Opinion
2020-00530 B-7010-16/18
10-13-2021
In the Matter of Caden Y. L. (Anonymous). Forestdale, Inc., respondent; Kathy L. (Anonymous), appellant.
Leighton M. Jackson, New York, NY, for appellant. Rosin Steinhagen Mendel, PLLC, New York, NY (Douglas H. Reiniger of counsel), for respondent. Janet E. Sabel, New York, NY (Dawne A. Mitchell and Judith Stern of counsel), attorney for the child.
Leighton M. Jackson, New York, NY, for appellant.
Rosin Steinhagen Mendel, PLLC, New York, NY (Douglas H. Reiniger of counsel), for respondent.
Janet E. Sabel, New York, NY (Dawne A. Mitchell and Judith Stern of counsel), attorney for the child.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P. ROBERT J. MILLER FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Queens County (Mildred Negron, J.), dated December 20, 2019. The order denied the mother's motion to vacate her default in appearing at a dispositional hearing and to reopen the dispositional hearing.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b, inter alia, to terminate the mother's parental rights on the grounds of mental illness and permanent neglect. Following a fact-finding hearing, the Family Court found that the mother had permanently neglected the subject child and that the mother was presently, and for the foreseeable future, unable by reason of mental illness to provide proper and adequate care for the child. The mother failed to appear at the dispositional hearing, and the court determined, inter alia, that it was in the child's best interests to terminate the mother's parental rights and to free the child for adoption. Thereafter, the mother moved to vacate her default in appearing at the dispositional hearing and to reopen the dispositional hearing. The Family Court denied the mother's motion, and the mother appeals.
The determination of whether to relieve a party of a default is within the sound discretion of the Family Court (see Matter of Brandon G. [Tiynia M.], 155 A.D.3d 626; Matter of Clarence D.H. [Fidelina A.], 150 A.D.3d 1113, 1114). A parent who has defaulted in a proceeding for the termination of parental rights must establish a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the relief sought in the petition in order to establish entitlement to vacatur of the default (see Matter of Brandon G. [Tiynia M.], 155 A.D.3d at 627; Matter of Joshua E.R. [Yolaine R.], 123 A.D.3d 723, 724; Matter of Niaja A.W. [Paulette G.], 100 A.D.3d 1009, 1010). Here, the Family Court properly determined that the mother failed to meet her burden of establishing a potentially meritorious defense to the relief sought at the dispositional hearing (see Matter of Joshua E.R. [Yolaine R.], 123 A.D.3d at 725; Matter of Jah-Meik S.C. [Sara C.], 108 A.D.3d 696, 697; Matter of Amber Megan D., 54 A.D.3d 338, 339). Accordingly, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the mother's motion to vacate her default in appearing at the dispositional hearing and to reopen the dispositional hearing.
MASTRO, J.P., MILLER, CONNOLLY and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.