in jail until February 27, 2017. In light of respondent's untreated mental illness, her continuing substance abuse problem, her lack of suitable housing, and her criminality, she was not able to provide the child with proper care and custody.
And there is no reasonable expectation that respondent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time given the child's age. Respondent had previously been offered services to address her mental health and substance abuse issues as part of her prior cases. Respondent even completed a substance abuse treatment program in 2009. Yet even after respondent was informed that she was pregnant with the child in this case, respondent continued to use substances. Thus, her past services clearly did not impact her substance abuse. Further, since the child was born, respondent has been arrested three times and continued to display erratic behavior, both to the caseworker and hospital staff. While some of respondent's actions may be attributable to her mental illness, she has been aware of her mental illness since she was a child and yet her mental health remained an ongoing concern at the time of termination. Accordingly, it is not reasonable that respondent would be able to provide proper care and custody for the child within a reasonable time given the child's incredibly tender age, and the trial court did not clearly err by finding that this ground was established by clear and convincing evidence.
Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), a trial court may terminate parental rights when "[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent."
As stated, respondent had a long history of mental illness that was inconsistently treated. While respondent was pregnant, she was involuntarily committed in March 2016 and May 2016. After respondent gave birth to the child, she had a violent episode involving the hospital staff, which led to her placement in the hospital's psychiatric ward. Respondent continued to demonstrate erratic behavior as the case progressed. The caseworker testified that respondent acted aggressively towards her when respondent walked in on the caseworker interviewing the then-punitive father. During the initial hearings of these proceedings, respondent continually interrupted and, when she was asked to stop by her counsel, she left. Respondent previously received services to assist her in addressing her mental health issues, but respondent largely did not benefit from those services, and mental health remained an ongoing concern.
Moreover, respondent was apparently incapable of following rules; she was arrested three times in little over one month after she was released from the psychiatric ward following the child's birth. Respondent's arrests also evidence an apparent inability to control her actions, even while her behavior was being monitored.
Further, respondent had an ongoing substance abuse problem. Her rights to four other children were previously terminated due in part to respondent's inability to address her substance abuse. Respondent tested positive for cocaine in January 2016 while she was pregnant with the child. At that time, hospital staff informed respondent that she was pregnant. Despite the fact that respondent previously lost her rights to other children due to her substance abuse, she continued to use substances after she was informed of her pregnancy, and she eventually tested positive for alcohol in March 2016 while still pregnant. Respondent's behavior shows a clear pattern of instability such that the child would be at risk of harm if placed in her care, and the trial court did not clearly err by finding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) was established by clear and convincing evidence.
In In re Gach, 315 Mich App 83, 100-101; 889 NW2d 707 (2016), this Court held that MCL 712A.19b(3)(l) was unconstitutional. Therefore, the trial court clearly erred by terminating respondent's parental rights pursuant to that section. See id. However, this error is harmless because the trial court did not clearly err by finding at least one other statutory ground for termination. See In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 461; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). --------
"Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights." In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). "[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence." In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 90. Appellate courts "review for clear error . . . the court's decision regarding the child's best interests." In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 83.
The focus at the best-interest stage is "on the child, not the parent." In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 87. The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to it in determining the child's best interests, In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 364, and may consider such factors as
the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home. [In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted).]Other considerations include "the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).
Here, termination was in the child's best interests. Respondent had no bond with the child. Prior to respondent's incarceration, she only visited the child on one occasion, and during that visit she left early because the child fell asleep. Respondent had the opportunity to visit the child more, but chose not to do so. As a result, at the time respondent's rights were terminated, she had only visited with the child a single time and there was no bond between them.
Respondent also exhibited a lack of parenting ability throughout the case. After respondent was informed by hospital staff that she had tested positive for cocaine while pregnant, respondent continued using substances and tested positive for alcohol two months later while still pregnant. Further, while respondent was pregnant, her mental illness was largely untreated and she was involuntary committed on two occasions. After the child was born, respondent had a violent outburst at the hospital that led to her placement in the psychiatric ward. Due to this involuntary commitment, the child did not have a place to go once she was ready to be released from the hospital. After respondent was released from the psychiatric ward, she continued to have problems; she was arrested three times in little over a one-month span. As a result of her arrests, respondent was incarcerated for six month, during which she could not participate in services or visitations with the child.
Respondent also demonstrated that she would not be able to provide the child with permanency and stability. Respondent had been receiving services through CNS since 2014, and during that time respondent was never able to acquire suitable housing. She also had continual run-ins with the law, a largely untreated mental illness, and ongoing issues with substance abuse. Based on respondent's inability to provide a permanent and stable environment for herself, she would likely be unable to provide one for a child. In contrast, there were no reported problems with the child's foster placement; the placement appeared to be meeting all of the child's needs, and the child was meeting all of her milestones while in the placement. Moreover, based on the child's very young age, there was a high possibility of adoption. See In re White, 303 Mich App at 714. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by determining by a preponderance of the evidence that termination was in the child's best interest.
Affirmed.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien