Once the bankruptcy case closes, title to any nonadministered property of the estate revests in the debtor. ( In re Cady (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2001) 266 B.R. 172, 182, affd. (9th Cir. 2003) 315 F.3d 1121 ( Cady).) Under the doctrine of after-acquired title, "[w]here a person purports by proper instrument to grant real property in fee simple, and subsequently acquires any title, or claim of title thereto, the same passes by operation of law to the grantee, or his successors."
CANBY, Circuit Judge. We affirm the judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, for reasons stated in its opinion, Palm v. Klapperman (In re Cady), 266 B.R. 172 (B.A.P. 2001). We reprint that opinion as an appendix hereto.
Yet, binding authority in this circuit holds that creditors who obtain a nondischargeable judgment are not stayed from collecting non-dischargeable debts so long as collection is sought from property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate. Palm v. Klapperman (In re Cady), 266 B.R. 172, 180 (9th Cir. BAP 2001) ("Section 362 [does] not preclude the execution of a judgment, which has been held by the bankruptcy court to be non-dischargeable, upon property of the debtor which is not property of the estate." (quoting Watson v. City Nat'l Bank (In re Watson), 78 B.R. 232, 235 (9th Cir. BAP 1987)), aff'd, 315 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2003); see Cal. State Univ. v. Gustafson (In re Gustafson), 111 B.R. 282, 286 (9th Cir. BAP 1990) ("We therefore determine that the automatic stay applies to preclude a creditor's attempts to collect a claim that is presumed, but not yet determined by the bankruptcy court, to be non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(8).")
Appellants concede that, upon filing, equitable title passed to the trustee, and that the Property was property of the estate within the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, they argue, Tippetts continued to hold record title, In re Cady, 266 B.R. 172, 181 (9th Cir. BAP 2001), aff'd, 315 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2003), which they could effectively transfer. The lynchpin of the trustee's theory is that all of debtors' interests in the Property passed to the estate upon filing, so they had no interest to transfer when they executed their deed to Coleman, and the Lenders' deeds of trust depend upon his title.
See id. There can be no question, therefore, that, if the California statute applies, the transfer to Coleman is effective, despite the absence of a property interest in the Tippetts. Our conclusion is unaffected by two cases the Trustee offers in support of his argument: Finalco Inc. v. Roosevelt (In re Roosevelt), 87 F.3d 311, as amended, 98 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1996), and Palm v. Klapperman (In re Cody), 266 B.R. 172 (9th Cir. BAP 2001), aff'd, 315 F.3d 1121(9th Cir. 2003). In both cases the courts determined that a debtor retained no interest in property following a particular property transfer, but the determinations were made for wholly different purposes and did not involve the validity of a transfer by a debtor to a bona fide purchaser.
When the Danish Sub entered bankruptcy, its debts and assets became the property of the bankruptcy estate. In re Cady , 266 B.R. 172, 181 (9th Cir. BAP 2001) ; Abele v. Phoenix Suns Ltd. P'ship (In re Harrell) , 73 F.3d 218, 219 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (bankruptcy estate "includes all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case"). So the Danish Sub's debts—including those arising from the loans from Archer—became Cirkel's, and Cirkel's assets include the amount Archer owes for the Danish Sub's intellectual property.
TE 155-56. SeeIn re Cady, 266 B.R. 172, 183 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001) (where "a creditor uses a recorded abstract to interfere with the administration of estate assets, such conduct will rise to the level of an automatic stay violation"), aff'd, 315 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). The bankruptcy court thus concluded that the automatic stay barred prosecution by Danko on his amended judgment against O'Reilly, as a joint and several judgment debtor in the state court action, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (staying "any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate").
A decision to remand is committed to the sound discretion of the bankruptcy judge and is reviewed for abuse of discretion. McCarthy v. Prince (In re McCarthy), 230 B.R. 414, 416-17 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) (describing the "any equitable ground" standard as "an unusually broad grant of authority"); see also Ernst Young, LLP v. Devan (In re Merry-Go-Round Enters., Inc.), 222 B.R. 254, 256 (D. Md. 1998). A bankruptcy court "necessarily abuses its discretion if it bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law." Snider v. Sherman, No. CVF-03-6605, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32336, at *53 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2007) (quoting Palm v. Klapperman (In re Cady), 266 B.R. 172, 178 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001)). III. DISCUSSION
We review de novo questions of law, including the bankruptcy court's determination as to whether a creditor has violated the automatic stay. Palm v. Klapperman (In re Cady), 266 B.R. 172, 178 (9th Cir. BAP 2001), aff'd, 315 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Advanced Ribbons & Office Prods., Inc. v. U.S. Interstate Distrib., Inc. (In re Advanced Ribbons & Office Prods., Inc.), 125 B.R. 259, 262 (9th Cir. BAP 1991) (the scope of the automatic stay under § 362(a)(6) is "a legal issue which we review de novo"). "De novo review requires that we consider a matter anew, as if no decision had been made previously."
We review de novo the bankruptcy court's determination as to whether the automatic stay provisions of § 362 have been violated. Palm v. Klapperman (In re Cady) , 266 B.R. 172, 178 (9th Cir. BAP 2001), aff'd , 315 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) ; Advanced Ribbons & Office Prods., Inc. v. U.S. Interstate Distrib., Inc. (In re Advanced Ribbons & Office Prods., Inc.) , 125 B.R. 259, 262 (9th Cir. BAP 1991) (the scope of the automatic stay under § 362(a)(6) is "a legal issue which we review de novo" ). We review the bankruptcy court's decision regarding civil contempt for abuse of discretion.