Opinion
C041521.
7-22-2003
In re C.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. EL DORADO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. W.A. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Appellants, the mother and father of the minor, appeal from the juvenile courts jurisdictional and dispositional orders. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 360, subd. (d), 395.) Appellants claim: (1) The petition failed to state a cause of action, (2) there was insufficient evidence to sustain jurisdiction, and (3) there was insufficient evidence to remove the minor. We shall dismiss the appeal as moot.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A dependency petition was filed in March 2002, alleging there was a substantial risk the newborn minor would suffer serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally. The allegation was based on an incident occurring in Minnesota in December 2000 during which the mother threatened to shoot herself and the minors then-four-month-old sibling. ( § 300, subd. (a).) Further, the petition alleged the mother was unable to provide regular care to the minor as a result of her history of chemical dependence and mental health problems. ( § 300, subd. (b).) Finally, the petition alleged the minors two siblings had been abused or neglected and there was a substantial risk the minor also would be abused or neglected because appellants parental rights to the minors two siblings were terminated in Minnesota in November 2001 after they failed to comply with their case plans., ( § 300, subd. (j).) According to the petition, during the incident in Minnesota, the mother told police that "at times she [could not] stand to look at [the minors sibling] as every time she does she sees his father." The child that the mother threatened to shoot had the same father as the minor.
An allegation that the minor had been left without any provision for support was struck at the commencement of the jurisdictional hearing. ( § 300, subd. (g).)
An amended petition added an allegation that the father failed to protect the minor in that he was aware of the mothers mental health issues but failed to take legal action to protect the minor from the mother. The juvenile court dismissed this allegation at the jurisdictional hearing.
According to the detention report, the mother had failed to reunify with three children before the minor was born. Records from Minnesota indicated the mother was hospitalized for mental health problems twice in 1997 and several times in 2001, and was found to be severely psychotic during two of the 2001 admissions. During the Minnesota dependency proceedings, the mothers therapist concluded that the mother was not able to parent "in her present condition."
The social services agency in Minnesota received information in December 2001 that the mother "had applied for assistance" in California. Shortly thereafter, the Minnesota social worker called the social services agency in California to notify them about the mothers case history and that she was pregnant.
According to several witnesses, the mother received appropriate prenatal care in California, and neither parent exhibited any behavior that might pose a safety risk to the minor. However, based on the information provided by the Minnesota social services agency, the minor was detained shortly after her birth in March 2002.
The mother made an offer of proof at the jurisdictional hearing that she had not engaged in mental health counseling since October 2001 because "she felt the stress which might ensue over discussion of issues would be harmful to her unborn child"; however, she had participated in "spiritual counseling."
The juvenile court sustained the petition, except the allegation that the mothers history of substance abuse rendered her incapable of providing care for the minor. Following the jurisdictional hearing, psychological and psychiatric evaluations of the mother indicated that "without a better structure and support system in her life, it is unlikely that she could fulfill the duties of a mother" and that her prognosis for being able to benefit from reunification services was, at best, "guarded."
The juvenile court made no finding on an allegation in the petition that the Minnesota social services agency made reasonable efforts to offer the mother services for the minors siblings.
At the dispositional hearing in June 2002, appellants stipulated to a dispositional order that included reunification services and out-of-home placement for the minor.
DISCUSSION
While the appeal in this matter was pending, the minor was returned to appellants custody and dependency proceedings were discharged. Nonetheless, appellants argue we should not find their appeal moot.
Pursuant to the fathers request, we took judicial notice of the juvenile courts order of October 28, 2002, to this effect.
"A question becomes moot when, pending an appeal from a judgment of a trial court, events transpire which prevent the appellate court from granting any effectual relief. [Citation.]" (Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 566.) "The question of mootness must be decided on a case-by-case basis." (In re Kristin B. (1986) 187 Cal. App. 3d 596, 605, 232 Cal. Rptr. 36.)
Appellants first contend that the issues they raise are not moot because the findings made in this case could be used against them in the event their family becomes the subject of another dependency proceeding. Appellants are incorrect.
It is true that jurisdictional issues are not moot after termination of dependency jurisdiction "where exercise of . . . jurisdiction has resulted in orders which continue to adversely affect appellant." (In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1548; In re Joel H. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1193; In re Hirenia C. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 504, 517-518.) However, appellants do not explain with any specificity how the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders made in this matter could be used to their detriment in a future proceeding. Nor can we divine any possibility that this could occur.
There are no statutory provisions that allow the juvenile court to assume jurisdiction in a dependency proceeding based on the fact that a prior dependency petition was sustained. Contrary to the mothers assertion, the jurisdictional findings in this case — in essence, that the mothers mental health history placed the minor at substantial risk of harm — cannot provide the basis for assuming jurisdiction in a future proceeding under either subdivision (a) or (j) of section 300. Section 300, subdivision (a) provides for dependency jurisdiction if there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by a parent, and allows the court to consider the parents history of repeated inflictions of injuries on the childs sibling in making this finding. Similarly, under section 300, subdivision (j), dependency jurisdiction can be based on the abuse or neglect of a sibling where there is a substantial risk that the subject child will be similarly abused or neglected. The factual findings made by the juvenile court in this matter did not concern abuse or neglect of the minor, or the infliction of injuries on the minor, but only supported the conclusion that the minor was at risk of abuse or neglect based on circumstances that were the subject of the Minnesota dependency proceedings. For the same reason, the factual allegations in the petition that were sustained by the juvenile court would not be admissible in future proceedings because they do not involve physical or sexual abuse, neglect, or cruel treatment of the minor. ( § 355.1, subds. (b) & (d).)
Nor could the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders support a denial of reunification services in a future dependency proceeding. There are no statutory provisions for denying reunification services based on a prior sustained dependency petition unless the prior proceedings resulted in a failure to reunify or the permanent severing of parental rights ( § 361.5, subd. (b)(10) & (11)), or involved a failure to comply with court-ordered substance abuse treatment (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13)). As appellants have reunified with the minor and dependency jurisdiction has been terminated, none of these circumstances apply.
Appellants have failed to demonstrate that any continuing adverse effect has resulted from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court. We conclude, therefore, that the issues raised by appellants are moot.
The mother also claims in her reply brief that the jurisdictional findings "could be used against her when she applies for licensing, such as a foster home license." The mother has failed to adequately brief this contention, providing no factual or legal analysis other than a one-sentence argument. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793, 897 P.2d 481.) Furthermore, the mother is not entitled to consideration of an argument raised for the first time in her reply brief. (Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 482, fn. 10, 940 P.2d 906; Neighbours v. Buzz Oates Enterprises (1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 325, 335, fn. 8, 265 Cal. Rptr. 788.) For these reasons, we decline to address this contention.
The mother also argues we should reach the merits of her claims because she has an interest in "clearing her name." In support of this argument, the mother cites In re Dana J. (1972) 26 Cal. App. 3d 768, 103 Cal. Rptr. 21 (Dana J.), which involved an adjudication under section 602 in which the minor was placed on six months probation without wardship, after which the case was dismissed. (Dana J., supra, 26 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 769-770.) The Court of Appeal found this did not render the appeal moot, concluding that "the juveniles right of appeal, as provided by . . . section 800, affords the juvenile the opportunity to rid himself of the stigma of criminality [citation] and to clear his name of a criminal charge [citation]." (Dana J., supra, 26 Cal. App. 3d at p. 771.)
However, in In re Katherine R. (1970) 6 Cal. App. 3d 354, 86 Cal. Rptr. 281 (Katherine R.), the appellate court concluded that an appeal was moot when a sustained petition under section 601, alleging the minor was beyond the control of her parents, was subsequently dismissed after the minor married. (Katherine R., supra, 6 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 355-356.) The court held: "Were the order making the minor a ward of the juvenile court predicated upon a finding that she had committed a criminal act, we would be inclined to agree with appellants that the minor should be given the same right as an adult, to clear her name." (Id . at p. 357.)
Subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 601 provide for juvenile court wardship when a minor is beyond the control of his or her parents, has violated a curfew ordinance, or is a habitual truant.
The mother cites no authority to support her claim that a parent in a dependency proceeding has an interest in pursuing an otherwise moot claim on appeal in order to clear her name. "Dependency proceedings, unlike criminal proceedings, do not result in criminal sanctions, and exist primarily to promote the best interests of the child. [Citation.]" (In re Cindy L. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 15, 30, 947 P.2d 1340.) "The dependency law is based on protection of the children rather than punishment of the parent." (In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 482.) Thus, the circumstances here are more akin to those in Katherine R., supra, 6 Cal. App. 3d 354.
Finally, the mother contends we should reach the merits of her appeal because the issues "are of continuing public concern." Again, we disagree.
Cases reaching the merits of otherwise moot claims on this basis have involved "matters of broad public interest that are likely to recur" (In re Mark C. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 433, 440; In re Jody R. (1990) 218 Cal. App. 3d 1615, 1621-1622, 267 Cal. Rptr. 746) or "issues capable of repetition yet evading review" (In re Raymond G. (1991) 230 Cal. App. 3d 964, 967, 281 Cal. Rptr. 625). The jurisdictional and dispositional issues raised by appellants here are fact-specific to their circumstances and therefore are unlikely to recur in other cases. Further, jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders are subject to direct and immediate appeal. (§§ 360, subd. (d), 395.) Consequently, they are not ordinarily capable of evading review.
As we cannot provide any meaningful relief in this appeal, we conclude that appellants claims are moot. (In re Pablo D. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 759, 761; In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
We concur: NICHOLSON, Acting P.J., KOLKEY, J.