Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. SJ10014453
Lambden, J.
A delinquency petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), was filed in the San Mateo County Superior Court (San Mateo court) and defendant admitted in the San Mateo court that he trespassed on railroad property (Pen. Code, § 369i). The San Mateo court transferred the case to the Alameda County Superior Court (Alameda court) for disposition. While the disposition hearing was pending in the Alameda court, a second delinquency petition was filed against defendant in the City and County of San Francisco Superior Court (San Francisco court). In the San Francisco court, defendant admitted the allegations of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c)), and assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)). At the disposition hearing, the San Francisco court declared defendant a ward of the court pursuant to section 602, subdivision (a), and placed him on probation in his aunt’s custody in San Leandro. The matter was transferred to the Alameda court. Subsequently, the Alameda court held a disposition hearing on the San Mateo petition and continued defendant’s wardship, committed him to the juvenile rehabilitation facility, and imposed probation conditions.
All further unspecified code sections refer to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Defendant appeals the disposition order of the Alameda court. He claims that the Alameda court improperly modified the disposition order of the San Francisco court. We conclude that the Alameda court issued a subsequent disposition order and it did not abuse its discretion in issuing this order. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
On February 8, 2010, an original petition pursuant to section 602, subdivision (a) was filed in the San Mateo court. The petition alleged defendant trespassed on railroad property (Pen. Code, § 369i), delayed a public officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)), and obstructed a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). According to this petition, on January 23, 2010, defendant was on a CalTrain and failed to provide his name and proof of identification for his ticket to the conductor.
On February 23, 2010, the San Mateo court held a hearing. Counsel for defendant advised the court that defendant “is an out-of-county resident who currently resides in San Leandro.” At the hearing, defendant admitted trespassing on railroad property, and the other two counts were dismissed. The San Mateo court transferred the matter for disposition to Alameda County, defendant’s county of residence. The Alameda court accepted the transfer on March 25, 2010, and set the matter for disposition on April 28, 2010.
A second delinquency petition was filed against defendant in the San Francisco court on April 20, 2010. This petition alleged that defendant committed kidnapping for purposes of exacting money or other valuables from another (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (a)), kidnapping for purposes of robbery (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1)), robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)), and attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c), 664).
The count in the San Francisco petition alleging kidnapping for purposes of robbery was amended to allege grand theft from a person (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c)), and the count of attempted robbery was amended to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)). On May 7, 2010, defendant admitted the two amended counts and the remaining counts were dismissed.
The probation officer filed her report on May 20, 2010. The report stated that on April 17, 2010, defendant and others followed two people leaving a fast food restaurant. One of the victims had a dog and the dog became stuck; one of the suspects yelled, “We’re gonna shoot your dog!” The victims abandoned the dog and ran. The suspects overtook one of the victims and defendant placed his hands on the victim’s chest and back to prevent him from running away. Another individual pulled a gun from his waistband, cocked it, and jammed it into the victim’s back. He demanded, “Empty your shit! Give me all your stuff! I’m gonna light this gun up!” The victim reported to the police that all of the suspects threatened him as they went through his pockets; they stole a pocketknife. The probation officer noted that the police report indicated that defendant’s involvement in the incident was “minimal.” She stated that defendant “gets into trouble whenever he comes into the City. He lives in San Leandro in Alameda County with his maternal aunt and brother.”
Police officers at the scene reported seeing four to five suspects. The victim said that he initially saw two to three males and then spotted five males.
The police recovered an “air pistol BB gun” from one of the suspects and a knife from the victim.
The probation officer recommended the following: “[Defendant] is a resident of Alameda County, who lives in San Leandro with his legal guardian. He has an outstanding warrant from Alameda County for failure to appear for disposition; thus, the undersigned thinks the minor should be transferred to his county of residence for disposition of this case.” Her final recommendation was the following: “The petition, having been amended and sustained, that petition, all findings and orders be transferred to Alameda County, place of legal residence; that the minor be transported in custody.”
The San Francisco court held a disposition hearing on May 24, 2010. The court noted that it was the last day for it to issue a disposition order. The court was advised that defendant had a case on for disposition in the Alameda court. The court announced that it was going to place defendant on probation and transfer the matter to Alameda county for its “supervision.” The San Francisco court declared defendant a ward of the court pursuant to section 602, subdivision (a), placed him on probation, and released him to live with his aunt in San Leandro. The San Francisco court transferred the matter to Alameda County.
While detained in San Francisco, defendant failed to appear for disposition in the Alameda court and a bench warrant was issued. On June 1, 2010, the Alameda court held a detention hearing and recalled the bench warrant. The court noted that there was also an in-custody transfer from San Francisco. Counsel for defendant explained that the San Francisco court issued a disposition order and transferred the wardship probation to the Alameda court. The court ordered defendant to be detained for violating a court order and “set this for further detention” for the following day.
The Alameda court accepted the transfer from the San Francisco court on June 2, 2010.
On June 17, 2010, the Alameda court held a disposition hearing on the original petition filed in the San Mateo court. The Alameda court stated that it had read the crime summary of the San Francisco case and the court noted that it was “a pretty serious event.” The court added, “He’s only got two months before he’s 18, so it seems to me that camp is appropriate.” The probation court officer recommended camp.
At the end of the hearing on June 17, 2010, the court stated: “The previous order is set aside with the exception of wardship and financial orders––I’m sorry, there is no previous order. I’m sorry, because he’s never [received a disposition] on either case. No, wait a minute. Event one?” Defendant’s attorney answered: “Event one was the train case. That was on for dispo[sition].” The court responded: “Okay. So I’ll find... that the minor’s welfare requires his custody be taken from his parents. [¶] Reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal. Remaining in the home is contrary to his welfare. [¶] He’s declared a ward, committed to the care, custody, and control of the probation officer, to be removed from the mother and aunt and placed in a suitable county facility, with Camp Sweeney approved.” The court then proceeded to set forth a number of conditions.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the disposition order of the Alameda court.
DISCUSSION
Defendant challenges the Alameda court’s disposition order. We review a juvenile court’s decision to commit a minor to a camp for abuse of discretion. (In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.) We must indulge all reasonable inference to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. (In re Tyrone O. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 145, 151.)
The record must demonstrate both a probable benefit to the minor and the inappropriate or ineffectiveness of less restrictive alternatives. (In re Angela M., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396.) A reviewing court must examine the evidence at the disposition hearing in light of the purposes of the juvenile court law. (In re Lorenza M. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 49, 53.) The juvenile court focuses on (1) the protection and safety of the public, and (2) rehabilitation of the minor through care, treatment and guidance which is consistent with the minor’s best interest, holds him accountable for his behavior, and is appropriate for the circumstances. This may include punishment that is consistent with rehabilitative purposes and a restrictive commitment as a means of protecting the public safety. (§ 202, subds. (a), (b) & (d); In re Jimmy P. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1679, 1684.)
Defendant claims that the Alameda court did not have the authority to modify the disposition order of the San Francisco court. Defendant, however, did not object on this basis in the lower court. A party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court. (See People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 716; In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222.) It is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an error on appeal when the error easily could have been corrected when it first arose. (In re Josue S. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 168, 171.) Here, the trial court could have addressed any concerns regarding the proper procedures before it issued a disposition order had defendant raised this objection; we therefore conclude he has forfeited this issue.
Even if we consider defendant’s contention on its merits, defendant cannot prevail on appeal. Defendant asserts that the Alameda court modified the disposition order of the San Francisco order. He claims that the order is invalid because the Alameda court failed to comply with the procedures set forth in sections 755, 777, and 778, and California Rules of Court, rule 5.570, which set forth the procedures and requirements for modifying a prior court order of the juvenile court. Defendant argues that the San Francisco petition was filed after the San Mateo petition and therefore the Alameda court did not consider any facts that had not already been evaluated and considered by the San Francisco court. He stresses that the Alameda court focused on the facts underlying the San Francisco petition, and not the facts related to the San Mateo petition. He contends that the Alameda court issued a new disposition order, changing the prior order, simply because it disagreed with the San Francisco court’s ruling.
For the purposes of this appeal we need not determine the application of these sections or whether the San Francisco court should have transferred defendant’s case to Alameda County for disposition at the time it accepted defendant’s admissions. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.610(c).)
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the Alameda court did not indicate that it was modifying the San Francisco disposition order. The Alameda court was initially confused as to what petition was before it because the San Francisco court had issued its order while the disposition hearing in the Alameda court was pending. However, the Alameda court understood that it was issuing a disposition order regarding the crime of trespassing on railroad property. When the court seemed confused whether there had been any disposition order, defense counsel informed the court that there had not been a disposition in “the train case.” Thus, the record supports a conclusion that the Alameda court was issuing a disposition order on the original San Mateo petition, and not attempting to modify the San Francisco disposition order. (See, e.g., In re Tyrone O., supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 151 [we indulge all reasonable inference to support decision of juvenile court].)
Furthermore, some of the confusion probably resulted from the San Francisco court’s decision to issue a disposition ruling after it had already decided to transfer the case to the Alameda court, the court of defendant’s residence. California Rules of Court, rule 5.610(c) provides the following: “ (1) After making its jurisdictional finding, the court may order the case transferred to the juvenile court of the child’s residence if: [¶] (A) The petition was filed in a county other than that of the child’s residence; or [¶] (B) The child’s residence was changed to another county after the petition was filed. [¶] (2) If the court decides to transfer a delinquency case, the court must order the transfer before beginning the disposition hearing without adjudging the child to be a ward....” (Italics added.) Thus, it appears that the San Francisco court should have heeded the probation officer’s recommendation to transfer the matter to the Alameda court for disposition.
Defendant’s complaint that the Alameda court focused on the facts underlying the San Francisco petition also lacks merit. We agree that the Alameda court focused on the same facts as the San Francisco court. It is also clear that the Alameda court came to a different conclusion than the San Francisco court. However, the Alameda court properly considered defendant’s entire record because, by the time it held its disposition hearing on the San Mateo petition, defendant had committed new crimes in San Francisco. “[E]very time a ward appears for disposition, the court may consider the minor’s entire history and the order must be all encompassing.” (See In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1140.) A court may “consider the juvenile’s entire record before exercising its discretion at the dispositional hearing and may rely on prior sustained section 602 petitions in determining the proper disposition and maximum period of confinement.” (In re Michael B. (1980) 28 Cal.3d 548, 553, superseded by section 777 on other grounds.)
Here, the Alameda court properly exercised its discretion in considering the robbery in San Francisco, and the record supports its determination that camp was appropriate. Although the probation officer stated that the police report indicated that defendant’s participation in the robbery was minimal, the Alameda court reviewed the summary of the crime, including the undisputed evidence that defendant physically restrained the victim, and concluded that it was a “pretty serious event.” It also considered the evidence that one of the people with defendant used a BB gun. Moreover, the probation court officer recommended a camp commitment. Given this record, we cannot say that the Alameda court’s decision of a camp commitment was an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Kline, P.J., Richman, J.