Opinion
No. 56875-2-I.
April 9, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Snohomish County, No. 04-3-02805-3, Michael T. Downes, J., entered August 10, 2005.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Laurie Butcher intervened in her parents' dissolution, claiming that a house titled in their names belonged to her. Laurie failed to prove that she had an equitable interest in the house, and the trial court treated the house as a marital asset and distributed it with the other marital property. We affirm.
All three of the parties have the last name Butcher. We refer to them by their first names. We mean no disrespect.
William and Rose Butcher married on February 29, 1960. They separated on May 27, 2004. William petitioned for dissolution. Their daughter, Laurie, intervened. She argued that the house where she lived, which was titled in her parents' names, belonged to her. Laurie asked the trial court to award her, not her parents, the house.
Laurie testified that she transferred ownership of the house at 8202 206th Street to her parents to avoid losing it to creditors. She produced a document showing that William and Rose agreed to give the house back to her when her difficulties with her ex-husband resolved. Laurie did not have a job and had not worked for years, but she said she paid the mortgage. She claimed to have paid with money her parents gave her after they refinanced the property and with money she received from her ex-husband and public assistance. But she admitted telling a public agency that she rented the house in order to receive public assistance.
The trial court found Laurie was not credible: "Laurie Butcher either lied to the court about the ownership of the house or she lied to the welfare department." The court awarded the house to William and ordered him to sell it and split the proceeds with Rose.
Laurie appeals. She asks this court either to reverse the trial court's judgment and award her the house, or reverse and award her a judgment that places "her in the same position she would have been in had the 8202 home not [sic] been awarded to her." Laurie's arguments are not persuasive.
William Butcher's response brief did not comply with the rules, but it was legible and appeared to respond to the appellant's arguments, so this court accepted it.
We assume she meant to ask for a judgment to put her in the same position as she would have been if she had been awarded the house.
Least persuasive is Laurie's argument that the trial court erred by basing its decision on her credibility. Laurie acknowledges that assessing credibility is the sole province of the trier of fact. See Boeing, Inc. v. Heidi, 147 Wn.2d 78, 87, 51 P.3d 793 (2002) (appellate courts do not assess credibility). To avoid being bound by that rule, she argues that "her credibility [was] not a fact of consequence to the action." But the parties' credibility was critical to the court's decision. None of the parties had documents supporting all their claims, and they disagreed about what occurred and what they intended. Therefore, whether the court found a witness credible or not made all the difference.
The court found that Laurie was not credible. She claimed she was entitled to the house because she paid the mortgage. But she also admitted telling a government agency that she rented the house where she lived. As the trial court said, Laurie cannot have it both ways. Her willingness to tell the government that she rented the house, enabling her to receive public assistance, diminished her credibility and weakened her plea for equitable relief.
Laurie's other arguments are equally unpersuasive. For example, she challenges the trial court's finding that the money she received from her parents was not a gift. She contends the evidence is not sufficient to support the court's finding.
William testified that he and Rose refinanced their own house four or five times, and financed Laurie's house once. Each time, he said, they transferred the funds they received to Laurie. William testified he intended the money, approximately $170,000, to be a loan. Laurie and Rose testified that the money was intended as a gift. Laurie and Rose were not credible, and William's testimony supported the conclusion that he intended the money as a loan.
But whether or not William loaned Laurie the money or gave it to her without expecting repayment is not especially relevant. The issue is whether Laurie proved she had an equitable claim to the house. She did not.
As Laurie freely, albeit inadvertently, admitted, the money used to pay the mortgage on the 8202 house was William's and Rose's. Her parents borrowed against that house and their own home, incurring greater debt for themselves, and gave the money to Laurie. During the divorce proceedings, William stopped paying the mortgage, and he and Rose nearly lost the 8202 property to foreclosure. William, apparently, was able to prevent that but he and Rose lost their own home to foreclosure.
William indicates in his response brief that Rose was paid for her share of the home, which suggests that William was able to sell the house rather than losing it to foreclosure.
As the trial court found:
The evidence at trial showed that the parents had given the daughter approximately $170,000 over the last four years. William and Rose Butcher mortgaged their own home . . . to the point where, while it started as a manageable mortgage totaling approximately $68,000, William and Rose Butcher ultimately wound up losing the home to foreclosure.
. . . .
The court is not persuaded that equity demands, or even timidly suggests, that the 8202 home should be awarded to Laurie Butcher.
Even if the parents intended the money to be a gift, their gift would not entitle her to own the property.
Laurie argues that the trial court's findings are not supported by sufficient evidence. But William's testimony supports the findings, and Laurie and Rose, who disputed William's testimony, were not credible.
Laurie's remaining arguments about promissory estoppel, the statute of frauds, and authentication of a document are completely inapt and without merit. They would be relevant only if William had asserted claims against Laurie. We will not address them.
Laurie did not prove she had an equitable claim to the property. The trial court did not err when it held that the house was a marital asset. The decision of the trial court is affirmed.